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Abstract
The recent advent and rapid spread of two new vernacular options, go and like,
within the (say) variable has attracted a growing body of research in variationist
sociolinguists. This thesis examines the synchronic functions of these new
quotatives and considers pragmatic, discourse, and social factors. The
investigation is based on an analysis of very large corpora of spontaneous spoken
British and American English. This cross-variety comparison gives me the
opportunity (i) to investigate a case of rapid language change that is happening
concurrently with the time of research and (ii) to consider to what extent social
and linguistic constraints hold globally.
A variationist study of the constraints which govern the quotative system is
valuable for the following reasons: By investigating the patterning of the (say)
variable as a whole, we gain insights into the rule-governed variability of
innovative features and their rival variants (say, tell, think, cry, ...). A look at the
entire quotative system reveals the intimate interplay of competing choices within
the (say) variable. My project aims at understanding how the system as a whole
reacts to the intrusion of newcomer variants. A sharply delimited and hitherto
stable set of variants - such as the (say) variable - presents the unique opportunity
to investigate the restructuring of all variants as new ones come in. This is
especially interesting when we look at competing choices which have the same [-
canonical] underlying semantic feature, such as unframed quotes. The data show
that far from ousting the unframed or say-variant, like and go add options within
the vernacular category.
A comparative study on the patterning of non-canonical variants within the
quotative pool produces important insights into phenomena such as reallocation,
competition within one socio-pragmatic field, as well as interaction of variants
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within the same variable. In this light, the restructuring of all quotative variants
during the rapid intrusion of the robust new variant like gives us an important
test-case for various explanatory parameters for language change that have been
raised in the literature, i.e. Romaine's claims about language and gender (2003),
the reallocation hypothesis as raised by Britain (2002) and Britain and Trudgill
(1999), the reformulation of the standard vs. non-standard dichotomy into local vs.
supra-local variants by Foulkes and Docherty (1999) and the Milroys' findings
(1998) concerning network and class.
Furthermore, research in variationist sociolinguistics has revealed the
importance of intralinguistic constraints in situations of competing grammars
(Meyerhoff 2000, Preston 1991, Rickford and MacNair-Knox 1994). Using a
synthetic approach which looks at both intralinguistic and extralinguistic
constraints, I attempt to explain the variability at all levels within the variable in
order to account for as much of the variability as possible. Investigation into an
array of linguistic factors reveals that linguistic constraints on the members of the
(say) variable are indeed very important and quite robust.
A cross-variety comparison gives insights into how much we can generalize
our findings: do locally separate systems handle the situation in the same way?
The comparison of pragmatic and sociolinguistic factors reveals some interesting
but subtle differences in go's and tike's development in different locales. This
raises more fundamental linguistic questions, such as are whether we are indeed
comparing the same variable in the US and in Britain. My findings give evidence
of the restructuring processes in the quotative system as a whole that accompany
the arrival of a newcomer variant, like, in two varieties, British English and US
English. There is evidence that different systems find idiosyncratic solutions to
similar problems. This finding constitutes an important contribution to the
growing body of research on globalisation phenomena and supra-local trends
(Buchstaller 2003, Kerswill 2003, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 2003, Tagliamonte
and Hudson 1999, Trudgill 1983, 1994, and many others).
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[The introduction and expansion of like is] one of the most striking and
dramatic linguistic changes of the past three decades, offering
sociolinguists an opportunity to study language change in progress on a
large scale in order to address the general questions on the mechanism,
the causation, and the consequences of change. (Labov 2000)1
Chapter 1
Introduction
The 'principle of linguistic economy' was originally devised by Martinet (1955)
in order to account for the position and extension of phonemes, which are dictated or
limited by the configuration of neighbouring phonemes. According to this principle,
we expect the introduction of an item into a stable system to result in the
restructuring of the organism as a whole. We know of such phenomena in the field of
phonology (Lindblom 1998). The semantic equivalent to this process is when a new
concept gets introduced into a semantic field and causes the members of this field to
regroup and consequently readjust their territories. This has been shown with respect
to colour systems (cf. Mackeigan, in progress, MacLaury 1998). This thesis
investigates the introduction of a new member into a functional morpho-syntactic
category. If it occurs, the entire system has to be re-organized in order to
accommodate the incoming option. This will consequently lead to each member
acquiring a new functional niche. We are witnessing such a large-scale restructuring
right now in the pool of quotative introductory devices. Sparked by the advent of the
newcomer like, as in example (1.1), the hitherto stable functional distribution within
the pool of verba dicendi, viz. verbs of quotation, has become imbalanced and been
forced to reorganize.
(1.1) The computer buff
L: she's talking about ROM and RAM and [you know
A: [((snore snore))
L: and she ha ha ha I know she's passionate about it.
ha I'm like ha "I can't relate,
leave me alone".
A: I can't relate at all,
1
Excerpt from an e-mail message sent by Labov to linguists attending the October 2000 NWAVE
(New Ways in Analyzing Variation (in English)) in Michigan. He also outlined a large scale cross-
linguistic study of the quotative verbs which he titled "The Tsunami Project".
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There is only one other case we know of in the history of English where an item has
been introduced into the quotative cohort. The intrusion of quotative tellan (attested
since 888, OED) into the hitherto stable quotative system is comparable to like being
introduced into the pool of quotatives today (cf. Marckwardt (1967:122). Ferrara and
Bell (1995:286) write that "the ongoing grammaticalization of a third alternative is
altering the balance between traditional forms of dialogue introduction (viz. say and
go) ... The obsolence of quotatives (e.g. quoth)2 has occurred before in English when
a three-way competition emerged and may be repeated if be+like competes
successfully with go". The fact that a collective reallocation is occurring at present
gives us the exciting opportunity to investigate a phenomenon of language change
that is happening concurrently with the research.
By modern times, pre-like, the quotative system seems to have balanced out
with say as the major introducer for reported speech, think for reported thought and
go for the introduction of non-lexical sounds, voice effects and gestures (see Ferrara
and Bell 1995, Johnson 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). It is of great interest
to see how the advent of a new member, like, imbalances this previously stable
system and how speakers resolve this new choice they are presented with. Due to the
rarity of this process, the arrival of a new option into a formerly stable system such
as the quotative pool, and the subsequent competition amongst the variants, is an
interesting field of investigation. Sociolinguists around the globe have been
investigating innovative like with an eye on the question of whether there is any
indication that a competitor variant will be pushed out, which would parallel the
introduction of tellan and the consequent obsolence of cwedcui. It has been claimed
that one of the possible outcomes of /zle-intrusion is that the newcomer will drive out
one or more of the older members of the quotative cohort, go (Bakht-Rofheart 2002),
or say (Johnson 2001), or unframed quotes. An alternative possibility is that the
system will stabilise in its richer form.
2 Cwedan > Scots and obs. quoth was according to Mackwardt (1967:118-20) the most frequent
quotative in "A Grouped Frequency Word-List of Anglo-Saxon Poetry" (430 times versus 380 times
secgan).
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Ever since its advent, there have been a number of studies which investigate
the distribution and social spread of the new quotative like (most notably Blyth et al
1991, Ferrara and Bell 1995, Fleischman and Yaguello to appear, Underhill 1988).
And since the late 1990s, most NWAVE conferences have featured at least one paper
which has topicalized it in some way (Bakht-Rofheart 2002, Blyth et al 1988,
Buchstaller 2001b, 2002a, 2003, Cukor Avila 2003, Dougherty and Strassel 1998,
Ferrara and Bell 1990, Fuller 2000, Igoe, Lamb, Gilman, and Kim 1999, Sanchez and
Charity 1999, Singler 2001, Singler and Woods 2002). But no paper ever specifically
addressed the patterning of the other vernacular quotatives, go or unframed quotes
(for a definition of this variant cf. Chapter 2). Also, as few studies actually tried to
locate like within the whole quotative system, the relationship between all members
of the quotative pool on the social and the functional planes is still under-researched.
A notable exception is Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999), who write that "its [like's]
relationship to other members of the English quotative cohort in each context,
presents an interesting test site for the examination of linguistic change in progress."
(149, cf. also Tagliamonte and D'Arcy 2003). Indeed, the quotative system provides
us with a fascinating opportunity to investigate the interaction amongst numerous
competing variants within one variable. In order to understand like's patterning, we
have to examine the balance between all members of the entire quotative system. It
will be especially revealing to compare like's functional and social behaviour with
that of other non-standard members. Hence, this study examines the systematic
patterning of the quotative system as a whole after the advent of quotative like. I will
investigate its interaction with all the quotative strategies which speakers have at
their disposition when they want to report. This thesis analyses how the quotative
system reacts to such a new form coming in.
The corpora used in this study present us with the opportunity to look at the
composition of the quotative system at two different stages of this change, viz. in
different diachronic "slices" (Chapter 2 outlines the corpora used in this study). The
quotative system of two urban varieties of British English in 1994 and 1995 gives
evidence of the patterning of like when it first came into being as a quotative. Results
from this corpus can help us answer important questions such as the following:
Which environments does like first get used in? Who uses like and when? Is like born
in a niche which it can enlarge or does it originate as an across-the-board quotative?
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A second corpus of US English data, where like had already had a lifespan of
roughly 10 years and where it was already considerably widespread at the point in
time when the recordings took place (1988-90) shows how the quotatives system has
settled in its larger inventory. The investigation of the US quotative system reveals
which functional and social niches like has appropriated for itself. It will become
evident that the quotative system has become fully restructured in order to
accommodate the additional item. This corpus will show which quotatives have to
"give way" for like to be able to establish itself. I will argue that, in fact, there is no
indication of a "pushing out" of older variants. Rather, the distributive evidence
points to a reallocation or refunctionalisation of all quotatives as the new one is
introduced (Singler 2001, Buchstaller 2001a). That is, different quotatives occupy
different functional niches.
A comparison between the two corpora will also reveal whether the two
varieties have reacted in the same way to the additional quotative option or whether
we find locally idiosyncratic developments on both sides of the Atlantic. In this
respect, this study constitutes an important contribution to the growing body of
research on globalisation phenomena and supra-local trends. (Buchstaller 2003,
Kerswill 2003, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 2003, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999,
Trudgill 1986, 1994, and many others).
In the following I will give an outline of the thesis:
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the corpora which form the basis of this
study. The methodology for the collection, transcription and coding of the data will
be laid out. I will define the variable under investigation and determine the envelope
of variation. The variants' attestations in earlier corpora will be examined and
borderline cases will be discussed.
Chapter 3 examines the interaction between the quotative options with respect
to linguistic factors in US English. I will evaluate the quotative system under
pragmatic, semantic, discoursal and syntactic aspects. By examining how the
functional load is distributed amongst the members of the quotative cohort, we get an
insight into the intimate interplay between the pool of variants. I will show their
functional distribution with respect to several linguistic variables such as (i) the
epistemic relation between the quotative variant and its complement, (ii) the
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"delivery aspects" (Clark and Gerrig 1990), viz. enquoted non- or para-linguistic
features (iii) the co-occurrence and interaction with inner state markers or "response
cries" (Goffman 1981) and (iii) the interaction with the syntactic system and possible
"birds of a feather" priming effects (Scherre and Naro 1991, 1992).
Using two case studies, Chapter 4 discusses go and like's synchronic status quo.
I will argue that we can understand and explain like and go's ambiguity and
polyfunctionality (comparative preposition, discourse marker, and quotative for like
and movement verb, future marker, and quotative for go) if we conceptualise
functions in terms of family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1978), or prototypes (Berlin
1992 and Rosch 1975, 1978). The manipulation of such concepts is creative with one
meaning giving rise to one or more others. I will give a model for the
grammaticalisation of like and go which is based on the radial structure model
originally proposed by Lakoff (1987). It depicts their synchronically occurring
functions as structured in a field around one focal member. Later functions, such as
the quotative use, are conceptualized as functional extensions from this common core
and are interrelated via cognitive links. Like and go's manifold synchronic functions
can hence be conceived of as a network of relations. It will be argued that like and
go's multifunctionality and ambiguity are highly motivated on a semantic-pragmatic
level.
The question as to whether like in British English and multiple other varieties
(Canada, India, Singapore, Australia, Namibia, ...) is an independent linguistic
development or whether the trend was picked up from the like-use in the US is not
easily resolved. The occurrence of quotative like in British English might have been
an independent process (especially given the naturalness of the underlying process,
as I will argue in Chapter 3), or a development influenced by US English, where the
grammaticalization of like in its quotative function was first attested (cf. Fleischman
and Yaguello to appear). In Chapter 5,1 will argue that before we make claims about
the borrowing of one variant from one into another variety, we first have to ascertain
its fundamental sameness in different locales. Indeed, the comparison of pragmatic
and syntactic factors will reveal some interesting but subtle differences between go's
and like's development in different locales. This raises fundamental linguistic
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questions, such as whether we are indeed comparing the same variable in the US and
in Britain, and how we can ratify calling something one and the same variant? Surely
a mere surface resemblance is not enough.
The study of grammaticalisation, which attends to the single case of incipient
language change and investigates the spread in frequency and linguistic versatility, is
a useful tool for answering such questions. In this thesis, I propose a combinatory
approach whereby the investigation of (socio)linguistic variables proceeds in two
steps. First, I quantify the intra-linguistic behavior of like and go with respect to
various linguistic variables. Statistical methods yield correlations and lead to a
frequency-based definition of the variants' properties in both varieties. If there is no
statistically significant difference in their patterning with respect to the distributional
and functional parameters across varieties, I can ratify my variables as the same
across varieties, viz. entities the patterning of which is linguistically non-
significantly different. Only in a second step can I proceed to correlate go and like
with extralinguistic, social variables.
But before proceeding to the social factors involved, Chapter 5 will ask
whether locality might actually have an effect on grammaticalisation. As we are
looking at incipient language change, numbers are small. Therefore, quantitative
methods yield unsatisfactory, statistically non-significant, results. In order to account
for my data as fully as possible and to trace language change in situ nascendi, the
second part of Chapter 5 pays attention to the single case, looking at what is different
in the two varieties. A closer look provides evidence that British English indeed
constitutes an independent development. This fact fuels the discussion about the
importance of social dimensions in grammaticalisation (Lass 2000, Nolde 2001).
After having ratified like and go's fundamental sameness in the two varieties
under investigation in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 gives an overview of the patterning of the
members of the quotative complex with the social variables age, gender, and socio¬
economic standing. Following Tagliamonte and Hudson's (1999:149) statement that
"the diffusion of be like beyond the United States presents a possible test case for the
examination of putative mega-trends currently underway as English increasingly
becomes a global language", the sociolinguistic distribution of the quotative pool in
two varieties of English (US and Southern British English) is investigated.
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The variant like is introduced into the linguistic system of both varieties by
typical proponents of language change, young speakers. These linguistic innovators
are also the very social group we can assume to be most likely to pick up a new
lexical variant through TV programmes such as soaps, talkshows, etc. While there is
unanimous agreement that the strong quantitative presence of TV in young peoples'
lives is bound to have some influence, the exact shape of this supposed effect is more
disputed. In Chapter 6, I will give a possible transmission scenario for like from the
US to the UK. On the basis of my data, I will examine which social groups carry the
newcomer variant in the US and which ones introduce it into the British English
quotative system. I will further indicate possible social trajectories that like could
follow in its spread with an eye on the other non-canonical variables go and
unframed quotes and also in contrast to canonical say.
There is evidence that discourse patterns such as "narrative style" in
storytelling (Johnstone 1990) and other norms of narration (Aukrust and Snow 1998)
are culture-specific. We would consequently expect discourse features such as
quotative introductory items to occur in different frequencies overall and
proportionally in different varieties. And indeed, this has been shown by
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999). I will argue that while the social constraints on the
(say) variable are generally not very important, like and go have a very different
social reality in the US and in Britain. In addition, my investigation of language
attitudes (Buchstaller 2003) have shown that British speakers have not borrowed
social attitudes along with the surface item like. Rather, just as reallocation of
linguistic forms is well attested, my research shows that reallocation of social
attitudes also constrains the outcomes of language contact.
In conclusion, this thesis examines the patterning of the quotative pool in its
syntactic, pragmatic, discourse and social aspects. The investigation uses the
quantitative methodology of variationist sociolinguistics and pairs it with the more
qualitative approaches of grammaticalization research and discourse analysis. The
fact that no single method can fully explain the patterning of the data speaks for an
eclectic, synthetic approach.
Furthermore, variationist sociolinguistics has been looking at how the
variability of a given variable can be explained by correlating it with social and
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linguistic variables. Of the large body of work that has productively investigated the
importance of linguistic factors on linguistic variation, many have found that the
linguistic constraints are more important than the social constraints (cf. Baugh 1979,
Nagy and Blondeau 2000, Meyerhoff 1999, 2000, Rickford and McNair-Knox 1994).
This study gives evidence that while the social constraints are only moderately
exciting, the linguistic constraints on the quotative pool are quite substantial. This
leads me to conclude that only when we look at variability at all levels, quantitative,
and qualitative, extralinguistic and intralinguistic, can we fully describe the
behaviour of our variable. Only then can we fully understand the role of the
vernacular variants go and like within the whole mechanism of quotative options. Go
and like have for a long time been dismissed as functionally vacuous variants in the
quotative pool. The following pages will show that contrary to claims in the
sociolinguistic literature, they are not just intrusive items in the paradigm of
reporting devices but fulfil a number of important roles, which are governed by
linguistic constraints.
Furthermore, the study of the quotative system provides a fascinating site for
research into the rule-governed variability of innovative features and their rival
variants. A sharply delimited and hitherto stable set of variants presents a unique
opportunity to investigate the restructuring of all variants as new ones come in. This
thesis reveals important insights into phenomena such as reallocation, competition
within the same socio-pragmatic field, as well as into the interaction of variants
within the same variable.
In this light, the restructuring of all quotative variants during the rapid intrusion
of the robust new variant like gives us an important test-case for various explanatory
parameters for language change that have been raised in the literature i.e. Romaine's
claims about language and gender (2003), the reallocation hypothesis as raised by
Britain (2002) and Britain and Trudgill (1999), the reformulation of the standard vs.
non-standard dichotomy into local vs. supra-local variants by Foulkes and Docherty
(1999) and the Milroys' findings (1998) concerning networks and class.
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No linguistic investigation can proceed without reference to concrete
data of some sort, no matter how informal or intuitive the collection
method used. Equally, an analyst necessarily and unavoidably brings to
bear certain theoretical assumptions to an analysis of data. Work within
the sociolinguistic tradition has always emphasized the principle of
accountability, i.e. the explicit reporting of how data have been




2.1. Attestations of like and go
Macaulay's (2001:5) claim that "the quotatives go and be like are relatively
recent innovations, apparently starting among younger speakers, possibly in
California" exemplifies many researchers' view that they are rather new additions to
the quotative pool (cf. also Butters 1980, Schourup 1982b). Quotative go has been
treated by sociolinguists as if it were another newcomer quotative, a slightly older
but equally innovative non-canonical co-variant of like. But these studies fail to
consider historical evidence. Looking up go in the OED yields a number of
borderline cases for quotative use, where it is ambiguous between a quotative
introducer and its older use as a story introducer (that's the way the story goes).
Absolutely certain cases of quotative-introductory function, first with onomatopoeic
sound effects only, are attested from 1791 onwards (Cowper Reddy "and his noble
heart goes pit-a-pat"). Thus, go has to be considered a member of the quotative pool
that has been around a while, if largely unnoticed.
But we note that in the early beginnings, go is only used in the sense "with
imitative interjections or verb-stems used adverbially, e.g. to go bang, clatter, cluck,
crack, crash, patter, smash, snap, tang, whirr, etc" (no 10 in the OED). The first
account for go as a full quotative, viz. an item which can introduce linguistic material
as well as sounds, is much later. The sociolinguistic literature usually refers to
Butters (1980) as the first mention of go as a quotative that can take linguistic
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complements in US English. While Butters was certainly was the first to point out its
existence as something noteworthy, the first study I know of to mention it in this
function is Partee (1973). Schiffrin, in her 1981 study, reports 10% go within the
pool of quotative verbs. I will henceforth refer to go in this larger functional
coverage, viz. when it can take the whole range of quotative complements, voice,
sounds, gesture as well as linguistic elements, as a 'full' quotative. Consequently,
when reference is made to like and go as 'new quotatives', the attribute 'new'
pertains to slightly different degrees for the two quotative options. Whereas like has
only recently enlarged its functions to the framing of quotations per se, for go, the
'newness' holds with respect to the recent broadening of complement type, from
para- and non-linguistic to linguistic.
In British English, the general view seems to be that go has been around for a
while (Macaulay 2001) but there is no explicit account for its arising as a fully
fledged quotative verb. The first study I could locate that mentions go in the UK as a
full quotative is Cheshire (1982) with data collected in Reading in the late 1970s.
Andersen (1996) finds it widely used in the Corpus of London Teenage English
(COLT)1 collected in 1993. Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) are the first to analyse
the British quotative system as a whole with a corpus collected in 1995-6 containing
go. For Scottish English, Macaulay (2001) reports its existence in 1997 data. While
my corpus shows that quotative go was alive as a fully fledged quotative in BrE in
1994, it is an outstanding question how far back we can trace its full quotative
function.
It was Butters (1982:149) who first noted like's new quotative function in the
USA. "Many speakers who use narrative go also have narrative use of to be (usually
followed by like) where what is quoted is an unuttered thought, as in And he was like
'Let me say something' or I thought I was going to drown and I was (like) 'Let me
live, Lord'". In a 1986 article, Tannen finds 4% be like in her corpus but does not
give any indication of its date of collection. In the years to follow, a flood of studies
on quotative like followed, most of them on its sociolinguistic behaviour, and notably
1
"The Bergen Corpus of London Teenage Language (COLT) is the first large English Corpus
focusing on the speech of teenagers. It was collected in 1993 and consists of the spoken language of
13 to 17-year-old teenagers from different boroughs of London. The ... corpus is a constituent of the
British National Corpus." (University of Bergen, http://www.hit.uib.no/colt).
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two on its grammaticalisation (Romaine and Lange 1991, Meehan 1991). Within the
UK, Miller and Weinert (1995) report for Scottish English no occurrence of like as a
quotative verb prior to 1980. Also, my investigations have revealed that the British
National Corpus, collected up until 1993, does not yield any tokens of quotative like
(this excludes the COLT). In the same vein, Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) claim
that quotative like is unattested in Britain until the early 1990s. We know that by
1993, like has found its way into the use of London teenagers because Andersen
(1996) is the first to report its occurrence in the COLT. Tagliamonte and Hudson
(1999) attest like for their 1995-6 data in York. In turn, Macaulay (2001) shows that
Glasgow Scots speakers use like in 1997.
In all evidence, and contrary to go, like really seems to be a newcomer to the
quotative pool. The following evidence corroborates this claim: (i) like was not
mentioned anywhere in the scientific literature before Butters (1982), (ii) it only
recently appeared in dictionaries. For example, the 2nd edition of the Random House
Webster (1999:768) is the first to incorporate the new use of like:
informal (used esp. after forms of 'to be' to introduce reported speech or
thought) (3) She's like "I don't believe it," and I'm like " No, it's true".
Furthermore, (iii) the OED does not yet mention like in its full quotative use
with dummy be and only gives an entry where like serves as a complementiser with a
full quotative verb, a stage which most probably led to like's grammaticalisation of a
full quotative. With respect to like, a full quotative verb means a verb that can carry
the force of introducing quotation independently of any graphic dialogue introducer
such as say, think etc (cf. Chapter 4 for like's grammaticalisation). I will give the
OED entry for like in the context of quotation in full:
N. Amer. colloq. Followed by an adj.: in the manner of one who is 111 Cf.
like crazy (CRAZY a. 4c), like mad (MAD a. lc). Also in less analysable
constructions. [...] 1970 Time 31 Aug. 19 Afterward, a girl came up to me and
said, 'You kinda look interested in this; did you know there are civil rights for
women?' And I thought like wow, this is for me. (OED online, emphasis
mine).
Given this information, my British English data represents the very point in
time when like was first introduced into the British quotative system. Examining the
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1994/5 corpora hence yields interesting insights into the patterning of a new
quotative item at its very emergence. The data from the US was collected at a point
in time when like was already sufficiently widespread.
I will now discuss the composition of the two corpora used in this study. I will
lay out their speaker selection, social composition and the transcription and coding
methodologies used.
2.2. The Data
The data for this thesis is drawn from 4 corpora of two varieties. These data
had already been collected for purposes other than this present thesis. The reasons for
basing my investigation on already existing corpora are the following: (i) One of the
aims of this study was to explore the earliest possible recording of British English
where like had just become introduced into the quotative system. As this time
predates the start of my PhD, I could not possibly have collected the data myself. I
had to rely on recordings that had already been made during the time slot I was
interested in. (ii) Furthermore, I wanted to do a cross-variety comparison of a low
frequency discourse feature, which required a huge amount of data for each variety.
Given the restricted time and resources of a PhD, I had to weigh the cost of
collecting my own data (with the time needed for speaker selection, data collection,
transcription etc.) against the benefits of working with pre-existing corpora (and
hence being able to devote more time to the analysis and implications of the data). I
opted for the latter.
The work with data coming from different sources inevitably leads to some
slight inconsistencies across the corpora which I will discuss under the respective
data sources. However, I suggest that the disparities are minor enough to make the
data comparable. This is for the following reasons: the corpora of both varieties were
collected within sociolinguistic research programmes, which documented and
controlled the social factors involved. The sociolinguistic matrix was filled in both
cases with equal amounts of male and female speakers coming from 2 distinct social
strata (for the definition of social "class" see the following sections) and from a wide
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range of age groups which I grouped into young (<38) and old speakers (>38)2.
Appendix 1 gives a break-down of the social profile of the speakers used in this
investigation. Furthermore, all data consists of unmonitored, spontaneous talk-in-
interaction from speakers paired in dyads. The speakers were native speakers of the
respective varieties and there was no or next-to-no intrusion from the fieldworker.
Note that this study uses quantitative variationist methodology in order to
investigate sociolinguistic patterns, viz. the way membership in social categories
correlates with the presence or absence of linguistic features. While this perspective
has been the prevailing one in variationist sociolinguistics to date, where social
factors are considered constraints on linguistic variability, it is in order to mention
important criticisms that have been raised against the operationalisation of
prefabricated, given, social categories. One shortcoming of such an approach is that
the notions of gender and sex are not disengaged. For a problematisation of the
notion of gender with respect to features of homosexual speech see Labov
(2001:263), Gaudio (1994), Leap (1996), Schilling-Estes (2002). For the delineation
of the concepts sex and gender see Giddens (1989). Research in the social
constructivist framework has questioned the view that gender and race are de facto
categories (Holmes and Meyerhoff 2003, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003). Rather,
they suggest an approach whereby "the relation between person and society is
[considered as] dynamic and mediated by language" (McElhinny 2003:36). In such a
performative approach, gender and race are considered accomplishments. They are
emergent, viz. the products of linguistic and other interaction. Acknowledging such
justified criticism, this thesis takes a quantitative, variationist, approach in order to
investigate the extralinguistic factors that play into the patterning of the quotative
system during the introduction of a newcoming variant. Such an exploration into the
question to which extent certain speakers adopt and further non-standard variants can
provide a useful backdrop for further, more detailed, work on the gendered practices
that have a bearing on the re-enactment of self and other past performance (Holmes
and Meyerhoff 2003). Furthermore, as Eckert (1989, 2003) points out, chronological
2 In the Derby data, the older speakers were >45. But as there are no speakers in the age range from
38-45 in the Derby corpus, suffice it to say that overall, young speakers were below 38 and old ones
above.
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age has often been divided into equal chunks without consideration of the importance
of these chunks with respect to socially significant life stages such as adolescence.
This study takes the commonly cited "temporal isogloss" of 38 years for like (Singler
2001) as the cut-off point for age-classification and later splits up the two rough
groups into chronological age.
In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the composition and the coding
mechanisms used in the corpora in more detail.
2.2.1 American English
The analysis of US English is based on the Switchboard Telephone Speech
Corpus (SWB) available online through the University of Pennsylvania Linguistic
Data Consortium (www.ldc.upenn.edu). The data were collected by Texas
Instruments in 1988-92 and first released by the LDC in 1992-3. They comprise of
roughly 2400 two-sided telephone conversations, recorded from 543 speakers (302
male, 241 female) from all areas of the United States. The telephone calls were
handled automatically by a computer-driven system. The caller was given recorded
prompts while the "robot operator" facilitated the connection with the callee and
gave a pre-selected topic for discussion. Interlocutors were told to talk about one of
70 topics, of which about 50 were used more than once. The topic and speaker
selection was regulated in order to ascertain that (i) no two speakers would converse
together more than once and (ii) no one spoke more than once on a given topic.
Speakers were told to talk for about 5 minutes. The ensuing conversations lasted for
varying lengths of time and were cut after a certain time if speakers exceeded the
pre-given time limit. The speech from the two subjects was recorded into separate
channels and transcribed and tagged with respect to grammatical categories. The
speakers were asked where they grew up during the first 10 years of life. They come
from 7 major linguistic regions in the US, South, North, New England, New York,
West, South Midland and North Midland (Lance 1999: 311). There were also some
speakers of mixed origins.3
3 This information is taken from the Switchboard information services provided via the LDC webpage
(http://www.Idc.upenn.edu/doc/switchboard/manual.html).
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For the analysis of like's and go's intralinguistic factors and for the case studies
of grammaticalisation (Chapters 3 and 4), I used the whole corpus. For the
extralinguistic investigation, I limited the data to a sociolinguistically balanced sub¬
set of 136 speakers. I made sure that I included equivalent numbers of speakers from
each social category for each dialectal region (for a break-down consider Appendix
1).
Because I was aiming at depth in regional coverage while keeping token
numbers per cell within reasonable limits, the only other social variables controlled
for were age, gender and educational level. The SWB provided the birth year of the
speakers. In order to achieve general comparability with the age range chosen in the
Derby and Newcastle corpora, I subdivided the US English speakers into two broad
age groups +/- 45 (with no speaker between ages 38 and 45). To counterbalance this
very broad categorization, I will later align each speaker on an age-scale and
correlate quotative production with numerical years of age.
As Labov (2001) noted, the division of a population into socioeconomic classes
tends to trigger a feeling of unease in many sociolinguists in the western world. He
suggests that rather than trying to avoid the issue because of ideological reservations,
sociolinguistic enquiry should aim at an accurate description of all social factors that
play into variability within the linguistic system. When looking at all the potential
social constraints, socio-economic stratification certainly is a possible candidate.
Whether or not it plays a significant role in the patterning of the quotative system can
only be determined post hoc, by using it as a predictor variable in a statistical
analysis. Research in anthropology has shown that social categorizations need to be
justified from within the system of the society under investigation (Pike 1954/1967,
Harris 1964, 1968). Only a socio-economic subdivision which makes sense in the
emic structure of the speech community will yield authentic criteria and provide
useful results. Hence, the criteria for the subcategorisation of speakers within the
socio-economic hierarchy in Great Britain and the US have to be tailored to the
respective situations. They are necessarily different if we want them to be
meaningful when applied to their particular societies. The United States of America
is and has been a highly mobile society, regionally as well as within the social
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hierarchy. A nation-wide large-scale study which bases the socio-economic ranking
on residential area does not make much sense.4 This is in contrast to studies such as
the ones conducted by Lippi-Green (1989) and the Milroys (L. Milroy 1980, Milroy
and Milroy 1985), which are based on the longevity of settlement patterns and which
base social stratification on residence in a specific, sharply delineated locality only.
But given the short-lived nature of settlement patterns in the US and the large
number of speakers from all over the nation in the American corpus, the criterion
'neighbourhood' used for British English as the basis of a class-based categorisation
cannot be adopted for the American variety. The much greater fluidity of the
American society defies a priori categorization of individual entities by their
ephemeral occupation or residence patterns (see also Ganzeboom, Luijkx and
Tremain 1989).
As Chambers notes (1995:7), the most important elements in the formation and
perception of social class are education, occupation, area and form of residence. It
would certainly be desirable to have such multiplex parameters for the determination
of the placement of the individual speaker within the socioeconomic hierarchy.5
Unfortunately, the build-up of the US English corpus on which this thesis is partly
based, is such that educational level is the sole determiner of socio-economic
standing (cf. Labov 2001:115 et passim for a discussion of educational indicators for
his SEC category). I am aware that this constitutes a simplification and would have
preferred a social index based on at least a score for occupation, income, and
residential neighbourhood (cf. Labov 1994) as well as educational level. But it has to
be pointed out that education, if not only and primarily, is at least causally linked to
social class via most of the related concepts: The degree of schooling will determine
a person's qualifications. These have, in most cases, a pre-selective effect on the
range of professional choices. Occupation, in most cases, has a direct causal effect on
remuneration and financial standing. Income then determines one's residency with
urban patches of much-sought after i.e. expensive areas and less-sought after,
4 This is not to say that studies based on specific neighbourhoods cannot be implemented. Given that
necessary care is taken to select areas with stable residencies and that the individual area is carefully
selected, such a design is a highly valid enterprise. See Labov 1994, 2001 for the study "Linguistic
Change and Variation in Philadelphia", especially Labov (1994: 35-73) for speaker selection and
methodology. Cf. also Edwards (1992).
" For complex multiple indices see Duncan (1961), Nakao and Treas (1992). For an employment of
social indices in sociolinguistic studies see Cedergren (1973), Labov (2001) and Trudgill (1974).
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cheaper areas. Thus, while a reduction of the determinant social class to educational
level is certainly a gross underspecification of the complexity of societal reality, it
certainly is the one element that subsumes and causally determines most other ones
(for an in-depth discussion of the determining factors of social class see Labov 2001).
In Macaulay's (1976) survey of Glaswegian speakers, occupation was the sole
defining criterion of social class.6
Also the number of social groupings that are distinctly different within a
society is an emic concept determined by the build-up of the particular culture. With
respect to the US English corpus, I chose to classify the speakers very broadly into
two socio-economic groups, the less educated and the more educated speakers (with
a cut-off point after a finished college education).
2.2.2. British English
The BrE data on which this study is based were extracted from the project
Phonological Variation and Change in Contemporary Spoken British English (UK
ESRC grant no. R00234892; 1994 -1997 to J. Milroy, L. Milroy & G. Docherty). It
consists of spontaneous spoken interaction collected from two urban varieties of
English, Derby and Newcastle. The Derby Corpus was recorded in 1994. The
Newcastle Corpus was collected in 1995 in order to match the Derby corpus. While
Derby lies at the transition point between several major dialectal areas and has salient
features of northern as well as south midland varieties, Newcastle has a quite strong
northern influence (see Docherty and Foulkes 1999). Both corpora were collected
within a sociophonological research programme (Milroy, Milroy and Docherty
1997). The multi-million word recordings span 32 45-minute cassette or DAT tapes.
Of these recordings, which usually contained a word list at the end, I used the first
side of a 45 minutes audio tape in Newcastle and one side of a DAT tape in Derby. I
transcribed them orthographically.
6
But Macaulay himself pointed out that Glasgow's peculiar situation might be the factor causing this
one-to-one correlation between occupation and social standing. Also, it has to be conceded that the
speakers in my corpus are of various age groups and much more mobile than the Glaswegian speakers
both in the social as and in geographical sense.
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In both corpora, speakers from two socially contrasting areas were paired up.
The determination of middle class and working class speakers was via their
residential area. This method was chosen because of the more neatly stratified class-
system in Britain (mentioned above). The fact that residential areas in the two
locations were quite hermetic made a grouping according to socio-economic status
determined by neighborhood practical (consider also Chambers' (1995:38-39)
discussion of the advantages of selecting people from well-defined neighborhoods).
Derby and Newcastle indeed constitute closely-knit, socially clustered residential
areas of manual workers' communities and other, also areally delimited clusters of
white-collar families (for other neighbourhood studies see especially L. Milroy 1980
in Belfast and Labov 2001 in Philadelphia).
I will now shortly motivate the choice of residential areas in the two corpora:
The speakers were selected so as to conform to two broad socio-economic settlement
areas. The classification of neighbourhoods as contrasting on the socio-economic
dimension rely on the experimenter's native intuitions and are underlined by
demographical facts (such as housing, unemployment rate and occupation patterns)
given in the General Census (1991). In Newcastle, the two residential areas are the
electoral wards ofWoolsington and Westerhope, which are judged by the inhabitants
themselves as broadly working class and broadly middle class. In Derby, the suburbs
chosen were Spondon for the middle class (+ 4 speakers form Little Eaton) and
Chaddesden for the working class speakers.
As recommended in Feagin (1979:25-26), the experimenters were natives of
the towns (in Derby) or used a native as a broker (in Newcastle). They could hence
exploit their community-internal knowledge of settlement patterns, social strata and
their personal acquaintances. Britain (1999:22) comments on this method as follows
"Taking full advantage of my insider credentials as a native to the area, I used
community-internal techniques for selecting speakers, drawing on peoples' pre¬
existing social relationships". Speaker selection was hence informed by in-place
social relationships, through the friend-of-a-friend method.
Generally, the fieldworkers gave as the reason for the recording the intention to
research the perceptions of older and younger locals regarding how they felt about
growing up and living in the city. There was no set topic for conversation and
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linguistics was not mentioned at all, as the interviewers "aim was to collect a corpus
of reasonably relaxed conversation from the speakers involved" (Oxley 1994). With
the exceptions of a room in the Conservative Club and a classroom in a school, all
interviews took place in the speakers' homes with the speakers sitting comfortably
face-to-face. There was a visible microphone on the table. The interviewers made it
clear that they did not intend to participate in the conversations and usually stayed in
the same room or an adjacent room during the tape-recording. All subjects embarked
on lively talk-in-interaction with the only exception of tape Derby 16, where the
subjects were clearly microphone-shy. Only once, when the conversation "dried up",
did the interviewer intervene and suggest lines of talk by asking leading questions.
In order to balance the speakers sociolinguistically, they were evenly
subdivided by age and sex, which resulted in a matrix of 4 cells per group (see
Appendix 1). The Derby and Newcastle corpora came tagged for age in two
categories, young (16-24 years) and old (45-65 years) in Newcastle and (14-27) and
(38-69) in Derby.
In Newcastle, mostly single-sex pairs were used. In Derby, six of the tapes
contain mixed-sex dyads. As one of the experimenters pointed out (Oxley 1994), this
set up resulted in one peculiarity depending on age. Many older mixed-sex dyads
addressed their speech to the experimenter rather than chatting amongst themselves.
As they directed their speech to a different interlocutor, viz. the fieldworker (who
often only participated non-verbally), they tended to produce a different form of talk.
They produced quite of number of stretches of speech where one speaker tells a story.
Due to the fact that only one speaker engages in longish monologues, these tapes
contain longer stretches of narratives by one person. This is in contrast with the
highly interactive speech we witness with most of the younger subjects, who, almost
without exception, talked between themselves and did not pay much attention to the
experimenter. But, as both forms of talk are (i) situated within the realm of
spontaneous talk-in-interaction and (ii) largely consist of the same genre, viz.
narratives, this effect should not affect the comparability of the data with respect to
quotative use. Overall, I suggest that the fact that the recorded speech has different
levels of collaborative production does not limit comparability.
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One other irregularity needs to be addressed at this point. In most older mixed-
sex couples, the female speaker produced a far larger amount of speech than the male.
The older women tended to take over the role of the principal story-teller, which is
especially noticeable with couple Derby 10. There were two ways in which the corpus
design tried to get around this problem: (i) the experimenter in Derby tried to
counterbalance uneven production output by starting to address questions explicitly
to the male speakers. Furthermore (ii) many of the old speakers were grouped into
same-sex dyads, which eliminates the gender-bias of the opposite-gender grouping.
While for the older speakers gender thus played a huge role, amongst the younger
speakers, men and women produced roughly the same amount of quotations. This
results overall in a slight bias towards female speakers in the number of quotations
produced (cf. Table 6.2).
Before I turn to the investigation, I will have to clarify a few theoretical
concepts involved in this study. I first need to describe the envelope of variation of
my analysis and to define my variable. I have to ask the question 'What is
quotation?'7 or rather 'What constitutes quotation for me, in this analysis?' I will
now give the working definitions I have adopted for this investigation and will justify
these decisions in the light of the current literature.
2.3. What is a quote?
As Cameron (1998:48) shows, research on reported speech has been carried out
in many subdisciplines of linguistics such as anthropology and ethnology (Boeder
2003, Briggs 1992, Hymes 1975), discourse analysis and literary stylistics or
pragmatics (Bakhtin 1986, Bolden to appear, Chafe 1994, Clark and Gerrig 1990,
DuBois 1989, Faircloth 1992, Ferrara 1992, Goffman 1981, Golato 2003, Johnson
2001, Johnstone 1987, 1990, 1993, Leech and Short 1981, Lucy 1993, Mathis and
Yule 1994, Mayes 1990, Maynard 1996, Myers 1999, Page 1973, Polanyi 1982,
Sanders and Redecker 1996, Schiffrin 1981, Tannen 1988, 1986, Thompson 1996,
7 I prefer the term 'quotation' to 'reported speech' because it is not necessarily speech that is
reenacted.
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Volosinov 1973, Yule 1993, Yule and Mathis 1992), historical linguistics and
language change (Buck 1915, Kammerzell and Peust 2003), kinesics (Kendon 1992),
language typology (Coulmas 1985, 1996, Li 1986, Massamba 1986, Roeck 1994,
Gtildemann 2001), phonetics and intonation (Fonagy 1986, Klewitz and Couper-
Kuhlen 1999, Kvavik 1986), syntax and semantics (Declerk and Tanaka 1996,
Munro 1982, Partee 1973, Steever 2003, Wierzbicka 1974), and variationist
sociolinguistics (Johnstone 1987, Vincent and Dubois 1996). Especially the newly-
arrived like has triggered a great deal of interest in the quotative system (Blyth et al.
1990, Cukor-Avila 2002, 2003, Ferrara and Bell 1995, Fuller 2000, Johnson 2001,
Singler 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). Recently, more and more researchers
have tried a grammaticalisation approach in order to capture the emergence of
quotative function in constructions which previously did not have this meaning
(Cohen, Simeone-Senelle and Vanhove 2003, Golato 2000, Gtildemann 2001, 2003,
Klamer 2003, Meyerhoff 2003, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 1995, 1998, Romaine and
Lange 1991, Waksler 2001).
I feel that I need to first lay out how I, in this study, define my subject of
analysis. We need to come to terms with the fact that quotation contains multiple
voices, the voice of the narrator and the voice of the person quoted. Talbot (1992)
refers to a "tissue of voices", which is closely related to the concept of
"multivoicedness" and "polyphony" raised by Bakhtin (1986) and Volosinov (1973).
The question is how can we account for this "relationship between an inset and a
frame within an utterance" (Maynard 1996:210)?
Looking at a data-base of talk-in-interaction yields the result that quotes defy
syntactic rules as they seem to be freely plugged into linguistic structure (cf. Dailey-
O'Cain 2000). As Clark and Gerrig (1990:771/2) put it, quotations can occur
"embedded in many type of external structure". In this vein, Cameron (1998:53)
gives the examples of a quotation embedded as a noun, as a verb and completely
free:8
8 The first line gives the original Puerto Rican Spanish, the second line {in italics) gives Cameron's
translation.
embedded as a noun: (2.1) Y se formo un "jVente tu!"....
'and a "come here, you!" got going'
embedded as a verb: (2.2) cada vez vefa a uno tenia que "Vi a fulano, Toco el palo"
'every time he 'd see one he had to "I saw so-and-so. I tag the tree "'
completely free: (2.3) estaba "yeee" llorando allf
'and she was "yeee" crying there'
Hence, syntactic parameters do not help in defining a quote.
A useful approach for defining quotation that I would like to discuss here in
slightly more detail is Fauconnier's and Sweetser's (1996) mental space model.
According to their model, we can conceptualise a quote as a person-bound,
embedded space within a narrative. It marks the introduction of a subjective point of
view and restricts the validity of the presented information to a particular person or
entity. Hence, quotation involves the creation of spaces within embedded spaces,
which are in turn entailing a restriction of the validity or factuality of the embedded
material (cf. also Fauconnier 1985 and Dinsmore 1991). Every space has its own
truth-conditions, different degrees of epistemic stance involved in it, etc. For a
similar concept of framing consider Goffman (1974), (1981), for the concept of
contextual frames see Mandler (1984), Schank and Abelson (1977) and Tannen
(1993). Linguistic markers (such as quotatives) or prosodic cues help the speaker to
establish and conversely the hearer to interpret the insertion of embedded mental
spaces within narrative. In Fauconnier and Sweetser's terms (1996:295), those
markers are space builders for embedded spaces. Let me apply this model to an
example:
(2.4) BrE - Derby 11: The good old days at Parcon Electronics. Told by Kate9
K: Johnny Mardo and Neill Archer,
T: they'd gone to Parcon.
K: I think they're at Parcon,
cause Anne said - she says "I wonder if Archie knows",
(...)
h ah ah
she says "ohhh dear",
she says "they were the good old days weren't",
she says "we really had a laugh didn't we",
I says "yeah" I says "that was when none of us had got any problems ha ha ha",
T: only than the ones you created yourselves or amongst each other,
9 Please consider Appendix 2 for the transcription conventions.
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BOX
In the above excerpt, the
represents the narrative sphere, as told by Kate at the moment of narration
represents an embedded sphere of a 3rd person sg. female speaker (Anne)
represents another embedded sphere of a 1st person sg. female speaker. This
speaker is the same person as narrator (Kate) but in a different consciousness at the
time of speaking.
In example (2.4), there are 3 different spheres of experience, the narrative surround,
which is the ground zero of the narrative structure (called the "basic mental space"
by Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996:295), and two embedded spaces which feature
reported speech. Linguistic markers, in this case the quotative says, help the speaker
to establish and conversely the hearer to interpret the insertion of embedded mental
spaces within the narrative. In Fauconnier and Sweetser's terms (295), those markers
are termed "space builders" for the embedded spaces (cf. Jakobson's (1971) shifters,
Gumperz' (1989, 1992) contextualization cues) which mark a 'transfer', viz. a jump
from space to space.
The mental space model has the advantage that it helps us to understand cases
of multiple stacked quotations. We can envision them as spaces within spaces,
usually indicated by space builders. In the example above, if Anne, the reported
speaker had in turn quoted the utterance of their friend Mary, we could conceptualize
this as shown in figure (2.1) below.
Figure 2.1: Multiply embedded spaces as of Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996).
The mental space model makes it easy to parse structures like the above where we
find quotes within quotes: We consider them as embedded spaces of a second order.
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This cognitive model is of great value for the definition of quotation, (i) It has
the advantage that it is independent of syntactic structure, (ii) It is also flexible
enough to allow for recursion, (iii) It allows for jumps back and forth between spaces,
(iv) Furthermore, as Bal (1990) has pointed out, it can capture the fact that narrating
and enquoting (what she calls 'vision') coincide in the person of the narrator, whose
voice is always present. Hence, a mental space model is able to conceptualise the fact
that quotation consists not only of changes of perspective. It lets us understand the
infusion of one perspective into another - for example in cases where a narrator
superimposes evaluative devices into a quote in order to characterize the person
quoted i.e. by representing the quoted person with a high nagging voice, a French
accent etc. (cf. Bakhtin's (1981) dialogic principle, Fludernick's (1993) echoing,
Labov's 1972 concept of embedded evaluation, Stanzel's (1984) contamination).
The conceptualization of quotes as mental spaces is reminiscent of Bakhtin's
(1981, 1984, 1986) notion of "dialogism" or "polyvocality" (cf. also
Bakhtin/Medvedev 1978), Goffman's "lamination" (1981) and Volosinov's (1986)
concept of "heterosemy of voices". What all have in common is the concept that
when quoting, there are (at least) 2 voices superimposed in narration. Hence, we
have to posit (at least) 2 types of subjectivity, the narrator (=reporting speaker) and
the reported speaker(s), which pertain to different perspectives. In Genette's (1980)
terms there is a difference in the experiencing subject and the narrating agent. The
interpretation of the story depends not only on who is quoted but also on whose voice
verbalizes it (cf. Goffman's (1981:226ff) production roles of 'animator' and
'author').
In this thesis, I will adopt a definition which relies heavily on the mental space
model (and its precursors) and combines it with the 'speakers as actors' metaphor
that is found throughout Goffman's work. This conceptualization has given rise to
the powerful theatre metaphor used also by Wierzbicka (1974). When quoting, the
narrator "'plays his part', that is to say, imagines himself as the other person and for
a moment behaves in accordance with this counter-factual assumption" (Wierzbicka
1974:272). Later researchers have picked it up showing that reported speech is
enactment (Haberland 1986), demonstration and "non-serious action" (Clark and
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Gerrig 1990). In Wierzbicka's words: "the author of the quotative .... does not say
what the content of the quote is (i.e. what was said) - instead he does something that
enables the hearer to see for himself what it is, that is to say, in a way, he shows this
content" (1974: 282). If we take on board this image, we assume that quotation is not
a word for word (verbatim) re-production (pace Coulmas 1985:42, Leech 1974:353,
Li 1986:40). Rather, the quoting speaker assumes the role of the original speaker and
selectively depicts the crucial aspects of earlier behaviour.
Contingent on this concept of selective re-enactment is the notion of
"constructed dialogue" introduced by Tannen (1989), which takes into account the
loose equivalence between original behaviour and quotation (called token mimicry
by Rimmer 1988). When reproducing another's verbal and bodily behaviour, the
quoting speakers are faced with their own personal limitations with respect to voice
quality, language, etc. Consider the following example:
(2.5) USE - File 1137: The joys of teaching EFL
S: I tried to get her to say hello,
and she'd be like "(CHOKE)=
C: [ha ha ha ha
K: [ha ha ha ha] ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha
S: [no puedo no puedo]".
I'd be like "yes you can,
just[say 'hello],
K: [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha
S: [hello' Amaria]".
K: [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha
S: ["(CHOKE)"
K: [ha ha ha ha ha
The depictions of S's student's attempts to speak English are clearly an
approximation of the original output.
Tannen's (1986:313) and Lehrer's work (1989) as well as much of Goffman's
(1980) insightful research, has shown that speakers are not actually able to remember
and consequently faithfully quote even short utterances. And Chafe (1980) illustrates
that even if speakers could technically reproduce a chunk of speech verbatim -
because they were asked to memorize a story- when quoting, they usually refrain
from doing so (for the discussion and demotion of the verbatim assumption see also
Clark and Gerrig 1990). Hence, quotes are to be considered approximative
reproductions of original behaviour. Romaine and Lange (1991:230) speak of
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"adequate representations" of the original utterance. What exactly adequate means is
defined by the context as well as negotiated by the interlocutors themselves.
Furthermore, Tannen (1986), Vincent and Dubois (1996) and Mayes (1990)
have shown that a large proportion of quotations never happened and are purely
imagined. Moreover, there are large numbers of quotes which report original thought,
viz. a sphere to which the reporting speaker does not have access (except, obviously
in cases of self-report, cf. Chapter 3).
In sum, in this thesis, quotation is defined as the performance whereby
speakers re-enact previous behaviour (speech/thought/sound/voice effect/gesture)
while assuming the dramatic role of the original source of the enacted behaviour (cf.
Yule and Mathis 1992:203). This re-enactment, I repeat, is not meant to be verbatim
and is in an inherently approximative relationship to the initial event, if the initial
event occurred at all.
After having defined the subject of my analysis, quotation, I will now discuss
how I have delimited it against some related concepts. I will further justify why I
have excluded certain constructions. I will also discuss my treatment of various
borderline cases.
In my analysis, I have not counted as separate tokens cases of repetitions of
quotes in sequences such as in example (2.6).
(2.6) Invented example - Repetition after Repair
01 A: blah blah blah
02 B: what did you say?
03 A: blah blah blah
In this example, I have interpreted line three as a verbatim repetition of what was
said in line one. This is because no re-enactment with a temporary suspension of
belief (Wierzbicka 1974) is taking place, no demonstration, no role-play but only a
reiteration of previously stated material because of auditory difficulties or other
reasons (such as disbelief). Consequently, cases like the above, which feature a
repeat sequence after an other-initiated repair prompt (Sacks, Schlegloff and
Jefferson 1974) have been excluded from the analysis.
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In the same vein, I do not count as two tokens but as two instances of the same
token cases in which a speaker is running into communicative difficulties and the
interlocutor proffers the element searched for. The following excerpt gives such a
scenario. Here, A is doing a word search (clearly indicated as such by the lengthened
sounds, ehhms etc.).
(2.7) BrE - Derby 6: Prompt after Communicative Difficulties
A: you don't need any::: ehhhm ( P A U S [ E ) eh ah overheads.
B: [overheads,
In (2.7), speaker B offers the word A was searching for and A repeats it. This form of
proffer-repetition does not count as quotation in my analysis. It is considered a case
of echoic mention (Hymes 1987) and not role-play in the 'speaker as actor'
framework of quotation. Also, I did not include cases of co-construction where one
speaker jumps in and foreshadows the other speaker's quote such as in (2.8).
(2.8) BrE - Derby 2: Foreshadowing
D: yeah it was a case of "if you can['t beat them (....) jo(ha ha )in them" ah ha ha
G: [beat them join them,
D: yeah so I as asked to stand for the borough,
Here, G's speech beat them join them is a projection of D's utterance, a form of
anticipatory overlap (due to the projectability of utterances, cf. Hutchby and Wooffitt
1998). Cases such as this are not included in the category quotation. It is not the case
that the message is first produced by G and then quoted by D. Indeed, speaker D
does not pick up G's utterance but only continues his own which is partly
overlapping with G's. Hence, I interpret cases of this sort as instances of two voices
one message, which serve interpersonal functions but do not count as cases where
one speaker re-enacts the other.
The same also applies to cases of backchannel where one speaker repeats the
other as in the following:
(2.8) BrE - Derby 6: Backchannel




Again, in my interpretation, the three turn constructional unit (TCUs) in example (2.8)
contain only one quote, A's I thought "brilliant no kids". The concept of a TCU as
the basic unit of talk has been established in Conversation Analysis by cf. Sacks,
Schegloff and Jefferson (1974). A TCU can be sentential, clausal, phrasal, or lexical
constructions. Every TCU contains a transition relevance place, which is a place of
potential floor transition (where either the current speaker can select the next speaker,
or the next speaker can self-select). Such TRPs are 'projectable' (viz. the
conversational interlocutors can make predictions about when it is to end) and
oriented to by the interlocutors (cf. also Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998). In example
(2.8), B is not producing any quote but is merely echoing A's words. Cases like this
where there is interspeaker alignment achieved through the sharing and repeating of






I will now discuss at more length the case of partitioned quotes in the form I
said "quote" I said "quote". Generally excluded from the analysis were cases where
the second instantiation is a verbatim repetition of a previous one. This can be seen
in the next example:
(2.9) BrE - NC 14: Full verbatim repetition
I says "how much will you give me for give you to me for mine"?
what did you get for it ?
he says "well" he says "well this price",
and you saw he sh- try put it off a bit you know,
mh,
The first quote he says "well" in line 03 has not been included in the data. Rather, it
is counted as the first instance of the second quote he says "well this price which is
given in its entirety right afterwards. Consequently, in my analysis, line 03 only
contains one quote, he says "well this price
The interpretation of two repetitive occurrences of a quotative frame + quote as
instances of the same quote only applies to material which is exactly the same on a
lexical basis and where no pronounced intonational difference occurs between
instantiation one and two. This treatment applies to cases where (i) speakers clearly
repair themselves and start a new sequence with exactly the same form as the
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abandoned one or (ii) where speakers produce repetitions for stylistic reasons or for
comprehension.
Generally, in the sequence Pers.pron. Vquot10 "quote 1" (Pers.pron.) Vquot
"quote 2", a 1st quote is only counted when it fulfils the following prerequisites. A
token is counted as an instance of quotation (i) if it is not repeated in the exact same
form in the next quote as stated above (with respect to lexical, para- and non-
linguistic factors as in example 2.8), and (ii) if the quoted material is a lexical item
with clear semantic content (this excludes discourse markers) or an exclamation with
a sound/voice effect. Otherwise I do not interpret the material following the first
personal pronoun Vquot sequence as a quote. This is shown in (2.10), where the first
instance of I said is interpreted as a repair.
(2.10) BrE - Derby 4: Repair sequence
X: I said ehhhrm I said "quote"
In (2.10), I said ehhhhhrm is not counted as a quote in its own right if it does not
have a pronounced intonation contour which would justify treating it as such. Bolden
(to appear), Gtinthner (1998) and Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen (1999) show that
suprasegmantals such as pitch, intonation, register, lengthenings etc. are used to
demarcate and interpret the beginning of quotations with no overt lexical signal (cf.
also the discussion under unframed quotes later in this chapter). In prosodically
unmarked cases, I interpret sequences such as I said ehhhhrm as repaired by the
following sequence Vquot "quote" I said "quote". Hence, I consider (2.10) as two
instances of the same quote instead of two independent quotes.
Only if the putative quotative frame contains lexical material or if the non-
lexical material is produced with a clear intonation contour of its own are the tokens
counted as quotation. As the next example shows, cases where the two potentially
separate quotes have their own, non-identical semantic content and their own
prosodic structure (as manifested by two complete intonation contours) are counted
as two separate re-enactments.
10
Vquot here stands for any verbum dicendi.
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(2.11) BrE - Derby 12: Two separate quotes
02 B:





he says "I want you inside so we can lock up",
so I've been back up this narrow little drive,
he shuts the gate.
In line 02 and 03 there are two pieces of re-enactment which I interpret as two
separate quotes, no and I want you inside so we can lock up. This decision is taken on
the basis of their independent truth value and semantic content, and due to the fact
that they constitute two separate intonation contours (two full falls, one after no and
one after up, as is indicated by the full stops in the transcription, cf. Appendix 2).
In this example, the fall in line 02 and the new onset of an intonation contour in
03 signal that the quotative frame he says introduces the second quote rather than
retroactively marks the first quote, no. In cases where the suprasegmental
information does not disambiguate the direction of the scope, the question poses
itself: to which quote does a quotation frame between two instances of reported
speech belong?
The methodological assumption that I make here is that one quotative frame
only has scope over one quote. If there is no clear intonational break either before or
after he says, which breaks down the construction into coherent intonation units
(Chafe 1988, 1994), we cannot disambiguate to which re-enactment he says belongs.
In such cases, I go with statistical probability, which shows that the default scenario
(over 99% of all clear tokens of quotation) is that the quotative frame occurs before
the quote. Hence, if suprasegmental information does not indicate otherwise, I
interpret cases like the above as two quotations, the first with a zero frame and the
second framed by a graphic introducer such as he says.
Another problematic area is when quotes are broken up by insertion sequences.
The question comes up: when do we consider the two parts to be one coherent entity
and when do we have to assume that we have two separate quotes? Example (2.12)
illustrates this phenomenon:
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(2.12) BrE - NC 10: Insertion sequence
X: and I got to a half an hour later it just got a bit sick,
and said "ahhh I'll have to go",
(.) ha ha ha ha (.)
"but ehh,
call me back I'll pay for that".
Here, X's self-quote "ahhh I'll have to go (...) but ehh call me back I'll pay for that"
is broken up by a laughter sequence by the same speaker, represented as ha ha ha ha
in the transcript. I interpret this laughter sequence, which is clearly set off
suprasegmentally from the surrounding speech by micro pauses, as an interruption.
Speaker X steps out of the quotation and adds the laughter sequence as a meta-
comment to his narration. It does not form a part of the reported material. I consider
cases like (2.12) as one quote with an insertion sequence when the interruption fulfils
the following criteria11:
(1) It must not add anything to the propositional content of the quote. In the
case of example (2.12), the laughter sequence does not have lexical status.
Consequently, the continuation of the quote is an extension of the same message with
only a meta-comment in-between. Any lexical item with clear semantic force would
divide the quote in two. Hence, I allow for discourse markers and meta-comments
such as voice, sounds, gestural effects and laughter in-between quotative sequences
and still count the two parts as pertaining to the same quote.
(2) A non-continuous intonation contour needs to clearly set off the insertion
sequence from the surrounding quote. Speakers in my corpus mark comments such
as laughter sequences, but also discourse markers very clearly as either pertaining to
the quote or as outside of the quote by the chosen intonation, (cf. Klewitz and
Couper-Kuhlen 1999 for more a more detailed analysis of the prosodic marking of
material with respect to its in-out status in quotative situations).
Having laid out the criteria for the delimitation of what I consider to be the
subject of my analysis - reported speech and thought, framed or unframed, past or
present, containing linguistic or extralinguistic material - it is important to
11 Note that laughter sequences or other insertion sequences can still be part of the quote if they do not
convey to the conditions mentioned in (1) and (2).
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distinguish direct from indirect reported speech because I will restrict myself to the
12
analysis of direct reported speech.
3.3.1. Indirect versus direct quotes
Cameron (1998: 51, cf. also Maldonado 1991:20) contrasts description
(indirect speech) and demonstration/re-enactment (direct speech). He adds that direct
and indirect styles "fail to meet the basic criterion for definition as a sociolinguistic
variable" as they perform different tasks in discourse (1991:48, cf. also Banfield
1982, Coulmas 1986, Leech and Short 1981, Lucy 1993, Maldonado 1991, Maynes
1990, Reyes 1993:41-42, Waugh 1995, Wierzbicka 1974). This fundamental break¬
down seems to have been the common assumption in sociolinguistic treatment of
quotatives; all studies I know of only consider direct reported discourse.
In this thesis, I will maintain the same subject of analysis in order to achieve
general compatibility with previous work. I also agree with Cameron's and Reyes'
claim about the general distinctness of direct and indirect speech. The following
paragraphs sketch out how I define direct quotes and how I distinguish them from
indirect ones. Clark and Gerrig (1990) demonstrate that direct and indirect reported
speech can be differentiated in terms of them being exponents of different stylistic
categories. They set up the opposition of more dramatic vs. more descriptive (cf. also
Baumann 1986, Dubois 1989, Macaulay 1987, Short and Semino and Culpeper 1996,
Sternberg 1982, Tannen 1986, 1989, Yule 1993). While this fundamental difference
indeed holds in theory, the reality test in the form of a corpus of real occurring
speech yields a surprisingly high number of borderline cases. I contend that the
notion of what constitutes a direct quote has to be refined. While I acknowledge that
the drawing of a line between direct and indirect quotes is a very slippery endeavour,
12 The intermediate style, indirect free speech is often referred to in poetics as in Pascal (1977),
Rabatel (2001), see also Fludernick (1993), Juillard (2000), Vuillaume (2000), Ehrlich (1990) and
many others. I will not be concerned with this style of quoting and will restrict myself to the analysis
of direct reported speech and thought. For a comprehensive treatment of direct and indirect styles
consider Roncador (1988), Roeck (1994), from a cross-linguistic perspective refer to the edited
volumes Coulmas (1986) and Lucy (1993).
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I will now try to demarcate the related concepts of direct and indirect speech.131 will
finish the definition by discussing my decisions in a few frequently recurrent
ambiguous cases.
On the structural dimension, we can distinguish indirect from direct quotation
because there is a formal prerequisite for indirect quotation. Indirect quotations
require the quoted material to have the syntactic form of a coherent declarative
sentence. Any utterance that does not syntactically fit the format required of the
indirectly quoted material has to be restructured in order to be incorporated into the
construction and to be embedded under the CP node. For example, direct questions
and imperatives are structurally impossible in indirect quotes. Hence the sequence he
said that where is the bar would not be interpreted as an indirect quote. The internal
structure of the quote would need to be reorganized in order to be incorporated
syntactically into an indirect construction. Equally, we do not find no / yes / or
vocative items such as greetings and address terms directly following the verbum
dicendi (+that) in indirect quotes. Furthermore, indirect quotations cannot start with
discourse markers. Hence, he said "sort of amazing that place" is necessarily direct.
But formal criteria alone do not fully delimit direct from indirect quotes. We will
need to add other criteria based on functional principles.
Leech and Short (1981:32) claim that the effect produced by the use of indirect
speech is one in which the reporter of the conversation intervenes as an interpreter
between the person being spoken to and the words of the person being reported,
instead of merely quoting verbatim the speech that occurred. Even though I do not
accept the verbatim assumption for reported speech and even though it has been
shown that direct reported speech also can contain interpretive elements from the
reporting speaker, Leech and Short are right when they say that the point of view is a
decisive criterion in the differentiation between direct and indirect speech. The
fundamental difference between the two modes of speech representation lies in the
perspective adopted by the person who does the reporting. I assume, like Clark and
13 For other partially overlapping attempts to delineate direct and indirect speech consider Banfield
(1982), Cameron (1998:48), Coulmas (1986), Leech and Short (1981), Lucy (1993b), Maldonado
(1991), Maynes (1990), Waugh (1995), Wierzbicka (1974).
33
Gerrig (1990) and Cameron (1996), that direct quotations have a deictic orientation
to the experiencer of the quote in spatial, temporal and personal deixis: He said "I
am leaving now", is a direct quote. This is in contrast to indirect quotes such as he
said (that) he was leaving now, which are from the deictic viewpoint of the reporting
speaker. Hence, the difference is the perspective from which the quote is reported (cf.
Cameron 1996:51).
Note that I have not taken as a distinguishing characteristic for a direct quote
two different criteria
(1) Whether or not there is a that. My data shows that many quotes feature the
complementiser that followed by experiencer deictic orientation.14 The following
example shows that it is not the (non) existing that which makes a difference
between indirect and direct quote but that it is the deictic orientation of the quote
(italics = voice effect).
(2.13) BrE - NC 17: Direct deictic orientation with that
H: when they were teaching you to cook a potato.
T: baked potato,
and you think that "well we're not stupid you know",
In vein with Cameron's analysis for Puerto Rican Spanish (1998: note 9), where he
concluded that que is not a decisive criterion for the delimitation of direct and
indirect speech, I interpret quotes such as (2.13) as direct.
(2) Also, I didn't consider a decisive factor whether or not there are voice
effects. Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen (1999) show that voice effects are by no means
restricted to direct quotes. Indeed, speakers use voice effects in indirect quotes quite
frequently. The authors demonstrate that the difference between indirect and direct
speech is much more fluid than currently claimed in the literature and that reporting
speakers often move in and out of direct and indirect reported speech.
14
Obviously, this interpretation opens up the question whether such quotes would have to be
understood as repairs away from the indirect to the direct quotation. I will not dwell on this issue here
and merely interpret such quotes as direct.
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In sum, in this thesis I define indirect quotes as reproductions that have to
follow structural requirements in order to be embedded and have a deictic orientation
to the reporting speaker. They cannot include extralinguistic and pragmatic elements.
By contrast, direct quotes are re-enactments of previous actions which are free in
their syntactic form and have a deictic orientation to the experiencer. They can
incorporate extralinguistic material and pragmatic markers.
I excluded quotations that were ambiguous between direct and indirect quotes.
One reason for exclusion was ambiguity of temporal and personal orientation. This is
most frequently the case when the quotative verb is in the present tense and
consequently does not trigger any backshift in the subordinate if it is introducing an
indirect quote. The example below is such a case:
(2.14) BrE - Derby 13: Duplicating videotapes
M: marking all the videos,
cause he's been taping them all,
D: did he,
M: I suppose [that] he's going to make em- almost taping all of them,
Here, the temporal deictic orientation in the quoted stretch lends itself to an
interpretation as an indirect construction - a that can easily be substituted - giving the
construction I suppose [that] he's going to make em- almost taping all of them, as
well as a direct construction I suppose he's going to make em... . The same problem
also occurs when the quotative verb is in the historical present (Johnstone 1987,
Schiffrin 1981, Wolfson 1981, 1982). In the analysis, quotes of this sort, which could
not be unambiguously identified as either direct or indirect have been disregarded.
Also, all tokens where a possible embedding in an indirect quotative construction
was merely a matter of clausal order have been excluded. The quotes have been
excluded if syntactic incorporation into an indirect quote is possible if we swap
matrix and subordinate. The syntactic non-possibility of incorporation in an indirect
structure has to be a problem of general structural incompatibility rather than a mere
problem of clausal order.
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3.3.2 The problem of think
A frequent phenomenon in my corpus was the occurrence of the verb think as a
modalising statement, as in the following example:
(2.15) BrE - NC 11: Think in modalising function
X; and I remember putting a pellet,
Y: in,
X: in the breech,
Y: ah,
X: and I think a cold button actually,
got caught in the trigger guard.
Here, I think indicates that the speaker is telling the story from his perspective and
from his substantially blurred memory given the fact that he is relating childhood
memories. I think functions as a hedge and attenuates epistemic certainty (Fludernick
1993, Schneider 2002, Semino, Short, and Culpeper 1997). In this function, it has
nothing of a quote and cases such as (2.15) have not been included in the analysis.
In some cases, though, it is slightly harder to judge whether or not to include
think + potential quote in my analysis. This was especially the case where I think
occurred in the present tense and was followed by material that could be considered
reported as in the following example:
(2.16) BrE - Derby 13: Think in modalising or quotative function
X: so I was then eleven you,
Y: you when we were a bit before then,
I think we moved there when,
we moved there when you were about 8 or nine,
X: yeah I can't remember that time,
Like (2.16), many instances of think with first person in the present tense were hard
to classify. They were somehow borderline cases between indirect and direct quotes.
Also, they were ambiguous between I think as a hedge (Aijmer 2001, Holmes 1990,
Schiffrin 1987, Simon-Vandenbergen 2000) and as a lexical quotative verb. As the
main focus of this analysis is not to understand the patterning of hedges, I have
decided to leave out the tokens of think with ambiguity in key. This is because we
would get too much noise in a statistical analysis if we left in instances which are
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functionally hedges. As pointed out by Guy (1988), Young and Bayley (1996) and
many others, when doing an analysis of variance such as a VABRUL or any other
kind of a regression analysis, one should take out 'knockout factor groups', cases
where no variation occurs. The normal procedure is to exclude categorical contexts
(Blake 1997, Singler 2001). As like (and go in US English, cf. Butters 1980,
Schourup 1982b) cannot occur with indirect speech, all tokens which are possibly
occurring with indirect quotes (as well as ambiguous ones) had to be excluded from
the analysis. This applies mostly to think in the present tense and the first person
singular in environments such as in (2.16) where we cannot tell whether the quote is
direct or indirect. But it also pertains to all other ambiguous cases as discussed above.
As soon as any ambiguity in key arises, the tokens have to be eliminated.
Hence, my subject of analysis consists of all strategies speakers have at their
disposition in order to signal that a re-enactment of previous behaviour is about to or
has taken place. This is then demonstrated from the perspective of the reported
speaker. I define the sum of enquoting strategies as the (say) variable. This is on the
basis of the fact that the quotative devices have "one common function in discourse"
(Dines 1980): they frame re-enactment of previous states or actions. As the (say)
variable is functionally defined, we will have to admit any device that functionally
falls within this category as a member of this category. When looking at a data-base
of talk-in-interaction, we find that numerous quotes are not framed by a verbum
dicendi (cf. examples (2.1)-(2.3) taken from Cameron 1998). I will now discuss this
category in more detail.
3.3.3. Unframed quotes'5
Guldemann (2001:28) claims that unframed quotes are strikingly rarely
thematised in the literature. But while studies in the field of discourse analysis do
tend to refer to this option, sociolinguistic research indeed includes this quotative
15 Unframed quotes have been called "freestanding" by Clark and Gerrig (1990), "zero quotatives" by
Mathis and Yule (1994), "unintroduced dialogue" by Tannen (1986) and "bald" and "unbracketed
quotes" by Romaine and Lange (1991), "free direct speech" by Leech and Short (1981) "unidentified
speech" by Wiesemann (1990), "null quotation formula" by Longacre (1994), "zero quotatives" by
Yule (1993) and Mathis and Yule (1994).
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option surprisingly rarely. Because such an omission of a variant "gives a distorted
picture of the formal aspects of the entire domain" (2001:29), a balanced variationist
study of the quotative system needs to include this quotative option.
With respect to the interpretation of unframed quotes, I follow Giildemann
(2001:29) and consider them not as a case of structural deletion of the surface marker.
Rather, I interpret unmarked quote as a variant in its own right, albeit with no overt
lexical signal. Note that this definition considers marking/not marking a binary
choice with no one member conceptually more basic than the other (see Ferrara and
Bell 1995). Couper-Kuhlen and Klewitz (1999) and Giinthner (1998) have shown
that lexically unmarked quotes are zero on the surface but clearly demarcated from
the surrounding material by their intonation, higher expressiveness of voice, pitch
movements, pauses, lengthenings and other suprasegmental devices. 16 Other
strategies for the disambiguation of the following quote as reported are (i) initial oh,
which is, following Heritage (1984:299) "a change of state token which shows some
kind of change in locally current state of knowledge, information, orientation, or
awareness", viz. a change in footing (Goffman 1979) (ii) and anaphor resolution
according to the preceding and following context (Marslen-Wilson, Levy and Tylor
1983:361). Tannen (1986:323) set up a continuum of quotative options with graphic
introducer verbs at the one pole and more expressiveness of voice at the other.
Consequently, in this analysis, quotatives without a frame are included in the
(say) variable as well. By doing so, we can "close the set that defines the variable"
(Labov 1996:78). Unframed quotes, as I will call them from now on, form one
variant, albeit a zero variant, of the category.
As unframed quotes, I counted completely zero quotative frames (as in
example 2.1) as well as quotatives that continue the experiencer subject17 (+dummy
verb he) as is illustrated below.18
16 Some studies have shown that suprasegmental patterns have acquired a certain degree of
conventionalisation (McGregor 1994:76), Du Feu (1996:14).
17 The fact that I found many quotative frames of the form and NP [be] (cf. also Clark and Gerrig
1990:772-note 9) where the verb in brackets is a form of inflected to be runs counter to Cameron's
native speaker intuitions (1998: 58).
18 See Cameron (1998:54) for the discussion of the same kind of construction in Spanish (with ser and
estar). In his analysis, quotes of this structure count as embedded, though.
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(2.17) USE — File 2464 Unframed quote with experiencer and be
A: no I could smell an accent a mile away,
B: oh isn't that only people from there can tell.
everyone else is "where did you get that weird accent"?
A: are you in Pennsylvania or Dallas right now?
In example (2.17), the narrator mentions the authors to whom the speech act is
attributed (a generic everyone). No quotative verb frames the re-enactment. Instead,
the narrator gives the source of the quote as well as the appropriately conjugated
form of the verb to be. In my analysis, such cases also count as unframed. Hence, the
category 'unframed' consists of quotes which are not framed by any item with
inherent quotative function such as a the verba dicendi say, think etc. or other items
which have grammaticalised or are en route to grammaticalization as quotatives such
as go, like and be all.
In sum, my analysis covers the full range of means which speakers make use of
in order to enquote reported speech, sound, gesture and thought. The (say) variable
can be broken up as follows.
Table 2.1: Frequencies of occurrence of variants of the (say) variable
British English US English
N % N %
like 93 4.5 121 8.8
go 264 12.8 80 5.8
say 967 46.9 562 41.0
think 175 8.5 121 8.8
unframed 462 22.8 298 21.7
tell 23 1.1 42 3.1
other 80 3.9 147 10.7
Total 2064 1371
The data-driven analysis ensures that all variants, whether marked lexically or
suprasegmentally, were included in my corpus and were counted as members of the
(say) variable. This analysis covers the full spectrum of quotative devices starting
from the graphic speech verbs, through the "new" quotatives like and go (there were
only very few instances of be all in my corpus), to unframed quotes. I have thus
closed the set that defines the variable and shown where quotation occurs. But note
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that there is in my view no way to predict where quotation does not occur other than
a genre-specific analysis.
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In this chapter, I conduct a quantitative analysis of the linguistic constraints of
all the variants within the (say) variable. I especially endeavour to explain which
functional niches the newest arrival, like, has appropriated for itself and will compare
its behaviour with the patterning of the older non-canonical variant go. I have chosen
to restrict my investigation to the US contingent of my corpus, the Switchboard
corpus, because like was already considerably widespread in the US data at the point
in time when the recordings were made (1988-1992). Given the fact that Butters
(1982) was the first to note quotative like in Californian English, we can assume that
the restructuring of the quotative system in this variety has had sufficient time to
adapt to the intruding newcomer and settle down in its richer ( + like) form. In
Chapter 5, I will compare the results reported here with the British English corpus in
order to show how the British system, where like is a younger addition, has reacted to
the more recent addition and whether we can postulate cross-varietal trends.
The quotative cohort had to react in some way to the intrusion of two new
members into the set of available options in order to accommodate these new
members. This chapter will give evidence of how the quotative cohort re-organised.
It will become evident that the quotative system of US English has become fully
restructured in order to accommodate additional items. It is not the case that
quotative items follow simple patterns of probability matching (Labov 2001) in
transmission where patterns of distribution are reproduced by later generations.
Rather, because individual quotative variants have a specific function in the pool of
quotative devices and are far from being semantically empty, exchangeable, variants
such as [in] and [iq], the refunctionalisation of all its members proceeded in a
systematic way, by reallocating the functional load of introducing different types of
quotations amongst the larger set of possible variants. Later, I will give evidence that
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this functional allocation is far from arbitrary; rather, it is motivated by semantic -
pragmatic features (cf. Chapter 4).
The linguistic facts presented here support the claim made in Buchstaller
(2001b) that the newcomer quotatives have linguistic as well as social significance
(cf. Chapter 6 for their extralinguistic patterning). It will be shown that we witness an
important division of labour within the paradigm of reporting devices. The "new"
quotatives like and go have taken on quite specific functions within the pool of
quotative devices while older quotative variants have been functionally reallocated to
other functional niches. Evidence of their functional load underlines the new
quotatives' status as full members of the quotative cohort with their own functional
niches. Hence, the new quotatives, go and like, are not just "picked up" from high
status reference groups as has been suggested by much of the sociolinguistic
literature to date. Rather, the task-sharing amongst the old and new quotative variants
provides the newer members with a linguistic raison d'etre. Like and go are far from
pleonastic, intrusive items in the pool of quotatives.
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section explores the use of the
quotative variants with hypotheticality levels. I will investigate their patterning with
respect to the epistemic level of the quote and then compare this distribution with
their occurrence with respect to contextual features (such as time reference, co¬
occurrence with a defined speaker and listener, etc.). It will be shown that
epistemicity is closely mapped onto contextual factors. Then, I will explore the
priming effects that hold amongst the quotative options, both on a structural level
and as concrete lexical priming effects. And finally, I will shed some more light on
the patterning of old and new quotative options with mimetic enactment. At the end
of this section, it will have become evident that that go and like have a wealth of
functions and are much more than mere intruders, or trendy fads.
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3.1. Epistemicity and Quotation
Modern English is rich in verbs representing speech and thought. But as
Romaine and Lange (1991) point out, the English system is not very good at
distinguishing between and linguistically marking hearsay and factuality. This makes
English unlike German, French and Turkish where epistemicity is marked via
inflection of the verb. In earlier stages, English had different resources for
representing de dicto domains in general, and more specifically for the reporting of
speech and thought (see Dirven at al 1982). Vendler (1972, in Romaine and Lange
1991: 264) has shown the close connection between mental verbs and verbs of saying
as well as of language and thought, claiming that this has to do with the close
parallels that exist between forms of thought and forms of speaking (cf. also
Frajzyngier 1991). Consequently, in English and many other languages, we notice a
very close relationship between descriptions of mental states and the reporting of
speech. Traugott (1986) claims that where non-speech act and speech act verbs co¬
exist, the former will emerge first. She postulates a cline mental verb > speech act
verb.
Generally, a quotative situation pertains over two periods of time. Let us
assume that t is the point in time of the initial mental/verbal activity and t +i is its
rendering as a quote between interlocutors. For example, imagine a situation where
speaker A tells his brother at t, Christmas Day, I forgot to buy you a present. This
speech act can be rendered at any given t+i, say, when A is chatting to his buddy B
on New Year's Eve as I said "I forgot to buy you a present". Conversely, if speaker
A thought at t damn, I forgot to buy him a present, this can be rendered at t+i as I
thought "damn, I forgot to buy him a present". The difference between reported
inner monologue and reported real occurring speech is their (non-) wording at t. Real
occurring reported speech was realized at t. Other forms of reported utterances might
or might not have been realized at t. For example, A might have mumbled damn... at
t or even only screamed it inwardly with anger. But the important thing to notice is
that, irrespective of their initial form in t, both hypothetical inner monologue and real
occurring reported speech are uttered out aloud at t+i, and this constitutes the actual
quote.
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My data shows that even when speakers use the most "committed" speech
introducer, say, we do not always have certainty that the actual words have been
spoken in t. This made me interested in how narrators, when quoting, index their
relationship and attitude to the quote. In this section, I will explore how speakers
index their relationship and attitudes to the quote and how they express the general
probability of the occurrence of the quote. It will be shown that like, go and other
quotative options are used to mark the degree of hypotheticality of the quote. This
section is structured as follows: I will first explain my notion of hypotheticality and
how it pertains to the study of quotations. Then, I will show how the quotative
variants pattern with respect to epistemic levels.
Hypotheticality is the probability with which a state of affairs or action is
realised. For Standard English, the conditional sphere has traditionally been divided
into a bi-partite (Quirk et al 1985) and tri-partite (Johnson-Laird 1986) system. A
variety of criticisms have been levelled at this partitioning: Thumm (2000) shows
that the criteria for determining which category to put a token into are often not
based in the data but artificially determined (often with a glance to Latin grammar).
Furthermore, Couper-Kuhlen (1999) argues that the boundaries between epistemic
categories are fuzzy and that individual instances cannot be subsumed under 2 or 3
degrees only. Both, Thumm and Couper-Kuhlen demonstrate that the actual
hypotheticality level is contextually determined, dependent more or less on the
situation, and a matter of pragmatics. Comrie (1986:88) notes that different
languages differentiate different degrees of hypotheticality. Buchstaller (1999) shows
that in a Creole language various lexico-syntactic means can grammaticalise for the
marking of hypotheticality and that those devices and the epistemicity levels they
relate to are merely a matter of convention (cf. Hopper's 1991 concept of emergent
grammar).
Taken together, these arguments speak for a more fluid conceptualization of
probability. In this chapter, I will follow Comrie (1986) and Akatsuka's (1986)
proposal of a factualis - realis continuum instead of arbitrary divisions of the
epistemic sphere. One pole of this continuum is held by factualis actions or states and
44
the other by counterfactual or counter-to-expectation events or states. In-between
those two endpoints, there are various intermittent steps of epistemic stance along the
continuum. The sphere of probability/hypotheticality is finely differentiated into a
multiplicity of epistemic stances. The whole range of epistemic relations ranges from
realis over possible and hypothetical to counterfactual.
Now let us transpose the notion of hypotheticality, the probability of realisation
of states of affairs, events or action, into the realm of quotation, which is the
reiteration (in t+i) of words, sounds, and gestures that have already been produced (in
t). I noted that there is a probabilistic relationship between the quote and the original
utterance. We can distinguish between utterances that could have been spoken out
aloud in t (with various degrees of probability) and those that were definitely spoken
out aloud in t. This means it is always possible and sensible to ask: How probable is
it that the actual utterance was realised as an outward, overt speech act? The narrator
in t+i can present the quote as counterfactual or as realis or somewhere in-between.
This builds again on Comrie's (1986) notion of an epistemic continuum where
boundaries between categories are fuzzy. If, following Comrie (1986) and Akatsuka
(1986), we conceptualise the sphere of hypotheticality as contingent and polar with a
finely differentiated multitude of epistemic stances in-between, there is no reason not
to believe that quotes might also be located along a cline of epistemicity (cf. Semino,
Short and Culpeper 1997). The hypotheticality continuum for quotations can be
conceptualised as follows:
Figure 3.1: The Hypotheticality Continuum
Stream of hypotheticality
Probability
low < T T-^ high
<" ^ t (* *) "
not uttered might have been uttered were uttered
If there is a factualis relation between t and t+i_ the quote is located at the rightmost
pole of the continuum. Quotes where the original utterance has not been produced at
t but is nevertheless portrayed as a reproduction in t+i, viz. where the relationship
between t and t +i is that of non-occurrence (counterfactual or counter-to-
expectation), are positioned at the leftmost pole of the continuum. The body of the
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continuum consists of quotes with various epistemicity levels from more to less
hypothetical. Consequently, we can differentiate between quotes that were uttered
aloud in t (on the high probability pole), quotes which definitely were not uttered out
aloud (at the counterfactual side), and quotes which might or might not have been
uttered (which span the continuum in-between).
The question then is whether taking this step sheds any light on the confusing
field of different quotative variants. The following sections seek to answer this
question.
3.2. Categories of Realisation
I will now determine how individual (say) variants pattern with respect to
epistemicity levels. In order to do this, I have set up three rough categories of
quotations, depending on their epistemic stance, which I termed realis, hypothetical
and situational. I will exemplify these categories at length below. For the analysis, all
quotative tokens were categorized as one of the three categories of use. I will now
explain the procedure that was adopted for the determining and coding for epistemic
stance. Please note that the exact parameters that were used for the classification of
quotes into the categories of use, as well as the contextual factors involved, will be
described at length in the discussion in sections 3.2.1-3.2.3. and 3.3.
The coding of all quotative tokens in the data was done in a three-way process.
(i) Every instance of quotation was identified in the data.
(ii) As a next step, all instances were coded as realis, hypothetical or situational. The
coding procedure was as follows: First, the quotative frame was deleted and
substituted by a dummy, QUOTE. This was done in order to ascertain that the
epistemic stance of the singular token was determined on the basis of the quote and
its context and not on the basis of the framing quotative. The tokens were given with
as much context as was needed in the singular instance for the determination of the
contextual variables (see below). Every quote, which was presented in a large chunk
of speech, was listened to and judged for its epistemic level. The actual coding for
46
category of use was done on an intuitive basis. Later in this chapter, I will give
evidence that there is independent validity to this categorization. An independent
coder and I coded several instances together.1 After several initial sessions of joint
coding, the coding was done by myself with regular crosschecks by an independent
coder, checking problematic cases as well as random tokens from my data. In order
to verify my coding system with other native speakers' intuitions, I counterchecked
the intuitiveness of the categories as well as the allocation of several random tokens
with two native speakers of British English, to whom I explained the mechanisms. I
also discussed several instances with those two informants along the way. For
consistency purposes, regular counter-checks with older coding were done. Finally,
39 ambiguous cases (2.9% of the overall corpus) were eliminated from the analysis,
(iii) In a third step, the individual quotative tokens were coded for the presence or
absence of various contextual variables (such as a defined speaker, hearer, situation
etc). I shall explain this process in detail below. Coding every token for contextual
rootedness (as defined by the aforementioned contextual variables) enabled me to
correlate the category of use of the quote (realis, hypothetical, and situation) with the
contextual factors in which it occurred. Chapter 3.3 will give evidence of the
significant correlation between probabilistic occurrence of overt contextual factors
and intuitively determined categories of use. We find that the epistemic stance of a
quote very nicely maps into its degree of contextual rootedness.
I will now exemplify and discuss the three categories of use for quotations,
realis, hypothetical, and situational.
3.2.1 Realis
Realis quotes are re-productions of past utterances that did occur in t. They are
at the high probability pole of the continuum. Example (3.1) shows a quote of this
type:














(3.1) Being mistaken for a woman
A: the other day I went into a bar and this guy asked me to dance,
B: ha ha ha [ha ha ha ha
A: [and all he saw was my hair,
and he goes "do you wanna dance"?
I turn around and go "what"?
B ha ha ha .hhh
A: and he goes "do you wanna dance"?
I go "no no".
he goes "oh oh I'm sorry".
I go "yeah you better be",
I go "you better be".
Here, structural properties ratify the quotes introduced with go as real occurring
speech. The two exchanges in lines 04-05 and 07-08 are question and answer
scenarios. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) note that a first pair part such as a
question (lines 04 and 07) structurally requires an answer (lines 05 and 08). If no
answer had occurred, it would have been noticeably absent (Hutchby and Wooffitt
1998). Hence, the quotes can be classified as 'reads' speech. The "second turn proof
procedure" (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974) ratifies their interpretation as real
occurring speech.
Note that the classification of quotes as realis does not rely on the verbatim
postulate (Leech 1974, Genette 1980). Rather, the interpretation of quotes as realis is
in accordance with Tannen's (1986) concept of "constructed dialogue", whereby
quotes are considered approximative depictions of an earlier action (cf. also Clark
and Gerrig 1990). The approximate nature of the depicted utterance is due to
personal constraints on the speaker and because quoting always also involves
interpretation and often contains "internal evaluation" (cf. Labov 1972c). Speakers
may enhance speech acts in order to create involvement and make the situation more
vivid (for the concept of "staging", see Clark and Gerrig 1990, Wierzbicka 1974).
3.2.2. Hypothetical
Ferrara and Bell (1995:279) observe that a clear boundary between reported
speech and thought is hard to draw (cf. also Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999, Vincent
and Dubois 1996, Chafe 1994). This is because speakers often express a past attitude
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or opinion in the form of reported speech in order to make inner states available to
hearers (Ferrara and Bell 1995, Nordberg 1984). Furthermore, because such
packaging of thoughts into the format of a quote makes the narrative more vivid and
engaging, a narrator can heighten the dramatic impact of the story and thereby secure
a claim to the floor.
In such cases, it does not make a difference whether the original speech act was
actually uttered aloud or not. We are dealing with quotes whose function is
comparable to Goffman's (1978, 1981:114-116) "response cries". Goffman defined
these as used to "show or index the mental state of the transmitters [...] to clarify the
drama of their circumstances". This is exemplified by the next stretch of speech.
(3.2) Plastic bags
B: yeah in fact I have one today,
A: ri[ght.
B: [the only problem with those is sometimes they got holes in the bottom.
A: yeah [they




The larger conversation makes it clear that we are to imagine the following situation.
There is a woman (B) with her chips in a bag. She may be alone. The bag breaks and
the chips fall out. Now imagine what one would say in a situation like this: one might
just be angry and swear inwardly. One might even swear out loud. But in the absence
of an interlocutor, to whom is this talk addressed? The chips?
Such verbalizations of mental states are exactly what hypothetical quotes are
about. Because hypothetical quotes are often attitudes or opinions expressed through
and in the form of a quote in order to make them more vivid, it does not make any
difference whether they are uttered aloud or not. Quotes in this category fall into
what Chafe (1994) has called "verbally uncommitted thought". Their status as verbal
or non-verbal, or even a combination of both, is left completely open. If uttered out
loud, they have the function of putting into words (at least in the speaker's and
hearer's now) what was going on in the mind of the person presented as the animator
of the quote. But as Goffman (1981:97) points out, with no one present the quote is
likely to be omitted altogether (cf. also Tannen 1986, Yule and Mathis 1992). In
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cases of self talk, it is impossible to know whether the words were actually spoken
and it is even less likely that they were heard (cf. Vincent and Dubois (1996).
The category hypothetical is set up so as to span the whole spectrum of
hypotheticality and not to break it up into arbitrarily chosen epistemic stances.
Quotes in this category can be situated anywhere on the continuum.
3.2.3. Situational
As I have explained above, quotes have an inherent probabilistic relation
between the utterance in t and the report of it in t +i. This epistemic stance can either
be very high, as for realis quotes, or somewhere in-between, as for hypothetical
quotes. For situational quotes, there is a counterfactual relation between t and t+i.
Hence, there is no communicative situation in the past - because there never was any
original utterance - but only in the present (in t+i), when the quotation occurs (cf.
Vincent and Dubois' (1996) concept of "assertion"). This means that the original
speech act is only portrayed as such by the reporting speaker. Example (3.3) provides
a nice case in point:
(3.3) Cooking
B: so I enjoy you know cooking things to take over to her hou[se or-
A: [oh that is nice,
B: yeah and it is fun for me to do that,
it's something I enjoy doing,
it's funny though it's like "I don't really want to cook for us" ha [ ha
A: [ yeah ha ha
In this stretch of speech, it is very unlikely that B had ever said "7 don't really want
to cook for us", which she is now reporting to A, to anyone else before. It is also
possible that she had not thought it before either. The situation is more of the kind
where A says to B 7 do not really want to cook for us in their interactive present.
There are no past events, no reproduction. This means that the only interlocutors
involved are the current speaker (B) and the current hearer (A); there are no past
speaker and hearer. The quote 7 don't really want to cook for us can be understood as




B: well I watch my husband swing,
and his swing you know compared to the pros is so,
it's ridged,
it's like "he's trying so hard,
it's not that flowing movement".
Here, again, it is very unlikely that B had ever said he's trying to so hard at t and is
reporting this utterance to her interlocutor in t +i. This is because there was no real
interactively communicative situation in the past. It also does not seem that she
thought he's trying so hard at t. Rather, like (3.3), her utterance is more a comment
on the situation at t clad in a quote. It is not a re-telling of an original quote. It's like
here can be glossed as "my perception of the situation is such that it [=the situation]
is like a:"
Because this category of quotes somehow straddles the border between a
description of a situation and a quote, I have termed it situational. And indeed, it is
often only the added or not added voice effect (Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999)
that helps to distinguish between a description of a situation and a reported quote.2
Vincent and Dubois (1996), while discussing this category of quotes (called
"assertion" in their terminology), point out that presenting information as reported
speech instead of as mere description gives it emphasis and makes it more vivid.
They also argue that by packaging a depiction of a situation into the format of a
quote, speakers assume full responsibility for what they are saying as they openly
state its subjective, agent-based status. Hence, for assertions, aka situational quotes,
the introductory verb can be replaced by the propositional attitude "it seems to me
that". A situational quote indexes a speaker-infused rendering of the situation, it
shows that the perspective is that of the current speaker (cf. Sanders and Redecker
1996). Quotes in the situational category can be understood as comments or
assertions (Pomerantz 1979) clad in the form of a quote. The moment of speaking is
in the now and becomes the quote.
2 While I have not considered suprasegmental features for the delimitation of the three categories of
use, intonation and prosody did inform my choices of whether or not to count something as a quote in
the first place (cf. Chapter 2).
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In conclusion, a relationship holds between the original utterance and its
reproduction. This relationship is one of more or less probability of occurrence of the
original utterance in t. The epistemic modality of the quote refers to the different
ways in which speakers can show their commitment or their attitudes towards what
they are reporting (Karkkainen 1999). They can portray quotes as situated
somewhere on the hypotheticality continuum for quotatives, which I have split into
three rough categories for this investigation.
The next few paragraphs discuss the importance of contextualization (Auer
1992:4) in the determination of the epistemic stance of the quote. I will show that the
probabilistic co-occurrence between epistemicity based categories of use and
contextual factors gives independent validity to the intuitive categorization. It will
become clear that the epistemic continuum matches very nicely into a
contextualization continuum.
3.3. Contextualization and Hypotheticality
Fillmore (1992) maintains that speakers have to open up an alternative world if
they want to express potential states and that they use different means to position
speech along a continuum of hypotheticality. But, as Thumm (2000) has cogently
noted, high hypotheticality need not be marked on the verb or even be signalled by
overt markers as long as the broader context provides the necessary conceptual
features (cf. also Snitzer-Reilly 1986). He argues that the epistemic stance of a
singular instance relies heavily on the context and does not have its locus in one
feature only. Couper-Kuhlen (1999) displays the variety of means developed by
speakers of Standard English for expressing epistemic stance in conditionals.
Moreover, Buchstaller (1999) and Couper-Kuhlen (1999) have shown that while
grammatical constructions get conventionalized as a means for the marking of
epistemic notions, speech communities develop methods for more subtle
differentiations within the epistemicity continuum. Some are more grammaticalised
and some less. The above mentioned research underlines Johnson-Laird's (1986)
claim that in English, content and context signal (i) that a conditional notion is
involved in talk and (ii) what degree of hypotheticality is involved.
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Transporting these insights into the realm of quotation, I will now show that
there is a direct statistical correlation between contextual factors and the epistemicity
level of the quote. In a data-driven analysis, I have isolated contextual elements
which can serve as contextualization cues (Auer 1996, Gumperz 1989, 1992, 1997)
for interpreting the epistemic level of the quote (cf. also Karkkaiinen 1999). I will
now demonstrate their patterning with respect to the hypotheticality level of the
quote. On a frequency-based scale, we can show that quotes with higher probability
are statistically more likely to occur in situations where contextual features are
specified.
As I have laid out in the methodology section above, all instances of quotes
were tagged for contextual factors in their environment. I will now describe in more
detail how this tagging was done:
There was no pre-determined frame of analysis. Contextualization cues can
have scope over hours and hours of conversation. For example, once the location of a
conversation has been mentioned, it can be considered as given and need not be
restated in later talk any more. For this thesis, I have restricted the contextual factors
to be included in the analysis to five: a defined time and situation in which the quote
is embedded, a known and given speaker and addressee, and the conversational
necessity of the quote.
Obviously, the fact that someone is present does not make him or her
automatically an addressee (see Goffman 1981, Kang 1998, Levinson 1983). In the
definition of an addressee, I follow a deixis model of conversation, whereby
participants are classified according to their status in the exchange. As conversational
necessity, I interpret quotes which are structurally required by their sequential
position in talk-in-interaction (cf. the notion of adjacency pair in Conversation
Analysis i.e. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974). Consider for example the
exchange in (3.1), where a question-answer relationship makes the answer
conversationally required. Also included in the category of conversational necessity
were contexts in which the interlocutors uttered meta-comments (referring to overtly
produced speech) on what/when/how something was said by the same interlocutor
who quoted. For example, some interlocutors commented that that they found an
utterance annoying or wonderful or too loud. Cases which were referred to as printed
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sources were also included in this category. Finally, Vincent and Dubois (1996)
conclude that a case of conversational necessity is given when an action causally
follows out of the utterance of a quote. Importantly, such actions would not have
followed out of inner speech (cf. Ferrara and Bell 1995:279, Tagliamonte and
Hudson 1999:156). In this category, I include cases where a quote leads to the
drawing of a conclusion or some knowledge or an action, which would not have
taken place, had the quote consisted of inner speech or mental action only.
I will now illustrate the coding procedure: Consider example (3.5):
(3.5) Getting Married
S: you came down to the Chronicle offices to seek me.
and you waltzed me into the registry office,
because I wasn't 21.
and you got us into Sattle Road,
before you really said what you were gonna do.
((11 lines deleted))
you never ever asked us,
you just waltzed us up the registry office,
—> and I said "where are we going"?
"you'll see you'll see".
The quote framed by I said in (3.5) is embedded in a clearly defined interactive
communicative situation. Both the speaker and the hearer in t are specified as the
husband and wife who are present at the moment their original speech is re-enacted
(t+i). The original utterance occurs at a real and given time, the day they got married.
Furthermore, a real location (on the way to) the registry office is given. Also, the
answer you'll see you'll see is contingent on the question where are we going?,
which in turn conversationally requires an answer (as a second pair part). I have
adopted a binary coding method whereby every single instance of a quote is marked
for the presence or absence of all the respective contextual features. The quote
framed by I said in the line marked by the arrow was consequently coded as
[+speaker], [+addressee], [+time], [-fsituation], [-(-conversational necessity].
It has to be borne in mind that we are looking at a discourse variable and this
makes it tricky if not impossible to quantify exhaustively or to specify an envelope of
variation (cf. Holmes 1989:297, Meyerhoff 1994, Rickford and McNair 1994). But in
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an attempt to capture the fact that speakers index and, conversely, hearers recognise
and interpret the intended degree of hypotheticality of a quote, I have set up a
contextualization matrix (as depicted in Figure 3.2 below) with the five factors I
coded for. Such a matrix enables us to investigate the occurrence of categories of use
(determined by degrees of epistemicity) with contextual variables. A frequency-
based representation of the categories of use by contextual rootedness has the
advantage that it can depict them as fluid along the continuum of hypotheticality.
The following figure shows the correlation between hypotheticality levels (the
x -axis) and degree of contextualization (as a percentage plotted on the y-axis) for
every contextual factor involved. There is a general trend in that slowly falling
values for contextual grounding correlate with lower levels of epistemic stance.
Figure 3.2: Co-occurrence of contextual factors with degrees of hypotheticality
100 n
realis hypothetical situational
We see that realis quotes achieve the highest values on all 4 parameters. Out of all
realis quotes (N=372), 89% are marked for speaker, 69% for a specific hearer, 64%
for a specific situation, etc. We can now set up an overall index-scale which gives the
actual contextualization , , . , ,
ratio , whereby actual contextuahzation is the number of
possible contextualization
quotes in the respective category (here realis) that are marked for a contextual factor,
and possible contextualization is the overall number of tokens in this category. Realis
quotes achieve the overall contextualization ratio of .59.' In a comparison with
3 This index is an attempt to statistically represent the patterning of discourse features. Such a
probabilistic representation enables us to draw comparisons between categories. For a discussion of
other indexes see Meyerhoff (1994) and the articles mentioned therein.
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quotes of other degrees of hypotheticality, realis quotes scored highest of all. Hence,
realis quotes occur in a more plausible and concrete utterance situation, which can be
numerically estimated by a frequency estimation of the contextual factors of time,
situation, speaker, hearer, and contextual necessity.
Hypothetical quotes (N=287) have intermediate values. Vincent and Dubois
claim that for this category of quotes (which they call "pseudo-reproduction") there
are "insufficient indications to clearly place the words in a precise context of being
uttered" (1996:366). The contextualization matrix above shows that Vincent and
Dubois's intuitive claim is borne out by the facts: hypothetical quotes are less
contextualized than realis ones. They only achieve a contextualization index of .35.
We notice that while contextualisation values for hypothetical quotes are below the
ones for realis quotes with respect to all factors, it is especially in the category
'hearer' and 'conversational necessity' that hypothetical quotes lag behind. The main
difference between realis and hypothetical quotes seems to be the presence or
absence of a hearer and of conversational necessity. While the realis score of .59 is
not an indication of overwhelming determination, there seems to be an important step
in epistemic level attributed to quotes which have a determined hearer and are
conversationally required. This step manifests itself in the classification of the quotes
as [+/- likely to be uttered].
It needs to be stated that the investigation of how speakers index and hearers
interpret the epistemicity of more or less probable quotes within the overall category
hypothetical is a topic that deserves further research. In order to do so, we would
need to fine-tune our analysis of contextual situatedness via contextualization factors
and include more (quantitative and qualitative) contextual indications. For the
present analysis, however, it will suffice to classify quotes with undetermined
epistemic level as pertaining to the category 'hypothetical'; I will not delve into a
further sub-classification at this point.
Situational quotes have not been uttered before. Hence, there has never been a
past illocutionary event in t. There is no other interactive context where speech or
thought really occured other than that of the interactive event in progress between the
interlocutors in their current now. This is manifest in the very low contextualization
ratio of only .15 for situational quotes (N=204). Notice that on the right hand side of
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the continuum, the values in all categories except the feature speaker (63%) have
been reduced to values under ten percent (cf. Vincent and Dubois 1996). But even
with respect to the contextual feature speaker, the values are lower than for the other
two quotative categories, realis and hypothetical.
Figure 3.2 shows that as hypotheticality levels rise, the values for contextual
factors decline. Hence, there is a clear overall correlation between contextual factors
and hypotheticality levels. The hypotheticality continuum is neatly mapped onto a
contextualization continuum. This shows that assigning something to one or another
level of hypotheticality, if intuitive, is not entirely subjective. The above matrix gives
evidence that choice of category can be operationalised in fairly reliable, independent
terms (such as the presence or absence of contextual features). The differentiation
between epistemicity levels of quotation can now be more than just intuitively fixed
but firmly rooted in their patterning with respect to contextual variables.
We will have to assume a circularity of interpretation: if realis quotes usually
occur in defined and plausible communicative situations (Vincent and Dubois
1996:366) and hypothetical and situational quotes with less and less
contextualization respectively, it is reasonable to assume that speakers exploit this
fact. In order to express probability levels, they can present quotes with different
levels of contextual rootedness (different degrees of contextual factors). Hence, we
have a fluid contextualization continuum, which is in fact indicative of the intended
marking of the degree of probability. The continuum of contextualization is used by
speakers as an outward marker of the underlying epistemic continuum. As Johnson-
Laird (1975) rightly claimed, people have rules of inference or natural decision
systems stemming from features they find in the context. It is consistent with a
situation in which speakers design their talk for recipients and set contextualization
cues in order to trigger such inferencing processes. They provide the context in
which the following utterance is to be interpreted with respect to its epistemic stance.
Hence, with respect to contextualization, we can affirm that the communicative
situation can be fixed onto at least the axes of time, situation, speaker, hearer and
communicative necessity (Clark and Gerrig 1990, Vincent and Dubois 1994). This
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leads to the conclusion that contexts are not just given but they are emergent, enacted
by participants.
The following table shows the results of an ANOVA and a regression analysis
in which all factors were entered simultaneously. While the overall result was highly
significant with F(3,1366)= 114.474, p< .001, an array of post hoc tests can indicate
where the significant differences are located.
The last line in Table 3.1 shows that all contextual variables prove to be
statistically significant. All factors used in this analysis are important for the
contextual characterization of hypotheticality levels.
Table 3.1: ANOVA Post Hoc table (LSD) for the hypothetical categories
time situation speaker hearer conv.necessity
realis-hypothetical 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
realis - situational 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
hypothetical - situational 0.000 0.000 0.175 0.014 0.838
r2 change per factor added 0.002 0.003 0.036 0.133 0.304
sig. per factor4 0.019 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000
The r2 values show how much each factor contributes to the explanation of the
variation of the hypotheticality levels. Hence, conversational necessity contributes
most to the explanation of the variation of the quotative categories. It accounts for
30.4% of the variance (but note that it contributes little to the difference between
situational and hypothetical, cf. line 3). The factor hearer also is selected as a very
important contributor with 13.3%. As discussed earlier, it is largely used to
differentiate realis from hypothetical quotes. But the factors time, situation and
speaker do not have very high r values.
The rows above the r show that all hypotheticality levels are behaving
significantly differently in their patterning with all contextual factors (this excludes
the aforementioned hypothetical-situational contrast with respect to the factors
speaker and conversational requirement). We see this in the line-graph where the
plotted values for the category communicative necessity and hearer are pretty much
stable between the categories hypothetical and situational.
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In a linear regression, a model with the all predictors (speaker, hearer,
addressee, situation, time and conversational necessity) was chosen as best fit with p
< .001. Also, the regression analysis yielded that the contextualization factors
discussed in this section account altogether for 47.5% of the variance. The rest must
be explained by other factors with orthogonal influences. Obviously, not the whole
variety of all possible contextual cues for epistemicity can be taken into account in a
large scale quantitiative analysis. There are certainly many more variables which
play a part in the contextualization of quotatives and which can serve as contextual
clues for the hearer (and for the researcher) as to how to interpret the quote. Also, in
many cases, speakers do not need lexical contextual cues. Rather, we have to assume
that "knowledge of how the world works" or background assumptions guide speakers
in their interpretation.
An example where world knowledge can be a sufficient indicator to interpret a
quote that features many contextual values (which would point in the direction that
the quote was actually spoken out aloud) as not having been uttered is when the
utterance of this quote would constitute a severe breach of face. An outward
utterance would trigger a noteworthy reaction. In the absence of any report of such a
reaction, the listener assumes the quote not to have occurred as outwardly realised
speech. For example, any gross insults towards persons of higher social standing and
in most formal situations would necessarily have reportable consequences. These
conversational reactions are important contextual elements which are discourse
factors and not quantifiable. Another important factor for any later investigation that
seeks to continue this line of research is certainly intonation (cf. research done by
Bolinger 1976, 1977, 1989).
I suggest that only a qualitative analysis which aims at identifying the
contextual elements in the singular case could do justice to the wealth of inferences
that can be drawn from contextual cues. Furthermore, these factors are generally
culture-specific. Their interpretation depends on the general cultural context, the
narrower interactive context between interlocutors in the here and now of their
interaction and on how a communicative situation is evaluated. The choice of what
counts as a defining factor at all and how they are consequently weighted and
4 These significances are given for a model that includes all factor variables as predictors.
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defined is an emic concept which has to be considered from a more culturally-
sensitive perspective such as critical discourse analysis.
But given the aims of this thesis and the above-mentioned limitations, I had to
restrict myself to lexical contextualization cues that gave important contextual
information, viz. information that is more salient and quantifiable. Notice also the
discussion of speech, thought or ambiguous context later on in this chapter.
Hence, in the above analysis, I have classified the epistemic level of a quote
first on an intuitive basis [+/- likely to be uttered], I have then set up a number of
contextual elements which occur in the surround of each quotative token. Note that
these contextualization cues do not define the categories. Rather, a correlation of the
frequency of discoursal contextual elements and the intuitive category
hypotheticality level has shown a direct association between contextual rootedness
and epistemic level. The post hoc exercise (Table 3.1) has given statistical evidence
that the standard contextualization cues for any real world utterance are more or less
likely to occur in the three (intuitive) divisions I have initially set up. Hence, the
presence or absence of the contextualization cues and conversational necessity are
very robust means of differentiating realis, hypotheticality and situational. This result
underlines that fact that there is no experimental bias in the analysis. Indeed, my
research shows that two separate approaches arrive at the same conclusion: both the
intuitive and the data analytic investigation point to the fact that quotes pattern along
a continuum. This continuum represents contextual rootedness as well as epistemic
level. As will become evident in the discussion to follow, a combination of
methodologies, which takes into account discourse analytic and more experimental
approaches gives more validity to the results presented in this section.
3.4. Comparison between the Quotatives
Having set up a differentiated set of categories of use and having shown them
to be closely correlated to their contextual grounding, I will now compare how
individual quotatives are used with respect to those epistemic categories. The table
below compares the frequency with which the new quotatives go and like occur with
respect to the three categories of epistemic stance.
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Table 3.2: Correlation between like and go and degrees of hypotheticality
realis hypothetical situational
% N % N % N SUM
like 27 29 39 41 34 36 106
go 63 46 33 24 4 3 73
X?(2)= 35.397, p <0.001
Table 3.2 shows that go is frequently used for higher probability levels, especially for
realis quotes with 63%. It is slightly less frequently employed in the hypothetical
category than like (33% versus 39%). Also, go generally does not introduce
situational quotes (only 4%, N=3). It does not have an equative function between a
quote and a situation. This suggests that go needs a real communicative situation, if
only a hypothetical one.
Like, on the other hand, functions more like a wildcard. It can be used for all
probability levels with quite substantial frequency turnouts (27% for realis, 39% for
hypothetical, 34% for situational quotes). When using like, speakers do not commit
themselves to any epistemic stance at all.
By means of comparison, consider the co-occurrence of say and think and
unframed quotes with hypotheticality levels.
Table 3.3: Distribution of degrees of hypotheticality as a percentage of all quotatives
realis hypothetical situational
say 70 24 6
go 63 33 4
unframed 38 42 19
like 27 39 34
think 1 83 16
X2(8): 280.694, p< .001
As expected, say is used most frequently with the realis category (70%). The
semantics of say at least theoretically pin down the quote as to its realization. Say
conventionally implies that the quote was actually physically uttered out loud, even
though, in real life, it need not have been uttered as say can also be used with
hypothetical quotes with 24% (but much less with situational quotes, 6% of the time).
The next most frequent quotative to be employed with the realis category is go, then
like and unframed quotes, then think. As is also shown in Table 3.2, of the new
quotatives, go is used more for the higher epistemic stances, i.e. for quotes in the
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realis category (with 63%). We have a neat range of falling frequencies from say
through go, unframed and like through to think. As a quotative that encodes mental
states, it comes as no surprise to see think used least frequently with real occurring
quotes (only 1%).
Concerning the hypothetical category, the respective frequencies run in the
other direction think, ///a?/unframed, go, say. Think usually refers to attitudes,
opinions, points of view, which are rendered as inner monologue but not spoken out
loud. It is the most frequent introductory item for the hypothetical category (83%).
Like, go and unframed quotes are in the middle field. Because they can be used for
'verbally uncommitted thought' as well as for real talk, they can function as a hedge.
They do not commit the speaker to the actual occurrence of the speech act.
As for situational quotes, we see that say and go do not frequently occur with
quotes of this category. Think and unframed quotes can be used for this category. But
Table 3.3 shows that the main introductory item for descriptive quotes is like.
Hence, all quotatives, including the newcomers like and go, pattern in their
own way with respect to hypotheticality levels. They all have their own functional
niche. By association with this particular function, the quotative variants fulfil their
specific task, such as the introduction of real occurring quotes for say and go, the
introduction of hypothetical quotes for think, unframed and like and the introduction
of situational quotes for like and to a lesser degree also think and unframed quotes.
Like is most indeterminate in this respect. It most frequently introduces hypothetical
quotes but can be found with realis and situational quotes. In this functionally
flexible patterning it parallels the non-lexical variant, unframed quotes. I assume that
one of the reasons why like has become so frequent in the lect of many young
speakers is its functional versatility: it functions like a wildcard, has no selectional
restrictions and can be used with every hypotheticality level. Hence, we can assume
that it is like's shallow semantics which make it functionally close to an item which




I will use the term priming in the sense used in the sociolinguistics literature by
Cameron (1998), Meyerhoff (2000), Scherre and Naro (1991, 1992), namely making
the occurrence of a linguistic item more probable, being aware that there are other
understandings of what it means for something to be primed.
Tannen (1987) has shown that speakers are more likely to use a word that has
already occurred in a conversation than a completely 'new' one. Cameron (1998)
showed priming effects in the quotative frame on a larger scale for Puerto Rican
Spanish. This raises the question whether we also find priming effects with respect to
quotation strategies in English. The following few paragraphs explore priming
effects within the quotative system from a wider and from a narrower perspective.
First, on a semantic level, I investigate the co-occurrence of like, go, say, and think
with lexical indications of contexts of speech and thought. Second, on a structural
and lexical level, I explore the correlation between quotative strategies.
3.5.1 Contextual Semantic Priming Effects
Earlier in this chapter, I showed that go and like and other verbs of quotation
occur with quotes of different probability levels. This raises the question of whether
they are also associated with different 'surrounds'. The concept 'surround' is defined
with reference to the mental space model as described by Fauconnier and Sweester
(1996) and is meant to refer to the 'base space' (cf. Chapter 2).
I will now investigate whether the hypotheticality category of the quotes
correlates with their surround in terms of speech or thought. The notion of
'epistemicity of the surround' is in accord with the discussion of the hypotheticality
continuum presented earlier in this chapter. In this section, I transfer this continuum
to the context of the quote and assume that the surrounding utterances can be
classified with respect to the probability of outwardly realised speech as well.
Speakers can signal the general key of a chunk of speech via linguistic choices.
Expressions relating to outwardly realised speech indicate that vocal activity takes
place, whereas expressions relating to thought processes are indications of mental,
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inner activity. Hence, the context can be classified as pertaining to real occurring
speech, as ambiguous with respect to whether speech occurs or not and as pertaining
to inner activity.
In order to investigate whether the hypotheticality level of the quote and the
mode of the surround are in concord, we first have to determine the key of the
context. For this analysis, all instances of quotation were coded with respect to the
occurrence of expressions of speech or mental behaviour in their surround. We can
then compare which quotatives occur more in a context of speech and which ones
occur in a context of mental activity. Obviously, the notion of context or surround is
problematic. Other studies have defined it with respect to a certain number of turns
or information units. For example, Scherre and Naro (1991:24) operationalise the
context to 10 clauses, while Cameron (1998:66) only gives a context of 2 preceding
clauses, which he terms a "minimal sequence". Note that whereas the coding for the
contextual variables took the whole preceding narrative context that was available to
me (viz. which was on tape) into consideration, for the purposes of exploring priming
effects, I imposed a narrower domain. I restrict the scope of the context to 5 TCUs
each way (cf. page 28).
I am aware that there is an element of arbitrariness to this measure. But I have
chosen to restrict the context in this way for two reasons. Firstly, a large scale
quantitative analysis with big token numbers and a delimited time frame has to
restrict the frame of analysis of the individual token. And secondly, because of the
generally ambiguous nature of discourse features with respect to their scope. It is
impossible to determine generally the scope of a discourse item (such as an
expression of speech) and to give overall valid delimitation of where it stops. I do not
think that we can generally quantify scope (at least not in numbers of words,
syllables, lexical items or turns) due to its highly variable and contextually
determined nature. Moreover, it may be dependent on intonation as well. It is
possible that only a qualitative in-depth case-by-case analysis which aims at
delimiting the scope in the individual case and which pays attention to the in-














Hence, for this analysis, I adopted a frame of 5 Turn Constructional Units
before (01-05) and after the quote (07-11) as indicated by the brackets in example
(3.6).







because I didn't have a bed or a couch or anything,
I have too much stuff.
yeah,
but now I could not move back home,
and I just realised this the other day,
I'm going "wait a minute,
I can't go home for summer or anything.
I have too much stuff',
yeah,
so it was just a weird transition out of home,
yeah mmhhh.
Within this context, all linguistic expressions that refer to verbal interaction (such as
to/a phone, to explain, explanation, stories,...), mental action (such as to remember,
to know, to a dream,...), or ambiguous ones were coded. 'Ambiguous' included
expressions which may index either speech or thought. In this category, we mainly
find quotatives like and go, but also verbs like reflected that can signal inner as well
as outward monologue. The non-occurrence of any such expressions was marked as
'not'. The 'not' category also includes unframed quotations. Hence the constraint
'surround' can have four values 'speech', 'ambig', 'mental', 'not'. For example, in
(3.6) the context contains an expression which pertains to mental activity realised in
the preceding context (in line 05), the token go in line 06 was consequently coded for
'mental'.
I will first examine like and go's correlations with the hypotheticality levels
of the context and will then compare them with the rest of the quotative pool.
Table 3.4: Co-occurrence of like and go with mental/speech contexts (in %)
speech ambig mental not
% % % %
like 21 22 28 29
go 36 21 16 27
3(2(3) =7.856, p< .05
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Table 3.4 shows that like occurs with all environments, speech, mental activity,
ambiguous ones as well environments that are undetermined with respect to mental
and verbal action, coded as 'not'. The frequencies show that it does do so with
roughly equal probabilities (21%, 22%, 28% and 29%). Hence, like is uncommitted
concerning the epistemicity of its context and can occur in a surround of speech,
thought, ambiguous terms or no index of speech or thought. This finding reinforces
like's emerging function as an anything-goes item. As was seen in the discussion in
3.4, it acts as a wildcard and can be used with various hypotheticality levels. Table
3.4 now gives evidence that it does not have any preference with respect to the
patterns of co-occurrence in its surround. But notice that if there is a preference, like
tends to occur in the contexts marked for mental activity. This distribution parallels
its main functional patterning with hypothetical quotes.
Section 3.4. has provided evidence that go most frequently frames real
occurring speech. It is associated with the realis category (cf. Table 3.3). The direct
association with go's high realis levels (63%) is here mirrored in independent factors:
go mainly occurs in a context indexed as involving speech. Hence, the correlation of
a quotative verb with hypotheticality levels is expressed on a different level as a
distributional preference: we notice a clear peak in the correlation between the
occurrence of go and speech environments (36%). Also, go often co-occurs with
ambiguous or non-determined contexts, which underlines the fact that go can occur
in realis contexts as well as in hypothetical contexts. But note its much lower
frequency than like in strictly mental contexts.
Overall, these findings support the earlier conclusion that go is frequently used
as a quotative verb for real occurring speech whereas like functions more like a
wildcard. The convergence of results, that is, the fact that different methods arrive at
the same conclusions, strengthens the claim about the functional distribution of go
and like and their association with different hypotheticality levels.
I will now discuss all relevant quotative variants with respect to the epistemic
level of their context. If we include the patterning of say and think with mental and
speech environments across varieties we get the following distribution:
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Table 3.5: Co-occurrence of (say) variants with mental/speech contexts (in %)
























5(2(12) = 146.400, p< .001
The first thing to point out is that all quotatives except like and go have very low
levels in ambiguous and 'not' contexts. In these two categories, say and think and
unframed quotes have values of less than 10% whereas like and go's frequencies are
closer to 30%. Such a finding is again consistent with the quotations' patterning with
respect to hypotheticality levels as shown in Table 3.3. Say and think had much more
clear-cut contexts of occurrence and consequently much lower frequency values in
others.
While we can certainly not directly map the hypotheticality continuum onto
the contextual values, looking at the distributional patterning of the members of the
quotative pool gives an astonishingly consistent pattern: the quotative variants are all
surrounded by their counterparts. Say, prevalently used for framing realis quotes (cf.
Table 3.3), most frequently occurs in a context of real occurring speech (53%). Think,
relating to mental activity (Table 3.3), usually occurs surrounded by mental activity
(68%). The newer quotatives like and go, while less defined in their functional load,
also show a more amorphous pattern with respect to their context. Both occur much
more frequently with ambiguous or non-defined, 'not', contexts. But even in their
patterning, we find correlations with the epistemic level with which they have the
highest probability of correlating: Go, according to Table 3.3 most frequently
associated with realis quotes, occurs with the highest statistical probability with
speech surrounds. Like, already shown to be a wildcard quotative but with a higher
frequency for hypothetical quotes than for any other category, patterns exactly this
way with respect to its contextual values.
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I suggest that this distribution is due to a semantic priming effect in a broad,
more abstract sense. This finding underlines the results noted earlier. Table 3.3
demonstrated that all quotative variants have their functional niches on the
hypotheticality continuum. Now we see that they are also contextually distributed
according to their co-occurrence with speech or thought. The contextual patterning of
quotative options confirms earlier results concerning the distribution of quotatives
with respect to epistemic stances.
3.5.2. Birds of a Feather Effect5
The 'birds of a feather effect' is based on the colloquial saying "birds of a
feather flock together" (Scherre and Naro 1991, 1992) and is a more specific form of
the priming discussed in the last section. Scherre and Naro, working on the presence
versus absence of plural -s in Brazilian Portuguese NPs, have provided evidence that
marking leads to more marking and no marking leads to lack of marking. Applied to
the field of quotatives, Cameron (1998:66) has shown for his Puerto Rican Spanish
data that there is a 'birds of a feather effect' in the sense that quotative frames that
contain verbs of direct report trigger more marking with verbs of direct report.
In the next few paragraphs, I am looking into the question of whether the
preceding quotative construction or even just a quotative verb has a priming effect on
subsequent quotatives. I will show that there are clusters of reciprocal attraction of
quotative strategies.
Again, I set my frame of analysis to 5 TCUs. Each quotative strategy was
analyzed with respect to the preceding instance of a reported speech strategy within
the previous five TCUs. This is explicated in the following excerpt:
5 Note that the statistical analysis in this section is calculated over higher token numbers of like and go.
This is for the following reason: The statistics of earlier sections of this chapter were all calculated
with the quotative variants attested in the sociolinguistically balanced subset of US English (cf. Table
2.1). This results in 121 occurrence of like and 80 occurrences of go. But as I will subdivide these
token numbers twice in this section, which would have led to very small numbers per cell, I have
decided to include all tokens of like (N=238) and go (N=186) attested in the US data into this analysis.
As the frequency distribution is calculated over a stable denominator (the overall number of tokens
per variant), this larger token number of like and go does not skew results.
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(3.7) Adjusting a computer
B: /d> and they would say "how did you do that"?
,and I'm like 'well it's really easy",
and they were like "well I never knew that",
so obviously they'd never considered looking it up you know,
When coding I'm like "quote" for its birds of a feather effect, they would say
"quote" was coded as the preceding strategy because it occurs within the preceding 5
TCUs of the token in question. Conversely, I'm like "quote" is coded as the
preceding strategy for they were like "quote Hence, in my coding, in any sequence
of quotations, the analysed strategy is the second instance (in this case I'm like) and
the strategy for which it is coded is the respectively preceding instance {they would
say).
Following Cameron (1998), I coded first for broad quotative strategy. Here, the
alternative quotative strategies are the following: the token in question can be
preceded by a quote framed by a quotative verb, it can be preceded by an unframed
quotation, or there can be no quotation in the frame of analysis. The results of this
analysis are displayed in Table 3.6 below (note again the larger token numbers for
like and go):
Table 3.6: Frequency of occurrence of quotative strategy per quotative
quotative verb unframed no quote SUM
% N % H N % ill N
like 64 153 3 8 32 77 238
go 66 123 5 10 28 53 186
say 30 165 5 27 66 366 558
think 19 22 4 5 76 87 114
*2(6): 203.084 p< .001
Both new quotatives co-occur quite frequently in contexts of repetitively occurring
quoted speech with lexical framing verbs: 64% of the quotations before like-
quotations and 66% before go-framed quotations are framed with a quotative verb.
Note while neither of the new quotatives often occurs in contexts where no quote has
previously occurred, the context 'no quotes' is the primary locus of occurrence for
the traditional quotative verbs (with 66% and 76%). While we do find the canonical
quotatives following any other quotative verb 30% and 19% of the time, the main
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distributive slot for the canonical verbs say and think is where the quotative realm
has not yet been opened by previously occurring quotes, either framed or unframed.
Also, generally, we note that quotations do not usually co-occur with unframed
quotes.
These more abstract, higher level effects suggest that there are priming effects
with respect to quotative strategies. The following paragraph explores whether one
level down, on the lexical level, there are also patterns of priming. When we split up
the category 'quotative verbs' from Table 3.6 into lexical items we find the following
concrete lexical priming effects:
Table 3.7: Frequency of occurrence of previous lexical quotative for like and go
like go say think
% % % %
like 37 10 31 22
go 3 39 50 8
%2(3): 50.944, p< 0.001
Table 3.7 reports from a subset of the full numbers of token and only takes into
account those instances of like and go that are preceded by a lexical quotative frame
within the preceding 5 TCUs. We can see that there are very strong lexical priming
effects for go and like. Like follows previous quotative like with 37% out of all
lexical quotative frames. Go directly succeeds go in 39% of all cases. Hence, there
seems to be much mutual attraction between quotes framed by go and like. The new
quotatives tend to come in clusters. But notice that, in contrast to the reciprocal
attraction of go and like amongst themselves, they seem to strongly disfavour one
another. Like and go do not occur frequently next to each other (with only 3%
frequency of occurrence for the sequence like-go and 10% for the sequence go-like).
This shows that the priming effect is lexical and not categorical.
In addition, the frequency for successive go-frames is higher than for
successive like-frames (37% versus 39%) Looking at the contingencies and
occurrences of reciprocal attraction that stretch over 3 or more items, we find that go
globally has a slightly stronger lexical priming effect than like for itself. The table
below shows the frequency of occurrence of 3 directly subsequent lexically
identically framed quotes.
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The frequency of 11% for the sequence go-go-go (compared to only 3% for the
respective //fe-chain) shows that go has a stronger tendency to cluster. It seems to
prime itself more than like does.
Notice also that like occurs much less frequently than go after say (32% versus
50%). As has been shown above, like occurs most often after no quoted speech at all.
We have already seen that go's primary locus of occurrence is where real occurring
quoted speech (as opposed to thought) is already present (Table 3.5), and that go is
found most frequently in situations where quotative verbs are in the immediate
preceding context (Table 3.6). Go's distribution points to the fact that it is to be
considered an item which pertains to the sphere of real occurring speech - while it
certainly has a very vivid secondary function of introducing hypothetical, inward
verbalizations. This has lead to the conclusion that go, overall, is an item associated
with speech. Table 3.7 indeed shows that say and go frequently co-occur.
There is another point to mention concerning the frequency of the sequence
say-go: Speakers in my corpus use the alternation of go and say in order to demarcate
speaker roles. This is illustrated in (3.8):
(3.8) Picking lemons
M: and / said "hi can I help you"?
P: ha ha [ha ha ha ]
M: [you know]?
and she goes,
and I- you know,
of course it's this long drive,
so I -1 probably look like ... total hell,
P: right.
M: and she goes "oh,
um I was just getting ... some lemons".
P: ha ha ha [ha ha ha ]
M: [and I said] "oh yeah?
who are you"?
P: ha ha [ha ha ]
M: [and she] goes "oh,
I'm your next door neighbour".
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Example (3.8) shows that the roles of 1st person and 3rd person singular can be
differentiated not only by the pronouns, but also by the tense and the verb of
quotation. As Romaine and Lange (1991:237) suggested, alternation between
quotative frames, while adding to the point-counterpoint nature of conversational
exchanges, also helps speaker identification if one quotative is consistently allocated
to one speaker. Table 3.9 demonstrates the frequency of the sequences like{ls)-
say(3s)-like(\s) and go(ls)-say(3s)-go(ls). Counted in this number were only cases
of uninterrupted sequences, which means without any other intermittent quotative
strategy such as unframed quotes, or other quotative frames. The frequency count
shows that the co-occurrence of go and say in the pattern of example (3.8), go used
in the present tense and for 3rd person singular and say in the past tense used for
speaker is quite frequent in my data. This effect does not occur as regularly with like.
Table 3.9: Co-occurrence of 1s go and 1s like with preceding and following 3s say
Here we see that clusters of the sequence say-go-say occur with a frequency of 12%
in the data. The demarcation of speaker role is a function that go has taken up via the
alternation with say.
In sum, the above paragraphs have provided evidence that priming and birds of
a feather effects are quite important with respect to quotative verbs in US English.
The effect has been shown to hold on three levels: on a semantic level, with respect
to the contextual epistemic stance, on a general structural level and on a lexical level.
3.6. The Co-occurrence with Mimetic Performances
While it can be traced back to Plato (Book III of the Republic), the notion of
mimesis has been taken up by Goffman (1981), Wierzbicka (1974) in her "quotations
as performance" approach, and more recently by Clark and Gerrig (1990). In this







part". The enquoting person "does not say what the content of the quote is (i.e. what
was said), instead he does something that enables the hearer to SEE for himself what
it is, that is to say, in a way, he shows this content" (Clark and Gerrig 1990:802). The
literature lists several reasons for the incorporation of mimetic performances: (i) to
convey a more emotion-based rather than factual rendering in order to reveal how the
speakers felt in and perceived the situation (ii) to add more vividness, which is
supposed to lead to audience involvement (Blyth et al. 1991) (iii) and to superimpose
internal evaluation without having to step outside the quotation frame (Labov 1972c).
Mimesis is understood as direct representation, the total imitation of the event.
In contrast, diegesis is summarized representation, a mere synthesis of the original
event.6 For our purposes, may it suffice to say that the difference between mimesis
and diegesis is between showing and describing, dramatic and descriptive, between
reporting the 'how' and the 'what' of the original speech event.
But even though the claim that these modes of representation are to be
fundamentally kept apart holds in theory, in every day talk-in-interaction the
boundaries between them are fluid and creatively exploited by speakers. Because
direct speech can incorporate "delivery aspects" (Clark and Gerrig 1990), such as
voice effects, gestures, inarticulate sounds etc., or even consist entirely of them, pure
direct reported discourse is a hybrid means of rendering past speech events. The two
modes of quoting can thus be considered as two endpoints on a continuum
(Gtildemann 2001, Yule 1993:236).7
I will now outline my coding conventions: as quotes hardly ever occur in a
pure form as sounds only or speech only, a choice had to be made as to how to
delimit the category voice or sound and no voice or sound against one another.
6 These extremes are claimed to exist in their purest form in direct and indirect discourse, respectively.
But Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen (1999) show that the borderline between direct and indirect discourse
is fuzzy even with regard to this point. They find that the age-old claim that mimesis defines direct
quotes can be violated. Mimesis can and does occur both in indirect and direct quotes. In this study, I
am only concerned with direct quotes.
7 As an anonymous reviewer of Buchstaller (2002b) commented, if mimesis is scalar, it should be
possible to quantify a quote's mimetic value, or at least to position a quote with respect to its
placement on such a scale. Quotes with only voice effect should then count as less mimetic than
quotes with voice and gestural effect. While this is an important fact to mention and does deserve
investigation, I have not included any measurement of a mimesis coefficient in this study. The main
point here is that mimesis is a scalar, multi-value phenomenon and that its mere non-/occurrence does
not constitute an a priori criterion for categorizing a quote as direct or indirect.
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Cameron (1998:62) codes quotes as [+mimesis] when they only consist of mimetic
enactment. I find that this gives undue supremacy to verbal matter and drastically
reduces the frequency of mimetic quotes. In practice, while we do find quotes which
consist of only sound effect, the bulk of my corpus consists of quoted speech
interspersed with sound tokens and/or stretches of voice effect. Hence, in my data, a
stretch of quoted report is coded as 'sound' if it contains any token of non-lexical
sound effect. It is coded as voice if it contains any stretch of speech that is
impressionistically a different voice from the reporting speaker's one. The remaining
quotations, which do not feature any voice or sound effects speech, count as 'speech'.
The counting of gesture is more complicated (see Cameron 1998). As my
corpus consists of audio recordings, I could only rely on the following cues to detect
gesture: when bodily movement caused noise of some sort or when the context
clearly indicated the presence of mimesis. These contextual cues could be twofold:
either the interlocutors commented on the mimetic re-enactment or an auditorily
empty quote triggered some sort of response from the interlocutor, such as laughter.
We would then have to assume an extralinguistic, inaudible content of the quote.
Obviously, many gestures will still be undetected. Hence, overall, my corpus only
contains eight instances of gesture. The impoverished information obtained through
audio-recording is one of the many facts which speaks for the use of video cameras
in research on naturally occurring speech.
For the present investigation, I have lumped the three mimetic categories, voice
effects, sounds and gesture together in the superordinate category 'mimesis'. Coded
as mimesis were all aspects of mimetic enactment to be revealed on an auditory or
contextual basis. This includes voice and sound effects of all sorts, and gestures,
where they could be retrieved from audience reactions.
I will now discuss the co-occurrence of quotative verbs with mimetic
enactment. The following table gives an overview of the co-occurrence of mimesis
with the most important verbs of quotation in US American English.
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Table 3.10 suggests firstly that many quotes contain mimetic re-enacment, no matter
which introducer they have. But there is still a significant difference (p < .001)
between the occurrences of mimesis with quotative verbs. Amongst the pool of
quotatives, go and like (76% and 73%) are most frequently used to frame mimetic
enactment, a finding that is consistent with much of the previous literature (Blyth et
al 1990, Butters 1980, Cukor-Avila 2002, Singler 2001, Schourup 1982a,
Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999, Tannen 1986, Yule and Mathis 1992). In contrast,
only 59% of the tokens of the most frequent dialogue introducer say as well as of
unframed quotes co-occur with mimetic performances.
Note that with 75% occurrence with mimesis, the quotative think patterns with
the new quotatives. This is not very surprising given that think enquotes inner
monologue, opinion, attitude and point-of-view. Table 3.3 gave evidence that think-
framed quotes are often inward, not uttered out aloud, not interactively realized. Also,
it shows that like and go often frame hypothetical quotes. The common patterning
that the new quotatives like and go have with think is the cue to their common
behaviour with mimesis. Hypothetical speech such as evaluation, attitudes, etc. is
often high in emotion (cf. Chafe 1994) and very frequently embodies voice or sound
effects. Because mimetic enactment has concentrated semantic reference, speakers
can represent inner mental activity in a more expressive form than only speech.
According to Goffmann (1981), these categories should be expressed via "response
cries". Such quotations leave the question of the original speech event's production
entirely open.
But in contrast with think, like and go can also be used with realis quotes (cf.
Table 3.3). My claim is that speakers using go and like play with this indeterminacy
between speech and thought. They exploit the fact that the new quotatives operate in
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the grey area between real occurring and hypothetical speech. Using the new
quotatives, speakers quote as if they were reproducing a real speech act but package
it in a more expressive form, in sound and voice effects. This suggests that speakers
take advantage of the full creative possibilities the language offers them in the new
quotatives: a stream of consciousness-like display of inner states and attitudes
realized in vivid, immediate speech. Like and go have introduced this quotative style
into the spoken language. It now fills a space within the spectrum of poetic formulae
of the spoken register, where indirect free speech, commonly used in writing, is not
an option (Chafe 1994, Romaine and Lange 1991) and where the theatrical topos of
soliloquy did not catch on (Ferrara and Bell 1995). Whereas think theatricalises inner
speech by outwardly displaying it in vivid, emotionally heightened output, like and
go are indeterminate with respect to whether the quote is hypothetical or real.
Table 3.11 shows that the newly grammaticalised quotatives go and like are
distinguished from the old quotatives say and unframed by their function as mimesis
markers. But they have a non-significantly different pattern to think.
Table 3.11: ANOVA post hoc (Bonferroni) results for significances patterning with mimesis
say think unframed like go
say x .000 .937 .000 .002
think .000 x .000 .567 .366
like .000 .567 .000 X .628
go .002 .366 .004 .628 X
We see that the difference between like and go is not statistically significant, both
can be used to enquote sounds. In the spirit of Giildemann (2001) and Yule and
Mathis (1992), we can claim that in US English, the canonical quotative say (and its
non-canonical, non-lexical variant unframed) foreground the semantics, the
propositional content of the quote. Like and go, the newcomers in the quotative
complex and still more marked constructions, highlight the 'how', the demonstrative-
enacted side of the material. This is in line with think, the other quotative used for the
hypothetical category. Ferrara and Bell's (1995:282) claim that like is a "theatrical,
highly conventionalized utterance" fits well with the above finding that it frames the
emotionally charged content of a sound effect or theatrical display of an effect quote.
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3.7. Conclusion
This chapter presented an investigation of the functional patterning of the
quotative system in US English. It has demonstrated how like and go are used
synchronically as quotative items in US English in comparison with the older
quotative variants. I have shown that the fact that like and go convey linguistic
information is best represented and understood by recourse to the notion of a
hypotheticality continuum. We need to be able to understand how quotes can be used
with different epistemic stances and how quotative items function with respect to
probability levels. This is the basis we need to show how speakers index how they
feel towards the quote, how they want to re-enact and represent the enquoted
material, and how they index their commitment to the epistemic stance of the quote.
Hence, I have argued that while both new quotatives are heavily used for the
expression of hypothetical talk, go has a stronger affiliation with higher probability
levels. Like can be considered a wildcard quotative as it does not have any selectional
restrictions with regard to the quote it frames.
Note Johnstone's (1987: 33) claim that "quantitative analyses of discourse
must be supplemented with qualitative microanalyses of what individual speakers do
in particular situations" and that we have to "show how rhetorical microanalyses of
some of the data can explain aspects (of tense choice) which quantitative analysis
leaves unexplained" (1987:35). While a quantitative investigation of the quotative
system would exceed the scope of this thesis, I am exploring these issues in on-going
work. I intend to push further our understanding of the association of quotative
variants, hypotheticality levels and items which can serve as contextualization cues
in the surround. Contextual elements that have been linked with the marking of
epistemicity are, amongst others (for a more comprehensive list see Thumm 2000
and in preparation), would/was gonna, negative polarity items, modal adverbs such
as perhaps/maybe (Buchstaller 1999) and questions or question intonation (Bolinger
1989). Furthermore, Snitzer-Reilley (1986) has shown that, as hypotheticality is in
closely associated with beliefs and mental action, verbs of imagination can be used to
mark epistemicity as well as verbs of volition, enablement and deontic stance.
Finally, unspecified number {any), gnomic statements, and the position of a quote in
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a row are contenders for features that have an impact on the interpretation of the
epistemic stance of a quote.
The distributional effects that I have discussed in detail in this chapter show a
clear division of work amongst the (say) variants. This is further underlined by the
quotatives' patterning with respect to the speech and thought mode of their
environment. Again, like patterns as an 'anything goes' item whereas go is more
affiliated with its speech surrounds. Overall, again, we witness a task-sharing within
the quotative pool.
Looking at priming and 'birds of a feather' effects, it has been shown that there
are strong priming effects both with respect to the general domain of the quote (realis
versus irrealis), as well as concrete lexical priming effects. Also, speakers use the
alternation between say and go to demarcate speaker roles.
With respect to the enquoting of sounds and other mimetic performances, my
findings underline the use of the new quotatives as mimesis markers. In this use they
pattern in line with the quotative for mental states and actions, think, and in contrast
with the older speech-related quotative, say.
The overall picture that emerges from this investigation into the intralinguistic
patterning of all quotative variants is that the quotative pool has reacted to the
intrusion of two incoming items. The functional load is neatly distributed between
the members of the quotative cohort. A functional reallocation must have taken place
within the system with older members giving way to the newcomers and then settling
in new niches. The fact that the new quotatives pattern quite independently of the rest
of the pool of quotative devices underlines their functional load. Hence, like and go
are not vacuous, taken over for purely social and stylistic reasons and because they
are cool, as has been suggested in much of the variationist literature to date. The
enlargement within the pool of quotative constructions is not simply that of two
intrusive pleonastic items edging their way into a stable paradigm. But, the new
quotatives have a justified place amongst quotative devices. They have taken on
quite novel functions with respect to mimetic enactments, the marking of
epistemicity, speaker role demarcation etc. This is an important finding, as it shows
the division of labour amongst quotative devices. Hence, this chapter demonstrates
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that go and like have functional significance. In Chapter 6 we will see that they also
have social significance.
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Each and every step [...] is an innovation, not only the initial act,
through which a new linguistic entity comes into being. It is through
innumerable individual acts of innovation - of acceptance, adoption,
and acquisition - that any new entity gains currency and enters into
competition with traditional entities in the usage of a linguistic
community. (Andersen 1989:14)
Chapter 4
The Grammaticalisation of like and go
This chapter is a synchronic account of the grammaticalisation of like and go,
two items which behave exactly as pointed out by Giildemann (2001): they are
functionally versatile elements which build up a whole network of uses, they are
notoriously polyfunctional outside the quotative domain and their utterance-
introduction meaning only surfaces in their quotative function. The classic definition
of grammaticalisation is Kurylowicz's (1965 [1975]:52) statement that it is a
phenomenon whereby we witness "...the increase of the range of a morpheme
advancing from lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more
grammatical status".1 But amongst the scholars working in this field, there is
disagreement about whether grammaticalisation is to be studied "from the point of
view of patterns of language use across time or at a synchronically segmented
moment in time" (Traugott and Heine 1991:1, cf. also Hopper and Traugott 1993);
whether grammaticalisation is the diachronic evolving of grammatical structure or
whether it is rather to be considered a discourse pragmatic fact. In this chapter, I will
take grammaticalisation very broadly to mean a phenomenon whereby discourse
patterns lead to the expansion of functions. More explicitly, this is the case when
new, more grammatical functions develop out of already existing material.
The new quotatives, like and go have quite a number of functions outside the
quotative frame. To date, all the models that have been proposed to explain their
polyfunctionality rely on the postulate of unidirectionality in grammaticalisation
' For a review of this and newer definitions of grammaticalisation. cf. Traugott (2001).
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(Bybee, Pagliuca and Perkins 1991, Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994, Fleischman
and Yaguello to appear, Heine, Claudi and Hiinnemeyer 1991, Meehan 1991,
Romaine and Lange 1991, Traugott and Heine 1993 and many others). In a large
overview of quotative structures in African languages, Gtildemann (2001:2) points
out that the approaches to the grammaticalisation of quotative items are very
homogeneous. This manifests itself in the strong tendency previous studies have
displayed to derive the functional versatility of any quotative item from its previous
use as a speech verb, which is invariably seen as the diachronic starting point for
their development. The traditionally assumed speech-verb channel (Lord 1976, 1993,
Saxena 1995) postulates a unidirectional chain linking generic speech verb > quote
orienter > quotative > complementiser > other, where the de dicto function is
considered a precondition for the development of the other functions.
At this point, a brief clarification of terminology seems in order: a channel
(Givon 1979, Heine and Reh 1984, Lehmann 1982,) refers to a particular way or
path of grammaticalisation. Channels constitute alternative options which have been
shown cross-linguistically to be the lines along which the same source concepts
typically develop on their way towards the introduction of a new grammatical
category. They are usually defined with reference to their endpoint.2 Chains, on the
other hand, concern the internal structure of the channels. They imply a development
wherewith one function leads to the other in a chain-like fashion (see Figure 4.1
below).
Frajzyngier (1996:99) claims that "one of the most common sources for the de
dicto complementisers are verbs of saying, confirmed time and time again in many
languages of the world". But Gtildemann (2001) has shown the inadequacy of the
speech-verb channel, which has long been considered the default scenario for the
creation of quotative introductory items. Giving a rich array of data, Giildemann
2
It is true that knowledge of what constitutes a natural development - based on what we know and
what has been established cross-linguistically - gives grammaticalisation mildly predictive value.
Nevertheless, I would argue that viewing it as necessarily goal-directed with the endpoint as the
crucial element diverts attention from the centre of investigation: the developmental process. This is
because presupposing an endpoint has teleological implications, which can cloud one's view of the
linguistic reality. By looking at developments from the perspective of a postulated endpoint, we might
not notice developments which take different paths from the same source concept or developments
which have not (yet) arrived at the goal. It seems to me that it makes more sense to conceptualise
channels in a non-telic manner, as development from source concepts onwards (Hopper and Traugott
2003). See in this vein Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca's (1994:282) inquiry into the processes
underlying creative language use.
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argues that unidirectional postulates often blur our understanding of
grammaticalisation processes and lead to self-fulfilling prophecies in the
understanding and analysis of the data along pre-postulated channels. He shows that
the synchronic polyfunctionality which quotative items display cross-linguistically is
largely determined by ultimate origins other than the quotative frame.
Having shown that there is no single unproblematic case in the
grammaticalisation of quotatives in African languages, he voices strong reservations
regarding overgeneralizing about the speech-verb channel and calls for more rigour
in reconstructing the facts (see also Naden 1989:165 and, in a cross-linguistic study,
Ransom 1988:364). He issues a call for a thorough cross-linguistic investigation of
quotative introductory items and their functional networks.
Sweetser (1991) claims that we cannot rigidly separate synchronic from
diachronic analysis because a synchronic slice is, by definition, nothing but a stage
in the history of a development (cf. also Heine, Claudi and Htinnemeyer 1991:172,
Lehmann 1982/1995:26, Schiffrin 1987).3 Language structure does not provide a
static semantic organization and conceptual structure is changing continuously.
Therefore, a synchronic functional account cannot be fully disengaged from
diachrony because the meaning of an item is in constant flux. Any description at any
given time is only a synchronic snap-shot of the developments so far and as such
simultaneously the starting point for future ones. Sweetser argues for their
combination in a unified account. Hence, the proposed radial structure has a
temporal element to it in that it captures what go and like have boiled down to at the
time of data collection. Heine et al. interpret grammaticalisation chains as the
"frozen" result of conceptual manipulation (1991:99). Frozen seems to me to imply a
certain element of immobility, so I prefer to refer to the situation as being one the
linguistic system has boiled down to, because this seems to capture the fact that it is
a synchronic snapshot of an ever-developing mechanism. Diachronic data informs
our knowledge of how linear or non-linear processes led to the present scenario. It
also gives information about the sequential order of events. I argue that as a linguist,
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it is only on the basis of such knowledge that we can make informed statements
about the present. Hence, the proposed radial structure and especially the core
meaning are built on the diachronic information available from historical sources
such as the OED. But to language users, as long as all tokens in question are equally
alive in their linguistic system, any diachronic information beyond the point of their
personal recollection is irrelevant. It does not make any difference for speakers
whether e.g. the temporal use of go was an earlier function than its modal function.
What matters is the synchronic link that they perceive between the synchronically
existing functions.
I will, therefore, allude to the diachronic grammaticalisation history which
informs or motivates like and go's "core" meaning and its functional extensions, but
this will not be the centre of attention here (for diachronic accounts of their
development consider Meehan 1991 and Romaine and Lange 1991 for like, Bybee
and Pagliuca 1987, Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 1994, Perez 1990, Royster and
Steadman 1923/1968, for go). In what follows, I will explicate the functional
relations between the uses of go and like and will show that they are semantically-
pragmatically motivated. Basing my comments on the findings of Lakoff (1987), I
will show how the synchronic functions that like and go have assumed can be
conceptualised via a radial structure model, a variation model.
The synchronic uses of go and like can be conceptualised as an interrelated
network of functional extensions stemming from a common core meaning. The
underlying processes that triggered the transfers will be discussed as will the
common semantic core that I argue still pertains in each of the extended functions. I
will show that, at least with respect to the go and like scenario, a radial structure
model can show how the superficially messy facts are linked in an orderly way.
I will concentrate on motivating their synchronically interconnected functional
extensions in semantic-pragmatic space rather than through time. Hence, this chapter
is a synchronic attempt to describe the grammar of go and like as it is realised by
speakers in present day English. I will show that synchronically, a unidirectional
model, which would propose a linear development along a cline of
1
Variationist sociolinguistics also incorporates this insight: the idea that the synchronic study of
variation at one point in time can give evidence about larger, diachronically occurring processes, is
known as the "apparent time" construct.
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grammaticalisation, would not hold much explanatory power in cases where multiply
ambiguous and overlapping meanings co-exist synchronically. I will come back to
this point later on in this chapter.
4.1. Conceptualising grammaticalisation
Lichtenberk (1991) asks the following question: do meanings have structure or
are they unanalysed wholes? As, by definition, all the meanings of a polysemous
word are related, it has been argued that they can be considered as linked through a
complex network of partially shared commonalities (Lichtenberk 1991), family
resemblances (Jackendoff 1983, Wittgenstein 1978), or gradual relatedness (Lakoff
1987). In fact, Brugman (1988) and Lakoff (1987) have suggested that word
meaning is structured and unified. This view implies that meanings are not
unanalysed wholes but that they are motivated and explicable. In the same vein,
Sweetser (1991:9) claims that words do not randomly acquire new senses but that
derived functions are acquired by cognitive re-structuring and that consequently, the
multiple synchronic functions of any given word are interrelated in a motivated
fashion. Hence, we should be able to discover the systematic structure underlying
such a semantic field and it ought not come as a surprise to find that certain semantic
changes are frequently cross-linguistically attested. Later on in this section, I will
show that there is evidence for a universal cognitive / perceptually salient pragmatic-
semantic field lying behind like's attested functions. However, the same is not true of
go. Neither Gtildemann's (2002) extensive study of African languages nor the
findings reported in the present study (cf. page 131) on typologically unrelated
languages has found any compelling evidence for an underlying field. It remains to
be fully investigated whether go's functional extension to quotation is a largely
idiosyncratic phenomenon.
Sweetser (1991) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have proposed that linguistic
usage reflects the inherently metaphorical understanding of many basic areas of our
lives. The extension of a linguistic item is motivated by the relation that speakers
perceive between the old and the new use of the item. Given this explanation,
84
linguistic structure can be considered a mirror image of cognitive structure. Heine,
Claudi and Htinnemeyer (1991: 168) claim that there is iconicity between cognitive
and linguistic patterning in the sense that language is the reflection of conceptual
manipulation. Consequently, language, as the iconic representation of human
cognition, is no more and no less logical or objective than any other aspect of human
cognition. The functions of a linguistic item are sedimentations of the linguistic
modeling of the cognitive processes involved in grasping connections and
contingencies in the real world (cf. also Blank 1999). Overlapping, ambiguity, and
polyfunctionality are a function of the underlying cognitive processes of metaphor,
context induced interpretation, metonymy etc. and are to be considered the outcome
of human agents' creative language use rather than autonomous processes.
When concepts are manipulated, they are subject to contextually induced
changes. Due to the inferencing, sense-making mechanism of language users, these
reinterpretations come about via the infusion of meaning from their local occurrence
within the discourse. Real-time production pressure forces speakers to comply with
Horn's principle of least effort "say no more than you must" (1984)4 and requires the
hearer to extract all possible meanings from the message, including all implications
as long as they are not controversial. Those inferences are abductive, based on world
knowledge (of which linguistic knowledge is a part) and lead to an "enriched
interpretation" (Blakemore 1987) or "context-induced reinterpretation" (Sperber and
Wilson 1986:1). This second meaning, which first arises in a specific context, can
gradually become conventionalized (Heine, Claudi and Hiinnemeyer 1991). Also,
when an implicature commonly arises out of the meaning of a form, it can become
part of its meaning (Heine, Claudi, and Hiinnemeyer 1991:150/1, Traugott 1989,
Traugott and Konig 1991) and can even go so far as replacing the original meaning.
The common underlying idea of most grammaticalisation accounts is that, as a
linguistic item loses more and more of its original inherent meaning, it is more
susceptible to changes brought about by the syntactic-semantic context in which it
occurs.
4 See in this vein Grice's (1975:45-6) Second Maxim of Quantity "Do not make your contribution
more informative than is required".
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4.2. The role of ambiguity
A diachronic chain model, which is employed in most accounts of multi-
meaning entities, is able to show overlappings and ambiguities between the
diachronically adjacent stages within the channel. But such a model fails to account
for the fact that meanings overlap and even reinforce one another at different ends of
the "channel". To get around this problem, Craig (1991) and Bybee, Perkins, and
Pagliuca (1994) allow for multiple grammaticalised constructions developing from
the same source and claim that they are often at different stages along a
grammaticalisation path. This amends the problem inherent in a purely sequential
step by step model. But it still fails to account for the interrelation of meanings
amongst themselves. Craig (1991:486) puts it this way, it "raises more questions
than it answers about the nature of grammaticalisation chains and how to conceive of
them in detail". As we will see, in cases like go and like, where an analysis of
changes resulting from grammaticalisation reveals a complex network of ambiguous
and even overlapping meanings, it seems inappropriate to try to force the multiplex
development into a linear sequential model.
This discussion agrees with the traditional accounts of grammaticalisation that
during a transition from A to B there is a stage (A,B), where the preceding and the
succeeding entities exist side by side, causing ambiguity and variation. It will be
argued that this stage is not necessarily ephemeral (Hopper and Traugott 2003).
Heine, Claudi and Hiinnemeyer (1991) rightly claim that the transition in meaning is
not a sudden replacement but a stage where the former co-exists with the latter. A
semantic field model considers this overlap, the functional in-between-ness being an
important factor. Ambiguity between two or more functions is not necessarily an
indication of a flux moment of language change - it can stabilize as a radial structure
model. The difference between a unidimensional and a multidimensional model is
shown in the following diagrams.
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Figure 4.1: Different conceptualisations of the grammaticalisation process
Uni-dimensional chain model




A —> A,B —> B
B D
E
A unidirectional model implies that the next steps in the chain are —> B,C —» C.
A radial structure model, however, does not constrain the sequential development to
a linear order. Developmental sequences such as A, C, D pose a particular challenge
to chain models in general because they cannot be explained by a unidirectional
model. A radial structure model, while in no way incompatible with developments
that progress linearly, does not restrict them to unidirectional clines. It is capable of
conceptualizing the functional developments of all sequential orders as they occur
during language use. Because a radial structure model is completely a-teleological
and does not make any assumptions about the temporal order of events but only
depicts functions as related in their semantic-pragmatic field, it is flexible enough to
cope with multidimensional developments such as like and go.5
Also, a radial structure model such as the above is especially useful when we
look at cases of polygrammaticalisation, where one single form develops different
grammatical functions in different constructions, a complex form of split where
"various chains of grammaticalization interlock" (Craig 1991:486). Such processes
are not just a matter of the original meaning remaining and developing in a step-like
fashion where one extension informs the other. Rather, synchronically, items such as
like or go are conglomerations of highly ambiguous and context-dependent meanings
which are interrelated amongst one another. Lakoff (1987), Meyerhoff and
Niedzielski (1995, 1998), Mosegaard Hansen (1997, 1998) and Buchstaller
(2001 a,b) argue that cases like the above are best explained by a common core
5 As one anonymous reviewer commented, such synchronic grammaticalisation accounts can only be
understood as ways of organizing the data, NOT as actual paths of change. While this is certainly true,
as is underlined by my use of the term 'model', I argue that a radial structure model still has the
advantage of graphically displaying the complexity and multidimensionality of the functional
extensions, a fact that a linear model can capture but fails to depict.
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model. In such a model, all functions of an item centre around a semantic-pragmatic
core. They retain a strong link to this core and have overlapping functions, which are
more or less closely tied to each other.
The claim that the synchronically occurring functions of go and like are
structured as a field around one focal member, the semantic-pragmatic origo, is
backed by work on the structure of concepts, which has shown us that cognitive
structures can be explained in terms of family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1978) and
prototypes (Berlin 1992 and Rosch 1975, 1978). The manipulation of such concepts
can be understood as creative with one meaning giving rise to one or more others.
Semantic and pragmatic shifts do not take place between discrete categories but
involve a continuum without any clear-cut boundaries (cf. Bath-Weingarten and
Couper-Kuhlen 2002). Overlapping, ambiguous meanings are not coincidental.
Rather, they are part and parcel of an associative, creative language use that leads to
the extension of meaning. Consequently, grammaticalisation processes are gradual
and continuous rather than discrete. They result in complex networks of associations
with nodes which are interrelated amongst themselves via cognitive links. A
semantic field provides the flexibility to depict such gradualness because it
encompasses various partially overlapping semantic dimensions. Functions can be
conceptualised as clines with more or less prototypical instances aligned on them.
This has the advantage that we do not have to postulate any rigid category
differences into which we have to force the occurrences of the lexeme when we find
it in the data. Rather, individual instances can be conceptualised as positioned
simultaneously on several clines because a polydimensional field permits multiple
ambiguities and not just two consecutive ones as a unilinear cline does.
Also, as concepts are in flux and creatively used, the structures resulting in the
linguistic system can be, and often are, just as complex. A core structure model has
the advantage that it can explain already existing meaning-transfers while being
flexible enough to provide for more motivated extensions in every direction. It
embodies the history of the cognitive-semantic developments to date which have
boiled down to meaning-transfers in the linguistic system but every single one of its
dimensions can be enriched by associative language use. Hence, a radial structure
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encompasses the polydimensional semantic-pragmatic field of a linguistic item
without constraining its development in the way a unidimensional chain does.
I propose a radial structure that, I will argue, underlies the many senses of go
and like. This structure highlights the multifunctionality and the overlap of the
various functions associated with like and go that are evidenced in my data. I will
explain the transfers in the linguistic system where newer functions have arisen out
of the original linguistic item and are considered by speakers to be conceptually
connected. I will start with like, then discuss go.
4.3. The Like-Scenario
Like's repetitive occurrence and the reciprocal attraction in its multiple
functions have been interpreted as a sign of grammaticalisation underway (Dailey-
O'Cain 2000, Romaine and Lange 1991, Singler 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson
1999). Furthermore, in its non-standard uses as a discourse marker6 and as a quote
introductory item, like has commonly been associated with the colloquial, every-day
discourse of adolescents and young adults, a distribution which points to its
evaluation of an item with newly grammaticalised functions. (As we will see in
Chapter 6, there is some truth to these stereotypes, but my focus here will remain on
the semantic-pragmatic dimension of its use).
The grammaticalisation of like in all its functions, as a preposition, a
conjunction, a discourse marker, and a quotative (cf. Webster's New World
Dictionary 1994:783, The American Heritage College Dictionary 1993:786, The
Random House Webster 1999:768) is yet to be fully resolved. Ever since Romaine
6
I consider discourse markers to be items that have much syntactic freedom and possess great
mobility inside the utterance in the sense that they can precede or follow a clause or any phrase.
Following Schiffrin (1987), discourse markers are "sequentially dependent elements, which bracket
units of talk and which are independent of sentential structure" [emphasis mine]. They have been
commonly classified as particles drawn from a heterogeneous group of functional classes that are
stylistically stigmatized, short, unstressed, optional items that do not affect the truth value of a
sentence and do not contribute to propositional content. Their occurrence is a typical feature of oral
style where they have to be interpreted on a global level as they have textual and interpersonal
function, see Kroon (1995), Schiffrin (1987). Cf. also Sankoff et al. (1997:195) "[discourse markers]
do not enter into constructions syntactically with other elements of the sentence".
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and Lange started off the investigation into like'' s grammaticalisation with their
brilliant and most insightful 1991 article, follow-up corpus-based studies featuring a
grammaticalisation model which is able to link all of like's occurrences in the data
have been notably absent. The literature usually recites Romaine and Lange's (1991)
model and keeps reporting on like's multifunctionality without suggesting how to
incorporate its manifest ambiguity and fuzziness into a coherent account (Dailey-
O'Cain 2000, Macaulay 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). Sociolinguistic
quantitative analyses, when having to incorporate cases of overlap and "deviant
patterns", speak vaguely about imperfect introduction from other varieties
(Macaulay 2001:13, 16), or small numbers of tokens (Tagliamonte and Hudson
1999). These tokens are then set aside from further investigation or incorporation
into a comprehensive account. Singler (2001:274) mentions several cases of what he
calls "transitional forms" but does not attempt to incorporate them into a coherent
model. In short, so far, no model has been able to capture the whole picture of like.
What we need is a) an account of like's grammaticalisation that is robust enough to
cover its entire distribution and b) a conceptual structure that is able to account for
the inter-relatedness and ambiguity of all grammaticalised uses of like (such as the
hedging and the quotative function) amongst themselves.
In this chapter, I will show that a corpus-based analysis of like reveals that the
development of its quotative function is actually not as smooth and simple as a chain
or as multiple extensions from one original core. I will first trace the links between
like's use as a quotative and its older grammaticalised functions. This discussion will
bring out the highly interrelated nature of those functional extensions. Then I will
sketch the situation as it presented itself in the two corpora I was using (discussed in
Chapter 2). I will also give several examples from the web. My claim is that when
we take into account all instances of like, it becomes clear that while the canonical
grammaticalisation accounts certainly have some explanatory power, there is more to
like's patterning than is captured in those models. I will show that a polydimensional
field with multiple paths can fully explain like's patterning in all its functions as we
know it today.
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I will now briefly discuss the most influential of all models concerning the
grammaticalisation of like. Romaine and Lange (1991) propose a grammaticalisation
chain for like, as depicted in Figure 4.2, which is based on Traugott's (1982) model.
They account for the co-occurrence of like's uses and for the fact that its
development is not strictly sequential by postulating a branching model. (For other
attempts to conceptualise like's current uses, cf. Meehan 1991 and Fleischman and
Yaguello to appear, who restructure the Romaine and Lange (1991) model to a
multiple pathway model).
Figure 4.2: Romaine and Lange s (1991) Model
PROPOSITIONAL TEXTUAL INTERPERSONAL
PREPOSITION -> CONJUNCTION -> DISCOURSE MARKER
prep/ _NP conj/ _IP DM/_XP




Maya's like "Kim come over here and be with ...."
Romaine and Lange's model shows that when like precedes a noun phrase, it is
used as a preposition and when it takes a sentence as a complement, its function is
that of a conjunction. Note that, in accordance with its cognate suffix (-ly), it can
also follow whole chunks of discourse. As like has a considerable amount of
syntactic freedom and variable scope, it is at the point where it can be reinterpreted
as a discourse marker, which is syntactically entirely free. Corpus-based analyses
have given statistical evidence that the placement of like as a discourse marker is
usually before the linguistic material it qualifies in US English and after it in British
English (cf. Miller and Weinert 1995). If the material following like is a direct quote,
like can be interpreted as serving the function of an introductory item to that quote.
The question of the directionality of this associative process (viz. of cause and effect)
is one which is hard if not impossible to answer. Suppose an item which is en route
to grammaticalisation occurs in a "new" construction, e.g. quotation. It can
metonymically be re-interpreted by language users as being constitutive of this
context, that is it is interpreted as a quotative. It can then be used productively with
this new function. This, in turn, strengthens its association with that context. In its
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turn, this will lead to a higher frequency of use, etc. Hence, the process, as postulated
here, is both reflexive and constitutive.
Note that like can also co-occur with a verb of saying, a fact that led to its
classification as a quotative complementiser. Mostly, though, nowadays it
accompanies the semantically empty 'dummy verb' to be.
The model given by Romaine and Lange (Figure 4.2) is typical for
unidirectional approaches: it traces the diachronic development of like, concentrating
on the syntactic development of the marker and trying to link it up with the semantic-
pragmatic facts. In this chapter, I will sketch a semantic-pragmatic model, which I
find is more able to conceptualise the synchronic facts. This is in tune with Romaine
and Lange themselves, who propose (1991:262) that a "network of related meanings"
captures best what we find synchronically. In the same line, Ferrara and Bell (1995:
281-2) suggest that the "present plasticity of be+like - that is, its ability to introduce
constructed dialogue, thought, and quotable gestures of self and others - arises from
systematic variation and expansion from a core, paradigmatic case. Individuals can
range along a continuum of usage levels".
But even when we look at it from a diachronic perspective, like's development
does not seem so straightforwardly linear as many might wish to believe. In a short
excursion on like's diachronic development, I will trace the developmental history of
its various functions according to the OED.
First, I will sketch the history of suffix -ly, a cognate of like. Originally a free
form lich, meaning 'body' , its development is typical for grammaticalisation. It
follows exactly the course as predicted by Meillet (1912, cf. also Kurylowicz
1965:52). The cline is independent word > suffix with lexical properties > suffix
with grammatical properties.
7 Consider the OED entry for —likej: "The original Teut. adjs. in -Itko- were compounds of the n.
*likom appearance, form, body (..). Thus *mannliko- ('manly') means etymologically 'having the
appearance or form of a man'; (...) The primitive force of the suffix may therefore be rendered by
'having the appearance or form indicated by the first element of the word'. When appended to ns., the
most general senses of the suffix in all Teut. langs. are 'having the qualities appropriate to',
'characteristic of, 'befitting'. In English of all periods it has been a prolific formative....".
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In present day English, -ly is a grammatical morpheme with the function of a
denominal adjectivising suffix (compare with French -ment). Suffix -ly looks like a
school-book example of grammaticalisation and indeed, in the course of its
development, we notice phonological attrition and semantic bleaching to the point
where -ly attains the status of a dummy marker. It signals grammatical meaning
'adverb-forming suffix' and change of word class. Also, the process of substitution
has taken place; lich no longer exists.
The history of -ly stands in sharp contrast to the free form like, which is a
direct descendant of the adjectival form gelic 'having the form of'. The following
sketch gives every new attestation of the form according to the century in which it
first occurred (the symbol '>' reads, according to the convention in historical
linguistics, as 'leads to'). Attested uses of like are as follows:
C14th adj. 'in the same manner, extent', 'similar'
> - approximately
- as if
C19th > - for example
- as such
C20th > - discourse marker
- discourse introductory item (quotative)
Hence, the adjective gelic with the semantics 'in the same manner, extent,
similar' gave rise to the meanings 'approximately' and 'as if' in the 14th century. It
further gave rise to two other meanings, 'for example' and 'as such' in the 19th
century. And it further branched off twice in the 20th century, giving rise to the
discourse marker and the quotative function. This scenario does not correspond to
the one painted by the common unidirectional models where one item develops into
another one in a chain-like fashion. And it certainly does not look at all like the
developmental history of -ly. Romaine and Lange comment on this situation as
follows: "certainly, historically, the nondiscourse functions of like appear to precede
the discourse uses but that may simply reflect the nature of our evidence. Both
coexist synchronically and the steps we are postulating here are almost certainly not
strictly sequential since in Middle English, even where like was used in clearly
prepositional function, it had some positional mobility ..." (1991:262, emphasis
mine). It seems that even diachronically, a unilinear model cannot account for like's
development. There is no chain-like development but more a situation where
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functions bifurcate and spread out further and further. Furthermore, a channel
suggests a suppletive development whereas, synchronically, we find persistence of
meaning. The newer uses of like have not supplanted the older ones and all uses
alike seem to persist with a great deal of vivacity as there are no indications of
suppletion or of earlier items decreasing in frequency. Furthermore, we witness no
cases of phonological or morphological attrition.
This diachronic excursion has shown that unilinear models are useful in
explaining chain developments such as the one of suffix -ly. But in cases where
multiple meanings develop simultaneously out of one original core, unidirectional
models are not able to capture reality as a whole, neither synchronically nor
diachronically. This is because there are more dimensions to the grammaticalisation
process than only one, linear chain. We need an explanatory model that can account
for lateral connections between functions developing simultaneously. The evidence
presented above calls for a more complex model.
4,3.1. The radial structure
In the case of overlapping and ambiguity of meaning between functions at
opposite ends of a grammaticalisation "channel", a chain model, or even a branching
one, seems to me a less appropriate account of the synchronic linguistic reality. So
far, I have found no model in the literature that is able to account for the inter-
relatedness and ambiguity of the grammaticalised uses of like amongst themselves.
But Ericsson (1995), Klamer (2002), Meyerhoff and Niedzielski (1995, 1998), and
Mosegaard Hansen (1997) have proposed field models for the conceptualization of
multi-meaning entities in languages as diverse as Bislama, French, Swedish, and
Kambera. In this section, I will show that it is possible to conceptualise like's often
highly ambiguous and overlapping uses, which depend heavily on the intra- and
extralinguistic context, in a coherent model without having recourse to a chain.
Figure 4.3 shows the semantic field of all uses of like configured as a radial structure
containing its core meanings and all its synchronic functions centering around it.
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Figure 4.3: The Radial Structure Model8 of Like
Note that this chart shows a synchronic semantic field. It does not make any
strong diachronic claims concerning the temporal sequence of like's functional
extensions. While it is true that a radial structure has a temporal element to it as it
shows the stabilization of the diachronic development in a synsemantic field, this
diachronic component is nevertheless not the main feature. The structure aims at
displaying the synchronically existing functions of a linguistic item and the way they
are related to each other. These functional extensions are not predictable but
motivated by connections that the language users perceive or make between the
respective phenomena. By this feature it has also mildly 'predictive' value; it does
not make further functions of the item (or of the same lexeme in another language)
necessary but somehow "less surprising" than others (Lakoff 1987). The ensuing
model is thus both a description of the synchronic status quo of the development of
the lexeme, and a motivation for the potential development of further functions.
The above model depicts the semantic functions that like synchronically
exhibits as spaces (boxes) in semantic space. The semantic-pragmatic links that
speakers perceive, and which are connecting those functions, are represented as lines
between such functional categories. In the following discussion, I will show that
like's synchronic functions have a common underlying denominator, depicted in this
8 The term 'model' has been used in the literature with varying meaning and without any clear
definition. It seems in order to justify my choice of terminology. I have chosen the term 'model' in
order to keep within the legacy of papers on the grammaticalisation of discourse phenomena, a
literature which tends to refer to explanatory schematic representations as 'models'. In this article, I
will take the term 'model' to mean 'empirically validated graphical representation with mildly
predictive value'.
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model as the shaded central functional space. Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994)
point out that the source meaning restrains the grammaticalisation path an item will
travel in its semantic development. The functions that arise from a linguistic item are
related to the source construction, a phenomenon termed "persistence" by Hopper
(1991) and "split" by Heine and Reh (1984:57-59).9 Hence, if semantic-pragmatic
extensions from one original core are not arbitrary but motivated, this implies that
the output of a meaning shift still necessarily contains a part of its input.10
I agree with Romaine and Lange (1991), Miller and Weinert (1998) and
Fleischman and Yaguello (to appear) that the newer functions of like have their
origin in the semantics of comparison. I assume as the basic core meaning of like the
notion of similarity which I take to be the basic underlying notion of both
comparison and approximation (cf. Romaine and Lange 1991). This is for two
reasons. The first is historical: the OED gives as the first entry for like "Having the
same characteristics or qualities as some other person or thing; of approximately
identical shape, size, colour, character, etc., with something else; similar; resembling;
analogous. cl200 ORMIN 7931 f'e'Ure sang iss lie wL' wop."11 (italics mine). The
second is that, as I will show in the discussion to follow, similarity is the persistent
semantic trait which can be found throughout the extended functions. The
connection between comparison and similarity has been motivated by Bredin
(1998:69) who describes comparison as "the process in which I inspect the things
being compared in order to discover whether they are alike or not". I conclude that
comparing is looking for +/- similarity. Under approximation, I understand the
notion which holds when two concepts are "similar (...) but not exactly the same"
(Collins Cobuild online, http://www.linguistics.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ccsd, March 1st,
2003, search for 'approximate'). Hence, similarity is the semantic primitive inherent
9 The literature seems to agree on the fact that outcomes of grammaticalisation are related. But there
is much less consensus on the way in which the various functions of grammaticalised constructions
are linked. Whereas Sweetser (1988) and Perez (1990) claim that metaphor is the major creative
impulse for grammaticalisation, Hopper and Traugott (1993) and Traugott and Heine (1991) see
metonymy or association in linguistic context as the driving force. Bybee and Pagliuca (1985) and
Bybee (1997) hold generalization to be the underlying force, whereas Traugott (1995) postulates that
realignment lies behind the transfer.
10 Lichtenberk (1991) claims that a common core meaning exists only historically but that
synchronically, there is not necessarily a common denominator exclusively shared by all functions.
11 Lit. Their song is like with weeping.
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in both comparison and approximation. The similarity notion then gives rise to
various other meanings, which I will show to be partly interrelated and which still
contain this core semantic meaning to a greater or lesser degree
I will now motivate this model by illustrating in what way like's multiple uses
are interrelated and how they can be tied to one core meaning. The following
paragraphs present a categorization of the synchronic functions of like as found in
my data: first its use as a discourse marker in its various functions, then in its use as
a quotative complementiser. I will show that while the existing functions are still
more or less closely linked to this core meaning, one can nonetheless not postulate
one single grammatical channel joining uses that are progressively more remote from
this core, even synchronically. Rather, my claim is that these functions are
semantically and structurally linked in a field around this one core. I will support this
claim with cross-linguistic evidence. Later, I will argue that the same kind of model
can also be used to explain go's synchronic functions and display how go's
development can be understood as a non-suppletive development of multi-layered
meanings via functional extensions.
4.3.2. The hedging function
Like as a preposition or as a conjunction has comparative function. It signals
near-identity between the compared and the comparator. This can be seen in
examples such as Paul looks like my father, where it is assumed that Paul has a close
resemblance to the speaker's father. Consider in this respect function 1 given by the
OED: "Having the same characteristics or qualities as some other person or thing; of
approximately identical shape, size, colour, character, etc., with something else;
similar; resembling; analogous."
In talk-in-interaction, speakers can compare entities using like even when there
is a substantial difference between the two entities compared.12 But the question
poses itself: when speaking of real-world similarity, how different can two entities
be and still be compared using the word likel While this question cannot be solved
12 This and the statements below obviously do not apply to metaphorical comparisons such as the
ones in poetics (cf. Bredin 1998:69).
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off-hand and will remain a matter for further investigation (Buchstaller, in
preparation), for the purposes of the present discussion, I will accept Schourup's
(1982a: 30) proposal of a comparative "more like" reading for like, which can still be
subsumed under its standard meaning "somewhat resembling" (Webster's New
World Dictionary 1994). Consider example (4.1)
(4.1) BrE - The barbecue
V: but ehhmm she's ahhmm,
so we just thought- and the other ones were sort of standing outside,
and we were just so,
like you know where the toilet were and everything,
and then we just went down the bridle path.
(...)
K: we were sitting here.
there was like ahh:: panel then,
and they were on that side,
Speakers V and K describe their and their friends' position with respect to the
placement of some other acquaintances. The geographical location is given by V.
Then, K describes where they were sitting: in a place where they were shielded from
their friends' because they were on the other side of a panel. V uses panel as a
representation of a dividing item of some sort. Knowing panel is probably not the
exact term, she employs it as a substitute for the lexical item she does not know or
she does not have in her immediate active word stock (if there is any).13 A short
word search for a better and perhaps happier lexical choice is also indicated by the
prolonged ah::: before the word panel. Using like before the lexical item she
eventually picks, V implies that the item they had been shielded behind somewhat
resembled a panel. Like in this function is still related to its old core use of
similarity: the comparative notion pertains between what was said and what was
conceptually intended. Like thus signals that the listener should not take the utterance
too literally and should be aware of a potential discrepancy between what the
speakers have in mind and what they actually say (Siegel 2002). The approximative
value of the verbal representation is acknowledged and highlighted (cf. Fleischman
13 I am grateful to Keira Ballantyne for pointing out to me that, in some cases, speakers may be
reluctant to put in exact technical terms even if they know them because the assertion of in-field
knowledge would put them in the position of claiming knowledge of a field that they might be
unwilling to take on (cf. Channell's (1994) concept of vague language).
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and Yaguello to appear). Schourup (1985) argues that by using like, speakers alert
their interlocutors to the "loose fit" between what was intended and the overt
expression; Andersen (1998) speaks of "loose talk". Like can thus be interpreted as a
signal of imperfect rendering of what the speaker actually intended to express, an
epistemic hedge (on the notion of hedge, see e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987, Holmes
1984, House and Kasper 1981, G. Lakoff 1972). This is also underlined by findings
of Sweetser (1991:28), who points out the frequent link between items that signal
physical likeness and epistemic stances.
Like as an epistemic hedge does not fully commit the speaker to the content of
what she says. In Underbill's words (1988:241) speaker V "leaves the statement
slightly open". She chooses a more general term which she hedges with like because
openly stating her uncertainty or using a more exact but possibly inaccurate lexical
choice would (if she were taken to task for it by her interlocutors) constitute a threat
to her positive face.14 Thus, taken at an interpersonal level, like functions as a
pragmatic hedge. By marking the lexical choice as approximate and giving the
speaker reduced responsibility, like can be a face-saving device used to forestall
criticism.
The literature mentions the use of like with numbers and the usefulness of an
item meaning "approximately" with numerical material has been pointed out.
Consider the following exchange:
(4.2) US English - Cold weather
A: I mean, one day it was like sixty below zero.
B: urn are you serious?
A: and uh- uh they said "uh, you know, stay inside".
Speaker A has not measured the temperature herself (and cannot remember it exactly
either it seems). Especially with rough estimates of numerical values such as this
statement, like shields the speaker from being taken to task for non-precise
information by the interlocutor (Precht 2003). Schourup (1982a:37) paraphrases this
14 For the notion of face see e.g. Brown and Levinson (1987), Holmes (1992).
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as "What I say is like what I mean". Like "invites the hearer to infer a comparison,
either actual or hypothetical" between the actual number and the nearest round
number (Romaine and Lange 1991:246). If we are not in a situation where exact
numbers matter (such as a physicist researching the exact boiling point of Radon at a
certain altitude), Horn's statement "say no more than you must" and Grice's (1975)
2nd Maxim of Quantity hold. According to Wittgenstein (1978), definitions are exact
if they are good enough for whatever purpose they have been introduced. Hence,
numerical exactness is often not only unnecessary but would even come across as
odd. Unless precision is required, speakers give approximate numerical values and
have the choice of marking them as such with like.
Berlin (1992) argues that some entities are more representative, more focal
than others, especially when categories are fuzzy. This is in accordance with Rosch's
(1975, 1978) prototype theory, which holds that human categorization is not
arbitrary or accidental but rather the result of psychological principles of
categorization. In (4.2), the round number sixty is not arbitrarily chosen over the
possibly more accurate fifty-seven or sixty-four but rather because it is a focal
member of the category. It is more cognitively salient than other possibilities and is
thus more prone to be chosen given the time constraints of talk-in-interaction (the
same obviously also holds for non-numerical concepts such as panel in (4.1)). Like's
effect as a linguistic hedge before the numerical expression is to signal the slight
deviance of the real-world phenomenon from the reference point, sixty. Arguing with
Rosch (1975:533) that natural categories such as numbers have "anchoring points",
in relation to which other stimuli are perceived and classified, like, with its
comparative semantics, marks the relation of a prototype and its less prototypical,
specific instantiation of the category. The hedging via like in situations where
prototypicality is involved can be very nicely seen in (4.3).
(4.3) US English - The discovery
A. and what did he discover ?
B. well,
he's still in the process of being discovered.
what he was discovering,
he discovered (.) higher- like millions of [[indistinct]]
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Millions here can be understood as a prototype for 'a lot'. As it is a multiple of 1000,
a salient number in the decimal system, it provides "a cognitive focus of [the]
human-processing mechanism[s]" (Berlin 1992). The choice of the prototype in
place of a non-focal member is not random but because it is a conceptually easily
accessible classificatory item.
4.3.3. The focus function
In the literature, like is often interpreted as a focus marker (Blyth et al. 1988,
Dailey-O'Cain 2000, Romaine and Lange 1991, Schourup 1982a, Underhill 1988).
Haiman (1989:310) states that "the comparative construction is one which contrasts,
and hence focuses the elements which are compared... the element compared being
more highlighted" (see also Nplke 1983). Hence, the semantic link between
comparing and focusing seems to be a fairly salient one (see also Rooth 1996). In
this chapter, following Underhill (1988) I interpret the most significant information
in a sentence, or, by extension, in a chunk of speech as focus (cf. also Kuno 1980).15
If like marks such salient information, we should expect to find it adjacent to
linguistic material that has such status. Consider example (4.4):
(4.4) BrE - Food cravings
Y: she was even like into meatballs,
X: phh gosh your sister is straining you.
ha ha,
Y: we all know that.
In (4.4) speaker Y has been telling her interlocutor about her ogreish sister. She is
enumerating the things her sister has cravings for and concludes her list with stating
the fact that her sister even had a yearning for meatballs. Note in this respect the
OED entry for even "9. Intimating that the sentence expresses an extreme case of a
more general proposition implied (= Fr. meme). Prefixed (in later use often
15 For other definitions of focus consider Beheny (1998), Jackendoff (1972), Lambrecht (1994),
Sperber and Wilson (1986:202ff), Vallduvi and Engdahl (1996), from a typological perspective see
Lambrecht and Polinsky (1997). Consider also individual papers in the edited volumes Downing and
Noonan (1995) and Payne (1992).
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parenthetically postfixed) to the particular word, phrase, or clause, on which the
extreme character of the statement or supposition depends" [emphasis mine]. Thus,
meatballs, preceded by even, is the extreme last member of a climactic list of staples
(cf. also Berckmans 1993). It is double marked as such with like, which acts as a
focus marker just like even.
Note that focused elements need not necessarily be new. Older, known
elements can be focused on when speakers tap into old common knowledge and
reintroduce it into the currently activated information state of the conversation (cf.
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 1993). Alternatively, currently activated knowledge
can stay in focus over a stretch of conversation as can be seen below:
(4.5) BrE - Calculator breaking down in the middle ofa maths exam
X: I was "ohh God,
I have to go through couple of maths exams higher math without a calculator".
Y: I can imagine Nicola because you know how her old one,
where you used to [bang it,
X: [bang it,
Y: I'd see her like banging this ehhm calculator to get it on during the exam,
but she got a new one so,
X: ahhh so.
Here, the concepts banging, calculator and exam have already been introduced into
the current state of awareness during the TCUs before the one containing like. What
the TCU with the arrow does, though, is bring them all together in one coherent
picture. Y paints a vivid picture of Nicola trying to get the calculator to work. It is
this scene which contains a whole scenario which is in focus and marked as such
with like even though it contains nothing conceptually 'new'.
Note the fact that the focusing function overlaps with the approximative
function especially in numerical contexts such as the following:
(4.6) US English - Cattle farming
A: they've got to have them there to milk them,
and they- and I read in this article,
I couldn't believe it where you know like one cow produces- like a day,
produces like a hundred or so pounds of manure,
B: o-oh
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When speaker A states how much manure a cow produces, this measure is obviously
an approximation. As estimates of this kind are averages that do not apply to all
members of the species cow at all times, any number will necessarily be approximate.
The rough and ready numerical indication hundred, again a focal member, is marked
with like as well as with or so. But note that, as in this case, measures are often the
focused information in a piece of talk as they answer the important question "how
much?". In (4.6), the phrase a hundred or so pounds of manure is in focus. Like,
which is immediately preceding it, can be interpreted as a focus marker as well as a
hedge. Indeed, in all of my examples like's focus meaning seems to co-occur with
another of like's synchronic functions as can be seen in the next example. Like here
precedes a stretch of speech, the content of which is a typical situation, the story of
someone who suddenly becomes rich and famous.
(4.7) US English - Talking about a man coming from India to England:
X. and he was like put up in a house,
Cambridge and everything,
was just amazing.
X relates a story about a poor immigrant from India who comes to England, finds his
way into the highest intellectual circles and ascends the social ladder in no time. Like
in this context could be interpreted as hesitative or hedging. This would in turn be
underlined by the fact that the speaker does not attempt an elaborate expression of
her thoughts - marked by and everything. But intonation suggests otherwise:
Because the speaker utters what follows like in a monotonous, dragging voice, I
interpret the material following like as stereotypical, commonly known information
that only has to be hinted at and needs no elaboration. Because the story is a well-
known motif, X marks it as that: the prototypical success story. Like precedes this
material and serves as a focus marker (Schourup 1982a). Note that speaker X only
gives an approximate rendering of the story, because she assumes that it is so well
known that everyone can fill in the rest. The use of the general extender and
everything (Overstreet 1999) signals the speaker's tapping into the common
knowledge of her interlocutors. Here, like retains some of its core comparative
function in the sense that this illustration is compared to and seen as one instance of
103
the prototypical success story. In accordance with Hopper's principle of persistence
(1991), like's similative meanings persists in its focusing function.
Note also that like in this use is very close to its quotation-introduction
function discussed later in this chapter. The speaker uses prefabricated concepts or
even parts of speech she has heard or read before, embedding them into personal
narration from her perspective. Like then sets off parts of speech the speaker cannot
claim responsibility for, a sort of indirect quote of a stereotype (Meyerhoff 1992).
This patchwork of chunks of speech of various authors and "voices" (Bakhtin 1981)
creates a speech mosaic (Buchstaller 2001a). Goffman (1981) talks of "lamination".
The problem of speaker commitment to quotes that have become stereotypes or
somehow 'common goods' has been commented on by many scholars, see especially
Bakhtin (1981, 1986), and Volosinov (1973). Flaubert thematises the second-hand
nature of every-day discourse which builds on knowledge in the form of pastiches
which are reiterated over and over again in his 'Dictionnaire des idees reques' (1966)
and its fictional counterpart 'Bouvard et Pecuchet' (1966). As I will exemplify in
section (4.3.5), with like used as a quotative complementiser, the speaker can mark
the borrowed part as second-hand, as reported speech.
4.3.4. Like as a filler
Current discourse analytic research (Fox and Jesperson 1995, Schegloff
1996) shows that speakers plan in advance while it is not their turn and then jump in
and claim the floor without necessarily having properly planned their whole turn
ahead. As a result, problems can arise when the utterance is in the middle of
production. Faced with the threat of losing the right to the floor, speakers who have
run into problems of formulation and who have to re-structure their lines of thought
and their possible wording are forced to use strategies which allow them to avoid
pauses where their role as current speaker is at risk. Fillers (ehm, well, you know)
lengthenings (a ma::::n, we::::ll) and repetitions serve as time-buying mechanisms
where speakers are heard saying something while actually not saying anything new
or contentful. Like is one of the possible fillers used in such situations. As an
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extension of its 'more like' approximate sense, Like can assume this function, which
has been most criticized by normativists as it is identified with slang or very casual
speech (Dailey-O'Cain 2000, Schourup 1982a:39, Underhill 1988:234). It usually
precedes afterthought modifications by speakers who want to continue their
utterances but have difficulty in formulating them. In accordance with this, in my
data, like in this use often precedes a restart or an anacoluthon.16 Consider, for
example, (4.8), where B starts off with we, breaks off and reformulates her choice of
pronoun as 1 (want a part time job).
(4.8) BrE - Part time job
A: and "I'm paying you such an such on full time,
no we can't afford you not to work".
—> B: I know like ahh we ehhh (.)-1 want a part time job as well,
dad doesn't seem to agree but.
I don't know I want a part time job,
In (4.8), in the TCU marked with an arrow, B has obvious trouble formulating her
thoughts. She tries to buy time by using the items I know, like, ahhhh and ehhh. In
spite of these fillers, a little pause ensues which threatens her right to the floor.17 I
argue that like here has about the same function as other discourse markers, it is a
"sound shadow" (Goffman 1981:109) to hold the floor. Like fills the pause, or part of
it, and thus enables the speaker to keep the floor by filling in the silence. Consider
also the next example
(4.9) US English - Who are yourfriends? 18
S: not only am I like one out of very few white people with blacks, but I'm also not=
=exactly too wealthy,
so like I don't know that's affected me a lot when it comes to- like being able to do=
=things like - um there was one thing I wanted to do,
16 This finding underlines Andersen et al.'s (1999:1339) claim that discourse markers signal
production problems.
17 Note that there is an alternative interpretation, like as a quotative in the sense and I know like "ahh
we ehhh (.) -1 want a part time job as well". But intonation suggests otherwise: there is no noticeable
jump in the intonation contour (Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999) nor is there any indication of any
of the other suprasegmentals, which have been shown to mark quotes, such as interjections,
exclamations etc. (cf. Giildemann 2001:28).
18 Source: The Smart Museum of Art, Dawoud Bey: The Chicago Project > Simone (http://smart
museum .uchicago. edu/chicagoproject/portrait_simone.shtml).
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Like again occurs at the points where the speaker hesitates several times (so like I
don't know... it comes to- like being able .... things like um there was one thing).
This results in clusters of like. It co-occurs with other items that have been classified
as discourse markers with similar functions (so, um) in earlier accounts (Brinton
1996, Ostmann 1995, Schiffrin 1987). The phenomenon that several discourse
markers, which are syntactically redundant and semantically shallow, co-occur and
are "multiply reinforced" has been considered one of the distinctive features of
discourse markers in general (Romaine and Lange 1991:251 cf. also Schiffrin
1987:66). It can thus be counted as supportive evidence for the view that like
functions as a discourse marker in this particular sequence. Note that, while letting
the speaker gain thinking time, like is also suspending the hearer's attention. It is
signalling that there is more to come because the material following like is portrayed
as standing in a relation of comparison or approximation to what has already been
said.19 By opening up a comparative notion, the construction is suspended as it needs
a comparator in order to be complete. Thus, by using like speakers put their
interlocutors on hold.
As speakers are forced to make complex choices in real time during
conversation (Ferrara 1992), the choice of an item such as like is motivated by the
fact that not much conversational harm is done if the interlocutor interprets like at
face value as a similative item. Potential similarities are everywhere and their
salience is often very subjective. Hence, if interlocutors interpret like as a
comparative and even if they themselves do not perceive any obvious comparison,
they may put this down to a speaker-specific interpretation of the situation which
they do not share. Like is the perfect particle to fill a pause, and to hold the floor. By
indicating that what follows is only an approximative rendering, the pause is
"detoxified" (Schourup 1982a: 46). This links up to the discussion under 4.3.3: the
presentation of new or newly focused on information can trigger problems of
formulation. Using like, a marker with an approximative function, speakers can
introduce focused material - marking it as such while giving the speakers time to
mentally prepare their following speech.
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4.3.5. The quotative function
Romaine and Lange (1991) have shown that syntactically, like can occupy a
slot before a clause or a sentence. In US English and even more frequently in British
English, it can also follow the material it has scope over (cf. earlier in this chapter).
A wide scope is the syntactic prerequisite for the framing of quotes, which are
mostly clausal. Hence, like's increase in scope - from preposition (+NP) to
conjunction (+IP) - has set the stage for its quote-introductory function. If like
occurs within the context of a quotation and starts co-occurring with it more
frequently, it can become associated with its environment. Note Gumperz's
comment in a paper held at a conference in 1988 (1992:47) that like "foreshadows a
quote".
Indeed, once like has grammaticalised as a focus marker and focuses on the
most significant information in a stretch of speech, it is not surprising to find it co-
occurring with quoted material. Discourse analytic research has shown that speakers
incorporate reported speech into narratives in order to simulate the feelings and the
setting at the time of the quote and make the narration more dramatic or expressive
(Blyth et al. 1991:222, Ochs 1997, Yule and Mathis 1992).20 Also, because
storytelling with incorporated voices is more captivating (Labov 1972c), it makes it
easier for the speakers to hold the floor (Nordberg 1984:20). This is because
speakers who give the protagonists narrative voices do not take on the function of an
omniscient narrator who covers all roles. By presenting a narration as a series of
interchanges, like in a radio-play, a whole auditory scenario is built up in order to
involve the interlocutor. Speech with these characteristics has been called "involved
style" by Wolfson (1982), "performed narrative" by Tannen (1989) and "replaying"
by Goffman (1981). Quoted speech usually occurs most heavily around the climax or
the coda of the story and qualifies thus as the most focused part of the narrative
(Fleischman and Yaguello to appear, Labov 1972c). The quotation can then be
19 In its filler function, like still retains traces of its comparative approximative meaning, even if its
propositional meaning has already become bleached (Lehmann 1985, Romaine and Lange 1991,
Sankoffetal. 1997).
20 Labov (1972c) and Chafe (1982) state that narratives are more vivid when direct speech is used to
report dialogue.
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interpreted as a variant of that focus. The semantic overlap between focusing and
introducing quotations is thus motivated.
The observation that like is an item heavily used for introducing interjections,
sound and voice effects and other mimetic enactment of previous events (cf. Chapter
3) further underlines this claim. When speakers include such non- or paralinguistic
elements, they perform the reported event rather than merely tell it. The aim of such
performances is to create listener involvement and to increase the dramatic impact of
the story. Giildemann (2001) claims that say and other common speech verbs focus
on the semantics, the prepositional impact of the quote, which is then not particularly
salient. By contrast however, other, more marked frame elements such as like and go
focus on the presentation. This underlines Blyth et al.'s (1990) statement that "be
like may be viewed as a focus quotative, that is a quotative which introduces a
particularly salient piece of information packaged in the form of reported speech".
Note the obvious link to Goffman's (1981:99) "response cries", which are used
to "show or index the mental state of the transmitters", to "clarify the drama of their
circumstances". Consider the example below:
(4.10) US English - Bottle deposit
A: and it was they come in like uh eight and and eight and ten packs you know,
B: right,
A: instead of six-packs and uh and they were like,
it was like two dollars and something for the bottles,
you know I was like "Go:::::d almighty it costs more for the bottles than it did =
=for the cokes".
B: that was my brother's first job in a grocery store,
he was in the bottle area,
Speaker A has been telling a story about an experience she had in her local
supermarket during the first stumbling attempts to introduce bottle deposits in the
USA. The story stretches well beyond the excerpt represented here but has been
trimmed down for space reasons. In the line marked with the arrow, A represents her
reaction to paying enormous deposits. She re-enacts herself as producing the
hypothetical speech act Go:::::d almighty it costs more for the bottles than... Note
the lengthenings and the stretches of loud speech. This quote incorporates her
feelings in the situation. The emotionally heightened event is expressed through
marked suprasegmentals. This quote is at the climax of the narrative and concludes
it; B starts another narrative on the same topic after it. The use of focusing like
before the emotionally and narratively salient quote ratifies its interpretation as a
quotative as well as a focus marker. Like frames quotes containing sound and voice
effect that are salient in the narrative line. The use of like with mimesis goes along
with the focusing effect.
In addition, the filler function of like makes it an item well-suited to use before
quotations. Quoting means inserting a new mental space (Fauconnier and Sweetser
1996) which hosts re-enactment of other or self-quotation at a time removed from
the speaker's (here and) now. In order to quote, the narrator needs to remember the
original speech, sound or voice, s/he intends to represent (which is then re-enacted).
Furthermore, as the linguistic host material of the quote has a different deictic
orientation, personal and temporal orientation needs to be shifted corresponding to
the original utterance. The cognitive processes that underlie such restructuring need
time. As a consequence, we typically find large numbers of discourse markers with
filler functions around quotes. In my corpus, roughly one fourth of all quotes co-
occur with discourse markers (often doubly marked), the most frequent of which is
you know, followed by generalized continuers (Overstreet 2000) such as or whatever,
and all that etc., and the markers just and like. The following excerpt shows like co-
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occurring with other filler items in a quotative situation."
(4.11) US English - Reading the classics
01 A: uh huh
02 B: I'd read some Dickens before but I hadn't read that one,
03 and I-1 was like (.) I thought to myself you know "what other things are out there=
04 = that are that are classics"?
05 A: uh huh,
06 B: you know "that have just withstood time and that are just excellent,
07 something's excellent about them,
08 whether it's the way they are written or whether it was the material they were=
09 = written" you know,
Speaker B's reports of her thoughts are framed by I thought to myself in line 03. The
on-line pressures of reproducing the original inner quote lead to phenomena
21 As I will show in the next paragraph, another meaning of like, namely its hedging function, plays an
important role in the re-analysis of like as a quotative introductory marker.
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commonly associated with repair (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, Fox and
Jesperson 1995) such as re-starts (/-/), a pause (.), and several instances of the filler
you know (in bold in lines 03, 06 and 09). Also, we notice an instance of like before
the quotative frame (in line 03). Sperber and Wilson (1986) have shown that in
utterance interpretation, speakers interpret concepts in accordance with their context,
a phenomenon called "context-induced reinterpretation" (cf. the related concepts of
"pragmatic strengthening" (Traugott 1989), and "strengthening of informativeness"
(Traugott and Konig 1991). As concepts are subject to contextual factors in utterance
interpretation, depending on their small-scale loci of occurrence, we can assume that
if like occurs in the vicinity of reported utterances, its context of use - quotation - can
encroach upon its interpretation. Like can take on the function of an introductory
item for quotations.
A quantitative analysis of my corpus yields the finding that like is the third (in
USE) / fourth (in BrE) most frequent lexical discourse marker occurring in and
22around quotes. Several papers in Bybee and Hopper (2001) show that frequency
has an important effect on the perception and cognitive treatment of linguistic
material as related. Thus, via the process of metonymic transfer, the string filler like
+ quote can be perceived as a quotation frame. Through association with its
environment, like can change category membership (Krug 2001).
Thus we have a situation where the same surface form belongs to different but
related functional categories, even more so as like is often ambiguous in its function.
In example (4.11), like could be interpreted as having a filler function, regularly co-
occurring with quotations and buying the speaker time to mentally prepare the
incorporation of the quote, just as you know does a few lexical items later. At the
same time, once like has already acquired its grammatical function as a quotative, it
could also be interpreted as a quotative item from which speaker B repairs away (the
repair would then be I was like —■> I thought to myself). In this account, B had
initially planned to use the quotative frame I was like "quote" but repairs it with the
22 The sequential positions under which I have counted a discourse maker as directly associated with
quotes are the following (slots marked with X): immediately before, in or after the frame as in X pers.
pronoun X Vqul„ X "quot", as insertion sequences (analysed as such on the basis of intonation) as in
"quot" X "quot" or immediately after the quote as in "quot" X. Obviously, discourse markers can
occur in any slot at any time, and they frequently co-occur.
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strategy I was thinking to myself "quote". Tannen (1986) has shown that if one
lexical item occurs in a given context, it is more likely to be chosen by the speaker(s)
over and over again, a case of lexical priming. Scherre and Naro underline this claim
on a larger scale (1991, 1992). Hence, if the discourse marker like regularly and
frequently occurs in the vicinity of a quote, it will not be surprising to find that the
same surface item, once it has acquired the new quotative function, is chosen for
quote introductory functions as well.
When quoting, speakers report the utterance, but its form and content can only
be rendered approximately because of the idiosyncrasy of expression in terms of
suprasegmentals such as accent, style, prosody of the original speaker. Due to her
imperfect memory of the original utterance (Chafe 1980, Stafford and Daly 1984)
and due to her personal restrictions concerning voice quality, pitch etc., the reporting
speaker cannot give an exact rendering of the features of the original speech act.
Tannen (1986) takes this into account when she claims that every attempt to quote is
actually "constructed dialogue" (cf. Fleischman and Yaguello's "interpretive
quotative" (to appear: 9), see also Chafe 1994, Ducrot 1984, Tannen 1989, Mayes
1990, and many others). Like, an item which bears approximative function and has
already been grammaticalised to function as a semantic and pragmatic hedge, seems
the perfect item to mark the approximateness of reported speech. It explicitly
mitigates the claims to verbatim reconstruction (Clark and Gerrig 1991). Example
(4.12) gives an instance with like directly before the quote:
(4.12) BrE - Take away food
B: well we are gonna go for the pizza but,
well the first the first thing well that he says like "well me mate's got a=
=he owns he owns a taxi",
uh his mate,
A: uh huh,
B reports what his acquaintance said when he and his friends were going to get a
pizza. He represents the words he said as a direct quote. This quote is necessarily a
"selective depiction" (Clark and Gerrig 1991:767) of the speech act as it was uttered
by the original speaker in terms of voice, prosody, lexis, facial expression, etc. By
adding like to the quotative frame, speaker B acknowledges the fact that he does not
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render the speech act as a gestalt but only certain aspects of it, in this case only the
linguistic material, without any attempt of replaying the original speaker's voice.
The content of the quotation can only be an approximative rendering of the whole
emotional and contextual situation. Using like with its approximative-comparative
semantics signals the possible non-equivalence between what is reported and the
actual utterance. The speaker retains a reduced responsibility with respect to what
was said and how, as a like in quote introductory position does not commit them to
the form and the content of the quote. The quotative frame thus consists of two
elements: a verbum dicendi say and like, which functions as a hedge, both on the
referential-epistemic, and on the interpersonal-pragmatic level.
Due to its occurrence in this and other positions in the vicinity of quotations
like is thus en route to being grammaticalised as a quotative. Example (4.13) shows
like with reported thought:
(4.13) US English - Feeling stuck
B: like you don't have any money to- to get out,
A: oh,
B: so uh and uh I was thinking you know like "foh my God you know,
I go back there and then and I get married there and now I have kids there,
and then I'll never leave the place" you know,
In (4.13), like precedes a quote consisting of inner speech framed by I was thinking.
Speaker B produces a quotation frame with the quotative, you know as well as like.
Like in its discourse marker function can here be interpreted as a filler as well as a
focusing marker and also as a hedging item. Structurally, because like co-occurs with
think in the quotation frame in (4.13) and with say in (4.12), it can be interpreted as a
quotative complementiser. While intonation often disambiguates between the
functional possibilities, the point I want to make in this discussion is that it is
sometimes not possible, nor even intended to be possible, to pin down the item like
to one function only (cf. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003). It is like's ambiguous
and overlapping functions that are the constitutive element of its grammaticalisation.
Speakers can exploit like's functional vagueness and use it in contexts where it could
have multiple meanings without giving any cues that help disambiguate it.
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Note that especially in BrE, the quite frequent association of like with
quotation via the equally non-canonical quotative go as in and I go like "what did
you say?" (4% of all go-quotative frames co-occur with like as compared to only 1%
in US English). We can assume that speakers using the relatively new quotative go,
which we will see is still a marked option amongst the (say) variants, might tend to
be more unsure about their quotative choice and might accordingly use hedging like.
This is especially the case as go very often occurs with quotes the content of which
is inherently approximate, such as sounds, voice effects etc. Hence, the advent of the
new variant go might have also opened the door for the grammaticalisation of
hedging like in quotative complementiser function. While this is a hypothesis that
needs further research, it lets us imagine a scenario where one new quotative option
has led to the introduction of another new one, which is of high explanatory value
given the historical facts.
In US English, where go is much less frequent overall, other channels seem to
have played a bigger role in like's grammaticalisation (as will be discussed below).
But in British English, where go is the second most frequent lexical quotative option
overall, the association of strongly stereotyped go with hedging like cannot be ruled
out as a contributing factor in the development of like's new function.
Once like collocates frequently with verba dicendi before quoted speech and
thought, it can become associated with its environment. Reanalysis occurs and like
acquires the function as a quotative complementiser. The mental salience of the link
COMPARATIVE MARKER - QUOTATIVE COMPLEMENTIZER has been
sustained cross-linguistically by Meyerhoff and Niedzielski (1995, 1998), Romaine
and Lange (1991) and Schourup (1982a: 33-34). In other words, if in a number of
languages the cognate equivalents of like have become discourse introductory items,
we have cross-linguistic evidence for a correspondence between the functions of this
linguistic item.
Once like has been sufficiently associated with the notion 'quotative', it can
bear the functional load of introducing reported speech alone, without a verbum
dicendi (consider Gumperz' (1992) statement that it foreshadows a quote). The next
stretch of speech contains a particularly nice example, which typifies like's
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grammaticalisation history from a quotative complementiser to a full quotative item
with dummy be\
(4.14) BrE - Scary situation
Y: pfh,
he thought I was mad,
he said like "what are you going on about",
and I was like "oh I know that was scary" .hhhhhh
Through the frequent association of like with the quotation (i.e. here as a
complementiser with quotative verb say), like with dummy be can now take on the
function of introducing quotes. This use is represented in the second line with an
arrow. The grammaticalisation path goes from say/think like "quote" to be
like "quote". Consequently, like with dummy verb to be (Romaine and Lange 1991)
can function as a quotative in its own right even without any preceding verbum
dicendi which opens the "quotative realm". This can be seen in the next example.
(4.15) US English - Teaching English23
S: I tried to get her to say hello,
and she'd be like "(CHOKE)=
C: [ha ha ha ha
K: [ha ha ha ha] ha ha ha ha [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha]ha ha ha
S: [no puedo no puedo"].
I'd be like "yes you can,
just [say 'hello].
K: [ha ha ha ha ha]
S: [hello' Amaria"].
K: [ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha]
S: "(CHOK[E)"
K: [ha ha ha ha]
In (4.15), like precedes quotations twice, once with 3rd person singular and once with
1st person singular. Here, like's hedging function becomes particularly obvious as the
content of the quotation can only be an approximative rendering of the whole
emotional and contextual situation. I have shown in Chapter 3 that like is especially
frequent in the framing of quotes containing sounds, prosodic and paralinguistic
devices, gestures or mimicry (cf. Kendon's 1996, 1994 "quotable gestures"), the
23 For the transcription conventions of this and the following examples, see again Appendix 2.
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approximate character of which is evident.24 Giildemann (2001) traces a scenario
whereby mimesis markers are first introducers of onomatopoeic elements or gestures
and only then occur as quotative verbs for the whole spectrum of reportable events
including reported speech (cf. also Buck 1915). They only encroach upon this
function later and can then become routinised for the whole category. This statement
parallels other claims in the literature according to which like is only or prevalently
used with sounds or gestures (Ferrara and Bell 1995, Tagliamonte and Hudson 2001
and many others).25. By the time of the collection of my data, roughly 72% of all
quotative like-use in US English and British English was with some form of mimesis.
Hence, 28% of all quotes framed by like contained lexical elements only. The one
third incidence of like with purely lexical material (and much higher frequency with
lexical as well as mimetic material) justifies the claim that in my corpus like has
generalized its function to a quotative item that can take all quotative complements.
Irrespective of the form of the quote, due to like's approximative-comparative
semantics, speakers can signal the possible non-equivalence of what is reported and
the original utterance. Fleischman and Yaguello (to appear) contend that the reduced
speaker liability brings quotations with like into the realm of indirect speech. A
quotative introduction with like signals approximateness and is completely non-
commital with respect to its quote. Be like functions as a hedging quotative,
epistemically as well as pragmatically. Thus, when Tannen (1986:321) says that "be
+ like functions like a formulaic introducer, not by its literal meaning but simply by
convention", I interpret this to mean that like's function of introducing quotation,
which is approximative by nature and focused on, is a direct extension of its literal
meaning of similarity and is in the process of being conventionalised.
24 This use is also typical of quotative go as I will discuss below (Butters 1980). Consider also the
new use of all in American English as in She was all which seems to parallel the use of like as
a quotative complementiser for token mimicry, sound effects etc (Waksler 2001).
25 The fact that it is still associated with mimetic enactments is expressed by statements such as the
following "there are several environments where quotative choice is constrained. ... a gesture, facial
expression, or non-speech sounds are all, are like or go but do not say" (Singler 2001:260). While in
my corpus, quotative say does occur with sounds and voice effects (especially with the older speakers
who have smaller repertoire without like and with much fewer go tokens), it is certainly a fact that for
speakers who have them in their repertoire, overall, the noncanonical quotatives unframed, go and like
tend to take over the function of mimesis introduction.
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Furthermore, as Ferrara and Bell (1995:279) point out, a clear boundary
between speech and thought is hard to draw. Especially for first person, it is often
impossible to distinguish thought from actual speech. Because of like's still more or
less inherent semantic comparative-approximative property, it can be given a 'for
example' reading. It is the ideal item to frame direct speech and inner monologue
and can be used to present imaginary discourse as if it took place. Consider the
following example:
(4.16) US English - Using plastic grocery bags as lunch-bags
B: yeah in fact I have one today,
A: rigfht.
B: [the only problem with those is sometimes they got holes in the bottom.
A: yeah [they-




At the point in time when B's chips fell into her lap she was sitting alone in her car,
there was no interlocutor to whom she could have directed the words "whoops there
goes my chips...". It does not really make any difference if the quoted material was
actually uttered or if it was inner monologue. This quote is a hypothetical quote, as
explained in Chapter 3 (cf. Chafe's 1994 "verbally uncommitted thought"). Now it
becomes clear why like as a quotative is semantically and pragmatically a good and
frequent choice to introduce such hypothetical quotes: Romaine and Lange
(1991:227) claim that by using like "the speaker invites the listener to infer that this
is what the speaker was thinking OR saying at this very moment". Rather than the
exact words, the quote is the expressive content of the speech act or the original
speaker's thoughts packaged in the more vivid form of reported speech. Like as a
quotative, due to its similative semantics, can frame direct reported speech and inner
monologue. In using like as a quotative introductory item, speakers sidestep the
problem of where thought begins and where speech ends by presenting the quote as
if it had taken place without committing themselves to its actual utterance.
"Discourse introduced by like blurs the boundaries between direct and indirect
representation of both speech and thought report" (Romaine and Lange 1991:234).
In this case, the link to like's hedging function is obvious. Using like, speakers take a
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non-committal stance towards the quote they are representing. They forestall
possible threats to their face by counteracting the possibility of being taken to task
for misrepresenting thought as speech and the other way round.
In example (4.16), B's speech is inward, a verbalization of what she thought at
that moment. Like, as in the above example, precedes internal comments on the
situation that can be given in this short form without having to step outside the
quotation frame and give external evaluation (Labov 1972c). In this vein, Ferrara
and Bell (1995) claim that the function of like in contexts such as the above has the
function of the soliloquy, which was previously used conventionally on stage in
order to convey characters' inner emotions to the audience, as it allows speakers to
open up their internal worlds to the public.
Now that I have motivated the semantic/pragmatic ties between quotation and
comparison, approximation, focus and hedge, I will try to describe the full messiness
of like's patterning in synchrony. Any model that aspires to do justice to reality will
need to be complex enough to account for all of like's attested distributive
instantiations. It will also have to be flexible and simple enough to be of explanatory
value with respect to all of like's case-wise ambiguities.26 After a discussion of its
distribution in my corpus, I will suggest a way in which we can incorporate the
status quo into a coherent model.
When looking at like's occurrence with verbs of saying in my data, the first
thing that stands out is the fact that the slot between quotative verb and reported
material is not the only one it can occur in. Its position in the quotative frame is by
no means fixed, and in my data, like quite often occurs before the verb, either in the
sequence NP like Vqu„t "quote" as well as in the sequence like NP Vquot "quote" (cf.
the examples below).
26 Case-wise means the following here and the following paragraphs: Like is an item that displays
multiple ambiguities. But between which functions these ambiguities hold can only be determined in
the single, particular case. Hence, there are situations where like's functions are ambiguous between
the filler and the quotative function. In other cases, like might be ambiguous between a hedge and a
focus marker etc. Only a case-by-case consideration can give evidence about which ambiguities are
involved.
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(4.17) BrE - NP like Vquo, "quote"
A: I mean it doesn't bother me if something doesn't have this or that,
but she like says "ahhhh I got this and I got that",
(4.18) BrE - like NP Vquot "quote "
T: and I'm thinking that's a bit stupid,
because it's - it's what's in your head that counts and exercise in your brain,
—> like she used to say " (...) do come to the church this week",
and I'd say "no",
Also, as is shown in example (4.19), like can come before or after the quote,
especially in British English as in this variety it is more frequently found with
retrospective scope.
(4.19) BrE - The driving licence
B: I think I mean my dad asked us what I was getting what I wanted for me birthday,
I mean he said "you I bought you a provis- provisional" like,
A: ay,
B: and I -1 never really asked for driving lessons,
Here, hedging or focusing like has scope over the quotation preceding it. Notice that
in cases like this, where like is not occurring directly adjacent to the traditional
quotative verb, its association with the quotation is nevertheless given. Not only does
it occur within the close vicinity of a quotation itself, but, also, while the slot it
occurs in is not the one overwhelmingly used by quotative frames (90% precede the
quotation in my corpus), it is nevertheless one of the possible slots for a framing
item. Like in this slot is predictably much rarer in US English because in this variety,
the occurrence of discourse markers with backwards scope is less frequent as
discussed above.
Also, like can occur in an insertion sequence between a quote that is split into
two parts, resulting in the pattern Vquot "quote" like "quote". This is exemplified in the
excerpt below:
(4.20) BrE - The not so nice guy
A: I mean everybody says "he",
like "him up there",
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Speaker A represents a quote in which everybody is portrayed as saying "he". This
first quote is framed by the canonical quotative say. She then rephrases this with a
second quote "him up there" which is preceded by like. Paralinguistic information
alone tells us that like's function here is not that of a discourse marker with
retrospective scope, following the quote he. Due to an intonation break after he and a
new intonation starting curve with like, I interpret it as preceding and associated with
him up there. Speaker A can be interpreted as repairing her initial choice "he" with a
longer quote "him up there". 27 Fleischman and Yaguello (to appear, footnote 10)
say that like "can signal a rewording, expansion, or justification of a preceding
utterance. It introduces a metalinguistic comment by the speaker in his/her own
words. In this capacity it overlaps functionally and often commutes with I mean (...)
and/ or you know". This is exactly like's function in this piece of talk. As the
discussion above has shown, like's comparative semantics allow speakers to use it in
situations where the repaired item is compared to the material it is repaired with. By
using items with comparative semantics, the speaker presents them as having
something in common (cf. Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 1995). This way, the speaker
saves his face and does not present himself as having made "wrong" lexical choices
(cf. Meyerhoff 2002).
This mitigation task on an interpersonal level taps into like's already
established hedging function. Obviously, another possible interpretation of this
excerpt is that speaker A represents what the speakers had really said at the time,
"he" and compares this to her own inteipretation which is "him up there". As we do
not know what the original speech act was, both readings are open. Like's, similative
semantics make both interpretations possible. The most important thing to note,
though, is that when like occurs between the parts of a two-part quote, it is exactly in
the slot where we expect a verbum dicendi to occur. The frequency of like in such
positions, especially in British English but also in US English calls into question the
27
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) mention the following case: Here, the first quote consists of
indirect speech framed by said like followed by a direct quote framed by like.
"So my friends said like, to go away, but not very politely ,
like "Fuck off, go away" (Uk/x)"
In their interpretation, like is not a full quotative but a false start. Given a certain intonation pattern,
this is a possible interpretation. However, I claim that if like regularly and repeatedly occurs in the
position directly in front of the quote, whatever its function, its co-occurrence can give rise to its
reinterpretation as a quotative.
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importance of the sequence Vquo, like "quote" for the genesis of like's quotative
functions.
Consequently, like can occur alone before a quote which is not a direct
continuation of a previous one when it occurs in a context in which the de dicto
realm has already been established. Consider example (4.21).
(4.21) BrE - Discussion on religious and ethnic tolerance.
B: so me mum and dad left the choice to make me,
A: uh huh,
B: I saw people say like "what nationality are you all,
and what [ ((religion and)),
A: [like"why shall I let you know what national I am",
In this example, speaker B creates a hypothetical scenario in which intolerant
peoples' attitudes are represented via what they say. In the line marked with the first
arrow, speakers enquire about other peoples' backgrounds (what nationality are you
all ). B quotes those people using the canonical quotative say plus like. Her
interlocutor A joins in and gives an equally hypothetical answer to the question
formed by B, "why shall I let you know what national I am ". Thus, B collaboratively
creates a hypothetical interactive situation with speaker A. This follow-up quote, the
answer to the question framed by her interlocutor, is preceded by like only. The
quotative situation has been established through the use of a canonical quotative; like
occurs in a bath of speech. According to findings in the field of conversation analysis
(Pomerantz 1979, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), an answer to a previously
asked question is structurally required, due to its structural position as a second pair
part. In (4.21) it need not be explicitly marked as the realm of quotation has already
been opened (cf. on a similar note Giildemann 2001:31). Here, like occurs in exactly
such a position and is framing a second pair part. Also, we can assume more
generally that once like has repeatedly occurred in the vicinity of quotation, it is at
the stage where it has become sufficiently associated with its context to serve as a
framing item alone, without a canonical quotative verb.
120
The hypothesis that like grammaticalised independently of collocations with
verba dicendi is underlined by the frequency with which like occurs in quotative
situations in slots directly before quotations.28 Let me give you a few examples:
(4.22) US English - Billboard hypocrisy
A I-1- they- they- they have all these neat phrases,
B yeah,
A you know- you know- you know like "critically acclaimed",
that's what they- when the thing hasn't won any award.
B oh I see,
In this extract, A makes fun of the hyperbolic descriptions used by the movie
industry in order to lure people into cinemas. She represents one of the neat phrases,
namely critically acclaimed, as an example of all the deceptive slogans currently
found in cinema advertisements, and frames it with like. Critically acclaimed is one
example and as such an instantiation of the neat phrases. Hence, like's similative
semantics plays a large part in its use as an introductory items for reported events.
Also, like marks the focus of the utterance, the actual rendering of the stereotypical
billboard phrase. Furthermore, the fact that the co-occurrence and repetition of
several fillers indicates production problems opens the possibility for like to be
interpreted as a filler. As can be seen in this example, all functions of like play into
its grammaticalisation as a quotative introductory item, as all of them can hold at the
same time. Consider also the next example:
(4.23) US English - The lilac bush
A and I'm looking at him like "jeez,
people would kill to have a lilac bush like this one",
B yeah.
The scenario in which example (4.23) is uttered is the following: A is renting a
house with a beautiful lilac bush in front. One day her landlord declares his intention
to cut the bush down. The ensuing exchange between A and her landlord hosts the
excerpt given in (4.23). Speaker A compares the look on her face to a speech act
"jeez people would kill to have a lilac bush like this one". We can interpret this
28
This hypothesis does not preclude that like and canonical Vquot cannot occasionally co-occur. It
only suggests that this collocation is not the only and decisive one for like's development into a
quotative item.
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quote as a "representation of what might have been said aloud (if the participant
were in a 'state of talk')" (Ferrara and Bell 1995:283). A probably didn't utter
jeez ... but she felt like uttering it (Romaine and Lange 1991:237). If A had spoken
out her thoughts, she would have uttered jeez ... but as it happened, she didn't. Only
her face betrayed what she would have said. The following example makes this point
even more explicit:
(4.24) US English - The dog
A: and it would not have been fun trying to retrieve her but uh this dog,
Dennis jumped in and got this look on his face like "what do I do now" he he,
and he's floating down the river then finally discovered that he could swim.
Here, the dog Dennis certainly cannot talk. A presents him in a way that if he could,
he would utter the words rendered as a quote.
In the next example, a house is compared to the typical reaction people have
when they see it:
(4.25) US English - The party
A: just her whole house is hhh like "wow" he he,
Obviously, wow is not attributed to a speaking house. People who perceive it
exclaim wow or would do so if they were in a state of talk. We see that in cases like
the above, the comparative function and the quotative function overlap: the house is
compared (or likened) to people's reaction at the sight of it. In the same vein,
Romaine and Lange (1991) say that once like has taken on the role of a (comparative)
conjunction, it is only a short step for it to introduce speech or thought. This is
possible when the narrating speaker reports the speech or thought as if it was an
exemplification or as if it was to be compared to what came before. They give the
following example of a checkout woman who is about to put a roll of coins that a
customer has just bought back into the cash register drawer. In this case the event of
the customer's standing there is compared/equated to a proposition belonging to the
de dicto domain "what is she doing"
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(4.26) US English - The checkout woman (quoted from Romaine and Lange 1991: 262)
Why am I putting these in my drawer? These are yours. You're just standing there like,
"What is she doing?"
The cashier is animating what the customer could have thought or would say if she
had put her thoughts into words. It is also a state of affairs to which the customer's
standing is compared. Romaine and Lange point out that there is a metonymic
association between comparing a state of affairs and the (constructed)
speech/thought event going on in it (cf. also Ochs 1996). Like, if used repetitively to
compare events with quotations, is on the road towards grammaticalisation. The
sheer frequency with which like occurs in such contexts in my corpora is highly
suggestive for their importance in its reinterpretation. A cursory look through the
BNC, collected before 1993 in BrE (notice the first attestation of quotative like in
this variety is in the COLT (Andersen 1998) collected in 1993) shows that like in
such de dicto situations occurs in this variety as well. Thus, we can assume that this
road to grammaticalisation is not a variety-internal phenomenon idiosyncratic to the
US.
The last few paragraphs have given evidence that if like occurs within the
realm of quotation in the context of say like "quote" as well as in cases such as the
above, it is independently associated with this context via two routes. This greatly
heightens the probability of its grammaticalisation.
I will now discuss another route to like's grammaticalisation which has been
almost entirely ignored in the literature to date. In my corpus, one of the most
frequent contexts of occurrence of quotative like is the sequence 3rd pers. neuter
pronoun + be+ like, which occurs almost invariably in the reduced form it's like.
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999: 170) mention it's like in a footnote "Interestingly,
although representing a very small proportion of the data, N=23 (3.4%), the most
highly favoured context for be like in Britain is with existential it...". Let me give an
instantiation of it's like from my corpus:
(4.27) US English - Recycling
B: it-1 know I've got a two year old and a four year old and that's,




B: sohhhh it's like "well, (.)
no honey",
so that - like so that was one of the reason we went to show her what people did=
=with their- their stuff,
Existential it plus dummy be and like make up the quotation frame in this example.
It's like introduces speech attributed to self. The question is: why did the speaker not
use I'm like? In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the role of it's like in the
grammaticalisation of like as a quotative. I will explain the patterning of it's like in
my data and discuss it in the light of the few comments on it in the literature, which
are, interestingly, usually found in footnotes.
Consider Romaine and Lange's (1991:254) very telling discussion of an
example of it's like in the media where they disagree with the punctuation proposed
by the author. R&L write of the 1st and 3rd instance of LIKE (which they represent in
bold capitals) that they are "indeterminate in usage". Let me give the excerpt and
their comment in full. I want to focus on the third instance, preceding I live here.
56. IT'S LIKE (sic.) you want to come home and it's no left turn, no right
turn, go this way, come back that way, and then the cops look at you LIKE
"where do you think you are going?", IT'S LIKE, I live here [Charles
Fishman, The Washington Post, 14 Dec, 1985, A3]
"They both follow the pronoun it rather than pronouns which indicate a
specific speaker, and it may be that these are regarded by the writer or
editor as cases where like is used for comparison rather than for the
introduction of speech. However, we would argue that these still might be
thought of as part of the quotation frame, particularly in the third instance
where the statement "I live here" seems to be what the speakers might have
said or thought. Likewise, in the second instance, the frames they said of
they thought could be substituted for like with no substantive change in
meaning...."
Romaine and Lange point out that the frame it's like seems to be particularly
ambiguous in that it can often be paraphrased using quotation frames such as I said or
by discourse markers like, look, I mean and so on. ... The speaker seems to be using
like here to describe a more general situation as well as to introduce a quote.
According to Hopper (2000, 2001),
new, creative patterns of grammar is
it+be+like provides the contexts with the
the most vital element in the formation of
frequency of patterning. The sequence
highest frequency where like occurs in the
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direct vicinity of a quote - 56% of all like-tokens in the American data occur with
neuter it (for British English see earlier). I argue that this fact is key to like's
grammaticalisation as a quotative, at least in US English.29 Note Fleischman and
Yaguello's (to appear) comment (again in a footnote) "The clause initial it's / it was
like occurs with sufficient frequency in our American data as to raise the question of
it's being a construction in its own right." Furthermore, the sequence it's like is the
principal site where we have ambiguity between two structures, one of which is the
comparative, core meaning of like (cf. Romaine and Lange's discussion above), the
other of which is quotation. In such an environment, due to the process of reanalysis,
it's like can acquire the function of a quotative frame. Let me show this with an
example:
(4.28) BrE - Devoutness and worldly success
01 T: cause like I didn't go to the church and stuff and,
02 and more or less blamed to god,
03 like- it's like "God was responsible for her passing her A levels and everything"=
04 = you know,
05 and I'm thinking "that's a bit stupid because it's-it's what's in your head that counts,
06 and exercising your brain".
Let me discuss line 03 first. Speaker T, telling her interlocutor of her feelings
towards her religious cousin, contrasts herself, a non-church goer, with her cousin's
weekly service attendance. She then discusses the possible link between her cousin's
success at school and her devoutness. It's like introduces one possible interpretation
for her cousin's success at school: that her cousin was helped by divine intervention,
which she later dismisses as that's a bit stupid. ...It's like thus precedes a description
of a situation from T's subjective point of view and can be glossed as It (=the
situation) was like, at least I perceived it that way. Line 05 is the point in the
transcript, where T refutes her earlier interpretation, presenting a rational argument
it's what's in your head that counts. She contrasts this perspective with her previous
proposal and marks its subjective character as well as the fact that it is her opinion
by framing it as inner thought with and I'm thinking. Again, T presents a situation
29 Consider in this vein Winter (2002:13,20) who shows that innovative be like in Australian English
is largely confined to third person singular use. She claims that this fact suggests a very different
introduction pattern for the innovation from that documented for North America, Canada, and British
English. Winter only reports 8% like+existential it.
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through her subjective interpretation. I'm thinking has the same functions as it's like:
to signal an interpretative description of a situation as seen through the eyes of a
protagonist and to present it in the form of a quote. In cases of formal ambiguity of
it's like as in the example above, the construction of arguments as contrastive stances
in a parallel structure -first the religious position, then the rational one- gives weight
to the possibility of interpreting it's like as a quotative.
Consider also the following example which hosts a repair from I think to it's
like.
(4.29) BrE - College talk
Y: ahh you do the MAB one,
X: uh uh,
and I think- it's just like eh "that gives us an advantage now",
because one MAB is based on your own,
you're doing geoscience.
and not having done geology GCSE,
We witness a case where there is a transition from I think to it's like. Speaker X,
starts by representing the situation as inner monologue, framed by I think. She then
repairs and reverts to using the less subjective form it's like. Both are modalising
utterances: I think portrays the description as perceived from the point of view of the
speaker, it's like hedges on the basis of subjectivity as well. We notice that the
construction it's like is on the brink between a parenthetical quotative (Schneider
2002) and a real quotative.
In the next sequence, it's like clearly takes on the function of a situational
quotative as described in Chapter 3.
(4.30) US English - Politics and ethics
B: but it's still you know,
A: I think,
B: I guess I keep that one part of me that's like "well hhhhh,
I don't know I want to trust them",
and I- it's like "I can't".
and maybe it's because you know we've had our own propaganda over the years,
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In this example, speaker B is describing his feelings "well hhhhh I don't know I want
to trust them" framed by that one part ofme that's like. The item like stands between
and compares the speaker's feeling to a quote. Again, we have the situation in which
a quote would have been uttered if the speaker it is attributed to had been in a state
of talk. B is representing inner talk.
In the line with the second arrow speaker B states 7 can't. This is first of all a
description of the situation at the time that B gives to her interlocutor. B cannot trust
them because of all the propaganda that had been disseminated previously. On the
other hand, I can't can be interpreted as a continuation of the previous quote this
time framed by it's like. The whole original line of thought, now broken up in two
quotes, would thus run "well hlih I don't know I want to trust them (but/and) I can't".
The sequence it's like frames linguistic material that is at the same time a description
of a situation and a quote of the situational category. Note in this respect Schourup
(1985:59-61), who feels that it's like has the same evincive meaning as like alone.
He interprets existential it as referring to what the speaker has in mind to express.
Hence, as has already been established, like has a similarity-marking function. In
collocation with existential it, forming the sequence it's like, it is used to describe
how speakers perceive situations. When descriptions take the form of previously
occurring, reported speech, the sequence it's like can take on the function of a quote
introductory marker. Note that the comparative function of like is an important
precondition for this transfer. The functional extension lies in the metonymical
association of a situation with a quote.
Ferrara and Bell (1995) state that one of the reasons for like's triumphal entry
into the quotative system is its flexibility. As complex choices have to be made as to
how to represent spoken discourse or inner speech, as well as gestures, sound, and
voice effects, a one-size-fits-all quotative simplifies planning. By choosing the form
it's like, speakers can cut calculation time even more because it can occur with all
grammatical persons, tenses and aspects. Functioning like a wild-card (cf. Chapter 3)
and being able to frame all re-enactments in all pragmatic and formal contexts is
undeniably one of the main reasons for the enormous momentum and speed with
which it's like has been introduced into the quotative system.
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Singler (2001) says that it's like might have been an important step in the
grammaticalisation of like but does not elaborate how: "arguably it's like evolved
from it's as ifX said, where X ordinarily has an indefinite referent (...) but can have
a specific referent (...). The construction may have played a crucial role in like's
grammaticalisation as a quotative" (Singler 2001:261). I will now sketch a possible
alternative scenario for like's genesis as a quotative. The frequency distribution of
it's like "quote" where it's like has clearly quotative (amongst other) functions in my
US English corpus (1988-1992) shows that 56% of all like-quotes are framed by
existential it.30 This is an astonishing number given how little it has been discussed
in the literature. Blyth, Recktenwald and Wang (1990:221) found that in their corpus,
like is rarely used in the third person. However, they do not give any indication
whether they have looked at the possibility of like occurring with existential it.
Ferrara and Bell's (1995:278) findings indicate that it's like amounts for 7% of
instances in their two earlier corpora (1990 and 1992) and only for 2% in their latest
corpus (1994). Thus, compared to my data (1988-1992), the number of 3rd person
inanimate pronoun with like found by Ferrara and Bell is substantially lower in the
first corpus (1990-2) and even lower (1994) in the second. I suggest that the
discrepancy might lie in the fact that earlier findings might have overlooked cases of
existential it, simply because they were looking at the quotative frame through the
lens 'personal author + quotative', hence failing to notice existential it. Such an
interpretation of not all but most of the early literature is underlined by how seldom
existential it+like is pointed out and by the fact that, if it is mentioned, it usually
occurs in footnotes (cf. Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). In sum, the possibility of
like's grammaticalisation via the sequence it's like "quote" in situations where
descriptions and quotes overlap is one that has been neglected in previous research.
As has been confirmed in publications on like over and over again (Bailey-
CD'Cain 2000, Ferrara and Bell 1995, Johnson 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999),
like has generalized into all pronominal environments. It is usually assumed to come
from first person sg.; no mention is made of it. Data supporting the claims about
30 Consider also Chapter 5. Those tokens are the ones which have been decided on as definitely
quotative by the author. In case of doubt, I have consulted with M. Meyerhoff and at least one other
native speaker. Only if all instances agreed on the interpretation of an instance as having a quotative
function, was this token kept in the analysis.
128
generalization could also be seen as evidence of paradigmatic spread (Hopper and
Traugott 1993) of quotative like, arising in its quotative function in a certain
environment (existential it) and expanding into others. Hence, it seems that it's like
is a strong contestant for the environment in which like could have grammaticalised
to a quotative. While claims in this chapter can only be of a suggestive nature, it
seems that the diachronic association of like with existential it provides a fascinating
ground for future research.
A comparative glance at the BNC (data 1991-1993) reveals quite a number of
instances of it's like with somehow ambiguous status which cannot yet be interpreted
as situational quotes but which clearly have some sort of quotative notion implied.
At the time the Derby and Newcastle data was collected (1994/5), 3rd person sg.
neuter accounted for 34% of all quotes (after 40% for 1st person). Thus, while we do
not know how important the role of existential it is in like's grammaticalisation
across both varieties of English, we can safely say that it's like is one of the
constructions via which like has acquired its quotative introductory function. The
question whether this construction represents the incipient grammatical form in
general or one which is particular to the American context also remains a question
for further research.
It looks as if in BrE, where like can occur after the item it has scope over, it is
predominantly the in-between quotes position which made it grammaticalise in this
variety as well as the association with non-canonical go, whereas in the US, the it's
like construction led to its use as a quotative. But it is by no means the case that we
have to postulate one grammaticalisation model for British English (the sequence
"quote" like "quote" leading to like's grammaticalisation as a quotative) and a
completely different model for US English (it's like "quote" being the precursor
structure to its quotative function). Instead of trying to pin down the
grammaticalisation to either of the two scenarios, and blurring the commonalities, I
suggest that the most intuitively satisfying hypothesis is that the triggering factor lies
in like's association with quoted material in the largest sense. The above discussion
has shown that we have to accept the fact that we have to work with fuzzy categories,
which are hard to pin down and ambiguous on multiple accounts. Thus, I claim that
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all the contexts mentioned above have contributed to the association of like with
quotation and all environments in which a reanalysis is possible need to be taken into
account.
4.3.6. Discussion
The above paragraphs have shown that all uses of like still have a semantic
trait of comparison / approximation. Whether it is like's hedging function on a
pragmatic or semantic level, or its filler or focus function, all can be conceptualised
as direct extensions from one common core of similarity. I have explicated in great
depth how these functional outgrowths have contributed to the development of like's
quotative function. Again, the metaphorical and metonymical extensions which have
led to this new function are motivated by the notion of similarity. This is in
accordance with Hopper's (1991) principle of the persistence of meaning: Like's
semantic core meaning is still present in all the derived uses which are linked to each
other in various ways. Like's older uses still persist in the language and continue to
play a role in its further development. The development is additive rather than
suppletive. Behind the overlappings and ambiguities that result from like's
multifunctionality lies an interrelated net of semantic-pragmatic links around the
core semantic property.
Schourup (1982a:32) gives data from languages such as Sierra Miwok, Lahu,
and Raluana in which like-lexemes function simultaneously as comparative items
and as, what he calls, 'evincive'. This seems to be supportive cross-linguistic
evidence for a grammaticalisation path linking comparative items and hedges, as
traced for Standard English by Romaine and Lange (1991), and for olsem in Bislama
by Meyerhoff and Niedzielski (1998, 1995).
Hence, my results are sustained by much cross-linguistic evidence (cf.
Giildemann 2001, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 1998, 1995, Schourup 1982a: 32). As
is evidenced in Table 4.1 below, multiple discourse functions within the same related
field are quite widespread among unrelated languages.
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Table 4.1:31 Cross-linguistic distribution of like-lexemes
approximative comparison rep. speech rep. thought focus hedge filler
English like X X X X X X X
Bislama olsern X X X X X X ?
Japanese nanka X X X X X X X
French genre X X X X X X ?
Chinese xiang X X X X X X X
Buang ? (na) be (na) be (na) be ? be ?
Finnish niinku(in) X X X X X X X
Thai bce:p X X X X X X X
This chart is to be read as follows: question marks denote cases where no data was
available. Brackets mark optional constituents. The chart gives cross-linguistic
evidence for a close semantic link between the notion of approximation, hedging,
focusing, and introducing speech and thought.32 These results are highly suggestive
of a universal cognitive / perceptually salient pragmatic-semantic field lying behind
such coherent findings (cf. Fleischman and Yaguello's (to appear) proposal that a
theory of pragmatic universals is at order). If source-items in two or more different
languages, especially languages that are unrelated, such as English and Thai, follow
parallel paths of development without any evident contact, this supports the
assumption that there is a general link between the notion of similarity and its
derived functions. Hence, Traugott (1995) asks if one can make cross-linguistic
generalizations about the development of discourse particles both in terms of their
semantic sources and their semantic-pragmatic paths. Consider also Mosegaard-
Hansen (1998:85) who points out that, synchronically and diachronically, discourse
markers can be traced back to a number of related uses. I claim that such evidence
supports the claim that a model, such as the radial structure model, which relies on a
semantic field as an explanatory parameter, is best able to cope with the linguistic
reality as discussed in this chapter.
It has often been claimed in the literature that discourse markers are highly
language specific items (Brinton 1996, Mosegaard-Hansen 1995), hard to translate,
and only understandable within their specific linguistic system. But Table 4.1 shows
31 For the information in this chart I am indebted to the following people: Mie Hiramoto, Kazumi
Yoshihara, Aaron Tsang, Sumittra Suraratdecha, Preena Kangkun, Gillian Sankoff, Hannele Buffy
Nicolson, and Miriam Meyerhoff.
131
that similar lexical items in unrelated languages are generalized to serve the same
discourse functions. Also, studies like the ones by Meyerhoff and Niedzielski (1998,
1995), Fleischman and Yaguello (to appear), and this present one underline this
claim and show that there are cross-linguistic parallels between the source items and
the outcome of such semantic-pragmatic developments. This means that it may be
possible to relax the claims about specificity and untranslatability of discourse
particles.
The proposed radial structure model shows how superficially messy facts can
be linked in an orderly way. The diverse functions that like has assumed
synchronically are motivated by this model - they cannot be predicted but they are
explained. The analysis presented in the preceding paragraphs has shown that the
synchronic functions of linguistic items cannot be fully explained by a chain model
but are best understood as a net of relations. Given the overwhelming evidence for
interwoven functions and the numerous cases of case-wise overlap and ambiguity
presented in this section, it seems naive to try to force functional extensions into
separate unilinear chains. The situation with like is one of ambiguity not only
between the core item and the functional outgrowths, but also between all functional
extensions. As I have argued throughout this chapter, this ambiguity is constitutive
of how different functions are understood and conceptualised. If we want to render
justice to what is really going on, we will have to try to free ourselves from
simplicistic goals, no matter how "neat" they might seem. Unfortunately, with
respect to like, things are complicated.
As linguists, we not only have to accept messy facts but we also need to
represent them the way they are and give comprehensive accounts for the underlying
factors that might have caused the status quo. What we need in order to account for
like's patterning is a model that is subtle enough to be able to cope with
multidimensional and multifunctional entities. I claim that a radial field model is a
strong contender for such a job (cf. the depiction earlier on). It comprises numerous
'paths' which I prefer to call functional extensions in order to avoid possible
32 For an extensive cross-linguistic study on the link between items meaning like, quotative verbs, and
various other domains see Guldemann (2001).
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infusions of directionality. The different functional extensions can be represented as
movements in semantic/pragmatic space. Consider Figure 4.4:
Figure 4.4: The functional extensions underlying ///re's semantic core field
t
Figure 4.4 depicts the semantic field of like where functions are radiating out from
the original core meaning of approximation / comparison. The model, which is
obviously only an impoverished representation of the multi-dimensional semantic
field, is presented so that is has a temporal dimension to it, with older functions
grouped more to the left and newer ones depicted as appearing on the right hand side.
In the ensuing interwoven field, dates indicate the first mention of the functional
extension. It is reasonable to assume that the hedging function arose quite early.
While we do not have any concrete evidence for its first attestation in the OED
(hence, the schema contains no date for the entry hedge), I argue that it is reasonable
to suppose that an approximative item can be used with hedging function from its
very beginning (see in this vein Fleischman and Yaguello: to appear). Except for the
quotative function, which Butters first noted with dummy be in 1982, the dates are
taken from the OED. Concerning this function, the OED gives an instance of like as
a quotative complementiser in the year 1970 under the heading "also in less
analyzable constructions" which is as follows: "1970 Time 31 Aug. 19 Afterward, a
girl came up to me and said, 'You kinda look interested in this; did you know there
are civil rights for women?' And I thought like 'wow, this is for m^"(italics mine).
If we accept like's occurrence as a quotative complementiser as a precursor to its full
quotative function, we can conceptualise this instance as situated within the realm of
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quotation. But it is still removed from the full quotative function and situated
somewhere in-between in semantic space along the intersecting dimensions hedge,
focus, and approximation and quotation. As those categories are fuzzy and have
intersecting areas, ambiguous cases - as attested numerously in real occurring data -
can be positioned somewhere in-between. Singular instances of like are located in
the scalarly aligned n-dimensions of the field, closer or less close to the prototypical
functional categories.
4.3.7. Conclusion
The above discussion has shown that like''s grammaticalisation does not
proceed unidimensionally. Its development does not progress step-by-step, but
within a synsemantic" field of mutually overlapping and reciprocally reinforcing
functions. Also, the boundaries of like's synchronic functions are hard to determine
and are heavily dependent on the context (prosody, lexicon, syntax etc.) as well as on
speaker intention and hearer reception, leading to case-wise ambiguity and
overlapping functions the interpretation of which must necessarily be subjective.
This is underlined by Bredin's (1998:75) statement about the "polysignificance of
comparison markers".
Building on those findings, I have shown that a unidirectional
grammaticalisation model cannot render the synchronic multifunctionality of like.
Rather, I have demonstrated that a semantic core structure is able to capture the
linguistic reality by giving enough plasticity and allowing for ambiguity on multiple
dimensions. This is underlined by Ferrara and Bell who claim that "the present
pragmatic plasticity of be+like - that is, its ability to introduce constructed dialogue,
thought, and quotable gestures of self and others - arises from systematic variation
and expansion from a core paradigmatic case" (1995:281-2).
Similarly, Romaine and Lange (1991:245, 262) say that "the meaning of
'approximative' and 'similarity' as well as the focus function have contributed to
33
Synsemantic in the sense of having (a) semantic trait(s) in common.
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both the discourse uses of like, and that these are natural outgrowths of existing uses
and functions of like... [Hence,] a simple linear model of grammaticalisation is
inadequate to account for these developments. What may emerge from
grammaticalisation is a network of related meanings of an item" (cf. Claudi and
Heine 1986:313). They have tried to render justice to this fact by using a branching
model. In this chapter, I go one step further. I have argued that the radial structure
model first introduced by Lakoff (1987), allows for one core meaning with
metaphorical and metonymic extensions more or less closely linked amongst
themselves while retaining their original core function. I have discussed this model
in the light of the distribution of like in my corpus and have shown that it is able to
motivate and conceptualise all instances of like. In the next section, I will show that a
radial structure model can also explain the status quo of go's functions.
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4.4. The go-Scenario
This section investigates the grammaticalisation of go, another highly
multifunctional item that can be used to introduce quotation. Several of its functions,
such as its use as a future marker, have been examined frequently in the literature
(Bybee and Pagliuca 1987, Bybee, Pagliuca and Perkins 1991, Bybee, Perkins and
Pagliuca 1994, Danchev and Kyto 1994, 2002, Perez 1990, Poplack and Tagliamonte
1999, Royster and Steadman 1923/1968, Wekker 1976). But no study has ever given a
coherent account of how go's quotative function can be linked up with its other
synchronic functions nor has there been any data-driven study which attempts to
motivate the ambiguity and multifunctionality which individual cases of go may
display in real occurring speech. This section is an attempt to give an account of how
the quotative function of go interacts and is informed by the rest of go's functions.
Investigating go from a synchronic perspective, I will propose a solution as to how
these functions can be conceptualized as motivated and interrelated. As with like, I
will argue that go's synchronic meanings are functional extensions from one common
core and that they are linked via diverse channels.
The OED's most general definition for go is the following:
"an intransitive verb of motion, serving as the most general expression
(I) of a movement viewed without regard to its point of departure
(II) for a movement away from the speaker, or from the point at which he mentally
places himself
(III) to or towards a place which is neither in fact nor in thought that occupied by
the speaker".
It further adds that go is to be understood as in contrast to come and that it later
acquired its semantic application to walking in order to distinguish this form of
movement from other modes of progression.
A contemporary dictionary entry for go yields a number of seemingly unrelated
functions. But looking at a corpus of talk-in-interaction, the only functions that occur
with great frequency in contemporary spoken English can be grouped under the
following four headings:33
33 This list excludes phrasal and idiomatic uses, as in (i) she goes to (i.e. attends) Edinburgh University;
(ii) I've gone and burned the toast; (iii) Blair will go to the country (i.e. hold an election) next month.
Nigel Love (p.c.) rightly pointed out that my proposed model can only claim to be a full account of all
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movement as in (4.31) She went by train,34
this category also subsumes more metaphorical cases of movement as in
(4.32) The prize went to a sophomore.
intention: (4.33) I didn't go to do it.
introducing quotes containing linguistic material and/or sound and voice effects
and/or gestures: (4.34) The gun went "bang".
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future: (4.35) What is going to happen to us? '
In the spirit of Lichtenberk's (1991) query as to whether meanings have structure
or whether they are to be thought of as unanalyzed wholes, this chapter will explore all
of go's functions (found above the level of significance in 2 corpora of talk-in-
interaction) and will try to represent them in one coherently structured model. It will
become evident that Lakoff's (1987) concept of a radial structure is again a very useful
tool to conceptualize go's linguistic reality. Through the mapping of diachronic
developments in synchronic semantic space, the ensuing model serves both as a
description of the synchronic status quo of the development of the lexeme go, as well
as a motivation for the development of further functions.
4.4.1. The radial structure
The semantic-pragmatic structure of go is quite complex, a finding which
directly taps into Giildemann's (2001) claim that "quotative verbs are notoriously
polyfunctional outside the quotative frame". Bybee, Pagliuca, and Perkins (1991:31),
however, argue that movement-derived futures do not provide the richness of semantic
nuances that modality-derived futures do. While this study is not in a position to
compare go's functional wealth with other future markers, it is worth noting that go, as
a movement-derived future, does display an array of other functions, which is also
contra Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca's (1994) findings that movement verb futures
typically have only one other use or no other use.
In this chapter, I will argue that all of go's functions (movement, future,
intention, and quotation) are 'alive and well', co-exist and even overlap. This again
of go's uses once I have been able to incorporate these functions. As it stands, this section is to be read
as an account of all of go's tokens that occurred with any frequency in a multi-million word data-base of
two varieties of spoken English.
34 This and the following examples have been adapted from Merriam-Webster's 2001 online dictionary.
35 From Collins (1998).
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questions the appropriateness of a chain as a synchronically explanatory parameter.
Within my model, I assume the notions goal and source as the basic semantic
components of the synsemantic field around go. This is both due to their early
appearance (first attestation in OED as goal 971, first attestation in OED as source
1000) and because they are the persistent semantic primitives which are 'shared'
within the developmental schema of extended meanings. Note that go can also have
the sense of 'unspecified movement', as in They went shopping. Its first record in this
function (attestation in OED 825) slightly predates the source and goal meaning of
go. Even though a slightly earlier date of occurrence (by 150 years) does not
necessarily point to an earlier use, especially in cases of patchy data-records from the
earliest periods of English, it nevertheless questions the status of allative and telic go
as a diachronic centre of the schema. This question certainly deserves further study but
I will not pursue it any further here as my focus is the conceptualization of go's
synchronic uses in one coherent model.36
Earlier accounts of grammaticalisation maintained that while meaning gets lost
or at least eroded, the newer functions usually retain traces of their original meaning
(Hopper 1991). Heine, Claudi and Hiinnemeyer (1991:156) have called this
phenomenon "isolating abstraction": the separation and possible further development
of a particular property or feature which is not necessarily the core or nucleus
characteristic of the source concept. I claim that it does not really matter whether the
features that give rise to a functional extension are at the semantic core of the original
source concept. What matters is that the feature(s) of the source concept is/are at the
core of the new radial structure. I will provide evidence for this claim throughout the
remainder of this chapter.
It will become evident that the core notions Source and Goal give rise to
various meanings which still contain the core semantic properties to a greater or lesser
degree. This claim follows the grammaticalisation literature in that it considers the
original meaning(s) of the source structure as determining the extended uses the
item(s) will have later in their history (cf. Bybee and Pagliuca 1987, Givon 1973).
36 Note also that as Therese Lindstrom (p.c.) has pointed out, there also could have been a split to
unspecified and specified movement in the history of go's development with the latter meaning
becoming the centre of the grammaticalisation schema as depicted here.
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This study shows that original semantic-pragmatic traits are the centrepiece of the
synchronic structure. They are not prone to being lost at all. Consider now the radial
structure model:
Figure 4.5: The radial structure model of go
The above radial structure outlines go's non-suppletive grammaticalisation into multi-
layered meanings via functional extensions. Those offshoots are based on processes
that have been identified as the driving forces of functional extensions: metaphor,
metonymy, and conversational implicatures. In the following paragraphs, I will
discuss the meaning extensions of go starting from its core. The discussion will show
that synchronically, a single grammatical chain joining uses that are more and more
remote from one original cannot cope with the situation as we find it in real occurring
speech. In my data, go's co-occurring functions are highly ambiguous and overlap
with one another, building up a multidimensional field. Note also that this radial
structure, contrary to the model proposed for like, splits up the function quotation into
two sub-functions, introduction of speech and introduction of sounds and gestures.
The reason for the split is that the different underlying parameters have given rise to
the functional extensions, as will be explained later in this section.
Giildemann (2001:38) shows that in some languages a verb which is capable of
marking mimesis may mean 'make, do, act', such as Greek kano reported by Tannen
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(1986:317) or German machen (Golato 2000, 2003). He proposes that a meaning like
'do' may actually be a descriptive confession that a monosemous account is
impossible because of the extreme semantic-functional versatility of the item. He
maintains that a verb in a quotation frame does not necessarily have to mean 'say' and
proposes, given the cross-linguistic evidence, several source items for the class of
quotatives that he provisionally calls performance or mimesis verbs. These verbs have
no de dicto meaning outside of the quotative frame and are usually generic
performance verbs. More specifically, GUldemann (2001) refers to the example of the
Dongala verb cm 'go, become', which, amongst others, has telic and non-telic locative
functions and can be used as a quote introductory item (cf. also Ambruster 1960). If
more cross-linguistic evidence for the general existence of the cognitively salient
pragmatic-semantic link between these functions can be found, one could argue for a
general semantic field underlying go-verbs. To date, it remains to be seen if the
synsemantic field of go with the above functions is a largely idiosyncratic
phenomenon.
4.4.2. The Temporal Function
Dahl's (1985) cross-linguistic study provides a number of common
developmental types of futures.37 It has given rise to the hypothesis that all futures
develop from an identical, reduced set of lexical items and assume a roughly parallel
course of development (cf. Bybee and Pagliuca 1987 for typical channels of future-
marking morphemes). Movement verbs are among the most frequent sources of
futures and are most frequently periphrastic with transparent etymology (Bybee,
Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994, Giildemann 2001, Ultan 1978). This could be seen as
evidence that they are relatively recent developments38. In the case of English go, there
37 For the discussion of whether will, going to and other future markers have the same semantics and for
an overview over the semantic shadings involved see Fleischman (1982), Nicolle (1997), Quirk et al
(1985), Royster and Steadman (1923/1968), Ver (1993) and many others. I will align myself with
Poplack and Tagliamonte (2000) who claim that it is impossible to establish an objective means to
identify or even measure highly subjective and contextualized speaker intention and listener inference
of semi-equivalent variants (see also Traugott 1972, Visser 1970).
38 Cf. Fleischman (1982) on the cyclic development of the future markers in Romance Languages where
the Latin synthetic form has been replaced by the periphrastic construction infinitive + habere.
According to her, this development is being repeated with the emergence of the going to future in
French and Spanish.
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is reason to believe that it is the entire construction be going to Goal and not only the
movement verb, which is the source of the future function (Hopper and Traugott 2003,
Perez 1990, Poplack and Tagliamonte 2000). Cross-linguistically, Ultan (1978)
observes that future markers are more likely to be periphrastic than other tense and
aspect markers and that their etymology is often still observable whereas in other
affixes it is often obscure. This is the case with the future marking function of go and
suggests a recent development for this function, a claim which is underlined by
findings from Danchev and Kyto (2000) who have shown that the first instance of go
with future connotations in the Helsinki corpus dates from 1438 only.
Bybee (1988) has convincingly argued that semantically unspecified movement
is not sufficient in itself to give rise to future meaning. The notion of a GOAL is an
important element in the grammaticalisation of a movement verb to a future marker.
Go in its telic meaning implies that the agent's point of view is situated at the moment
of the speech act and any newly occurring event is seen as a step forwards in space as
well as in time. The origo of the deictic reference is moving away from the spatio-
temporal here and now towards a locally displaced event in a prospective future. This
is concurrent with the metaphor "future is forward and past is backward" (Fillmore
1997) and the underlying general metaphor "time is space". The following example
shows this overlapping property between future and the goal of a movement as an
inchoative, telic entity.
(4.36) adapted from SWB (US English)
A: I am going to see a real good movie tonight.
Let us assume that speaker A describes himself as physically moving at a later time to
achieve event <e> see a real good movie (the context makes clear that A is planning to
leave the house for this movie and is not referring to a rental film). The spatial
precondition for <e> is state X, being in the cinema, a place distant from where A is in
the deictic now at the time of uttering (4.36). Such an event <e> at state X is placed in
the future and implies a temporal move as well as a spatial one. The construction could
be considered as an elliptical form of I am going (to the cinema in order) to see a real
good movie tonight. The event, to see a good movie tonight can, via metonymic
transfer, be interpreted as a temporal achievement. Hence, if the spatial GOAL is
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encoded as an infinitival phrase, as above, is can be read as a temporal destination.
Today, future go most frequently occurs with such infinitival complements but Perez
(1990) reports its incipient grammaticalisation to have occurred with NP complements
such as the example given in Poplack and Tagliamonte (2000), I am going to Nova
Scotia.
Also, a purposive situation needs to hold in order for the semantic transfer
between a movement verb and a prediction future to take place (cf. Bybee 1988,
Bybee and Pagliuca 1987, Fleischmann 1982, Givon 1973, Ultan 1978, 1972 for the
link between imperfective and purposive). When speaker A produces an utterance like
(4.36), he is not simply announcing movement towards a spatially distant place. Going
somewhere to do something also involves the speaker's intention to bring about this
event, why else would one be moving towards it (see this section)?
Hopper and Traugott (2003) point out that originally, the imperfective aspect
was an important part for goal-directed movement to be interpreted temporally:
simultaneity of prediction of later event <e> and action in order to achieve it (cf. also
Poplack and Tagliamonte 2000). If the agent A is already on his path to the movie
theatre and the movement is in progress at the time he utters (4.36) the target of the
agent of to be going to can be interpreted as a purposive future.39 Note that the
overlapping semantics of moving forward in space and travel ahead in time can only
be co-present in a scenario where both hold simultaneously. This scenario is when a
continuous goal-directed action is intentionally executed. An utterance like I'm going
to get my jacket typically uttered when the person is (about to be) on his/her way to the
current location of the jacket is a representative example of such a co-presence of
travel in space and in time. Similarly, a speaker's movement is motivated by their
desire to achieve event <e>, be at the movies and this movement is at the same time in
the course of happening. We have simultaneity of prediction of a later event <e> and
action in order to achieve it. Due to a generalization of the form, the imperfective-
39 Note that Traugott and Heine (1991) point out that if we compare the cross-linguistic
grammaticalisation of go-verbs to future markers, we notice that such a trajectory does not necessarily
rely on an overt purposive construction (such as ro-constructions in English) or imperfective marking.
However, even if such components are not explicitly given in the co-text, we might still assume that
they can be inferred from the context.
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requirement, of course, is not a constraint for the use of go in its temporal function any
more now.
In every day discourse, as Traugott and Heine (1991:14) point out, the future
marker go mostly blends with the auxiliary as well as with the proposition to into
gonna. Heine and Reh (1984:25) define the phenomenon of fusion as the
disappearance of the boundary separating two (or more) morphemes "these
morphemes thus being reduced to one phonological unit". If we accept Givon's
(1990:826) cognitive form-function parallel, which he refers to as "diagrammatic
iconicity" and which maintains that the more semantically or pragmatically integrated
events are, the more the linguistic material expressing them will be grammatically
integrated, we can assume that in the case of go in its future reading, the event of
movement and the intended goal are morphologically fused into one marker, gonna.
The question of whether the ablative element (=SOURCE) is necessary for the
grammaticalisation of future is less clear and has not been addressed much in the
literature. According to some researchers it is important (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca
1994, Hopper and Traugott 1993, Fillmore 1997) but need not be explicitly marked.
The entity which goes necessarily has a deictic origo which is (at least implicitly)
defined by temporal, spatial and personal parameters. As stepping forward in time
(and space) implies movement from a certain reference point in the here and now
onwards, there seems to be a semantic overlap between the concept of a SOURCE and
future meaning. Thus the notion SOURCE is at least implicitly present when a telic
movement verb such as go grammaticalises into a future marker. I therefore follow the
literature and postulate a link between the future function and the semantic trait
SOURCE in the radial structure for go without claiming that this trait is a necessary
condition for go's development into a future marker.
The analogical extension of temporal go to contexts that have nothing to do with
movement has also forced a more general interpretation onto go as a future marker. As
the semantic feature of spatial movement has been lost, temporal go has reduced
selection restrictions in present-day English (cf. Bybee 1988, Danchev and Kyto 1994,
Perez 1990). Historically, spatial goal-directed go is the basis for the future marking
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function of go. Synchronically, though, go has more than one potential meaning, that
is, we have a case of polysemy/semantic layering (Hopper 1991, Torres Cacoullos
2001).
"... we lose the sense of physical motion (together with all its likely background
inferences). We gain, however, a new meaning of future prediction or intention -
together with its likely background inferences. We thus cannot be said to merely have
"lost" meaning, we have, rather, exchanged the embedding of this image schema...."
(Sweetser 1988:392)
Consequently, speaker A in (4.36) need not be on the way to the cinema at the
time of his/her speech act just as much as the speaker in Poplack and Tagliamonte's
example does not need to be on the way to Nova Scotia. In fact, due to the time
adverbial tonight, the most probable interpretation is that speaker A is not. In this vein,
consider the following example:
(4.37) personal example (BrE)
She is going to become a massage therapist.
If (4.37) is said in a situation where the agent is already at the place of professional or
academic training, this assertion does not involve any physical movement component.
While temporal movement without spatial movement is a frequent scenario, it is quite
hard to imagine spatial movement without temporal movement (Einstein 1938).
Hence, (4.37) does entail metaphorical movement towards a career GOAL: becoming a
massage therapist. By the time (4.37) was uttered (in 2002), go had already
sufficiently grammaticalised to be used as an expression of future reference which
does not involve spatial displacement. In this case, it overlaps with the intention
function use as will be discussed in the next section.
Full grammaticalisation to future has taken place when go can be used in cases
where the agent and/or the event are incompatible with the concept of motion, i.e.
cases like I am going to regret this. Due to its generalization as a future marker, go can
now have future marking function in cases where the agent's temporal goal is clearly
not physical movement. Consider the following utterance o.k. so I am going to stay put
then (http://www.writerspace.com/chat/chat 082601.html, 26.06.03)
Here, the event to stay put is incompatible with physical movement. Go as a
temporal marker has extended its use to the future marking of static events.
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Furthermore, all agents in the previous examples were human subjects which are
endowed with wilful behaviour. The realization of the GOAL, event <e> may thus be
determined and intentionally executed by the agent deciding on and moving to
perform the action in the event clause. Go with a more generalized future meaning can
also encompass subjects which are not capable of self-propelled physical movement or
willpower as in The party is going to be held Saturday. Being fully grammaticalised as
a future marker, go has no selectional restrictions concerning the animacy of its
subject any more.
To wrap up this section, historically, go's spatial function is a semantic
precursor to its temporal function. Synchronically, both functions can hold
simultaneously, resulting in ambiguity of meaning as in example (4.36), where we
have temporal, as well as, spatial displacement. I have thus provided evidence for the
motivation of the link between the core GOAL and go's future time reference use in our
semantic field model. It has to be pointed out that this link also holds when no
movement component is present as in example (4.37). It is, again, not the movement
which is the motivating factor for the new function but the semantic trait GOAL. While
telicity can be physically concrete, as well as volitional and abstract, diachronically, it
was the telic physical movement component that allowed for the functional extension
to arise. The notion of GOAL underlies go's newer future time reference function.
Thus, the future marking property of go is metaphorically and metonymically
motivated by the telic trait of movement inherent in go's semantics.
4.4.3. The Modal Function
As most activities have both a physical and a mental component, the transfer
from the literal meaning of 'the subject is on a path moving towards a goal' to 'the
subject intends to do the event indicated as the goal' is quite straightforward (cf. the
discussion under 4.4.2.). The movement and the path only have to be taken
figuratively for the internal, purposive sense to arise (cf. Nicolle 1997, Poplack and
Tagliamonte 2000, Royster and Steadman 1923). Conversational implicatures of
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intentionality easily arise with respect to movement (a self- or other- sustained
activity). These implications can then become conventionally associated with go.
Our world knowledge tells us that most activities entail physical displacement of
some sort, especially when the context makes clear that they are conducted at a
geographically distant location from the deictic reference point. Hence, according do
Grice's Maxim of Quantity, the implication is that stating that someone goes to do
something should involve new information, not only displacement. It is open to attract
implications based on contextual inferences. In the same vein, Horn's (1984) principle
of least effort states that speakers say no more than they must and that hearers require
that speakers say as much as they can. Because of this tension, of which both parties
are aware, the hearers are required to extract all the meaning possible from the
message, which leads to an "enriched interpretation" (Enfield 2003, Wilson and
Sperber 2002). As concrete, spatial and abstract, volitional goals occupy the same
syntactic slot, modal and motion meaning can overlap given the appropriate context.
Consider (4.38), where both the telic movement and the intention reading pertain.
(4.38) US English - Missionaries
B I mean they have a training center where they teach them,
it's called the missionary training center in Utah
and they have to be taught the langu[age customs and all those kinds of things.
A [um-hum,
—> B and then they um you know go and actually live in that country for,
the the uh young men do it for two years and the young women for eighteen months,
The line marked by the arrow expresses both intention and movement. Speaker B
instead of uttering they um you know actually live in that country... chooses to say ...
go and actually live in Her choice of words could be taken to mean that she wants
to stress the fact that the event <e> (the missionaries going abroad) involves motion.
But as the conversation has been about missionaries serving in countries other than the
US, this has already been asserted and would constitute old, non-reportable,
information. Consequently, in line with Grice's Maxim of Quantity, the go-
construction can be interpreted as expressing that those missionaries have the intention
to do <e>, live in that country. If such implicatures regularly arise from a certain
linguistic surface structure, they can become interpreted as inherent in the form.
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Traugott (1989) has called this process, where inferences become so associated with
the verbal expression that they become part of the meaning, "pragmatic
strengthening".
Note also the occurrence of the adverbial emphasiser actually in this chunk of
speech (cf. the OED entry for actually "(5) added to vouch for statements which
seem surprising, incredible, or exaggerated: 'He has actually sent the letter after all.'",
see also Quirk et al. 1985:583 and Clift 2001:28 who says "the very presence of
actually marks the TCU AS informative"). What makes the chunk of speech above
reportable or informative is the fact that the missionaries have the intention to do <e>
in spite of all the obstacles such as the different language, the unknown customs etc. as
cited in the chunk of speech above. Example (4.38) could be paraphrased with
purposive to (Hopper and Traugott 2003) as go in order to (actually) live in that
country. Hence, go expresses physical motion as well as the intention of the actors.
In this vein, consider the difference between
(4.39) She hit him with a bottle40
(4.40) She went and hit him with a bottle
Where (4.39) is a matter-of-fact description which does not necessarily express
assault. A continuation such as ... but actually she didn't mean to is possible, hence
intentionality is a conversational implicature and cancellable. Example (4.40), on the
contrary, expresses intention to hit him with a bottle and, if uttered in a context of a
court hearing, would not leave much leeway for any claims to the accused person's
innocence41. Note that (4.40) expresses more intention than (4.39), as go is used here
with a meaning which is situated closer to the intention function. This is even more
evident in the next two sentences:
(4.41) She killed him
(4.42) She (actually) went and killed him
Whereas the agent in (4.41) could be held for manslaughter, the agent in (4.42) is
implied to have committed an intentional killing. This is because go, with its telic
meaning, expresses the intention to achieve some kind of GOAL.
40
Example 38 was taken from the State ofMichigan Court of appeals, Wayne Circuit Court No.
221289.
41 These interpretations obviously only apply given a continuous, non emphatic intonation curve.
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Through the aforementioned conventionalization of conversational inplicatures,
go has long extended its use to cases where no displacement is, at least tacitly, implied
and the go-construction is now also found in contexts where it is contextually clear
that the agent is not moving in order to fulfill the intention/event expressed in the
complement. Go then operates on an abstract level without any spatial connotations.
Example 4.43 gives such a situation where no movement is implied in the context,
which leaves room for go's interpretation as modal as well as temporal. Speaker A
reports an incident when, on a lazy afternoon, he gets an invitation to go out. He tells
the girl who phoned him that he and his friends prefer to stay in and watch golf.
(4.43) US English - The lazy Sunday
A it's like we just woke up we had a hangover and everything you know,
and so we just woke up and uh we're watching TV,
—> and I go "no today we're just going to dedicate ourselves to watching golf'.
Speaker A and his buddies are watching TV (and so we just woke up and uh we're
watching TV) when he gets the phone call. Consequently, it seems likely that event
<e>, watch(ing) golf at a later point in time does not imply any spatially telic
movement. As A and his buddies' future activity is continuous with their present one,
we can assume future action to be equilocal to the one executed at time zero. Thus the
possible interpretation of go as spatially telic is cancelled out. It can only have
figurative uses which have to be inferred from the context: As the event watch(ing)
golf is to take place at a later temporal stage than the deictic reference point marked by
and I go42"[quote] the verbal expression going to can be interpreted as signalling
future tense (prediction). But going to in this case can also be interpreted as expressing
intention on the part of speaker A and his buddies. This is because intention and future
functions are target-oriented, the epistemic and temporal expression of a GOAL (cf.
Leech (1971:54) "future of present intention", Fleischman 1982, also Hopper and
Traugott 1993). A and his buddies' staying at home is not some mere chance
coincidence in future time but is presented as executed intentionally, a situation of
planned likelihood.
42 For an interpretation of go as a quotative consider section 4.4.4.
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On a similar note, Dahl (1985) pointed out that the central function of future is
less a temporal category and more a category resembling agent-oriented and epistemic
modality with important temporal implications.
Leech's example *1 wonder if she's going to know you underlines the intentional
function of go in the future sense: it strikes one as odd "because one cannot will
oneself into knowing somebody" (1972:55). Hence, Ultan (1978) claimed that while
cross-linguistically, future markers are often used with atemporal functions, they seem
to be especially often associated with mood or modality, from which they are
frequently diachronically derived. Often, their primary function is the expression of
modality and the future time reference is only a secondary, or at least temporally later
function (cf. also Giildcmann 2001, Bybee 1995). Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994)
and Sweetser (1988) maintain that in a movement construction the co-occurrence of
spatial as well as temporal meaning is given from the very beginning and that the
spatial is explicitly expressed first and the temporal follows from it (cf. Section 4.4.2).
Hence, there is reason to believe that, diachronically, intention even seems to be the
crucial bridge to the development of the prediction function.
While examples (4.37) and (4.43) have shown the functional ambiguity of go
between modal and temporal function, I will not make any claims here concerning the
temporal order of the functional developments. This chapter has shown that go, a verb
of movement, can have strong modalised functions. I have illustrated the close
association between directional movement and intention. The connecting tie has been
identified as the notion of a GOAL, concrete in the first case, figurative in the second.
The link between intention and movement is thus motivated. Furthermore, a close
association between intention and future meaning has been pointed out. When it is
asserted that an agent intends to achieve a goal (event <e>), we can safely infer (unless
otherwise advised and as long as the goal is realistic) that the agent will carry out <e>.
In this vein, Langacker (1985:23) states "the speaker/conceptualizer... traces mentally
along the path in order to situate the process in relation to a reference point". The
common denominator between the future and intention sense is salient: an abstract
GOAL.
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Within the radial structure, we have to assume a tightly-knit triangular cognitive
structure between goal-directed motion, intention, and future reference as depicted in
Figure 4.5. This point is underlined by Danchev and Kyto's (2002) research into the
future marking function of go. Looking at the Helsinki corpus, the first English
example with future connotations which they found dates from 1438 and combines
features of movement, intentionality and near futurity. Thus, the close association of
those notions in a synchronic radial structure is sustained diachronically.
A conventional unidirectional model would have problems depicting such a
close association between the dimensions of modality, temporality and spatially
directed displacement. It would not be able to represent the functional three-way
ambiguity of some examples. But note that the radial structure model proposed here
can cope with the linguistic reality of closely knit, at times even overlapping, multiple
functional categories by representing them as interconnected functional extensions
from one semantic core. The ensuing semantic field model depicts them in more or
less close associations with potential ambiguity stemming from and relying on one
common semantic origo, the notion of a GOAL.
4.4.4. The quotative function
The advent of two newly43 grammaticalised quotatives go and be like into the
formerly stable pool of quotative introductory items has triggered a wave of interest in
their patterning with respect to intra and extralinguistic factors (Buchstaller 2001 a,b,
2002a,b, 2003a,b, Cukor-Avila 2002, 2003, Butters 1980, Ferrara and Bell 1995,
Macaulay 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999, Singler 2001, Winter 2002, and many
others). Example (3.1), here replicated as (4.44) illustrates go in this use:
(4.44) US English - The long haired guy
A: the other day I went into a bar,
and this guy asked me to dance,
all he saw was my hair,
43
Newly grammaticalised in the sense of newer than the other members of the quotative cohort, which
has been stable for centuries (Ferrara and Bell 1995).
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and he goes "do you want to dance"?
I turn around and go "what"?
he goes "do you want to dance"?
I go "no no".
he goes "oh oh I'm sorry",
I go "yeah, you better be".
I go "[you better be".
B [that's hilarious,
Example 4.44 gives a whole row of go-lexemes in quotative function. Here, go
precedes reported speech and has taken on a function roughly corresponding to say.
(The details of the functional differences between say and go are discussed in Chapter
3 or Buchstaller 2001a) In this example, go introduces linguistic material, such as "do
you want to dance", "what" etc.
4.4.4.1. Go as an introducer of voice effects, sounds and gestures
In what is considered its more prototypical use (Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999)
go introduces quotes containing non-linguistic material. This function is exemplified
in (4.44) and (4.45), below:
(4.45) US English - Kids' games
B: my kid didn't care,
A: I know,
B: He picks up a stick and goes "bang".
(4.46) BrE - Home sweet home
B: and I have got home and after dinner,
and you are just kind of going "urghhhhh",
Here, go introduces the sound effects bang and urghhh. But it is also frequently found
with quotes which contain voice effect and gesture as in (4.47).
(4.47) US English - Watching baseball
A: so I tu-I watched entire games of baseball
and they're going "o::h.hh my ?Go:d"
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Those re-enactments of (selective aspects of) previous events based on voice, sound or
gesture have been called "mimesis". Clark and Gerrig (1990) show that the enquoting
person "does not say what the content of the quote is (i.e. what was said) instead he
does something that enables the hearer to SEE for himself what it is, that is to say, he
shows this content" (1990:802, cf. also Goffman 1981). Go in (4.45) introduces a
mimetic enactment of a previous non-linguistic event, bang. By replaying her son's
playful conduct via a sound effect, speaker A is demonstrating the WHAT and the
HOW of the original speaker's action. She re-plays a selectively depicted aspect of her
son's behaviour at the time of the original occurrence.
Gtildemann (2001) claims that mimetic quotes are marked and by that feature
are better enquoted in a structure that is marked in some way as well (cf. also Yule and
Mathis 1992). This claim is substantiated by his findings on African languages as well
as by a study of the enquoting constructions in American English. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the newly grammaticalised quotatives are principally used as markers of
mimesis. Like and go, the newcomers in the quotative complex and still more marked
constructions, highlight the HOW, the demonstrative-enacted side of the material.
Romaine and Lange (1991:238) claim that go lacks the explicitness of say and has
special connections with the auditory-vocal channel. It serves as a cue for that channel
and introduces sounds or onomatopoetic expressions rather than words. "Go translates
loosely as 'makes the sound of'" (240). In contrast, the most frequent dialogue
introducer say is generally used much less with mimetic performances. It is
pragmatically unmarked and thus less compatible with marked quotes (Buchstaller
2002b).
According to Butters (1980: 307), go's enquoting function for onomatopoeia and
non-linguistic sound imitations precedes its use as a quotative item for speech. "The
imitative go, present in the language for centuries, would seem in a more general way
the most likely candidate for the source of the semantic extension". Butters sees
imitative go as the developmentally primary, narrower function. He says that "it is
actually just a small movement from this specialized use to the broader one" (ibid
1980: 307). Giildemann (2001), while agreeing on the diachronic scenario traced by
Butters, reverses its interpretation. He claims that while go originated as a mimesis
marker, its use as a quotative of direct discourse is the more specialized function.
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Counter the standardly assumed "speech-verb channel" (Lord 1976, 1993, Saxena
1995), he argues for a broadening of go's functions from an introductory item for
sounds, gestures etc. to a general mimesis marker.44 He points out that mimesis is
actually a more general domain than direct reported discourse and that a mimesis
marking construction is generally a potential source for introducing linguistic
elements. This claim is backed by findings by Buck (1915). Tracing a diachronic
scenario for the Indo-European languages, Buck shows that verbs introducing noise
can become general discourse introductory items.
Despite the details of their interpretative difference, both Giildemann and Butters
stress the close relationship between the enactment of sounds, voice effects, and
gestures and the rendering of linguistic material in direct discourse. In my model, I
maintain the category quotation as a superodinate concept for quotative verbs that
frame more or less mimetically enacted renderings. But due to differences in their
slightly idiosyncratic developmental histories and due to the fact that we can construct
functional extensions involving different links, I divide the realm of quotation into 2
subcategories: introductory items for sounds, gestures etc. (mimesis) and introductory
items for linguistic material, being well aware that this distinction is arbitrary due to
the fluidity between (conventionalized) speech and (not -yet- conventionalized)
sound 45
Giildemann (2001) shows that, in general, mimesis is embedded in the
surrounding linguistic material as follows: (1) It does not require an embedding
construction such as a predicate (cf. Cameron 1998), (2) if it is co-occurrent with a
discourse introductory construction, it does not enter in a syntactic relation with it (cf.
Partee 1973:418 "the quoted sentence is not syntactically or semantically part of the
sentence which contains it.", Munro 1982), (3) it is usually set apart from the co-text
by a pause or other suprasegmental features (Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen 1999,
44 A comparative case is German (so) machen (Golato 2000), which occurs with sound imitation and
gesture but rarely with direct discourse (yet). Time will show whether so machen grammaticalises in the
same way and whether it generalizes into a fully-fledged Vquot.
45 As the reader will have noticed, mimesis can be understood to be a more or less encompassing
category. It has been used in the literature mainly as the superordinate term for more expressive re-
enactments like sound, gesture and voice effects. Because of its usefulness as an umbrella term, I will
employ it in this sense here. Gtildeman (2000:10) is right, though, when he reminds us of the fact that
any kind of re-enactment is to be considered as mimesis, no matter how expressive it is. Direct reported
discourse lies within the functional domain of mimesis. Thus, mimesis actually is the superordinate
term for linguistic and all other demonstrations.
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Giinthner 1998), and (4) it constitutes an independent and focal intonation unit by
itself. Along the same lines, Clark and Gerrig (1990: 772) point out that quotations are
embedded in the discourse but not in the sentence that hosts them. The internal and the
external structure of embedded quotations have to be kept apart.
While I do not think that their statement can be generalized to all quotations (cf.
Cameron 1990:771/2), with respect to the interpretation of go, I follow Clark and
Gerrig's reasoning that "internally the quotations again depict sentences but externally
they are a manner adverb and predicate nominals or adjectives" (1990:772). Hence, we
can interpret the quote following go externally as a manner adverb. Let us consider
Butters (1980) example
(4.48) ... .and this little pig went wee-wee-wee all the way home.
Go, as a verb of movement, predicates the displacement of the agent pig. This
movement is qualified by the "adverb" wee wee wee which - if we had to put it into
words while loosing a lot of expressive force - is roughly equivalent to crying. It
further qualifies the action of the agent this little pig. Wee-wee-wee co-occurs with
linguistic material but is not embedded syntactically in the sentence. It qualifies the
way in which the pig went home, a marker of the HOW. The above scenario can
obviously be replicated with other sorts of mimesis. Gesture, for example, can be
produced simultaneously with a speech signal as the two signing techniques rely on
different media (the same is true with facial demonstrations). Scholars researching in
paralinguistic signs and bodily movements (Kendon 1980, McNeill 1985, 1992, Streek
1988) show that verbal and bodily behaviour are to be considered closely associated if
not dependent on one another. They form complementary channels to convey
information about the referents' mental and physical state, where the linguistic
material is the more symbolic rendering and the gestural-sound channel is the
indexical rendering. Also, rhythmic enactment, singing, etc. can be superimposed on
verbal behaviour and complement its impact.
Once speakers repeatedly qualify movement with manner adverbials such as wee
wee wee, go co-occurs more frequently with mimesis and, via the process of
metonomy, it can become associated with its environment. The co-occurrence of
mimetic performances with go then becomes conventionalized because its context of
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use encroaches upon its interpretation (Sperber and Wilson 1986). It is exactly small-
scale loci such as the occurrence of go preceding mimetic enactment which lead to the
infusion of contextual implication into the meaning of an item and bring about an
alternative analysis (cf. Stern 1931:353). Again, the conventionalization of
conversational inferences, which is especially frequent in the earlier stages of
grammaticalisation (Hopper and Traugott 1993) can go so far as to become part of the
inherent meaning of the form or even replace its original meaning. As Grice puts it, it
is not unusual "for what starts life... as a conversational implication to become
conventional" (1975:58). In our case, though frequent association of go with mimetic
enactment of whatever sort, go's mimesis introductory function starts becoming a
conventional use within its field of functional extensions.
Note that it is not the telic sense of go that is implied in its grammaticalisation as
a mimesis marker. In (4.49) below, no direction is implied:
(4.49) US English - Latin American Dancing
M: I don't know what those Brazilian women are doing,
J: what are they do[ing,
M: [but their hips are like,
J: are they going-are they going like really fa::st?
I mean are they going [one two three. (rhythmical)
M: [I mean,
J: one two three-,
M: first you had this wi::de sw:::ay of their hips this way,
Here, an atelic motion (dance) is portrayed via enacted material, one two three, which
is rendered as if uttered or thought by someone doing dance steps, in a rhythmic, beat-
following manner. The dancers are represented as moving in a one-two-three-ish
fashion, as if going with an imaginary rhythm.
Go as a movement verb is modified by an adverb of manner which qualifies the
HOW: one two three. Thus, given its placement in the clause before the mimesis, go is
in the right kind of syntactic position to be reanalyzed as a verb of quotation. The
material following it is a selective demonstration of the agent's behaviour at an earlier
time, thus a mimetic re-enactment in Clark and Gerrig's (1990) and Wierzbicka's
(1974) sense. Go frames a mimetic quote and can thus be interpreted as functioning as
a quotative verb. Note again that the scenario in (4.49) involves no telicity. The
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dancers have no concrete goal, neither in a spatial telic sense - they are not dancing
towards something - nor in the form of an interlocutor to which they direct the
words/action represented by one two three. The important notion is that of a SOURCE.
The mimetic enactment is stemming from actors, the dancers in question. Whether it is
intended for someone else (i.e. whether there is a potential goal) is irrelevant. What
matters is the performing actors who produce what is later rendered as mimesis, the
point in space where the enactment comes from. It is the SOURCE-encoding function of
go that can give rise to its use as a mimesis marker. In this case we have an overlap
between go as a mimesis marker and between its ablative atelic movement meaning.
The mimesis stems from, "move(s) away, depart(s) from, ieave(s)" (OED II, 21) the
author who produces it. Therefore, go in this sense should be grouped under heading II
"uses in which movement from a place is the primary notion".
We saw this, too, in example (4.48). The little piggy has some sort of goal (all
the way) home. But this fact is tangential to the interpretation of go. I claim that even
though a goal is present, it is not a crucial component for go's functional enlargement
and that the analysis of go as a mimesis introduction maker does not rely on a telic
element in the context. If we substitute a non-telic adverbial such as the PP along the
street for the goal-oriented adverbial all the way home, we get the same interpretation
for go as shown in (4.50).
(4.50) ... .and this little pig went wee-wee-wee along the street.
In example (4.50) the context does not contain any spatial goal. Yet, go does take the
function of introducing reported action even if it is not directed at anyone and even if
it is not heard. Note that even in go's earliest attestation as a mimetic introducer (OED
1791) And his noble heart goes "pit a pat", there is no addressee, explicit or implicit,
for the sound/movement pit a pat which is re-enacted in the quote. Go can be
interpreted as a verb of motion further qualified by an adverb of manner, at the same
time, it is a quotative verb which frames mimetic re-enactment. This example is
significant because it shows that go, in its early stages of grammaticalization, did not
need a contextually given telic element. Quite the opposite seems to have been the
case: it is the element of a SOURCE which is the decisive factor in go's
grammaticalisation to an introducer of sounds and gestures. I will show in the next
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section how the notion of a goal comes into play with respect to go's functional
generalization which then also includes reported speech. By now, the link from
ablative movement to mimesis introduction in go's radial structure has been motivated
via the notion of a SOURCE. Here, again, the two functions are not discrete. They
overlap in some contexts and can be ambiguous.
4.4.4.2. Go as an introducer of reported speech
Reported speech in this chapter refers to direct reported speech only. In my US
English data, go cannot be used as an introductory item for indirect reported speech
(cf. Golalo 2000, Hudson 1985, Schourup 1982b). Although very infrequently, there
are some tokens of go framing indirect speech in my British English corpus (cf.
Chapter 5, as well as Buchstaller 2002a). This finding does not violate my claims, as
indirect speech, albeit involving a different deictic orientation, can nevertheless
involve telicity as in She told me that she wasn't sure, where me functions as the telic
addressee, a GOAL.
Once go is already grammaticalised as a marker of enquoting non-directional
sounds or gestures (according to the OED, its first attested use as a mimetic enactment
marker is 1791), all it takes is a goal-directed performance on the part of the speaker to
an explicit or implicit addressee for it to enter the terrain of a quotative in the
interactional, directional sense. This can be exemplified with the following stretch of
talk:
(4.51) US English - The party
A: so Cathy calls me up,
and she wants Jonathan's ph- address,
and I go "for what"?
she goes "well we have to invite him to the New Year's Eve party"?
and I go "why"?
she goes "well XX opened his big mouth",
and I said "oh so you're going to host them are you"?
she goes "what do you mean host them".
I said "if you invite them up there for a party,
they're gonna assume that they are staying with you",
Example (4.51) contains several question and answer scenarios (Q: why, A: well XX
opened his big mouth, Q: what do you mean host them, A: if you invite them up there
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for a party... ). Arguing with the next turn proof procedure used in conversation
analysis (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), according to which a second pair part
sequentially needs a first pair part, the fact that an interlocutor provides answers to
questions speaks for the fact that these questions were interactively realised, goal-
directed instances of speech. Go enquotes linguistic material which stems from an
author and is intended for an interlocutor, the receptor. The same situation also holds
for example (4.44). The quotes in both stretches of speech contain other-directed, telic
speech which involves the notion of a goal. And in both cases the addressees confirm
their role as an interactional goal: they acknowledge the receipt of the question by
giving an answer. Hence, go has taken on the function of a fully fledged introductory
item for quotes in a context that is defined interactionally as telic.
Go's functional transfer from a verb of motion to an item associated with
reported speech can be explained by what Fillmore (1997) referred to as the
Place/Time parallelism. Sweetser (1987) argues that the lexical fields of physical
motion, action, location and of mental states and speech acts are distinct semantic
systems but that they are metaphorically connected and indeed overlapping. As our
understanding of abstract processes (such as speech acts and mental states) is modelled
on the concrete physical world, the source vocabulary for intellectual and speech
domains taps into the expressions for the corresponding physical activities. Via this
analogy, a communicative act can be metaphorically seen as an instance of motion: a
travelling message from one interlocutor, the sender, to the other, the addressee. A
communicative model relying on the conduit metaphor (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980,
Lakoff 1987, Foley 1997) as depicted in Figure 4.6 makes the overlap between
temporal and quotative function explicable.
Figure 4.6: The metaphorical base for go as an introducer of reported speech
The Conduit Metaphor: Speaker (sender) ► Addressee (receiver)
travelling message
Source Goal
According to Figure 4.6, we can conceptualize communication as a travelling message
from the speaker (the sender, thus the source) to the addressee (the receiver, hence
the goal). The temporal vantage point is to be taken to be the point at which the
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encoding of the utterance takes place. Decoding is understood to occur in the
prospective future as signalled by the forward trajectory of the telic movement verb.
Consequently, the semantic primitives of ablativity 'starting point' as well as
telicity 'endpoint' are the decisive factors in the grammaticalisation of a movement
verb into an introductory item for reported other-directed speech. Both, the notions
source and goal play into the grammaticalisation of go as a quotative in the
interactive sense. Hence, we have to postulate functional extensions from the core
which rely on two different semantic traits: telicity as well as ablativity.
Go in its functions as a mimesis introducer and as an introducer of reported
speech share one semantic feature (source). We can postulate a diachronic scenario
where go first occurred as a mimesis introducer (And his noble heart goes "pit a pat"
OED 1791) which relies on the notion of source only. Later, it took on the quotative
function for interactive reported speech, which also relies on the notion of a goal as a
second feature. This means that once go was grammaticalised in its function as a
marker of enquoting non-directional sounds or gestures, all it needed was a goal-
directed performance on the part of the speaker for go to take on the function of a
quotative in the interactive, directional sense. Synchronically, the two functions of go
still overlap in their common underlying feature source. Other-directed go has a
second functional link to the centre, goal. Note that this explanation further
corroborates Giildemann's (2001) claim: because adding a semantic trait to an item
increases its specificity, go as an introducer of reported discourse has the more
specialised quotative function.
At this point the division of quotation into sounds/voice effects/gestures on the
one hand and linguistic performances on the other hand has to be reconsidered. While
it is true that sounds/gestures are prototypically not intended for an interlocutor, there
are certainly situations where they are. Consider a typical example.
(4.52) personal example - USE
This guy went "xxx" (giving the finger)
Here, the enquoted gesture is clearly other-oriented. It stems from an author, a
source and is intended to convey an attitude to an opponent, the goal. Interactive
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mimetic enactment is framed by go. The same phenomenon can also apply to sounds
and voice effects. Consider, for example the whistle that certain men (and women) in
some cultures utter upon seeing an attractive member of the opposite or same sex. This
whistle can be non-directional, not meant for the ears of anyone else, a mere
acknowledgement of one's inner states, an outloud. But the prototypical macho-
whistle is so annoying exactly because it is directed at the person in question (and
possibly even bystanders) and does not only signal inward approval. When quoted
with go, the whistle as mimetic enactment could be a telic or non-telic performance
depending on the situation it occurred in (whether or not there was a goal who was
intended to hear the sound). Regardless of the situation, the whistle stems from a
source and it is this notion which is important for the grammaticalisation of go as an
introducer of non-directional quotes, irrespective of their content.
At the same time, there are reported speech events which are not telic. An
example is (4.53).
(4.53) US English - Money comes and goes
B: when you go out into the working world,
A: uh huh,
B: it-it changes quickly,
A: I am sure,
B: um you look at your paycheck and you ghhhooh "oh my gosh where did it all go"?
A: hhhhh,
Notice that in this case, the original utterance - which is replayed in the quote in the
marked line - is not other-directed. The source, from which the utterance oh my gosh
where did it all go stems is speaker (B), who is reporting the incidence. At the time B
looked at her paycheque and uttered oh my gosh where did it all go, there was no telic
goal, hence no addressee to whom B could have addressed her utterance. Rather, B is
reporting her reactions to the dwindled amount of money to A in the form of a
hypothetical quote (see Chapter 3), which puts into words (at least in the speaker's and
hearer's now) what was going on in B's mind when she saw the cheque. As Goffman
(1981:97) rightly points out, with no one present, speech acts like this are quite likely
to have been omitted altogether (cf. also Tannen 1986, Yule and Mathis 1992). The
utterance reported in (4.53) is not telic, as there is no real or contextually inferred
interactive, communicative GOAL. Hence, direct quotes containing linguistic material
are not necessarily other-directed. This means that quotative go does not inevitably
rely on the semantic feature telicity when framing direct reported speech of a linguistic
nature. Even though (4.53) is a direct quote with linguistic material, the motivating
functional extension in this case is that of SOURCE only.
Examples like (4.52) and (4.53) show that the decisive criterion for a subdivision
of the quotative realm cannot be whether the reported material is linguistic or non-
linguistic. We have seen that the semantic features SOURCE and GOAL can be present
in communicative situations irrespective of the nature of the quote. What matters is the
interactive, telic nature of the quote and the presence or absence of an interlocutor to
whom speech/ sound/ gesture is addressed. Diachronically, it seems that go's quotative
function was first restricted to non-telic quotes, motivated by the functional extension
SOURCE only. Later, it enlarged its repertoire (cf. Butters 1980) and acquired the more
specified function of a quotative in the interactive sense (cf. Gtildemann 2001). This
was possible through the addition of a further functional extension already present in
go's radial structure, the notion of a GOAL. The above claim is motivated by the fact
that the examples cited in the OED (ranging from 1791-1892) still all imply non-telic
mimetic re-enactment. Butters (1980) is the first to mention full quotative go in its
interactive telic sense.
Synchronically, the two categories of quotes have one underlying semantic
primitive in common and one that distinguishes them; i.e. shared notion of a SOURCE.
Both interactively realised quotes and verbally non-committed thought stem from (an)
author(s). But only the interactively realised, other-oriented quotes need the telic
notion of an interlocutor. Consequently, the decisive criterion is whether or not there is
an addressee, a GOAL.
These different motivational parameters justify the division of the category
quotations into two sub-categories: the diachronically earlier non-directional
([-(-source] but [-goal]) and the later directional ([-(-source] and [+goal]). This calls for a
re-labelling of the headings of the 4.2.4.1 as Go as an introducer of other-oriented
quotes and 4.2.4.2 as Go as an introducer of non-other oriented quotes. The same
applies to the functions in the realm of quotation of the radial structure. Consider
Figure 4.7 below:
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Figure 4.7: The radial structure model of go
Notice that the radial structure model depicts the close association of the two quotative
functions by conceptualizing them as sub-functions pertaining to one common
category, quotation. They have one semantic trait in common, the notion of a SOURCE.
Their difference lies in whether or not they rely on the existence of a GOAL.
Notice also that the possibility of ambiguity and overlap between the functions
movement and quotation, time and modality and between all the above categories with
the central semantic primitives of GOAL and SOURCE can be captured by this model.
As with like, the lines between the functions should be considered as clines linking the
focal members of prototypical functional categories. Singular tokens of go are thus
situated somewhere along the line between the endpoints, oscillating more towards the
one or the other pole. Far from forcing linguistic structure into a linear model, this
highly flexible radial structure provides an explanatory model that can cope with the
linguistic reality. As poly-ambiguity and non-determinism are an integral part of the
structure, cases of where one example has several functions simultaneously do not
constitute a problem for this model. Rather than accounting for ambiguities one by one
in terms of respectively earlier and later functions, the full linguistic messiness of
fuzzy categories is provided for via a poly-dimensional approach.
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4.4.5. The substructures of the grammaticalisation schema
The above discussion has given evidence of the complexity of go's radial
structure. Its synsemantic field hosts multiple links of various underlying motivations
(metaphor, context induced interpretation etc.). Its grammaticalisation can be
understood synchronically as an interwoven net of functional extensions from one
common core. Within the network there are functions which are linked to one another
to greater or lesser degrees. All display more or less close semantic -pragmatic
relationships to a core meaning. Another finding underlines the complexity of the
model: there are two sub-structures involved. The links within the network are based
on two different functional extensions based on semantic core traits. The structures
originate and overlap in the core and spread out independently, forming a
superimposed web of connections. The constitutive overlaid structures of the model
are depicted in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: The substructures of go's radial structure model
QUOTATION MOOD AND MODALITY
This model shows on which semantic traits the functional extensions in go's core-
structure model rely. One motivating semantic trait that has crystallized through the
discussion is the notion of a GOAL. As we have seen, the telic use of go can be shown
to be at the base of the future and the intention function. It also gives rise to the
enquoting function for other-oriented speech/sounds and gesture.46 The notion of a
46 The semantic trait GOAL that these notions have in common justifies the overlap that Comrie
(1985:44) has shown between intention and future meaning as "alternative worlds" with lower
epistemic stance. We can easily link up quotation-introduction as a further function that implies an
alternative world: the opening of new mental space (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996) representing the
speech/thought of another individual nested into the account by a narrator.
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SOURCE is involved in the development of the future function and the function as a
quotative introducer for non-other directed speech/sound/gesture and thought.
4.4.6. Conclusion
I have shown in this section that all of go's functions can be interpreted as direct
functional extensions of the common semantic core. They are linked to this core via
the semantic traits allativity and telicity, which all functions share to a greater or lesser
extent. As has been shown throughout the discussion, SOURCE and GOAL are the
semantic primitives which made go's reanalysis possible. They are the heart of two
intertwined substructures and they link the outgrowths to each other as well as to the
centre. Notice that both the future and the other-oriented quotative function involve
both underlying notions. The superimposed structures centering around SOURCE and
GOAL overlap at the two functional nodes which rely simultaneously on both
explanatory parameters.
Figure 4.8 shows that not only is a radial structure not unidirectional, it can also
rely on multiple functional extensions. As cognitive structuring is a flexible and
perpetual process, it can lead to structures which rely simultaneously on various
explanatory parameters and diverse pathways from a common core. Motivational
similarities leading to reanalysis (via metaphor, metonomy etc.) are everywhere and
can turn into co-occurring, superimposed motivating forces in a grammaticalisation
schema.
4.5. General Conclusion
I have shown that in American and British English, the synchronic status quo of
go and like is best captured by a radial structure model, which is capable of rendering
the versatility of the lexeme within its synsemantic field.47 A unidirectional chain is
47 On a similar note, cf. Giildemann's (2001: 28) statement that the hypothesis that a quotative
introductory element is derived from something other than a speech verb can often explain in a more
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not able to cope with their synchronically complex polyfunctionality and with their
ambiguity of function in the singular case (between the future and intention function
as in (4.37), between future and movement as in (4.36) and between movement and
quotative as in (4.49), for like the filler and focus function as in (4.6), the hedge and
quotative function as in (4.15)). These instances of multiple ambiguity speak for a
more multifaceted scenario. In view of the individual and highly local development of
lexical items (cf. also Buchstaller 2001a, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980), a
more complex premise than a unilateral cline seems in order.
The unidirectionality claim has long been one of the basic assumptions within
the field of grammaticalisation. The historically underlying claim is Kurylowicz's
(1965:52) fundamental statement that grammaticalisation involves "an increase of the
range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less
grammatical to a more grammatical status". The movement is considered to be
unidirectional from less to more grammatical and not vice versa. But even this basic
underlying claim is not without exception. (Jeffers and Zwicky 1980, Kahr 1976, but
refuted by Lehmann 1982/1995:16-20). Cases like the degrammaticalisation of up
from a preposition to a verb (Givon 1975:96) show that the process can be reversed
and that cognition and, accordingly, language do not follow rigid one-way lanes of
48
development. The unidirectional claim can be held in stronger and weaker forms and
the literature has quite divergent views of how encompassing unidirectionality is to be
interpreted (Traugott 1995, 2001). In its strongest forms, it claims that all grammatical
items derive diachronically from lexical ones and that no reverse process is possible.49
This claim postulates an early stage in a language where there are only lexical
elements and no grammatical morphology. As there is no evidence for such a stage in
Indo-European nor is it empirically attested cross-linguistically (Tabor and Traugott
1998), this claim raises serious questions and is nowadays upheld by only a few
natural way many of its characteristics in and outside the reported discourse domain. Furthermore, it
involves much less bleaching of lexical meaning than has been assumed in the grammaticalisation of
quotatives according to the unidirectionality-cline model.
48 There has been ample discussion of whether unidirectionality is actually a hypothesis, thus testable
and falsifiable, or whether it is inherent in the definition of grammaticalisation per se, thus a postulate
(cf. Lass 2000, Lindstrom 2001, Traugott 1995, and many others).
49 For an overview of counterexamples to unidirectionality see Janda (2001), Joseph (2001). For a
criticism see Traugott (2001).
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scholars (Haspelmath 1999, Lehmann 1982/1995 see also Heine et al 1991, Heine
1994). A much weaker version of unidirectionality states that it should be seen as an
assertion about the orderliness and traceability of semantic change (cf. Bybee, Perkins,
and Pagliuca 1994, Hopper and Traugott 2003).
Working from two case studies, this chapter has given evidence that synchronic
orderliness does not depend on unidirectionality in grammaticalisation (cf. also
Buchstaller 2001a, Lakoff 1987, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 1995, 1998, Meyerhoff
2002, Mosegaard-Hansen 1997, 1998). Rather, systematic patterning can have
multiple, non-linear but highly ordered forms. As has been displayed throughout the
previous paragraphs, orderliness may just as easily result from an underlying radial
structure and rely on functional extensions from one common core. More specifically,
Gtildemann (2001:4) raises serious reservations against the overgeneralization of the
"speech-verb channel".
I have given evidence that in conversational English the quotative introducers
like (Buchstaller 2001 a,b) and go (Buchstaller in preparation) are polyfunctional and
build up a whole network of relations. In cases such as these it is clearly contrary to
the synchronic evidence to postulate a unidirectional channel with say or any other
single starting point and to conceptualize derived functions as linearly aligned in a
chain-like fashion. Rather, this chapter shows that change results from context-induced
reinterpretations triggered by the in-sequence positioning of the item, and due to more
general metaphors. A radial structure can capture the fact that the outcome of the
grammaticalisation process is dependent on the small-scale environment of a particular
item (cf. Hopper and Traugott 1993). As form, meaning and context play into the
functional extension, a neat, all-encompassing linear generalization is impossible to
make. This chapter proposes a radial field model which captures the semantic space in
which functional movements co-occur and which most readily expresses the full
ambiguity and overlap we find in real occurring data. The proposed radial structure
shows how the superficially messy facts can be linked in an orderly way. This model
is able to motivate all functions that like and go have assumed synchronically and has
mildly predictive value in the sense that some functional extensions (within the same
semantic field, relying on already established dimensions) seem less surprising than
others. Even Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994:282), researching the cross-linguistic
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propensities of future markers, contend that "close analysis of changes in progress
may reveal a complex network of mechanisms applying together in sequence".
In conclusion, the only general principle which holds in the light of go and like's
synchronic status quo and which can be applied to a common core model as well as to
chain structures is the innovativeness principle mentioned by Andersen (1989, cf. also
Hopper 1991), which basically builds on the "principle of exploitation of old means
for novel functions" (Werner and Kaplan 1963:403). Consider also Traugott and Heine
(1991:86/7)
"Grammaticalisation can be interpreted as the result of a process which has
problem-solving as its main goal, its primary function being
conceptualization by expressing one thing in terms of another. This
function is not confined to grammaticalisation, it is the main characteristic
of metaphor in general."
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From the fact that language is a social institution, it follows that
linguistics is a social science...we must determine which social
structure corresponds to a given linguistic structure and how general
changes in the social structure are translated into changes in linguistic
structure (Meillet 1926:17-18, quoted in Labov 2001: 22-23)
Chapter 5
The new quotatives in US English and British English
Ever since Butter's birth announcements of the quotatives go and like in US
English in 1980 and 1982, the new quotatives were attested in numerous varieties of
English, such as Canadian English, Nigerian English, Indian English, Scottish
English etc. (Singler and Woods 2002, Macaulay 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson
1999) and it is commonly assumed that they spread out from a US epicentre via the
mass media (Singler and Woods 2002, but see Buchstaller 2003, Meyerhoff and
Niedzielski 2003). US hegemony has been claimed to leave its imprints in the
language in the form of the newest addition to the quotative system in other varieties
of English just as it has on a cultural/societal and economical level. Hence, in a
cross-variety study, Tagliamonte and Hudson write that "the diffusion of be like
beyond the United States presents a possible test case for the examination of putative
mega-trends currently underway as English increasingly becomes a global language"
(1999:149).
Like and go's widespread attestation has lead researchers to compare how they
pattern with respect to social factors in different places. Such an investigation into
extralinguistic constraints presupposes the variants' general linguistic comparability
across varieties. To date, researchers have taken as given their status as the same
variants in several varieties. Cf. Tagliamonte and Hudson (199: 147) "the linguistic
trajectory of the innovative form be like is remarkably parallel, not only across the
British and Canadian corpus, but also comparable with previous reports of this form
in the United States". But sociolinguistics has shown in numerous studies that
regionality has an impact on language structure. Prior to that, works in dialectology
have taught us that we cannot assume a priori likeness across regional varieties (e.g.
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Dutkova-Cope 2001, Kretschmar 2003, Macaulay 2002). It seems that assuming that
superficial resemblance (in the shape of the same surface form) indicates overall
equivalent linguistic constraints in various varieties runs the risk of comparing apples
with oranges. But so far, sociolinguistic research on the new quotatives has fallen
short of investigating their overall comparability on linguistic grounds. I would argue
that failing to clear the linguistic ground before embarking on extralinguistic
investigations is an oversight which ultimately threatens the validity of cross-variety
comparisons (cf. Rickford and McNair-Knox 1992). I suggest that the first question
we have to answer when doing sociolinguistic research of any kind is: are we looking
at the same thing? Hence, in this study, I have to ask: do I have the same variant in
both varieties?
In the same vein, in their 1999 study on the use of like in Canadian and British
English, Tagliamonte and Hudson ask for the "assessment of the presence and use of
be like in other countries, particularly the differential trajectories of linguistic change
and diffusion in which it may be engaged, as well as the relationship to other
members of the English quotative cohort in each context"(149).
This chapter has two concerns. First, I will address the issues raised in
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999). Looking at the patterning of the whole quotative
cohort in British English (henceforth BrE) and American English (henceforth AE), I
will show that like and go are separate but equal in the two varieties under
investigation. This claim is based on the fact that they have fundamentally the same
properties with regard to their co-occurrence with levels of hypotheticality (section
5.2.1), the mode of their surround (section 5.2.2), and their co-occurrence with
mimesis and exclamation (5.2.3). But it will become evident that this is not the whole
picture. While it is true that we are witnessing a restructuring of the quotative system
in both varieties, like as well as go follow slightly different trajectories in both.
The second aim of this chapter is as follows: I will show how we can fruitfully
incorporate insights from grammaticalisation into variationist sociolinguistics in
order to ascertain general comparability across varieties, registers and other lects.
Following Hopper and Traugott's (1993:30) plea that "a fuller integration of
sociolinguistic (...) research with research on grammaticalisation still remains to be
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worked out", this chapter will show that it makes sense not only to turn to
grammaticalisation in search for generally valid principles of language change but
also that a grammaticalisation approach will help define what a sociolinguistic
variant is.
Within variationist sociolinguistics, the extension of sociolinguistic analysis
"above and beyond phonology" (Sankoff 1980a) sparked a cacophony of voices
arguing for and against the fundamental comparability of phonology and other areas
of linguistic inquiry.1 The main problem at the time was the (in)-equity of phonology
and syntax. According to Labov (1972a:271), "social and stylistic variation presume
the option of saying 'the same thing' in several different ways: that is, the variants
are identical in reference or truth value, but opposed in their social and/or stylistic
significance". Hence, semantic equivalence is the primary justification for including
surface forms within one same category. But Lavandera (1978) challenged the
assumption that there ever is semantic equivalence between syntactic variables.
Shortly afterwards, Dines defined a discourse variable as having variants with the
"same function in discourse" (1980). This raises the question: how is equivalence to
be measured?
Cheshire (1987) and Romaine (1984) called for an interdisciplinary approach
to be taken in order to grapple with the problem because "a wider perspective is
needed than a purely sociolinguistic one ... [and because] ... sociolinguistics can
both enrich and be enriched by other disciplines" (Cheshire 1987:274). Since then,
numerous studies in sociolinguistics have drawn upon the framework of
grammaticalisation and have incorporated explanatory mechanisms, such as clines
(Meehan 1991, Poplack and Tagliamonte 2000, Romaine and Lange 1991), layering
(Macaulay 2001), and persistence (Torress-Cacoullos 2001), but none has actually
tried to closely intertwine grammaticalisation methodology and variationist
sociolinguistics.
Looking at variation in discourse, I will argue that grammaticalisation helps us
establish that the potential candidates for a sociolinguistic investigation (in this case
like and go) can actually be considered the same variant. It will be shown that we can
1
Cheshire (1987), Dines (1980), Labov (1978), Lavandera (1978), Romaine (1984), and others.
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go about ratifying their status as the same variant by ascertaining that they are
grammaticalising in the same way. Hence, sameness is defined here in functional as
well as in distributional (cf. the notion of the surround introduced in Chapter 3)
terms. Only when sufficiently comparable status has justified treating surface items
as one same variant (viz. the same variant of the same varible), can we proceed to see
whether there are differences in the use of those variants with respect to
extralinguistic or intralinguistic factors such as variety. This will be further explained
below.
This and the following chapter of my thesis can be read as a case-study which
demonstrates how a cross-variety variationist investigation could proceed. First,
sameness is established and then, as a second step, I conduct a variationist
investigation into the patterning of the variable with respect to extralinguistic
parameters (Chapter 6).
5.1. Emergent Grammar
Chapter 4 demonstrated like and go's recent grammaticalisation as quotatives.
New functions, more explicitly new more grammatical functions, developed out of
already existing material (Kurylowicz (1965 [1975]:52). The approach within
grammaticalisation that proves most compatible with variationist sociolinguistics is
that of emergent grammar. The term emergent grammar was coined by Hopper, who
claims that he was influenced by historian James Clifford's statement that "culture is
temporal, emergent, disputed" (1986:19). Hopper maintains that the same holds for
language "a language is not a circumscribed object but a loose confederation of
available and overlapping social experiences" (Hopper 1998:171).
Emergent grammar considers grammar not as an abstract system that exists
independently of language, where language is only the implementation of a logically
prior system; rather, grammar is emergent in the sense of being continuously
negotiated by the speech community or communities. Grammar, then, is not the
source of regular patterns of distribution but the outcome. After some time,
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unplanned spoken discourse results in recurrent strategies for the expression of
certain phenomena.
"Structure, or regularity, comes out of discourse and is shaped by
discourse in an on-going process. Grammar is, in this view, simply the name
for certain categories of observed repetitions in discourse. It is hence not to
be understood as a prerequisite for discourse, a prior possession attributable
in identical form to both speaker and hearer. Its forms are not fixed
templates but emerge out of face-to-face interaction in ways that reflect the
individual speakers' past experience of these forms, and their assessment of
the present context, including especially their interlocutors, whose
experiences and assessments may be quite different."(Hopper 1998:156)
Hence, grammatical structure is always provisional, as language incessantly
changes and evolves. Recurrent strategies are constantly being negotiated in speech
communities in which they develop. Grammar is thus social in that it reveals the
practices of speech production of a given community at a given time on their way
towards (potentially new) structure. This structuring is a "sedimentation of routine
ways" (Couper-Kuhlen 1998:1) of engaging in talk. In the same way, structure must
always be anchored in the concrete situation of the utterance; grammar "is context-
dependent" (Hopper 1998:157). And this is how we can link the approach of
emergent grammar with variationist sociolinguistics: the concrete situation or context
of an utterance is defined by the sociolinguistic variables of gender, age, socio-
educational level, ethnicity, regional and social affiliation etc. We can expect
language patterns to sediment differently in different social groups and, indeed,
sociolinguistics has shown in numerous studies that different communities of
practice have their own linguistic norms and customs (Bucholtz 1999, Eckert and
McConnell-Ginet 1999).
This social aspect of grammar is of primary importance for our present study;
the consideration of how like and go grammaticalise in different regional varieties. In
this chapter, I will compare the patterning of like and go as quotatives with respect to
their function and distribution within the cohort of quotatives in BrE and USE.
2
Hopper says (1998:166) "language is, in other words, to be viewed as a kind of pastiche, pasted
together in an improved way out of ready made elements" (cf. also Goffman's (1981:151) concept of
the "lamination of language", Bakhtin's (1981:281) concept of "heteroglossia", Derrida's "graft
metaphor" (Culler 1982:134-135), Becker's "prior texts" (1988:69), Volisinov's (1973) "voices".
Buchstaller (2001a) refers to "mosaic". Cf. also the related concepts of "conversational routine"
(Coulmas 1981) and "routinization" (Haiman 1991, 1994).
172
Chapter 3 has shown that the entrance of the new variant like causes an
important restructuring of the USE quotative system as a whole (cf. Buchstaller
2001b, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). The following chapter will now investigate
whether we can generalise our earlier findings on US English and whether the
functional niches that like and go have appropriated for themselves are identical
across varieties. I will show that while the reorganisation amongst the quotative
variants has generally resulted in the same functional distribution, like and go follow
slightly different trajectories in the two varieties. It will become evident that there are
some crucial differences in the grammaticalisation of go and like as quotatives on
both sides of the Atlantic. This chapter focuses on four aspects of their systematic
patterning: go with telicity (section 5.3.1), go with direct and indirect quotes (section
5.3.2.), the collocation of like with grammatical person (section 5.3.3.) and with other
verbs of quotation (section 5.3.4).
5.2. Separate but equal
In this chapter, it will be seen that both of the new quotatives go and like
behave equally within the linguistic system of the two varieties. I will first discuss
like and go's behaviour with respect to the hypotheticality level of the quote they are
introducing (5.2.1). Then I will talk about their distribution with respect to the
epistemic level of their surround (5.2.2). Finally, I will address their co-occurrence
with mimesis and exclamations (5.2.3). It will be shown that go as well as like
behaves fundamentally the same on all three accounts in the two varieties.
The fact that like and go have similar status within the cohort of quotative
devices and their comparable distribution point to a grammaticalisation along the
same lines in both varieties. This ratifies the cross-variety comparison of go and like.
5.2.1. The Co-occurrence with Levels of Hypotheticality
In chapter 3, we saw evidence that in US English the different variants of the
(say) variable pattern differently with respect to epistemic stances. In this section, I
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will explore like and go's patterning with hypotheticality levels across varieties and I
will investigate whether the quotative system has been adjusted functionally in the
same way in the two varieties to accommodate the intrusion of the two new
members.
I will again consider the three categories, realis, hypothetical, and situational,
which can be can be conceptualized as stretches of the continuous, bi-polar cline of
epistemicity. Realis quotes are situated at one pole, situational quotes at the other,
with hypothetical ones filling the intermediate sphere and spanning various degrees
of probability. We find that go and like in both Br and USE have a similar tendency
to co-occur with realis (for go) and as a wildcard (for like).
Table 5.1: Frequency of distribution of go (in %) with degrees of hypotheticality by variety
realis hypothetical situational SUM
go BrE 54 44 2 238
go USE 63 33 4 73
ANOVA post hoc (Scheffe) : go bfe-use: p= -288
Table 5.1 shows that, generally, go is used in BrE as well as in USE for introducing
realis quotes (54% and 63%). It can also be used for hypothetical quotes (with 44%
and 33%) but it is not used very much for situational quotes (only 2% and 4%). This
equivalent functional load is underlined by the results of a multivariate ANOVA test,
which was performed on the two quotative systems. Post hoc tests, which reveal
which pairings of variants are significant, showed that the difference in the use of go
with hypotheticality levels is not significant across varieties (p= .228, n.s.).
When we look at the frequency-based patterning of like by variety, the same
pattern emerges in both USE and BrE.
Table 5.2: Frequency of distribution of like (in %) with degrees of hypotheticality by variety
realis hypothetical situational SUM
like BrE 22 59 19 80
like USE 27 39 34 106
ANOVA post hoc (Scheffe): like bhe-use: p= -791
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Across the board, like can be used with all hypotheticality levels but it is most
prevalent with hypothetical quotes (see Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999 for equivalent
results). There is a slight difference in patterning in that like is used more frequently
with situational quotes in USE (34% vs. 19%) and more frequently with hypothetical
quotes in BrE (59% vs. 39%). But in both, BrE as well as USE, we witness the
wildcard effect, viz. no commitment to any level of hypotheticality and no low
values in any category. Fundamentally, the use of like is the same in the two
varieties. As with go, an ANOVA post hoc test yields no significance for its
distribution according to variety (p=.791, n.s.) and underlines the claim about like's
equivalence across varieties. Hence, we have statistical evidence that go as well as
like is functionally equal in both locales when it comes to their co-occurrence with
hypotheticality levels.
By way of comparison, consider the co-occurrence of say and think with
hypotheticality levels. Table 5.3 gives an overview of how all verbs co-occur with all
levels of hypotheticality in the two varieties:
Table 5.3: Frequency of occurrence of Vquo, with level of hypotheticality per variety
realis hypothetical situational
USE BrE USE BrE USE BrE
like 27 22 39 59 34 19
go 63 54 33 44 4 2
say 70 71 24 26 6 3
think 1 2 83 89 16 10
F BrE - US hypotheticality (1» 1363)— 0.2, p— .888, n.S
As expected, say's primary locus of occurrence is the framing of real occurring
quotes and this, again, in both varieties (70% and 71% respectively). And think, in
USE as well as in BrE, is used for inner monologues, which feature the category
hypothetical quotes (83% and 89%). But note that it also functions as a way of
introducing situational quotes (10 % and 16%).
All quotatives, including the new ones, like and go, pattern in their own way
with respect to hypotheticality levels. Importantly, this functional allocation across
different verbs of quotation looks the same in BrE and in USE: ANOVA tests show
the difference to be non-significant. Overall, we witness a similar task sharing
amongst the members of the (say) variable. Hence, after the entry of the new
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quotatives, the same re-functionalisation appears to have taken place in both systems.
Every quotative variant has found its own functional niche and this is the same
across varieties.
The above discussion has shown that we can indeed make cross-varietally valid
claims about the patterning of quotative variants. Generally, we can show that
different quotative options are correlated with different hypotheticality levels and
that they are by that feature associated with quotes of a certain epistemic value. As in
Chapter 3, I will now transfer this notion to the concept of the epistemicity of the
surround, whereby expressions with a certain hypotheticality level attract/co-occur
with other expressions of the same epistemic stance.
5.2.2. Priming
Again, I tagged every quotative frame with respect to the expression of mental
verbal or ambiguous expressions in the surround (which was determined as the
preceding and following 5 TCUs). Table 5.4 gives the cross-variety results for all
quotative variants.
Table 5.4: Co-occurrence of quotatives with mental/speech expressions (in %)
mental
USE
speech ambig not mental
BrE
speech ambig not
like 28 21 22 29 34 36 19 12
go 16 36 21 27 19 44 31 6
say 38 53 3 6 20 68 7 5
think 68 21 2 9 47 35 6 13
X2(9): 136.867, p< .001 y2{9)\ 227.801, P< .001
T-tests: like^rE-usE^ p= .196, gosrE-usE: p= .068, n.s.
^yBrE-usE- P< .001, thinksrE-usE- p< .01, unframedBrE-usE: p< -001
We see that the noncommittal stance of like in its general environment holds in BrE
as well as in US English. Like can occur in a surround characterised as speech,
thought, or it may be ambiguous verbs or in a context unspecified for repeatedly
occurring speech at all. While it is true that in BrE like is used more frequently with
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mental and speech environments (and less in ambiguous and 'not'-contexts), the fact
that there is no single favouring surround in its distribution holds here as well.
Also, the direct association with go's high realis levels, as shown in Table 5.3
(63% and 55%), is expressed on a distributional level in a preference for speech
surrounds. We notice in both varieties a clear peak in the correlation between the
occurrence of go and speech environments (36% and 44% respectively). Go
prevalently occurs in an 'envelope' of speech. Say, is associated generally with
verbal activity (53% and 68%). Notice that say is much less surrounded by
ambiguous verbs (with much lower percentages than go or like). Think, the
introspective quotative, is mainly surrounded by verbs of thought, much more so in
USE (68%) than in BrE (47%) but clearly in both varieties. Also, it does not occur
much with ambiguous contexts in both varieties.
T-test results show that the patterning of like and go in the two varieties is non-
significantly different (with p= .196, and p= .068). Hence, the two new quotatives
occur in the same surrounds in both varieties; their distribution with mental or speech
environments is the same in both varieties. Note that that the functional difference
for say's and think's patterning per variety came out significant. But looking at the
table I think it becomes obvious that the main locus of occurrence for say in both
varieties is speech environments (and even more so in BrE, hence the significant
difference). Think mainly patterns with mental environments (with an even stronger
tendency to do so in USE, hence significant).
The main point to note here is that, as with the hypotheticality level of the
quote, the new quotatives pattern in an equivalent way in BrE and in USE.
5.2.3 Verbs of Quotation, Mimetic Effect and Exclamation
In the following sections I will investigate the patterning of all quotative
variants with respect to mimesis, such as voice and sound effect and gesture, as well
as with respect to exclamations. Table 5.5 gives an overview of the co-occurrence of
mimesis with the most important quotatives in US American English and British
English. The numbers in this table are percentage values out of all tokens of the
particular quotative (i.e. 69% of all of like's tokens frame mimetic enactment in
BrE).
177









%2 (df 18):205.55 , p<.001 yl (df 18): 132.7, pc.OOl
T-tests: likeErE-usE^ p=.356, gOBrE-usE- p=.616, n.s.
.va^srE-usE: p< -001, thinkB,E-vsE- P< -001, unframedBrE-usE: P< -001
The patterning of quotatives with mimesis is highly significant in both varieties as is
shown by the y2 statistics. A t-test was run to see if the quotative options pattern
differently with respect to mimesis in the two varieties. The frequency distribution
shows that both varieties converge in the fact that go and like are amongst the main
mimesis introductory items (69% and 75% for like and 74% and 73% for go). But the
results show that the functional difference for like's patterning and go's patterning
with respect to variety is not significant. Like and go in USE as well as in BrE are
used to introduce voice effects. Tagliamonte and Hudson's (1999) results underline
this claim and show that like and, to an even greater extent, go are both used with
what Tagliamonte and Hudson call "inarticulate sounds" in British as well as in
Canadian English.
But Table 5.5 also shows that the members of the quotative pool which take on
mimesis-introductory function are not necessarily the same across varieties. In BrE,
mimesis co-occurs most frequently with like, go, and unframed quotes (69%, 74%,
and 72% respectively). But in USE like, go, and think-framed quotes most frequently
introduce mimesis (75%, 73%, and 75%). The difference in mimesis-framing
function is significant across varieties for say, think, and unframed quotes.
Hence, the frequency distribution gives evidence that different quotatives
occupy different functional niches (cf. the same effect with hypotheticality levels in
section 5.2.1). Presumably, after the intrusion of two new quotative options,
functional re-allocation takes place in both varieties and functional tasks such as the
introduction of mimesis are re-distributed over the whole quotative cohort. There is
statistical evidence that like and go have taken on the same functional load - viz.
they are mainly used to introduce mimesis - in both varieties. Other members of the
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cohort behave differently across the two varieties and have taken on different
functions in different varieties. Overall, we can see that the association between
mimetic enactment and quotative introducer is conventional, dependent on the
variety.
Let me briefly show that like and go's functional equivalence in their
correlation with mimesis is underlined by their patterning with exclamations such as
oh, wow, ooops in USE and BrE. Exclamations, which have been termed "quotable
gestures" (Kendon 1992), "meaningful noises with no conventional spellings"
(Ferrara and Bell 1995:282), or "response cries" (Goffman 1981) are usually drawn
from 2 sources - mild taboo words and non-word vocalizations - and are used to
dramatise the situation and to create listener involvement (Tannen 1989:25-26).
Ferrara and Bell draw attention to the earlier occidental tradition of drama which
often featured soliloquies -revelations of inner states in order to cue the audience
into the mental landscape of the characters. While lengthy introspective sequences in
the form of soliloquies have gone out of fashion (Goffman 1981), Carbaugh (1988)
claims that they nowadays find their continuation in the (American) tendency for
self-revelation, which finds its epitome in shows like Donahue, Oprah or Jerry
Springer. These media-manifestations of the inner self abound with dramatic re-
enactments of personal experience, most of them in the form of narrative (Labov and
Waletzky 1967). This creates a need for a frame that can introduce what was going
on in the mind of the actor and present it as if the participant was "in a state of talk"
(Goffman 1981). Ferrara and Bell (1995) found that like had filled the slot of a
conventionalized theatrical device which marks revelations of inner state to the
audience. Similarly, it seems clear that quotative go emerged from an earlier stage as
a mimesis marker (OED 1791 my noble heart goes "pit a pat"). Consequently, we
would expect go also to feature highly in the category 'framing exclamations'.
For the purpose of this study, I define exclamations as non-referential, non-
lexical expressions (cf. Goffman's 1981 response cries, "exclamatory expressions
which are not fully fledged words"). Like Cameron (1998), I include laugher and
weeping in this category because they share the element of emotional distress or
intensity associated with the use of interjections. Unsurprisingly, the same quotatives
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that have been shown to introduce mimesis most frequently co-occur with
exclamation.








X2(4): 88.211, p< .01, %2(4): 38.102, p< .01
T-tests: likeusE-BrE^ P= .473, gousE-BrE: P= .912, sayusE-BrE:
p= .338, thinkusE-KvE p=.231, but unframedusE-BrE P< -01
Table 5.6 shows that, in both varieties, like and go are the main items for introducing
exclamation (at 29% versus 33% and 40% versus 40%). This distributional evidence
underlines the findings for mimesis. Go even has the highest percentage of
occurrence in both (40%). In USE, think, which has been already identified as
strongly associated with mimesis (cf. Table 5.5), also occurs with high frequency
with exclamations. In BrE, it is again unframed quotes (cf. Table 5.5), and also think,
that are strongly associated with exclamations. Hence, think in BrE, while not
necessarily associated with sound and voice effects, is nevertheless one of the
quotatives that have a high frequency of co-occurrence with exclamations.
Again, we witness task-sharing amongst the quotative options. Different verbs
of quotation take on specific functions, here the introduction of exclamations. But we
notice that the allocation of quotatives into functional niches is a variety internal
matter. Such a re-distribution can and indeed does yield a different pattern in
different varieties. The case of think has already been pointed out. We also note that
the unframed variant is much more associated with the introduction of exclamations
in BrE than in USE. T-tests show that all lexical verbs pattern non-significantly
across the two varieties but that the functional load of unframed quotes again differs
significantly across varieties. Also, the functional difference between go and like
across varieties is not significant. This means that go and be like have assumed the
same functions both in USE and BrE.
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Comparing these results with the variants' patterning with respect to mimesis
(Table 5.5) shows that the new quotatives, like and go, have assumed the same
functions in both varieties. Other quotative variants, which had to be re-
functionalised after the enlargement of the quotative pool by two options, sometimes
occupy different functional niches across varieties. With respect to mimesis, think,
unframed, and say pattern significantly differently and, with respect to exclamations,
unframed quotatives show a significant effect. Functional reallocation does not
automatically proceed along the same lines and hence does not necessarily lead to the
same distributional patterning in both varieties. This makes the finding that like and
go show identical patterning in both varieties even more important.
We are now in a position to assert such sameness for like and go. Initially, I
stated that when looking at a potential variant, it is important to answer the questions
of 'what is it doing? (what is its functional load)' and 'where is it occurring? (in
which contexts)'. Only if the results show that those are comparable in the most
fundamental sense can we speak of the variant as being the same thing across
varieties.
We have now seen evidence that go and like have the same functional
patterning in two different varieties. Like as well as go has the same distributions
with regard to the epistemicity of their quotes and the contexts they occur in, both in
BrE and USE. In both cases, the quotative system has been re-structured so that
different quotatives take on specialised functions, i.e. occupy functional niches. It has
been established that mimesis is associated with like and go in both varieties and also
with think in USE, but with unframed quotes in BrE. Research into the distribution of
quotatives with exclamations has yielded similar results.
In her criticism of Labov's criterion of semantic equivalence, Lavandera (1978,
cf. also Dines 1980 and Romaine 1984) came to the conclusion that functional
equivalence is a much better criterion for establishing sameness than semantic
equivalence. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that both function and distribution
with respect to the key of the surround help us decide whether we can assume that
something is to be taken as the same thing. The mere fact that the surface looks the
same for like and go in different local varieties does not mean that they are actually
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grammaticalizing as the same thing. After having proven with statistical results that
we are actually comparing same with same, that go as well as like behaves
fundamentally the same in the two varieties, we are at the point where we can
conduct a variationist study and investigate the variants' patterning with respect to
linguistic, and external, social variables. I will now investigate whether there are
regional differences with respect to the new quotatives and if so what these
differences are. The remainder of this chapter is a study of their intralinguistic
constraints. Chapter 6 presents an investigation of their patterning with respect to
extralinguistic factors.
5.3. The Crucial Differences
This section shows that when we look at the linguistic details of like and go's
patterning, we notice that while they are generally comparable, there are nevertheless
indications that they grammaticalise independently in different varieties. In the
following sections, I will give four key differences. The fact that we have two
slightly different surface outputs means that we have to consider the developments in
the 2 varieties to be autonomous to at least a certain degree. I will conclude that
a) due to their overwhelming functional and distributional equality and in spite of
minor differences in their patterning, like and go are to be considered the same
variant across varieties, and
b) we cannot speak of the grammaticalisation of like and go as a process in English
per se because we witness divergent grammaticalisation patterns in different regional
varieties.
5.3.1. Telicity with go
Chapter 4 has shown that go's metaphorical extension from a verb of
movement to a quotative is made possible by the fact that it encodes directional/telic
movement (cf. Buchstaller in preparation). Figure 5.1 (below, as reproduced from
Chapter 4, cf. also Fillmore 1997, Foley 1997, Lakoff 1987, Fakoff and Johnson
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1980) depicts the communicative act as a travelling message from the speaker (the
sender) to the addressee (the receiver).
Figure 5.1: The metaphorical base for go's use as a quotative
The Conduit Metaphor: Speaker (sender) ► Addressee (receiver)
travelling message
Hence, we can conceptualise communication as the encoding and sending of a
message by a speaker to a potential addressee. An addressee is a communicative
goal, an interlocutor to whom speech is directed and who can be encoded into the
quotative frame as a participant to whom speech is directed.
The prototypical sequence for a quotative frame is the sequence Speaker VQUOt
"quote" without such an overt encoding of an addressee (cf. example (5.1) for BrE
with go).
(5.1) BrE - Coming home from work late
X: whenever she's tired she'll get ratty [won't she,
Z: hh hih[hi
X: [and irritable,
and she'll go "get me a cup of tea,
I've been at work all day",
This sequence holds for both varieties in English, BrE and USE, as well as for any
quotative such as think, say, scream,... But there is also the non-prototypical
quotative frame, which has the form speaker VQUOT addressee "quote". Here, the
addressee is explicitly encoded as a participant in the quotative frame. This sequence
is exemplified for BrE in (5.2) below with a quotative framed by say.
(5.2) BrE - The new car
A: and he was just so,
Mandy was around the other night when we phoned Tom during yeah,
B: uh huh,
A: and he was saying to Mandv "I took her show around in the car,
I know she doesn't like it,
but tough".
In (5.2), in the line marked by the arrow, we have the sequence Speaker (he) Vquot
(was saying) Addressee (to Mandy) "quote". The surface addressee is encoded in
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the PP to Mandy. While this sequence occurs with most quotatives in both varieties,
the crucial difference is that only in BrE do we have go in this structure with a
surface addressee. The sequence Speaker VQUOt (go) Addressee is exemplified with
a 1st person addressee in (5.3), where the surface addressee is encoded in the PP to
me. Example (5.4) contains a 3rd person surface addressee, to the police.
(5.3) BrE - Jogging
A: she goes "did you you ever went jogging",
I said "yeah",
B: of course you'd heard,
A: and she's going to me "w-well will you speak to her today",
and I went "well yeah",
(5.4) BrE - Youth today
X: and I mean my brother was terrified in case the police had said something you know,
Y: uh huh,
X: had said something to me mum and me dad,
I mean nowadays they would just go to the police "ehhhh".
you know,
Y: yeah they think nothing of it,
For (5.4) the previous context (which I have not included due to its length) makes
clear that the addressees the police were already present at the moment of the quote.
This excludes an interpretation whereby go has the function of expressing telic
movement of the speaker towards the police. Hence, the go-quotative frame hosts an
expressed surface addressee to the police.
What the two BrE examples show is that go as a quotative does occur with an
expressed addressee in the frame, a sequence which is not attested in the USE data (0
tokens out of a total of 234 go-framed quotes). Hence, the structure speaker go
"quote" is possible both in BrE and in USE, whereas the structure speaker go
Addressee "quote" is possible in BrE but not in USE. Altogether, the BrE data
contain 4 tokens out of 291 quotes framed with go (1.37%). Note that the tokens are
not from the same speaker but have been produced by 4 different speakers, 3 from
Derby and 1 from Newcastle. In three cases the addressee was expressed as a PP
with to and once a bare NP. The direct encoding of such an addressee in the
quotative frame as a PP or NP means that telicity is overtly expressed as an
argument. A comparative survey of all of go's tokens suggests that the two varieties
differ with respect to whether telicity can be overtly expressed or not. Hence, the
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data suggest that telicity can grammaticalise differently during the emergence of go's
quotative function. In BrE, go is grammaticalising as a quotative which can take an
overtly expressed/surface addressee. In USE, go appears to have co-occurrence
restrictions. It does not take an overt surface addressee. We witness different patterns
of grammaticalisation for go in different varieties.3
A short note on the small numbers involved in this and the following sections:
during the initial stages of grammaticalisation, we necessarily expect low numbers of
tokens of the linguistic phenomenon in question. Changes start off slowly and only
acquire impetus as they are picked up by the speech community. Labov (2001:450)
gives the estimated curve of a change in progress, replicated here as Figure 5.2:
Figure 5.2: 100-year progress of a change with incrementation (from Labov 2001:450)
Percent
change
0 13 30 at) *C< 14 60 TO «0 90 t00
Years
The low numbers of tokens given in this section may not show any statistical
significance, but what they may represent is the initial appropriation of new contexts
during the early stages of grammaticalisation. In this respect, this section is more of a
qualitative nature. The importance of the numerical difference between the varieties
(albeit small) lies in the fact that one integer is consistently zero. Whereas the new
quotatives have appropriated themselves a certain linguistic context in one variety,
they have not done so in the other.
3 In order to check whether go as a quotative verb is generally grammaticalising differently with
respect to the encoding of telicity in the two varieties, I conducted an investigation into the occurrence
of go in structures where it is ambiguous between a spatial telic verb and a quotative. Ambiguity
exists in constructions such as speaker go "quote" PP/ Advspace , as in
X: Simon went down the hill on the way to college,
went "bang" into the back of a van.
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5.3.2. Indirect quotes with go
American authors have pointed out that go occurs only with direct quotes.
When Butters first noted the occurrence of go as a quotative verb in USE in his
much-cited 1980 article, he wrote "so far, it does not seem to have spread to indirect
discourse ... though (...) [that] might come in due time", (cf. also Blyth et al. 1990,
Cukor-Avila 2002, Romaine and Lange 1991, Schiffrin 1981, Tagliamonte and
Hudson 1999). Schourup writes that go "... unambiguously cues listeners to the
onset of a direct quotation [so that it] (..) neatly solves a small problem in spoken
English" (1982b: 149-150). The problem-solving property he refers to is the fact that,
whereas say and other verbs of quotation are often ambiguous with respect to the
enquoting of direct or indirect reported speech, go apparently always enquotes direct
reported speech.
To recapitulate, for the purpose of this thesis, I define direct quotes (cf. Chapter
2 for a more detailed definition) as representation of past speech or thought which
have a deictic orientation to the experiencer of the quote in spatial, temporal and
personal orientation. I have not taken as a distinguishing characteristic for a direct
quote the absence or presence of voice or sound effects (Klewitz and Couper-Kuhlen
1999) or of whether or not there is a complementiser that.
Having defined direct quotes by those criteria, we can investigate go's
patterning in the two varieties. Looking at the USE corpus, we find Butters and
Schourup et al. ratified. There are no indirect quotes with go (0 out of 234 tokens).
But in the BrE corpus, we find instances of quotes like example (5.5):
(5.5) BrE - Spooky night
X: and the first thing that went through me mind was,
I was telling Mandy was ehhhmmm,
when Angela stayed that night,
—> and she goes .hhh she heard a noise downstairs,
someone speaking,
and I thought "flipping hell,
who is that"?
I found no token in US English (with 234 overall) and 3 tokens in BrE (1.03 %). This confirms earlier
results in which the telicity of go is overtly grammaticalising only in BrE but not in USE.
186
In (5.5), the TCU marked by the arrow contains the quote (.hhhh) she heard a noise
downstairs someone speaking. The 3s reference she marks the agent as a person
other than the experiencer - otherwise it would be the Is pronoun, I. Angela is
clearly the person referred to by both tokens of she. Hence, the deictic orientation of
this utterance is to the speaker relating it, not to the experiencer. The reported stretch
is an indirect quote. Another possibility is to interpret this construction as a structural
break. According to this interpretation, X, who is telling a story about Angela, starts
with she goes (movement or quotative go). Immediately after go, X breaks off and
starts a new construction with she heard a noise downstairs. This new construction
has no structural connection with she goes, thus cannot be interpreted as
subordinated under quotative go.
There is a slight breathing pause after she goes, which could be interpreted as a
sign of reorientation followed by a different structure. But due to the fact that we
have none of the typical signs of an anacoluthon, such as stutter, lengthenings,
extended pausing, fillers, repairs, etc., I have not analysed this as an example of a
structural break. I take this stretch of speech to be an indirect quote framed by
quotative go, an interpretation which is underlined by a continuous intonation
pattern. 4
Go, an item which can have quotative function, is occurring directly before an
indirect quote (.hhhh) she heard a noise downstairs and can be interpreted as framing
the reported utterance. Go thus functions as an introductory item for indirect reported
speech.
Overall, my BrE corpus contains 4 tokens of indirect go-framed quotes out of
291 go-quotes (1,37% versus none at all in USE). Even though there are problems in
using negative evidence (Lass 2000, Lindstrom 2001), I conclude that while go as a
quotative for direct speech occurs both in USE and in BrE, it can be used to
introduce indirect quotes in BrE but not in USE. While go can take on the function
of framing indirect speech in British English, like certainly does (still) have this
disambiguating function and never occurs with indirect speech in both varieties.
4 I would like to thank the participants in the Language in Context group at the University of
Edinburgh for their helpful comments and suggestions concerning this analysis.
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Having shown that go patterns independently in the two varieties with respect
to indirect enquoting and telicity, I will now give evidence that like as well, has
slightly idiosyncratic behaviour on both sides of the Atlantic. Far from directly
mirroring the developmentally earlier American surface item, British speakers use
like in a distinctive fashion.
5.3.3. The Collocation of like with other verbs of quotation
In this section, I will focus my investigation on collocations of like with
quotative introductory items leading to sequences of the form Subject VQUot like
"quote". The co-occurrence of like with quotative verbs has been commented on in
the literature as "mixed forms" (Macaulay 2001)5 or "transitional forms" (Singler
2001). In my data, like is attested as co-occurring with an array of quotatives, say
like, think like, tell like,.... Example 5.6 shows a case of the collocation of like with
go in BrE:
(5.6) BrE - The barbecue
Y: cause ehhhm I was talking to him you kn- you know Mandy's barbecue at XX,
—» well ahmm he was tell- he was going like "I don't know anybody",
and all this-
X: -did he go?
The collocation of two items with quotative potential, go like, here frames the
reported speech sequence I don't know anybody. There is no noticeable pause, stutter
or any other sign of disfluency which would speak for a repair of one quotative (viz.
go) for another (viz. like). This leads to the interpretation that go like together take
the function of introducing a quote. An investigation of the distribution of such
collocations in the two corpora yields an interesting pattern:
5 While Macaulay (2001) refers specifically to quotative frames with the form go like that "quote", i
will not concern myself with the deictic here.
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Table 5.7: Collocations of like with quotatives across varieties


















Table 5.7 shows that, in BrE, like co-occurs with all sorts of quotatives but mostly with
say. Fourteen tokens (50%) out of all 28 collocations are combinations of say and
like. In USE like enters much more frequently in collocations with quotative verbs
(35.9% vs. 18.8% in BrE), but it is specialized with feel. Seventy-six of all 82 tokens
are collocations of this sort, i.e. 92.7% out of all combined frames. The following 2
excerpts exemplify the prototypical collocations of like in the two varieties, first the
combination with feel like in USE (5.7), then say like in BrE (5.8).
(5.7) USE - Planting
B: I've got a few plants here,
but I'm not really knowledgeable.
Ill feel real good if I water them and they continue to grow,
you know I feel like "oh I've accomplished something",
A: uh huh
(5.8) BrE - The deja-vu
X: he thought I was mad,
he said like "what are you going on about"?
and I was like "oh I know that was scary .hhhhhh
I didn't like that",
Those examples show how speakers use like with quotatives associated with the
verbal as well as with the mental domain. It is regularly combined both with verba
dicendi that are associated with real occurring and with hypothetical speech. In fact,
different varieties favour one or the other collocation (feel like versus say like). This
is not surprising given the wildcard status of like. As I have shown in earlier sections,
it is not committed to any epistemic stance. It can introduce quotes of all
hypotheticality levels (Chapter 3.4), and it can co-occur in contexts of expressions of
6
The parenthesis indicates that Vquot is an optional item.
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verbal and of mental activity (Chapter 3.5). These findings underline that like has
few co-occurrence restrictions and collocates relatively freely with quotative verbs. It
just sediments out, i.e. grammaticalises, differently in different varieties.
5.3.4. Verb-person correlation for like
In Chapter 4,1 investigated like's occurrence with existential it and the role this
collocation might have played in the grammaticalisation of like as a quotative (note
also the reservations about the incompatibility of my results and earlier studies).
Example (5.9) gives another illustration of this sequence:
(5.9) USE - mood changes
A: and the people their moods are extreme you know,
B: right,
A: it's like "God if I don't get to see the sun I'm going to be in this bad mood all this=
=entire time" I mean,
and this is how I see people reacting.
Recall Tagliamonte and Hudson's (1999:23) footnote, which reads as follows:
"interestingly, although representing a very small proportion of the data, N=23
(3.4%) (viz.), the most highly favoured context for be like in Britain is with
existential it ...". If "existential it" is the most highly favoured context, why does it
only account for 23 out of 120 ///^-quotations?
Indeed, in my corpora, //-quotations constitute the most favoured context.
Certainly, as Tagliamonte and Hudson point out, the question of the occurrence of
like with it is worth investigating from a cross-variety perspective. Table 5.8 gives an
overview of like''s patterning with grammatical person in both varieties.
Table 5.8: Verb-person Correlation for tike in both varieties (in %)
1st 2nd 3rd it not
LIKE BrE 40 4 19 34 1
LIKE USE 29 3 13 56 0
F (1,26.474)= 15.973, p<.001
We see significant differences (p < .001) across varieties in the use of like with
respect to like's occurrence with lstperson, 3rd person and existential it. Notably, US
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English speakers use like 56% of the time for impersonal //-quotations in comparison
with only 34% for British English speakers. The most frequent environment for like
in BrE is 1st person (40%) whereas in USE it is most frequent with impersonal it. The
higher //-frequency in US English patterns with lower frequencies of 3rd person
personal and especially of 1st person marked quotes (13% USE versus 19% BrE and
29% USE versus 40% BrE).
Whether this different distribution is due to different narrative styles, as hinted
at in Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999), or whether the fact that in US English, like as
a quotative is at a much more advanced stage and thus intrudes in territories that BrE
like has yet to explore is a matter for further investigation. Without any time-depth
study that is based on data that includes impersonal it, it is impossible to draw any
conclusive results.
But in any case we see that synchronically, like has assumed very different
distributional preferences with respect to person marking. While it is mostly used to
frame first person quotation in BrE, it is first and foremost a quotative that occurs
with impersonal it in USE.
5.4. Conclusions
The conclusions to this chapter are twofold. I will first talk about the
descriptive findings and will then address the methodological consequences of this
study.
5.4.1. Descriptive
I have shown that both go and like as quotatives have fundamentally the same
properties in BrE and USE. Like as well as go has the same function with respect to
the hypotheticality level of the quote (Chapter 5.2.1) and the enquoting of mimesis
and exclamations (Chapter 5.2.3). Furthermore, in both varieties, like, as well as go,
has the same distribution with respect to the mental and speech environments they
occur in (section 5.2.2). We not only witness a surface resemblance but in function
and distribution, both like and go are the same thing across varieties. We are now in a
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position to claim that because of their form and their distribution, it is appropriate to
consider them comparable variants of the same (say) variable across the two
varieties. Hence, the innovative forms like and go have spread in the quotative
system of two regionally separate varieties of English in astonishingly similar ways,
alike enough for us to categorise like^re and likeuse and gobre an^ £°use as the same
variants.
But a closer look at like and go's intralinguistic behaviour has shown that there
are different patterns of grammaticalisation in different local varieties. Macaulay
(2001) refers to "innovations or confusion in the transmission" and he points out that
the grammatical isation of the quotatives in Scottish English is not a case of the
colonial lag phenomenon mentioned by Trudgill (1999). This claim is underlined by
the comparative BrE-USE data presented in this study. With respect to the encoding
of telicity, this chapter has given evidence that go can co-occur with surface
expressions of telicity in BrE but not in USE. Also, go can frame indirect quotes in
BrE, whereas in USE it appears to have co-occurrence restrictions.
Looking at like, I have shown that with respect to collocation with other
quotatives, it co-occurs most frequently with say in BrE, whereas in USE, where we
have a generally very high occurrence in collocations, it most often occurs with feel.
This has led me to conclude that like specialises with different quotative verbs in
different varieties. Also, like's patterning with person marking shows distinctive
patterns on different sides of the Atlantic.
Overall, like and go's idiosyncratic developments have provided evidence that
the surface output of the grammaticalisation process differs with respect to locality, a
fact that points to locally independent grammaticalisation. Hence Tagliamonte and
Hudson's (199:169) statement that "British and Canadian youth both are following
the same functional trajectory as that found in the United States. While the more
traditional variants (e.g. say, tell) have somewhat different patterns of use in British
and Canadian English, the patterning for like is the same" is to be taken with a grain
of salt. While the data makes evident that like and go pattern functionally similarly
enough in British English and US English to justify calling them the same variant
across varieties, a closer look at the details of their grammaticalisation has shown
that they both display idiosyncratic, variety-specific behaviour. The present study has
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shown that while newcomers like and go sparked a reallocation of the functional load
amongst all members of the quotative pool in both varieties, the individual quotatives
have come to occupy slightly different niches in each variety. This leads me to
conclude that we cannot speak of the grammaticalisation of go and like as a process
in English per se. Language variety is a variable that must be taken into account.
5.4.2. Methodological
Sociolinguistics and grammaticalisation theory have not traditionally been
closely intertwined. This chapter shows that there are real advantages to tying
grammaticalisation, most notably the notion of emergent grammar, into a variationist
sociolinguistic study. A combination of approaches is possible as their field of
interest is the same: both look at change or variation in linguistic practices.
While variationist sociolinguistics seeks to investigate the co-variation of
social and linguistic variables, and quantitatively examines language variation and
change, grammaticalisation argues that language structure is (re-)emergent and that
these emergent regularities are the creatively achieved outcome of verbal activity.
Methodologically, grammaticalisation tries to empirically investigate in which
linguistic contexts the innovations arise, strives to find explanations of how those
new structures come about, to give an account of the mechanisms involved, and to
understand how the innovations penetrate the linguistic system. This has implications
for sociolinguistics: according to Labov, "social and stylistic variation presume the
option of saying 'the same thing' in several different ways" (1972a:271).7 Semantic
equivalence has been challenged as the proper measure of equivalence (Lavandera
1978) and subsequent definitions of the sociolinguistic variable have relied on
variants having the "same function in discourse" (Dines 1980). This chapter has
shown how variationist sociolinguists can take on board grammaticalisation as a
means of assessing whether our variants generally - overall - function within the
linguistic system in the same way. Applied this way, grammaticalisation can help us
ratify and rationalise our decision as to whether or not a variant is actually "the
7
This is parallelled by Hopper and Traugott's statement that grammaticalisation looks at the
phenomenon of speakers "findfing] new ways to say old things" (1993:65).
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same". Once we are in a position to assert functional equivalence, we have a
justifiable reason for claiming that a potential variant is behaving fundamentally as
the same thing. And only once this general sameness is asserted can we go on to
investigate how this variant patterns with respect to extralinguistic variables as is
demonstrated in the next chapter.
One final note: what can variationist sociolinguistics give to
grammaticalisation? Within the framework of grammaticalisation, which proceeds
primarily diachronically and cross-linguistically, languages are still very much
considered homogeneous blocks. Even though we do find the occasional allusion to
sociolinguistic registers (Hopper 1991, Norde 2001, Traugott and Heine 1991),
variation is very much seen as an intermediary, messy state of ambiguity which
precedes the clean, clear-cut next stage in a grammaticalisation pathway which is
assumed to hold for a whole language. But stable variation in the sense of different
patterns with respect to different social variables has not been explored by
grammaticalisation studies so far (cf. Lass 2000). As Janda (2001) pointed out,
within grammaticalisation, linguistic change has to be reformulated in terms of
speakers and their linguistic practices. This study shows that we cannot speak of the
grammatricalisation of like and go as quotatives in English per se and thereby proves
that extralinguistic factors, especially the variety in question, have an influence on
surface output. It also shows that there is systematicity at each stage in the process.
And that this systematic variation can ultimately give rise to what grammaticalisation
theorists have commonly idealized as different languages.
"For each individual, his language is thus a total recreation achieved under the
influence of the milieu that surround him."
Meillet (1929/1936:74-75)
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Not all variability and heterogeneity in language structure
involves change; but all change involves variability and
heterogeneity. (Weinreich, Labov and Herzog 1968:188)
Chapter 6
Extralinguistic factors
Ever since the 1960s with the ground-breaking work of Labov (1966a, 1966b),
sociolinguistic research has been concerned with finding the orderly relationship
between social factors and linguistic variables. Quantitative variationist
sociolinguistic research aims to express the variability of a given variable as a
correlation between the variants and a set of social factors. This probabilistic co¬
occurrence is considered not only as indicative of group membership but also
stresses the agentive and constructive nature of variable use.
Numerous studies have shown that grammatical variables tend to stratify
groups more sharply than phonological variables (see Cedergren and Sankoff 1974,
Chambers 1995, Wolfram 1969). This chapter investigates how a discourse or
morpho-syntactic variable, such as the (say) variable patterns according to social
parameters. Indeed, earlier research on (say) variants has given convincing evidence
that the quotative frame is a site that can carry extralinguistic information. Yule and
Mathis (1992) show that quotative choice can organize speaker's topic, Mathis and
Yule (1994) give evidence of how the zero quotative expresses both interpersonal
and spatio-temporal immediacy. Romaine and Lange (1991), building on the work by
Nordberg (1984), show that quotative choice can heighten the dramatic impact of the
story.
With like being a highly salient innovative option within the quotative system
and progressing at full speed across the sociolinguistic spectrum in many varieties of
English, sociolinguists around the globe have seen their chance to investigate the
birth of a linguistic variant. The plethora of sociolinguistic studies which report on
like's extralinguistic patterning have resulted in a variety of (sometimes conflicting)
findings which I will summarise below. Most research to date has, however, only
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looked at like (plus sometimes the most common other quotatives) without
accounting for all other variants that make up the variable (notable exceptions are
Tagliamonte and D'Arcy to appear, Cameron 1998, Cukor-Avila 2002, Johnson 2001
and Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). But, as Cameron rightly argues, we need to
"close the set that defines the variable" (Labov 1996:78) in order to fully account for
the variation amongst the individual variants within the variable. Hence, this chapter
discusses the extralinguistic constraints of all variants which interrelate within the
(say) variable. While I will specifically focus on go and like, their patterning will be
discussed within the systemic interplay of all quotative variants.
Indeed, Cameron's plea for a full consideration of all competing variants is
underlined by two findings reported here: (i) the importance of a stable denominator
in statistical evaluations within one variable and (ii) the fact that the introduction of
quotative like resulted in a functional restructuring of the entire cohort of quotative
variants. This large scale reorganization gives evidence of the systematicity of the
(say) variable as a whole. And just as Chapter 3 has shown linguistic reallocation /
refunctionalisation of all variants, it will be interesting to see whether the quotative
system has become restructured on the extralinguistic plane as well. But we can only
fully understand like's spread across the social spectrum when we are looking at its
interaction with all other quotative options. It follows that we will have to consider
the social reality of the (say) variable as a whole.
Furthermore, previous chapters have shown that even though like and go
fundamentally follow the same lines of development in both varieties, their
grammaticalisation route is nevertheless locally independent. I will now examine
whether this finding can be extended to their social constraints by conducting a
variationist sociolinguistic investigation of the two varieties. Given the fact that the
allocation of social meaning is arbitrary and highly culture specific, we would expect
an idiosyncratic national patterning of sociolinguistic variants according to locality
with respect to social constraints just as much as with respect to the linguistic
constraints. But we will also have to admit for influence from US English - the
variety where like was attested 12 years earlier - to British English via the mass
media (which facilitate the transmission of cultural goods as well as the social
meaning attached to them, see Stuart-Smith 2001). Nevertheless, as social meaning is
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high context information (von Hippel 1994), we would imagine a less-than complete
transmission of social constraints (Buchstaller 2003, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski
2002). Rather, it is to be expected that the transfer of a surface form goes hand in
hand with reallocation and reappropriation in the new locale (cf. Chapter 5). The
following pages will test this hypothesis in discussing whether like has the same
social distribution in the UK as in the US data, the variety from which British
English speakers have allegedly borrowed the new quotative (Macaulay 2001,
Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). A comparison of the results of two separate
variationist sociolinguistic investigations of the quotative system in both varieties
will enable us to compare the social constraints which play a role in the (say)
variable in the two varieties.
This chapter is structured as follows: After a discussion of the relevant
sociolinguistic literature and of previous investigations of the new quotatives, I will
give an overview over like and go's social constraints in the two data sets under
investigation. In the first sub-section, the correlation of social categories and
quotatives in the American English data will be described. Here, like has already
spread considerably across the social spectrum and had had the time to expand
intralinguistically by the time of data collection (1988-92). Then, the patterning of
the quotative system in British English, where like was at an incipient stage at the
time of data collection (1994/5), will be investigated. I will point to crucial
differences in the patterning in the two varieties and will give possible explanations
why.
It will become evident that there are not many significant social effects with
regard to like and go in British and US English in my data. Hence, while the previous
chapters have given evidence of like and go's important intralinguistic constraints,
their extralinguistic profile turns out to be much less remarkable than their linguistic
constraints. This finding complements a growing body of research which, looking at
both intra- and extralinguistic constraints, has found linguistic factors to be much
more important and robust than social factors (cf. Bell 1984, Fought 1999, Labov
1993, Meyerhoff 2000, Preston 1991, Rickford and McNair-Knox 1992, but see also
Smith and Steele 2003). I will argue for a synthetic approach to variationist
sociolinguistics. We need to account for social as well as linguistic factors that
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constrain the variability of our (say) variable, as much as any other variable, in order
to be able to understand as fully as possible the reality of the variable in question.
After giving an overview of the few social constraints that have an effect on the
new quotatives, I will look into the sociolinguistic distribution of all members of the
pool of quotative strategies in more depth, especially with respect to the interaction
between the non-canonical variants, go, like and unframed quotes. I will discuss their
patterning across apparent and real time.
6.1. Literature overview
In an important observed regularity of linguistic change, Milroy and Milroy
(1992) show that in modern urban societies, members of different social classes tend
to have very dissimilar social networks: middle class speakers exhibit less closely-
knit networks with social ties outside their immediate neighbourhoods and families.
Working class speakers, on the contrary, tend to be less geographically mobile with
closer social ties. The Milroys show that this difference is directly reflected in their
speech with the middle class speakers producing less localised and more standardised
variables than the working class speakers.
Additionally, L. Milroy (1980) found a weakening of gender-effects on
linguistic variables within the less locally oriented open network of the middle class
speakers. Hence, in the present investigation, we would expect a bigger gender effect
amongst the working class speakers for class-stratified quotative variables. Chambers
(1995: 128, et passim) further adds that "loose-knit network structures also found in
the MC go together with the blurring of gender roles ... [and] yet we consistently find
the same linguistic differences between men and women".
Labov (1990:214) comments that "women ... are said to be more expressive
than men or use expressive symbols more than men or rely more on such symbols to
assert their position" (cf. also Sattel 1983). This is underlined by findings that
"female linguistic behaviour is viewed more tolerantly by local peer-groups, so that
women have, in a sense, more linguistic freedom than men" (J. Milroy 1981:37). We
would expect this higher degree of (socially permitted) linguistic creativity to
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manifest itself in the overall higher use of non-traditional variants by women. And
indeed, while we do find variationist studies that show men in advance (Labov's
1963 Martha's Vineyard study, Belfast as described by Milroy and Milroy in 1978,
in Norwich, Trudgill 1972), women have been shown to be at the forefront in many
studies on linguistic change in progress whether in New York City (Labov 1966b),
Philadelphia (Labov 1984) in Panama City (Cedergren 1973), in Hong Kong (Bauer
1986) etc. In fact, differential statistical output according to gender is one of the most
commonly cited diagnostics of language change in progress with females generally
in the lead (cf. Labov 1972a, Labov 1990, Ladegaard 1998, Romaine 2003). Young
women are consistently cited as the main innovators (cf. Eckert 1989, Eckert and
McConnell-Ginet 1999, Labov 2001).
This apparent contradiction between women leading the way and women
lagging behind has been pointed out by numerous researchers. Eckert (1989:248)
calls for caution against sweeping gender-related statements and reminds us that "not
only is it a mistake to claim that women are more or less innovative than men, but at
this point in our research it is a mistake to claim any kind of constant constraint
associated with gender". And Wolfram and Schilling-Estes (1998:187) spell out the
conundrum: "women appear to be more conservative than men, in that they use more
standard variants ... At the same time, women appear to be more progressive then
men, because they adopt new variants more quickly".
Labov (2001) formulates this situation, whereby the same group of speakers is
at the same time conservative as well as progressive, as the "Gender Paradox ...
Women deviate less than men from linguistic norms when the deviation is overtly
proscribed, but more than men when the deviations are not proscribed". However, as
Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003:293) rightly point out, this only amounts to a
paradox if we try to attach the same social meaning to non-standard language and use
of innovative forms. Indeed, as sex and linguistic practices do not simply map up but
because speakers can choose to construct particular aspects of their identity via
(amongst other things) linguistic means, "gender has a variety of effects on the
variable and (...) gender in variation cannot be reduced to notions of male and
female speech as 'more or less conservative'" (Eckert 1989). While this chapter is
not able to resolve the conflict that surrounds this topic, it will be interesting to see if
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and to what extent male and female speakers in the two data-sets adopt and further
the non-standard variants. Furthermore, following calls to investigate specifically the
interaction between gender and other social categories (Eckert 1989, Eckert and
McConnell-Ginet 2002, Romaine 2003), this chapter will investigate the social
reality of the quotative system at the interface of gender, class and age.
In his 2001 book, Labov, extrapolating from the social patterning of numerous
sound changes, has formulated a number of principles, which are intended to predict
courses of language change. I will print principles 1, 3 and 4 in full.
Principle 1, or the Curvilinear Principle: Linguistic Change from below
originates in a central social group, located in the interior of the
socioeconomic hierarchy (2001: 188) ...
Principle 3: In linguistic change from above, women adopt prestige forms at a
higher rate than men (2001: 274)
Principle 4: In linguistic change from below, women use higher frequencies of
innovative forms than men do (2001: 292)
In the course of this paper, the developments within the quotative system in
British and US English will be examined with an eye on their conformity or non¬
conformity to the predictions. But we need to bear in mind that with the introduction
of like into the hitherto stable pool of quotatives, we are looking at the very special
case of a rapid change phenomenon. The variable consists of a whole pool of
competitor variants, some of which are vernacular (namely like, go and unframed
quotes).1 And while the numerous lay comments in the media (e.g. List of All Time
Banished Words) give evidence that the lexical items newcomer like and stigmatized
go are above the level of consciousness, the status of unframed quotes, the variant
without surface form, is not so easy to determine. Also, the question of prestige is
problematic with a variant that holds prestige for the younger generation (viz. is
highly endorsed by and associated with role models in the media) but seemingly
stigmatised by their elders. Furthermore, given the fact that the innovative variant
like potentially got transposed from one variety to another, it will be interesting to
see whether the same principles of transmission and adoption can be shown to hold
' I employ vernacular in the sense of Holmes (1992:146) in that I use "the term vernacular as an
alternative to non-standard... vernacular forms tend to be learned at home and used in informal
contexts."
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in geographically separated locations with largely different social structures (Aukrust
and Snow 1998).
If we want to investigate the overall idea of women as the innovators or as the
more conservative speakers in more detail, Foulkes and Docherty's (1999:16)
suggestion that "in the current climate, where non-standard varieties are becoming
more and more influential, it follows that females are more likely to be the
harbingers of oncoming variants, even if they are non-standard in origin" is a very
useful point of departure. Mathisen (1999), Trudgill (1988), Przedlacka (2001), Watt
and Milroy (1999) and Wells (1982) independently show that women's speech is
more prone to being influenced by non-local forms. Foulkes and Docherty (1999)
rephrase the dichotomy of variants being standard versus non-standard used in earlier
work as local versus non-local (going back to Milroy et al. 1994 and Abdel-Jawad
1981). They go on to show that female speakers use more supra-local forms, viz.
variants which do not characterize the regional variety of a local community. These
findings are of great interest for the situation we are investigating. It will become
clear during the discussion in this chapter that if we redefine our parameters and
speak of supra-local versus local forms instead of prestige versus non-prestige forms,
we can account for several patterns we find in the data.
Another important concept involved in this discussion is Britain's "contact,
focusing and reallocation" hypothesis (1997), which states that dialect contact can
lead to levelling and simplification. One common form of simplification is known as
reallocation (Trudgill 1985:40, 1986:152) or rule governed contact (Taeldeman 1989)
where "two or more ingredient variants are reallocated, in the new koineized dialect -
whether to different phonological environments (Trudgill 1986:159), to different
lexical environments (Taeldeman 1989), or to certain stylistic contexts (Trudgill
1986:110)" (Britain 1997:35). While Britain and Trudgill state that such processes
can occur "when face to face interaction occurs at a high level between speakers of
different but mutually intelligible language varieties" (Britain 1997:34), later
research has shown that they do not necessarily need face-to-face interaction in order
to take place (Kerswill and Williams 1999, Williams and Kerswill 1999). As I will
illustrate below, the reallocation hypothesis can be used to account for the possible
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scenario whereby like was borrowed from the US into British English.2 Consider
section 6.5. for more details.
Sociolinguistic and discourse-oriented publications which explored the recent
changes within the quotative system have primarily concentrated on like's gender
affiliation and have resulted in highly conflicting results. For US English, where
most investigations of like have been conducted, it has been reported to be a feature
of women's speech by Ferrara and Bell (1995 for the 1990 corpus), Romaine and
Lange (1991:228), Singler (2001) and many others. Blyth et al. (1990), Dailey-
O'Cain (2000), Dougherty and Strassel (1998) and Lange (1986) report that in the
US, independently of the actual linguistic reality, people tend to perceive like more
as a feature of female speech. But Blyth et al. (1990), Dailey-O'Cain (2000) and
Sanchez and Charity (1999) found like to be more prevalent in male speech. Some
articles report no gender difference at all (cf. Ferrara and Bell 1995 for the 1992/4
corpus, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999 for Canadian English, Eckert 20003 and
Singler 2001). For a very useful overview of the literature see Cukor-Avila (2002).
In a real-time study spanning the years between 1990 and 1994, Ferrara and
Bell (1995) show that the female bias has decreased to almost zero as fast as from
1990 to 1992 in Texas. This result is paralleled by Tagliamonte and Hudson's (1999)
data from Canadian English in 1995, where they report that the difference in
VARBRUL weights .54 (female) and.44 (male) is not significant.4
Note on the contrary the situation in British English: while like in my corpus (in
1994/5) is not stratified by gender at its incipient stage, later studies in York have
2 I do not want to rule out the possibility of an independent development in US and British English.
But like's diachronic precedence in US English (attested as early as 1982) points to the fact that its
occurrence in America has at least helped spark the development in British English. Consider Chapter
4 for an analysis of the semantic field underlying the grammaticalisation of like, which makes its
development into a quotative likely. Consider also the cross-linguistic evidence given in Table 4.1
which justifies calling this process "natural", thus prone to occurring in several places at the same
time, cf. Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 2003).
3 Note that Eckert does not separate out quotative and discourse marker use.
4
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) work with the VARBRUL system, widely used in sociolinguistic
research, which gives weighted probabilities stemming from a multivariate analysis. The factorial
weights give the probability of a variant occuring in a particular context. The closer these numbers are
to 1, the more highly this context favours the occurrence of the dependent variable.
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shown that the more diffused like gets, the bigger the frequency-based gender
difference becomes (cf. Johnson 2001). Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) speculate
that the longer like persists as a full member of the quotative cohort, the more
gender-stratified it becomes.
Prior to studies that endeavoured to investigate the quotative system as a whole,
not much was known about the social or linguistic constraints on quotative go.
Consequently, besides a short birth announcement by Butters in 1980, I have not
come across any study which specifically investigates go. It is usually mentioned in
passing when discussing quotative like. While broadly associated with male speech
in North America, go is found to be sharply delineating male and female speech,
preferred by the males, by Tagliamonte and Hudson (1995) for Canadian English
(.35 and .73 VARBRUL weights) or at least to show significance as in Singler (2001,
with VARBRUL weights of .55 male and .47 female). When it was first attested by
Butters (1980), he associated it with male adolescents in North Carolina. But note
that, contrary to the stereotype, Ferrara and Bell (1995) only find a 2% difference
between younger speakers of both genders in 1992. Furthermore, Blyth et al. (1990)
and Tagliamonte and Hudson's 1996 British English corpus show that go is non¬
significant with respect to gender.
In British English very little research has been done on the quotative system at
all. All sociolinguistic accounts of the quotative system have been conducted after
the introduction of newcomer like and specifically target its distribution (and later
also its interaction with the other members of the quotative cohort). The only three
variationist studies of the quotative system of British English which investigate like
and go are Macaulay (2001) for Scottish English collected in 1997, Tagliamonte and
Hudson (1999) with data collected in York in 1996 (from a cross-variety perspective)
and a follow-up study by Johnson (2001) in 2001 in York. One major asset of the
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) study is the fact that they draw attention to the fact
that like is on the borderline between thought and speech. Consequently, think and,
by extension, other verbs of introducing quoted thought are included in their analysis,
which closes the set of the studied variable and makes their results more comparable
to mine.
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Interestingly, in my data, there is a big gap in go-production between only 5.8%
in the US English and 12.8% in the British English data. The question is whether this
fact stands in relation to an issue which has been raised in the literature (Bakht-
Rofheart 2002, Blyth et al. 1991), viz. whether the spread of like intrudes in go's
territory. Note in this respect Macaulay's (2001:6) proposition that "go became
popular in the US among younger speakers about 25-30 years ago but soon was
replaced by be like, although older speakers continued to use go." I will aim to test
this claim. If like is indeed replacing go, this should show up in the apparent time
data.
The following sections discuss the sociolinguistic patterning of the two corpora
under investigation. While the amount of variation we find in the data sets explains
only a small part of the overall variation observed, a study of the social constraints
which govern the quotative system is nevertheless valuable for the following reasons:
By comparing the patterning of the (say) variable as a whole in Britain and the US,
we gain insights into the rule-governed variability of innovative features and their
competing variants in two geographically distant varieties. Furthermore, the
restructuring of all quotative variants during the rapid intrusion of the robust new
variant like gives us an important test-case for various explanatory parameters for
language change that have been raised in the literature. In the discussion to follow, I
will consider my data with respect to Labov's principles, the reallocation hypothesis,
Foulkes and Docherty's claims and the Milroys' findings. Looking at the data we
will see that the social constraints of quotative like and go are not the same in the two
varieties. Hence, even if like was transmitted from the US to Britain, the social
information adhering to this item in the donor variety was not taken over but has
been re-created in the borrowing variety. This finding constitutes an important
contribution to the growing body of research, within sociolinguistics, on
globalisation phenomena (Buchstaller 2003, Kerswill 2003, Meyerhoff and
Niedzielski 2002, 2003, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999, Trudgill 1983, 1985 and
many others). Also, a comparative study of the apparent time patterning of non-
canonical variants within the quotative pool reveals important insights into
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phenomena such as reallocation, competition within one socio-pragmatic field, as
well as the interaction of variants of a single variable.
6.2. A note on statistics
Before beginning variationist sociolinguistic research into the two new
quotatives, a few preliminary words of caution concerning the statistical analysis are
in order: Labov shows that changes in their incipient stages move very slowly and
have low token numbers which do not get picked up by statistical analysis (because
they do not achieve significance). With respect to the Philadelphia Sound Shifts, he
finds that the "relatively low involvement of social factors is characteristic of the
earlier stages of change, when the major independent variables concern group
membership rather than social status" Labov (2001:301). Note again Figure 5.2
(drawn from Labov 2001:450) here replicated as Figure 6.1, which depicts the
calculations of language change as a logistic curve underlying the increments from
one year to another. The vertical axis tracks such changes from 0 to 100 over the
horizontal time-axis.





The low values on the left hand side show the slow start of linguistic change with
increments picking up force until the midway point and slowly decelerating
symmetrically after that. This is concomitant with earlier observations that changes
begin slowly, pick up speed when they are in mid-course and slow down in their later
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stages (Bailey 1973, Kroch 1989, Weinreich, Labov and Herzog 1968). Judging from
this figure and bearing in mind the fact that like is only a few years old in British
English at the time the data was collected (cf. Chapter 2), we would necessarily
expect low token-numbers in the British corpus. An incipient linguistic variant, like
is expected to be situated on the extreme left of the continuum. In American English,
on the other hand, we would expect like to have picked up speed. Incrementation
tends to accelerate when the variant starts carrying social or stylistic weight; like may
be socially, and stylistically, more stratified.
In general, as Cameron (1998:57) points out, discourse variables - such as
quotation - are relatively rare in speech5 and the collection of a sufficient quantity of
tokens requires an enormous amount of textual data. In my data, the Derby and
Newcastle speakers combined produced 2064 quotations and the US speakers 1371.
Note again the break-down of the (say)variable:
Table 6.1: Frequencies of occurrence of variants of the (say) variable
British English US English
N % N %
like 93 4.5 121 8.8
go 264 12.8 80 5.8
say 967 46.9 562 41.0
think 175 8.5 121 8.8
unframed 462 22.8 298 21.7
tell 23 1.1 42 3.1
other 80 3.9 147 10.7
Total 2064 1371
As this investigation is concerned with all quotative options within the (say) variable,
a further split of this multiplicity of variants per numerous social categories, viz.
independent variables, reduces cell size significantly. This turns out to be especially
problematic with respect to the variant like in British English and with respect to
quotative go in the US data. The low token numbers mean only few subdivisions of
the social constraints are possible. In order to keep cell size reasonable, I have
5 The occurrence of quotation has been shown to be very strongly genre-related, with narratives
providing the most common environment of occurrence. As not all speech consists of narratives, a
bias towards naturally occurring talk-in-interaction has proven to yield highest frequency of quotation
(cf. Chapter 2 for an overview about the data used in this investigation).
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restricted this investigation to three categories: age, gender, and socio-economic
status.6
As I noted in the data section in Chapter 2, even with a carefully designed
corpus that aims at selecting a speaker pool which represents all social categories
equally in terms of numbers of speakers, it is a well-established fact that different
social categories of speakers produce uneven amounts of speech (cf. Macaulay 2001,
Tannen 1986). I will now lay out in some detail the important consequences of this
numerical bias on the statistical evaluation of the raw data.
Consider the production of quotatives in my two corpora split by gender, age
and class as depicted in the following tables:













As already pointed out by Ferrara and Bell (1995), Johnstone (1988, 1990, 1993), R.
Lakoff (1973), Romaine and Lange (1991) and many others, the production of
quotation in any corpus is skewed towards the female speakers. Table 6.2 shows that
this applies also to my data, where women produce 56% of all quotes.8 A further
The concept of socio-economic status was predetermined by the respective research projects in
which the data was collected. Consider Chapter 2 for details of the methodology involved in sampling
and coding.
7 Note that the parameters for the inclusion of individual speakers in socio-economic categories were
slightly different in the US and in Britain. They have been grouped together here for demonstrative
purposes only. Please refer to the data section (Chapter 2) for details.
8 There is evidence that there are different speech styles according to gender (Macaulay 2001, Vincent
and Dubois 1999). Therefore, there is a possibility that the differential number of quotations produced
is a direct function of the speaker's gender. But the question of to what extent unequal overall
quotative production is due to an underlying social factor (such as speech style) or whether it simply
reflects unequal speaking times (with one or the other gender claiming more speaking time within the
mixed sex-pairings) will not be investigated in this thesis.
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skew in the data steins from a much less noteworthy numerical bias towards the
working class. In spite of being given the same amount of speaking time in the
corpus, working class speakers quote more (55%) than middle class speakers (45%).
This effect is consistent with Rimmer's (1988) findings in Liverpool and
Birmingham, where working class speakers with less specialized training used the
most quotations (cf. Macaulay 2001, Vincent and Dubois 1996: 370). Again, we
have a numerical skew leaning towards one social category.
Finally, Table 6.4 shows that the overall quotation production is considerably
biased towards younger speakers, who are responsible for 61% of all quotations in
the corpus, whereas older speakers produce fewer quotations (39%). Again, this is
consistent with previous results (Dailey-O'Cain 2000, Ferrara and Bell 1995,
Macaulay 2001, Romaine and Lange 1991).
To sum up, given potentially the same speaking time, members of different
social categories will produce highly unequal numbers of quotes. As Tables 6.2-4
show, my data is significantly skewed, far from normalised. But as this investigation
is not concerned with the raw token numbers of quotative production but rather aims
at describing the composition of the quotative system as a function of social
categories, the uneven numerical distribution of overall quotative use does not
constitute an impediment to statistical investigation per se. Rather, it is a noteworthy
reality and indeed a determining factor for the way statistical analysis is to be carried
out. I will demonstrate this point in the discussion to follow.
The research question underlying this chapter is: what is the composition of the
quotative system per social category. How often do, say, female speakers produce
like or go out of ah quotations they produce? This can be stated even more
specifically: what is the proportional use of the new quotative like within its
functional domain, the pool of quotatives? How does it interact with go, say and
unframed quotes in social space? In the following paragraphs, I will show that an
investigation starting with such a research question also avoids a fundamental error
commonly found in calculating such data.
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If we are interested in the distribution of quotations per social category, the
frequency-based distribution can be calculated in two ways: firstly, we can allocate
each quote-introductory strategy to one of the levels of the social variable involved.
Table 6.5 represents such a vertical split of all quotatives in my corpora by social
category, here gender. At first glance, such a vertical subcategorisation seems to
represent token-distribution per social category.
Table 6.5: Vertical distribution of quotatives per gender (m. = male, f. = female)
like go say think unframed tell other
% | N % N % N % N % N % N % N
m. 41 89 35 119 44 665 42 123 49 369 51 33 45 101
f. 59 125 65 1 225 56 863 58 173 51 391 49 ■;.j 32 55 125
Table 6.5 answers the question of which percentage of a given quotative is produced
by male and which percentage is produced by female speakers. For example, out of
all like tokens in the whole corpus, 41% are produced by male speakers and 59% by
female speakers. This outcome is very likely to be highly significant. The question
remains: 59% out of what (Lass 2000)? This is an important issue because such an
investigation only makes sense when we have an even number of tokens overall. But
as Tables 6.2 has shown, we do not have even distribution of like across male and
female speakers. An extreme example will make this point clear: Let us assume that
men produced 100 quotatives and women 100,000. If both social groups were
responsible for 5 like-tokens, a vertical statistical representation such as the above
would end up showing a 50% ///^-frequency for each social category, men and
women. Such an analysis makes it look as if men and women had an equal like-
output, 50% each. Yet, the import of like within the quotative system of men and
women is completely unalike: 5% of the hypothetical men's sample and only .005%
of the hypothetical women's quotatives are tokens of like. If we calculate our
frequencies vertically, the percentages for a quotative variant are effectively
independent of the overall number of quotatives produced by the respective social
category. The hypothetical example has shown that a numerical breakdown in this
way can greatly falsify the statistical results. Consequently, it does not give accurate
information about the build-up of the quotative system according to social categories
such as gender, age etc. It follows that the skewedness of my data, and of probably
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all non-normalized naturally occurring data, forbids a vertical statistical evaluation
which does not take into account the overall sum of quotatives produced.9
It becomes clear that we need to have a stable denominator. We will have to
measure the token-number of quotatives produced (like, go, say, unframed, etc.)
against the variable N (number of all quotations produced) and we will have to do
this for all social categories. In order to get at the proportional estimate of a
frequency of quotative x by a social category A, we can use the formula
x(A)
^ (quotatives) A
Accordingly, for the rest of this chapter, I will display frequency as rate of
occurrence calculated with the above formula, in what amounts to a horizontal
comparison. Henceforth, the frequency distribution (in %) of a type of quotative is
understood to be the occurrence of this type of quotative per all quotative tokens
produced.10 This will become obvious in the next table:
Table 6.6: Horizontal distribution of all quotatives per gender (in % and N)
like go say think unframed tell other SUM
% N % N % N % N % N % N %Sl N
m. 6 89 8 119 44 665 8 123 25 369 2 33 7 101 1499
f. 7 125 12 225 45 863 9 173 20 391 2 32 7 125 1934
Table 6.6 restructures Table 6.5 and gives a breakdown of quotative use per total
number of quotations. Every grey cell contains the percentage of occurrence of a
particular quotative type used by the members of a particular social category (here
male and female) out of all quotatives produced by this respective social category.
The overall sum of quotations is given in the last column (in bold borders) on the
right hand side of the table. Calculating ratios over the denominator, we end up with
a split of the (say) variable in its composite variants/strategies for every demographic
9
It needs to be stated at this point that I have refrained from setting up an index of N(tokens) /
y(words) or z(seconds) for the individual quotatives. This is because such an index would not give any
insights into the importance of social constraints on the statistical composition of the quotative system
either. All it would indicate is, again, the overall number of quotatives produced by the individual
social categories per so many words or seconds.
10 Consider Dailey-O'Cain (2000:65) for what she calls "a ratio for each speaker which tells the
numbers of times (...) quotative like occur[s] as compared with the number of times it was possible for
[them] it to occur". The formula provided treats the overall sum of quotatives as the possible times it
could occur and hence puts this as the denominator.
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category. For example, in the two corpora, like is used by male speakers to a
frequency of 6% out of all quotatives produced by the male speakers. Put differently,
in the quotative system of male speakers, 6% of tokens are like while like comprises
7% of the females' quotative system. The apparent 41% versus 59% difference
between the sexes in Table 6.5. evaporates to a non-significant result (x2(l): 2.563,
p= .109)."
Calculated this way, the numerical imbalance between the number of
quotations as produced by male and female speakers does not skew the statistical
evaluation. A horizontal break-down displays the distribution of variants accurately
because frequencies of quotatives are not independent of the overall quotative
production. On the contrary, because the numerical unequal outputs by female and
male speakers constitute the denominator of the equation, the quotative frequency is
a function of the variable overall production by the particular social category under
investigation. It follows that such a horizontal subcategorisation is largely preferable
to the vertical comparison. It evaluates "its proportional use .... within a given
common domain (i.e. all quotatives) in the data set under investigation"
(Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999:156).
The fact that only a horizontal evaluation makes sense in cases of naturally
occurring data with non-normalized subsets and also because my data is not binary
but consists of at least 5 dependent variables (cf. Labov 2001:96) precludes the use
of a logistical package which has been widely used in sociolinguistic studies,
VARBRUL (Guy 1988, Guy 1993, Pintzuk 1986, Young and Bailey 1996).
VARBRUL comes in two versions, one for Macintosh, which works for 2 dependent
variables and one for DOS environments, which can cope with 3 or more dependent
variables. A higher number, if theoretically possible, is not practicable as the
weighted values become small and therefore undifferentiable (Young and Bailey
1996). Hence, I reverted to the statistical package SPSS in order to perform the
necessary cross-tabulations, frequency estimations and significance testing and all
results reported in the rest of this chapter are based on this.
'1 The statistical analysis was run with a recoded set of variables, like versus else (variables are like,
coded as a dummy variable 1, and all other quotatives, coded as variable 2). The chi square statistic
was then run as a cross-tabulation with like_other as the dependent and gender as the predictor
variable (cf. Labov 2001).
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6.3. A regression analysis
Let us now have a look at some comprehensive statistical results. In the
following discussion, I will first look at US English and then at British English. In
order to examine like and go's social constraints, a regression analysis was run.
Using social factors as predictors, such an analysis can account for the various
strengths of the social factors involved. In so doing, we can find out which external
constraints play a role in the patterning of a dependent variable and what the
individual predictors' strength is. For the following tables, I have recoded all other
quotative variants as a dummy variable. Its patterning was then compared against the
variant we are interested in, in this case like or go (cf. Labov 2001). By calculating
the statistical output for each independent variable while keeping the other predictors
constant, we can measure the relative weight for every social predictor variable while
still accounting for all others simultaneously. The following tables give the
probabilities (p) for the respective social factors in the middle column. The r2 ratios
in the right hand column indicate how much of the dependents variables' inherent
variability can be accounted for by each independent variable (again, while keeping
the others constant). Thus, for example, 2.8 % of like's patterning can be accounted
for by the factor age.
Furthermore, Guy (1993) and Young and Bailey (1996:273, cf. also R.
Cameron 1998) have shown that log-likelihood can be used as an indicator of the
goodness-of-fit of a model to the data. In this analysis, the category which shows a
log-likelihood closest to zero represents the best account of the variability of the
variant. In our specific case, we can do a run with all social categories included in
order to test which social constraints are selected as most important with respect to
the new quotatives' extralinguistic patterning. The combination of predictor variables
which accounts best for the variability (the model with the best "fit") achieves the
lowest log likelihood.
With respect to like and go's patterning in the US, Table 6.7 plots each
individual social factor's log-likelihood, p-value and r2incrementation. The last row
gives the model which has been chosen by the program as the best goodness of fit
and the social factors involved in this particular model (with all factors in the run).
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Table 6.7: Logistic regression for like and go with the social categories age, gender, and
class in US English (significant results in bold)
like go
log likelihood P12 r2 log likelihood P r2
age 779.360 0.000 0.028 601.166 0.005 0.005
class 809.714 0.023 0.006 609.044 0.2 0.000
gender 815.674 0.804 0.002 609.019 0.37 0.001
best goodness of tit
age+class+gender 773.070 0.007 0.032 599.243 0.028 0.008
The log likelihood values indicate that the factor age alone is the best predictor for
quotative like in the US. It also achieves the highest significance (p<.001) and its r2
ratio shows us that the factor age alone accounts for 2.8% of like's variance (cf.
Labov 2001). While class is significant at the p< .05 level, it can only account for a
negligible 0.6% of like''s variance. The predictor gender is not significant and would
only add 0.2% to the model of fit.
But while gender and class alone are not very good predictors, in combination
with age, they nevertheless contribute to the explanatory model and add to its
goodness of fit. The last line of the table shows that a model with all three variables
was chosen for the best goodness of fit (lowest log-likelihood with 773.07).
The statistics for go are similar to those for like inasmuch as age is the most
highly significant predictor (p= .005). But in contrast to like, age only accounts for
0.5% of the variance for go. Class is not significant (with p= 0.2) and accounts for
only 0.1% of the variance. The variable gender is not at all significant at p= 0.37.
Note that while the factor age alone obviously achieves the log likelihood
closest to zero (601.166), a combination with the other two predictors achieves the
best goodness of fit. Again, a model which simultaneously takes into account gender,
class, and age is the best model to account for go's variance with a log likelihood of
599.243 (r2 ratio of .008).
Hence, in the US, the only factor that comes out as highly significant for like
and go's social patterning is age (with p= .000 and .005). Like also displays a slight
class effect (with p= .023), while go is completely unaffected by class. Note that,
12 There and in the next probability testings, all three variables, age, class and gender, are entered for
likelihood evaluation.
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surprisingly, given the large focus of the sociolinguistic literature on the variable
gender, this social factor does not play any role whatsoever in the patterning of the
new quotatives in the US data. Overall, the social constraints on the new quotatives
are far less important than we might have supposed.
Let us now look at the social situation across the Atlantic. Table 6.8 displays
the importance of the factors age, gender and class with respect to the patterning of
quotative go and like in British English.
Table 6.8: Logistic regression for like and go with the social categories age, gender, and
class in British English (significant results in bold)
like go
log likelihood P r2 log likelihood P r2
age 697.121 0.000 0.020 1422.948 0.000 .073
class 758.173 0.851 0.000 1560.788 0.002 .009
gender 757.884 0.262 0.000 1566.288 0.015 .006
best goodness of fit
age+class+gender 695.654 0.264 0.03 1406.02 0.732 0.08
Again, age is the single best predictor for quotative like. Its r2 ratio indicates that it
alone can account for 2% of like's variance. When we look at the individual
variables' goodness of fit as measured via the log likelihood in isolation, it becomes
quite clear that the predictor age with a log likelihood of 697.121 shows the best fit.
The combination of all three independent variables age, gender and class constitutes
an even better model with a log likelihood of 695.654 and a slightly higher r2. Class
and gender alone are not significant (p=0.851, 0.262).
Turning to go, we notice that a combinatory model which takes into account all
three social variables again shows the best goodness of fit overall with a log
likelihood of 1406.02 and an r2 ratio of 8%. The individual independent variables
also all achieve significance. Again, gender has the least significance (with p-values
of .000, .002, and .015) and age is the single most significant factor involved. Note
that with 7.3%, its r" is significantly higher than for like.
Thus, in the British system, quotative like only patterns with respect to age,
whereas quotative go is subject to the social constraints of age as well as class and
gender.
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Overall, we can safely say that not much is going in terms of the new
quotatives' patterning with respect to social factors. Contrary to the hype in the
literature, we see that like does not display a strong social patterning with respect to
social variables at all. The only factor that achieves significance in either variety is
age (and a mild class effect for US English).
Go, while showing an effect with respect to all three variables, age, gender and
class in British English, only patterns according to age in US English.
While the overall social patterning of like looks far less than exciting (and go is
only showing strong social constraints in British English), I now will investigate in
more detail what lies behind these general effects. A cross-correlation between social
factors and comparison with other existing data-sets in real and apparent time will
give some depth to the investigation.
6.4. US English
This section will investigate the patterning of all quotative variants in the US,
the variety where quotative like and go were first officially attested as new quotatives
by Butters in 1980 and 1982. Consequently, like had had at least 6 years to spread
across the social sphere by the time my corpus of USE was collected. I now will
discuss their social patterning in my data from 1988-92 in the light of the earlier
literature.
This section is subdivided into three parts. First, I will first discuss the (say)
variable with respect to the social factor gender, then I will investigate the impact of
the factor class. Finally, I will look more in-depth at the age effects across and within
time.
6.4.1 Gender
The factor gender has been a focus of previous research on quotatives. Studies
either allocate like to the male or to the female speaker and only very few show no
significant gender effect with respect to like. As can be seen from Table 6.9, which
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depicts the patterning of all quotative variants in the US according to gender, like is
slightly more common for female speakers but not significantly so.
Table 6.9: Distribution of quotatives in US English per gender, significant differences bold
like go say think unframed tell other SUM
% N % N % N % N % N % N % N
m. 7 47 6 33 45 0 282 8 48 21 131 4 22 10 64 627
f. 10 | 74 6 47 38 280 10 73 22 167 3 20 11 82 743
In the sociolinguistic literature a female lead has sometimes been used as a
diagnostic of language change in progress (cf. the literature cited above). But a chi
square analysis shows that the 3% differential between men and women is not
significant (x2(l): 2.563, p= .109, cf. the regression analysis above). Consider in this
vein Ferrara and Bell's (1995:285) results from a real time study where the female
bias they found in the earlier data was diminishing in the later corpora as frequency
was increasing and as like was generalising its intralinguistic functions.
According to their findings, while women are still in the forefront in 1990 in
Texas, by 1992 this lead has levelled out. If this reflects a general trend for like,
greater diffusion in any groups of speakers might be expected to go hand in hand
with the levelling of the gender-effect. My data for the period 1988-1992 would
slightly predate Ferrara and Bell's corpus but can be consolidated with their findings
when we remember that like (first attested in the West and North East) arrived down
south with a substantial time-lag and that the gender levelling would have occurred
there later than in other parts of the country. But it is important to note that work by
Cukor-Avila (2003) in Texas shows that like had arrived in the quotative system of
Black as well as White speakers as early as 1988.
Go, far from sharply delineating male and female speech or at least showing
significance, displays no gender difference (6% female and male). This result
parallels findings by Ferrara and Bell (1995) and Blyth et al. (1991). Taken together,
these results run counter to the prevailing and much cited stereotype that go is a
"rough", male, blue collar feature (Blyth et al. 1990). Reality defies this stereotype,
which has been around at least since go was first associated with male adolescents in
North Carolina (Butters 1980). The results presented here on US English and
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Tagliamonte and Hudson's data on Canadian and British English agree in the fact
that go is not stratified by gender.
Unframed quotes pattern the same as like and go. The difference between
female and male speakers (22% females 21% males) is at the level of chance,
(p= .511).
As Figure 6.2 shows, female speakers in the Switchboard corpus consistently
favour vernacular ways of enquoting (like, go and unframed quotes). The preference
of female speakers for non-canonical variants is directly reflected in their differential
use of the canonical option say (7% gender difference 45% male versus 38% female).
This production gap constitutes the biggest gender effect in the whole (say) variable
and comes out statistically significant (yl (1): 7.471, p<.05). Figure 6.2 gives the
beak-down of canonical versus non-canonical forms in the US data:
Figure 6.2: Distribution of canonical and non-canonical variants per gender
□ male
@ female
like go say unframed
While no significant gender effect holds for any one of the vernacular variants, the
combined tendency canonical versus non-canonical just about reaches significance
with p=.05. Even though the significance is not very strong, we can nevertheless
confirm a tendency for women to favour non-canonical ways of quoting in general.
Men are more prone to sticking to canonical say.
The finding that women use more non-traditional means to enquote past speech
and thought events might be due to what Labov (1990:214) mentioned as a tendency
of female speakers towards greater expressiveness (cf. also J. Milroy 1981:37). This
higher degree of linguistic creativity manifests itself in the overall higher use of all
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three non-traditional variants (like, go and unframed).13 Note also that this balance is
slightly different in British English as discussed in 6.5.1.
6.4.2 Socio-economic Class 14
The following paragraphs deal with the distribution of the members of the
quotative system according to socio-economic class. While the literature gives
comparatively little statistical evidence with respect to the patterning of quotatives in
US English according to class, I will use impressionistic comments in the literature
as well as from lay-people as a comparative foil whenever appropriate. Table 6.10
shows the distribution of all quotatives with respect to less (less) and more educated
(edu.) speakers in my US corpus.
Table 6.10: Distribution of quotatives in US English per educational level, significant
differences in bold
like go say think unframed tell other SUM
% N % N % N % N % N % N % N
less 11 81 5 40 38 284 9 65 23 169 3 23 11 84 746
edu. 6 40 6 40 45 277 9 56 21 129 3 19 10 62 623
If, as claimed in Holmes (1992:174) and elsewhere (see Trudgill 1983) "vernacular
forms express machismo", we would expect go, stereotypically associated with
working class speech (according to Blyth et al. (1990), used by "men like Rocky"),
to carry the covert prestige of roughness and accordingly to be preferred by men. But
the present investigation shows that go is neither a feature of male speech (Table 6.9),
nor of less educated speakers. Rather, as we see in Table 6.10, there is no difference
whatsoever in the distribution of quotative go by socio-economic status (with 5% and
13 Cf. similar results on the use of quotatives by preadolescents by Levey (2003).
14 The term "class", amply used in sociolinguistic studies, is slightly awkward in general, and for an
investigation in which the socio-economic categorization is based on education especially. In order to
avoid the awkward long-windedness of the term 'socio-economic standing as based on educational
level', I resorted to the admittedly less-than-perfect solution of speaking of socio-economic class
(henceforth SEC) when investigating US English. As the British English data was collected from
speakers belonging to two classes, I will refer to this term in the discussion of the Derby and
Newcastle data. For information on how individual speaker were grouped with respect to class in the
BrE data and socio-economic level based on education in the US data please consider Chapter 2.
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6%, %2(2): .754, p=.686). This result belies the claims concerning its working class
status.15
Like, on the other hand, does pattern according to socio-economic standing in
US English. Contrary to the much-cited stereotype that it is used mainly by
university students (Blyth et al. 1990), in my corpus, like is preferred by speakers
with a lower educational level (with 11% versus 6%, %2(1): 8.348, p<.05). Note that
Dailey-O'Cain's (2000) study and my study independently show that like is primarily
a feature of the less educated speaker's habitus and, importantly, it is perceived as
that in the US as well. The association with female university students might well
stem from a persistent sampling bias: Most studies of the American English
quotative system to date have been conducted only or mainly on university students
and hence base their conclusions on a speaker selection which is not representative of
the population as a whole.
To forestall possible objections that educational level is not independent of age
and that, therefore, the preponderance of like among speakers of a lower socio¬
economic level might be a function of their being older, interaction effects between
age and education were investigated. A factorial ANOVA between subjects rules out
interaction as an explanatory parameter (F( 1,1369) = 1.373, p= .242). Thus, we can
discount the possibility that like's significant patterning with respect to educational
level is due to the interdependence between the factors age and education. Rather,
age and educational level are significant but independent of one another. The
question of quotatives patterning according to age will be discussed in the next
section.
Say, the canonical quotative, is used more by the higher educated speakers
(X,2(l): 5.900 p< .05.). In the 1988-1992 US corpus, the educated speakers have a
more conservative habitus generally. Again, a check for interaction effects with age
shows no significance (F( 1,1369) = 2.435, p= .119).
15 It has been suggested that like could have bled go for class. But an apparent time investigation
reveals that go's class affiliation stays stable across age. While it is true that go is used more by highly
educated speakers in the youngest age group, the fact that all other age groups are unaffected by like-
intrusion does not allow any conclusions regarding the interaction of like and go with respect to class.
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To complete the discussion of the correlation between quotative choice and
class, the patterning of the other quotative options proves to be unaffected by class
and is non-significant (unframed: y2 (1): .783 p=.376, think x2(l): .029 p= .865, tell
X2(l): .002 p=.967).
We still need to investigate whether there are any interesting interactions
between gender and class. Focusing on the variants like, go, say and unframed, I will
now split up my US data according to those two predictor variables. Table 6.11 gives
the break-down:
Table 6.11: Distribution of like, go, say and unframed across gender and class (in %)
like go say unframed
less educated men 7 3 47 21
less educated women 13 7 34 24
educated men 8 7 44 21
educated women 4 6 46 20
Table 6.11 shows that the group who mainly use the newcomer-quotative like are the
less educated female speakers (13%). Educated women, in contrast, are the group
who produces the least like with only 4%. Hence, with respect to like-use, the biggest
gap in production is neither within the lower class (Cameron and Coates 1988) nor
between male and female speakers (L. Milroy 1976, Milroy and Milroy 1978, J.
Milroy 1980). Rather, the significant differential of like-use distinguishes less
educated women from more educated women (x2(l): 11.106, p< .01, all other
pairings n.s.), cf. also Eckert (2000), Labov (2001). A check for interaction effects
(two-factorial ANOVA) revealed that age and educational level do indeed interact
for the female speakers (F( 1,742) = 9.467, p= .002) but not for the male speakers and
not overall (cf. above).
Hence, to say the least, we can state that in the 1988-1992 US data, like-use
divides females into more and less educated speakers. We need to modify the above
statement that lower educated speakers are the heaviest like-users: rather, the less
educated female speakers primarily use like, notably in contrast to higher educated
women. The figures are too small to speak of an avoidance effect (as discussed by
Bakht-Rofheart 2002). But there still seems to be some sort of dissociation going on,
with educated women being less inclined to embrace like-use.
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With respect to go, the differences in frequency are not very big; all speakers
produce about 6% go, except for the less educated men, the very socio-economic
category to which the literature has attributed go. A glance at British English will
show that this result is consistent on both sides of the Atlantic (see Figure 6.15).
While go is apparently perceived to be typical of lower class men, in reality they are
precisely the speakers who produce it the least (with only 3%). This interesting
finding shows how misleading sociolinguistic intuitions can be especially with
respect to discourse, or in this case, quasi-discourse variables (Labov 2001).
Furthermore, it underlines findings by Buchstaller (2003) about the non-coherence
between perception and reality especially with respect to go.
Unframed quotes are again slightly favoured by less educated women (by 24%)
whereas the rest of the speakers use them around 20% of the time.
Overall, women with less formal schooling prefer like, go, and unframed
strategies, all of which are non-canonical strategies. Consequently, they have the
lowest say-production overall with only 34% as compared to over 40% for all other
social groups (lower class males 47%, educated females 46%, educated males 44%).
While the results on the US English unframed and say variants corroborate the claim
that the overall gender difference is bigger for the working class speakers (Cameron
and Coates 1988), this does not tell the whole story. As I have shown above, it would
be misleading to try to explain like's patterning as a function of gender differences
within class. Rather, the (say) variable patterns with respect to gender and class.
A final analysis by canonical and non-canonical variants shows that this
subdivision is actually a good parameter for understanding the data:
Table 6.12: Distribution canonical versus non-canonical
quotatives split up by gender and educational level
non-canonical canonical
less educated men 31 69
less educated women 43 58
educated men 35 66
educated women 31 69
While less educated women use non-canonical variants most, educated women use
them least. Men pattern in-between. The cline for the use of non-canonical variants
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can thus be represented as follows: Less educated women - educated men - less
educated men - educated women, whereby both ends of the cline show significance
but none of the intermediate stages does (less-educated men vs. less-educated women:
X2(l): 8.807, p= 004.16
When looking at the use of the canonical variant, say, we notice a big gender
divide amongst the less educated speakers. Here, women produce the smallest
numbers and men prove to be more conservative ray-users. But again the biggest
overall effect is the difference between educated and less educated women in the use
of the non-canonical variants.
What about the less educated men, the ones to whom Trudgill (1972, cf. also
Labov et al 1968) ascribed the notion of "covert prestige" and who, according to
Labov (2001:216), consider non-standard forms as "symbolic of masculinity or
toughness; or as expressing a warmer, more personal, more human or more friendly
approach to life"? As can be seen from Table 6.12, when it comes to quotatives, less
educated men are the most conservative social group with respect to their linguistic
habitus. Rather, it is the less educated women who have the most vernacular
quotative system and produce the highest number of non-canonical quotatives (with
43%).
6.4.3. Age
The first accounts of quotative like allocated it to young, female university
students from California, who were also the subjects of the first corpus-based studies.
From then onwards, numerous papers commented on the upper age-limit of like-use
in the US. Blyth et al note (1990:219) that like was completely absent from the
quotative system of speakers older than 38, in 1995, Ferrara and Bell (1995:273)
report with a corpus from 1992 that the oldest speaker who produced any tokens of
like was 39. Singler (2001: 296-70) comes to the conclusion:
"The simplest view of the generational change in progress is that it is both
straightforward and inexorable, with the prevalence of like growing as the
16 Educated men vs. educated women: x2(\): 1.385, p=.255, less-educated men vs. educated men:
%2( 1): 1.128, p=.296, less-educated women vs. educated women: x.2( 1): 9.459, p=.002.
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individual users of like grow older and the percentage of primary like-users in
the general population increases thereby. By that view, the sharp drop that
separated the 27-33 group in the corpora from the 36-42 groups represents the
temporal 'isogloss' of the change. This reasoning has it that in ten years the
sharp drop will separate a 37-43 group from a 46-52 group".
In short, with increasing time, like expands sociolinguistically. Its spread across
age in real time is indicative of its newcomer status. But note that like-use also
spreads upwards in age disproportionally to the ageing of the generation who first
used it, as numerous studies have commented on /zle-borrowing by people who,
according to their age, do not fall into the typical category of like-users.
Since non-attestation of a feature certainly is no proof for its absence in a
particular, in this case social, category (consider the discussion in Chapter 5), the
findings cited above call for a careful check of like's patterning across age in the
Switchboard corpus. The following paragraphs investigate the distribution of like as
compared to the other members of the quotative pool with respect to the social
variable age. I will first give a simple break-down of my speakers into older (38+)
and younger (13-38) age. To counterbalance this very broad categorization, I will
later align the speakers on an age-scale and correlate quotative production with
numerical years of age.
Table 6.13: Distribution of quotatives in US English per age-group, significant differences
in bold
like go say think unframed tell other SUM
% N % N % N % N % N % N % N
young 13 100 7 58 36 285 7 55 23 181 3 23 10 81 783
old 4 21 4 22 47 277 11 66 20 117 3 19 11 65 587
A cross-correlation between age-group and /z&e-ratio shows that younger speakers
produce 100 tokens of like, which amounts to 13% in their system, whereas older
speakers only use this new quotative with a frequency of 4% (N=21). This
distribution across age is typical for changes in progress which are picked up by the
younger speakers and do not find their way into the older speakers' more set habitus
(Lenneberg 1967). Like's age-patterned distribution is statistically significant at
the .01 level (with x2(l)= 34.086).
223
To give some time depth to this study, I will now compare my findings with a
later corpus of US English. The following table gives the remarkable numerical
difference between the Switchboard (recorded in 1988-1992) and Singler's (1994-
1999) NYU corpus. Note that I have included only speakers aged 15-51 from the
Switchboard corpus in order to assure compatibility between the two corpora.
Table 6.14: Comparison of quotative systems: Like-




Note the amazing difference in frequency between corpora which are not even 10
years apart. L/fce-frequencies soar from 4% and 13% in 1988-92 to 12% and 60% in
1994-99. But caution has to be exerted when comparing those two data sets. Firstly,
they pertain to different genres. The NYU corpus consists of sociolinguistic
interviews, which were mostly conducted between people who are friendly with or
even family members of the interviewer. In contrast, the SWB data is made up of
telephone conversations between strangers. Secondly, the populations the corpora are
sampled from do not have the same regiolectal origin. The Singler corpus consists
mainly of NYC speakers, whereas the Switchboard corpus represents a cross-cut
through the 7 main dialectal areas of the US, Northern, South Midland, North
Midland, West, New England, New York, South.
But due to the scarcity of comparable data, which obviously stems from the fact
that this feature is still quite new, I nevertheless decided to compare the two corpora.
The results are even more impressive when we consider the fact that New York is the
dialectal area in the Switchboard corpus with the lowest //^-frequency overall (5%).
Such an investigation across real time shows the impact with which like is spreading
across the quotative system.
In order to investigate like's patterning across apparent time, we need to plot
the occurrence of the variant on a linear age-scale (for a discussion of the limits and
assets of apparent time studies see Bailey et al. 1991, Labov 2001). For the following
discussion, I cross-correlated like-output (in % frequency) with numerical age. One
data-point will henceforth represent the frequency of a variant as produced by any
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given numerical age range divided by the overall production of the (say) variable by
the same age range. In our particular case, the frequency of like per age range is thus
the ratio , (where x = years of age). Consider the scattergram in
) (quotatives),
Figure 6.3, which gives the frequency of like by chronological age.
Figure 6.3: Distribution of //Tre-ratio over chronological age
like [%]
age [years]
This scattergram depicts speakers born within the same year as one dot and
calculates the like-ratio as a percentage of all other quotatives produced by this age-
group. Even though we find a considerable amount of variation (Cukor-Avila 2002,
Ferrara and Bell 1995), this scatterplot still shows a clear association between age
and like-use. Like-values are falling with increasing chronological age. A Pearson
Correlation shows this statistical association of like-ratio with age is significant (r= -
.182, p< .01).
Abstracting away the messiness of such a depiction by chronological age, I will
portray the use of like by 8 age-groups below. But first two apparent outliers in the
data will have to be addressed, the very high frequencies amongst the 59-year old
speakers (13%) and amongst the 20-year olds (34%). Let us first consider the
younger age group. The output from the 20-year olds comes from 4 speakers born in
1969 with considerable spread: 18%, 40%, 50% and 70%. Hence, the high like-ratio
in this age-group seems to be borne out of the data and is not due to a singleton
outlier only. Again, the substantial spread that Singler (2001) has found for his New
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York data is represented in my data as well. I will leave all speakers of the age range
20 in the calculation of like according to age brackets.
But let us now discuss the older speakers. Due to the high /z'&e-frequency
amongst the 59-age group, the association like ratio-age would give a U-shaped
curve because like-use increases again in the lowest age-group (consider the broken
line in Figure 6.4). This would result in a patterning that is reminiscent of age-graded
variables. Given the non-attestation of like in earlier accounts (prior to Butters 1982),
this outcome is quite unlikely. Note again that I am not trying to argue that non-
attestation implies non-existence. But two facts make it very implausible that like has
been around long enough to have been in the quotative system of the speakers born
in the 1930s ever since their youth: (i) neither the OED, nor any other dictionary
before the middle of the nineties has picked up on like and (ii) the overwhelmingly
unanimous impressionistic judgements by speech communities from both sides of the
Pacific that like, as a quotative, is a newcomer. But obviously, only a full
investigation of all diachronic evidence can lead to a scientifically founded claim
about like's apparent non-existence prior to 1982. However, any further diachronic
investigation exceeds the frame of this thesis.
The question remains: what are we to do with the high /tie-frequency amongst
the 59 year olds then? After checking the data, it became clear that the 8% like use
for the oldest age-group is due to an outlier. The low numbers of overall tokens
produced by the highest age groups are prone to distortion by single speakers who
patterns atypically. The high //fe-frequency for speakers aged 59 is caused by one
speaker who produced 2 tokens of like (13% of his only 15 quotatives). None of the
other speakers in this age group (and the surrounding ones) produces any like-tokens
at all. We do not know anything about this particular speaker's demographic profile
as the Switchboard restricts the social information given to age, gender and
educational level. But if we assume that this speaker has borrowed like as a lexical
item from the younger generation (cf. Singler 2001) and hence eliminate him, the
like-ratio for the oldest age-bracket falls to zero.17 We end up with a very neat curve
17
Obviously, there have been ample comments in the literature that outliers can teach us important
facts about the behaviour of the community as a whole, namely what it is that they do differently. And
indeed, it is an interesting fact to note that even older speakers acquire like, even if the use of this
newcomer item is atypical for their age-group. But admittedly, singular cases can also detract from
general trends and might skew the statistical analysis. Hence, having noted the outlier at age 59, I will
henceforth eliminate this speaker and proceed to an investigation of the general patterning.
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which shows a clear correlation of falling like-use with increasing age, as can be seen
in Figure 6.4 (full line).
Figure 6.4: Distribution of like -frequency over age-groups
Figure 6.4 depicts this monotonic relationship between age and like-ratio. Once the
one outlier is taken out (the dotted line), the like-curve (full line) runs smoothly
except for the youngest speakers, who lag slightly (by 3%) behind in //^-frequency,
a pattern which seems typical of changes in progress (Eckert 2000, Guy 1990:52,
Guy, Horvath, Vonwiller, Daisley and Rogers 1986:36). Without the outlier, the r2
goes from .027 (p= .000) to an r2 of .031 (p= .000). This means that 3% of like's
variance across speakers can be explained by the factor numerical age when we work
with 8 age groups (cf. Table 6.7).
The following figure shows the possible development of like by age. I have
plotted the Switchboard and the NYU corpora together into one graph in order to
depict incremental /i&e-frequencies across real time.
Figure 6.5: Incrementation of //7re-frequencies in 7 years (as of a comparison
between the Switchboard corpus and the Singler (2001) NYC corpus)
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The NYU and the SWB corpus lie on average 7 years apart. The age brackets (as
given by Singler 2001:277) are 9 years apart. The roughly equivalent difference in
increments in numerical age and years of corpus collection make possible a direct
comparison between an age bracket in the earlier SWB with the diachronically next
one from the NYU corpus. Such a direct association of age-ranges with two
diachronically separated corpora combines the merits of apparent time and real time
investigations (Cedergren 1984). We can see the incremental frequencies from the
youngest age group (a huge jump of 32%), while older speakers' linguistic habitus
does not change much. The isogloss mentioned by Singler (2001) moves from the
27-33 year olds to the 36-42 year olds. Speakers beyond this cut-off point do not
partake actively in the introduction of newcomer like, neither in 1988-92 (SWB) nor
in 1994-99 (NYU).
Next, I will proceed to do the same statistical break-up across chronological
age for go. Table 6.13 shows that in the USA, go is mainly a feature of younger
people's speech with 7% as opposed to only 4% for the older speakers. This
patterning is statistically significant at the .001 level (x2(l): 7.519). But note that
when we applied chronological age as a predictor variable in a regression analysis,
we only got a very low r value of 0.5% (cf. Table 6.7). By plotting the go-ratio on
the dimension age rather than working with a binary category only, we will be able
to see what underlies this age differential. Is the effect in US English due to age
grading with falling values for increasing age and a prototypical tail for the oldest
speakers? Or do we witness a generational change?
But note that with a proportion of only 5.8% of the (say) variable overall, go is
not a very frequent variant in the United States. Due to the paucity of tokens, I have
refrained from including a scatterplot by numerical age. Firstly, such a depiction
would result in many zero age-ranges. Secondly, small token numbers would lead to
a high risk of skewing results in the few age ranges that do display tokens. It seemed
more meaningful to depict go's patterning (in % frequency) across 7 age groups,
which the following line graph shows.
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of go across age groups
The line-graph we see in Figure 6.6 shows zero values for the lowest two age groups.
Note that this outcome is in contrast to go's patterning in British English, which I
will argue is highly indicative of age-grading. But in US English, the oldest two age
groups produce zero tokens of go (with E (all quotatives54.62) = 65 and Z (all
quotatives48-53) = 152). This non-occurrence in the repertoire of the oldest US
speakers questions whether go, although recorded in British English since an early
date (OED 1789), had ever gained any real frequency in the US before it became a
trend at some point when the 41-47 year-old speakers were young. I will come back
to this question during the discussion to follow. But first, I will discuss the statistical
output in Figure 6.6 as a whole.
From the age-group 41-47 onwards, go-ratios rise with declining age and reach
a peak in the age group 36-41 with close to 10%. Until here, the patterning looks like
a typical change in progress: we notice zero tokens for older speakers, a start of the
trend when the generation of 41-47 year old speakers were young, and rising ratios
with progressively lower age.
But from the peak years (36-41) onwards, go ratios fall to 5% in the age bracket
30-35, reach a plateau for speakers 24-29 and rise again for the youngest speakers.
This pattern is underlined by Blyth et al's (1991) findings that go is most frequent in
the youngest age group (20-24, VARBRUL weight .799), not frequent in the middle
age group (27-32, .243), which is exactly where Figure 6.6 shows dipping
frequencies, and frequent again in the oldest (38-72, .439) age group.
Why, after go reaches its local high in the age group 36-41, do we see the line
fall and stagnate with the younger speakers? This could be because go has reached its
peak and is slowly dying away (see Labov 1994 for completed changes). But note
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that this fall takes place in exactly the same age bracket where like comes to speed in
the quotative system (consider Figure 6.4). This seems to indicate that, as Macaulay
(2001) suggests, go became popular 25-30 years ago among younger speakers in the
US and enjoyed quite some popularity afterwards (see the high values for the
speakers in the age bracket 36-41). It was then challenged by a new item that hit the
linguistic market, like (first mentioned as a trend that has been around for an
indefinite amount of time in 1982). We can now assume that the oldest age-group
that retreated from go-usage and took on like were the age group 30-35 (the then 20-
25 years old) - note the dip in the curve in this age bracket. Hence, the fall in go-
ratios for the 24-35 year olds can be accounted for by those speakers picking up the
like-trend and changing their choice of non-canonical quotative from go to like. Note
the consistency of this claim with Blyth et al.'s report in 1990 that in their corpus the
absolute oldest speaker to use like was 39.
The change of preference from go to like is facilitated by the fact that both
share the underlying feature [-canonical]. Speakers, when wanting to quote non-
canonically, have had another option at their disposition since the early 1980ies.
What could have been going on in the quotative system is the reallocation of a
semantic feature [-canonical] from an old quotative (go) to an innovative variant
{like). The newer option is thus taking away some of the vernacular ground that was
previously covered by go. Like is intruding in go's semantic-pragmatic sphere, which
they now have to share.
Had like taken over and pressed go out of the system, we would witness a
continuous fall in go-frequency from like's introduction onwards. But, after a strong
dip in go-ratios in the age brackets 24-29 and 30-35, we notice that the youngest age
groups found renewed interest in the use of go. Go-frequencies even rise steeply for
the youngest age group, with a climb up to 18%. Judging from Figure 6.6, the
conjecture that like is going to replace go in American English (Bakht-Rofheart 2001,
Macaulay 2001, Singler 2001) is not sustained by my data.
But the question presents itself: what do we make of the steep rise in the
youngest age-bracket? For the 14-23 year old speakers, the go-ratio soars higher than
any frequency it attains throughout the entire age-spectrum. I suggest that the boost
in go-production amongst the youngest speakers might be the outcome of a
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heightened awareness due to the more frequent use of non-standard quotatives,
notably through newcomer like but also, more recently, be all (Bakht-Rofheart 2002,
Singler 2001 etc.). It is very conceivable that the high frequency and salience (cf. the
numerous comments and stereotypes cited in the literature and in the public domain
such as the world wide web) of those non-canonical items have triggered a renewed
wave of interest in go amongst certain sociolinguistic groups. Go is a variant that is
operating well above the level of awareness. Such variants are prone to be adopted,
enhanced or dropped across the linguistic community according to linguistic trends. I
assume that it is not impossible that the vigorous new quotative like has thus sparked
go-use through their common association with the underlying feature [-canonical]
(the same can occur later for be all). Following this line of argumentation, the fall
and resurgence of go can be interpreted as being due to a reallocation of [-canonical]
from one surface item, the older go to its rising counterpart like and back.
Obviously, this study can only shed light on go's patterning as it manifests
itself during a very limited time frame. But a small diachronic window can be opened
by comparing my Switchboard (1988-1992) data with the later NYU data (Singler
2001). Due to the aforementioned sampling differences and the small token numbers,
it does not make sense to represent the two data sets in one graph. Also, in addition
to the above mentioned differences, the NYC corpus is in many other ways not
comparable to the Switchboard corpus: while the NYC operates with spaced-out age
brackets, we find continuous age sampling in the Switchboard. Furthermore, the
NYC corpus did not sample any speakers over 51. Also, the NYC corpus reveals
much lower frequencies for go overall. But bearing those reservations in mind, it is
noteworthy that we find the same apparent-time curve in the two corpora. Figure 6.7
represents the patterning of go in the NYU corpus.
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Figure 6.7: Go's patterning across age (data: Singler's NYC corpus)
9+ 18-24 27-33 36-42 45-51
The pattern noted in the Switchboard with a dip in go-ratios for speakers in their late
twenties and early thirties with rising ratios for younger and older speakers found in
1988-1992 is replicated almost exactly 7 years later. Note that while we find a
levelling out for the oldest speakers in 1988-92, in 1994-99 even the oldest speakers
have 8% go-frequency. Given the fact that the NYC corpus is 7 years younger, the
oldest age group in 1994-9 (45-51) represents the age slice where go boomed in (36-
41 in 1988-90) and is thus exactly the generation in which we would expect high go-
values. Hence, the peak in the 36-42 age group which we found in 1988-1992 stays
in the diachronically later NYU corpus as well as the dip for the speakers slightly
younger than the boom generation (27-33), which stems from higher like-ratios in the
system of the younger speakers.
Hence, the whole line-graph (Figure 6.6) for go can be explicated as follows:
speakers in the oldest age brackets did not take part in the go-trend when it was first
introduced into the quotative system some 25 years ago and consequently show zero
go-values today (age 48+). The speakers who espoused the variant when they were in
their teens and twenties are middle aged today and continue to use go with high
frequencies today (Lenneberg 1967). Among those speakers is the age-group where
go is still peaking (36-41). Speakers born subsequently (age 35 and younger) have
reduced go-ratios because they are using yet another, newer, quotative, like. Go
bottoms out and stays stable at a very low level for an interval of 10 years (ages 24-
35 at 5 and 6%). A glance at Figure 6.4 shows that it is exactly in this age-bracket
that like was introduced into the quotative system in US English. It thus seems
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appropriate to assume that like took away some of go's ground, which results in
lower go-ratios. But for the youngest speakers, like might have broadened the path
for go by dragging it along in its current wave of popularity. Consequently, we find
steeply rising go-ratios in the youngest age bracket in Figure 6.6. Singler's follow up
study seven years later gives evidence that go-production stayed stable with the
second youngest and the youngest generation producing go at about a rate of 8%.
Let us for a moment investigate the different possible scenarios that could have
given rise to the patterning seen in Figure 6.6. If we disregard the recent
developments connected with the rise of like and only consider go's patterning in the
age-groups from 36+ upwards, we see a steady decline in go-use with increasing age.
When interpreting the patterning, we are faced with the following two unknowns:
(1) We lack the concrete diachronic evidence that would pinpoint the time
when go arrived in the US quotative system.18 Even though we can assume that
quotative go is understood even by speakers who use it with zero frequency, there is
no evidence that it was actually used in this variety until speakers in the age bracket
41-47 started the trend. Hence, go's entry point could have been when the generation
of 53 year-old or younger speakers were adolescents (note the zero-frequencies in the
oldest age groups). Alternatively, given its earliest attestation, go could have been in
use in the US for decades. Even though go's first appearance in a source text in
British English was after the War of Independence (1775-1783), we can nevertheless
assume that there has been enough contact, face to face, and later especially via the
media, for a variant such as go to spread.19 Note in this context that Meyerhoff and
Niedzielski (2003:26) contend that external influences on US English have largely
been ignored in the sociolinguistic literature. They propose to compensate for this
shortcoming by considering all cross-variety transfers as parts of one subordinate
phenomenon. "If we conceive of the changes occurring across all varieties of English
in terms of a broadening of the vernacular base, this avoids the (we think, highly
18 This claim concerns quotative go per se. I am not considering the content of the quotative with
respect to sound, voice effects or lexical content. All that matters for the present discussion, is the
ability to frame quotes of some sort with the lexical item go.
19 Of note also is of course also the steady stream of immigrants from the British Isles into the US
even long after it became a separate nation.
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problematic) claim that Americans are in any way trying to sound Scots (with wee)
or British/Australian (with wank(er))". Alternatively, it is also possible that quotative
go had been in the system for some time before it was mentioned in the 1791 source
document of the OED and that it had found its way into the system of US English
with the settlers even before American independence. In both cases, we can assume
that go has been a member of the US quotative system for centuries.
(2) As Hockett (1950) pointed out, an apparent time study investigates the
"distribution of linguistic variables across age. If we discover a monotonic
relationship between age and the linguistic variable, or a significant correlation
between the two, then the issue is to decide whether we are dealing with a true
change in progress or age grading". On the same lines, Labov (2001:83) has shown
that falling frequencies in apparent time can give rise to two interpretations: either
the change is at the individual level where the community does not change - a
situation of age grading. Or the community changes with individual speakers staying
stable across their lifetime - a generational change.
The question is whether underlying go's distribution there is the regular process
whereby speakers embrace different quotative variants with age (Chambers 1995:189,
Macaulay 1977) in successive generations. If this were the case, we would expect go
to be a variant which is endorsed only by young speakers and regularly and
predictably gets lost from their linguistic habitus during their involvement in the
linguistic marketplace. More canonical quotatives such as say or even non-canonical
ones such as the unframed strategy would then take over its role. Given how long
ago go was attested in British English (OED 1791) relative to its non-attestation in
US English as a full quotative until 198220, do we have to assume, though unnoticed,
it was always around as an age graded feature until it was finally officially
"discovered" by Labov/Butters?
Alternatively, in the US, go could be considered a change in progress in the age
group from 53 upwards until its spread was halted by a younger competitor, like.
Note that research on the quotative system of African American vernacular speakers
20 The first mention of quotative go with the mimetic sound-rendering function that I know of is
Labov (1972c:372) "In BEV, objects that do not speak but make noises are not said to go X but to say
X (...) in White vernacular, people go powww! with their fists".
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in rural Texas underlines this hypothesis. In Cukor-Avila's (2002) data, only one of
the pre-WWII speakers uses go, and his frequency of production is only 0.2%. When
Cukor-Avila split up the data into three time periods, she found that this speaker
actually used go only in the latest period, in 1997. This gives reason to assume that
the few go-tokens in his system are lexical borrowings from younger speakers. As go
had gained some frequency by 1997, we could imagine that the variant was
sufficiently used in his surroundings to make such a borrowing possible. Of the post-
1970s speakers, all (except for one) produce go with frequencies between 1.3 and
4.7%. Thus, again, it seems that go as a quotative has not been around as long in the
US as it has in British English. Maybe Singler (2001:257) is right when he says that
"the twentieth century saw the introduction of three quotatives into American
English. First there was go, whose appearance appears to date at least as far back as
the 1940s and 1950s (...)"? Note that the OED does not give any American English
examples in the section on go's quotative function but it does not specifically
annotate the usage as British only (note in contrast the annotation N. Amer. colloq in
the entry for like).
Bearing in mind these parameters, I will now consider go's patterning across
time in more detail. But note that the situation is further complicated by the fact that
a number of competing variants interact within the (say) variable. In such a scenario,
where we do not witness a replacement of one variant by another in a set of binary
choices, it is much harder to know whether what we see synchronically is a change in
progress (cf. Singler 2001). I will now discuss the possible scenarios that could have
given rise to go's patterning.
Let me first scrutinize the possibility that go is age-graded. Figure 6.8 displays
the classical (roughly) symmetrical bi-modal pattern for age grading as discussed by
Downes (1984) and (Holmes 1992), (see also Labov 2001, McMahon 1994).
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When we look at go's patterning across apparent time in Figure 6.6 we notice a
steady decrease in go-frequencies with increasing age from the age-groups 36+
upwards. But the oldest age groups do not display any rising frequencies in go-
production. This "tail" has been considered a typical feature of age-grading whereby
older speakers are to some extent regaining the variables they have suppressed
during their involvement in, what has been called the "marche linguistique"
(Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, Sankoff and Sankoff 1973). The reclaiming of
nonstandard variants after retirement age has been considered an indicative cue for
identifying a pattern as age-graded. Looking at go, we find that, in fact, speakers
above the age of 48 do not produce a single token of it (out of 153 quotatives). But
note that the absence of a tail is not a decisive criterion for the interpretation of an
apparent-time pattern as age-graded. As Guy and Boyd (1990) have shown, not all
cases of age grading actually display a tail. Their research on patterning of -t,d
deletion in semi weak verbs across the age range 4-65 shows a regular decline in
probability of deletion with increasing age.
Notice further that age-grading, which is "a regular change of linguistic
behaviour with age that repeats in each generation" (Labov 2001:46), does not
necessarily hinge on the fact that a variant has the underlying trait [vernacular],
which leads to suppression and later endorsement of the particular variant, depending
on the speaker's status with respect to the linguistic marketplace. Rather, there is a
possibility that go's falling frequency across age is due to other another underlying
feature, which this variant carries and which is considered less appropriate for
middle-aged speakers. Indeed, social attitudes research has revealed that go is
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perceived as [+young] (Buchstaller 2003). Hence, it would be no surprise if older
speakers discontinue a variant marked for young age once they reach middle age and
21
that older speakers do not revert to go-use after their retirement.
If we accept the age-grading scenario for a moment, we can assume the
following diachronic scenario: quotative go has been around in British and US
English (possibly since 1791, possibly before or after) and it patterns according to
age. Note that also Singler's apparent-time data could be interpreted as age grading
with younger speakers embracing go, middle aged speakers reverting to other
variants (such as like, albeit only the speakers ages 27-33), and the oldest speakers
again showing higher frequencies.
But again, we do not have any evidence of go's existence in the US before
1972, or, alternatively, in line with the concept of apparent time, when the speakers
aged 53 or younger were young. Consequently, if we interpret the falling frequencies
in the apparent-time data as an indication of a generational change, we can assume
that go is a change in progress which started about 45 years ago (note again the zero
frequencies for the 53+ year olds).
The problem with this interpretation is that we still cannot account for the
attestation of go in 1791 (nor for much anecdotal evidence that go has indeed existed
at least since the 50s in the US). In order to get around this dilemma, let us for a
moment assume that the there is a spread-out curve underlying the chronological






21 Notice that this argument does not hold generally. In British English, go can also be used by the
oldest age group (consider the patterning in British English as in Figure 6.23).
Figure 6.9: Generational change captured at two stages
age
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Figure 6.9 depicts a generational change, stable at the individual level and unstable at
the community level. The unshaded area (I) spans one lifetime. The shaded areas on
the u-shaped curve depict the zones which are inaccessible to the analyst in an
apparent time study, such as the present one, because the speakers who would feature
in these age brackets have already died. The curve represented in I depicts go's
patterning as we know it from Figure 6.6. But I suggest that we should ask whether
zero production by the oldest speakers necessarily means that this variant has never
been in use before. Let us for a moment play with the question of what would happen
if there was a "wave" underlying go's chronological development and that this curve
was too widely spread to be captured full cycle by one single life-span. In this case,
the cut-off point would occur at the lowest point of the curve. The information
needed to show whether frequencies stay at zero would not be accessible to us from
an apparent time study. This is exactly the situation we are in with respect to go at
the moment: we need real time evidence from earlier time slices. If we can be sure
that we do not have any previous attestation of the linguistic variant (such as like),
we can fairly safely assume that a monotonically falling line is evidence of a change
in progress. In cases such as go, though, where earlier investigation has captured the
variant, the question arises whether non-attestation in older age groups is not simply
an artefact of the fact that our sampling does not span the whole spread of the curve.
In the current situation, we simply cannot safely exclude the possibility that we
might not have the situation depicted by the shaded areas (II and III) in Figure 6.9. It
might be the case that a sampling error due to a spread-out u-curve falsifies our
results within an apparent time study only. If we could have sampled the 120 year
old speakers, we would have been able to see a rise in frequency. And indeed, go's
patterning in apparent time in British English looks like II.
This effectively means that what underlies go's patterning could be a change in
progress but with a very rapid ebb and flow between the variants. There is a
possibility that underlying the chronological development of go is a repetitive u-
shaped curve. In this case go-production might have been going up and down in
waves.
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Figure 6.10: Chronological development over several generations
Figure 6.10 depicts a (hypothetical) situation whereby, across time, go-production
comes and goes. The wave-like status of variables is a feature that was discussed
recently at the fourth Language Variation and Change conference with respect to
spread of the labiodental variants [f] [v] for interdental /9/ and /5/. In this particular
case, Kerswill's (2003) data suggests a slow diffusion from London starting in 1850
and accelerating towards the north and west, reaching the big towns first via the
major rail lines (Bristol 1880, Reading 1950, Norwich 1960, Hull 1970, Newcastle
and Glasgow 1980 etc.). However, the fact that the development has been mentioned
at various times and in several places before the main diffusion pattern from London
leads to the speculation that some natural changes come in waves. In the case of the
labialization of fricatives, it seems that localised wave-like developments were
superseded by a nation-wide spread from London outwards. Once the variant became
stereotyped in London in the 1880s and acquired a critical weight, it spread to the big
cities. Similar points have been raised by R. Cameron (2000), and during the
discussion following Wolfram's comment concerning the ebb and flow of linguistic
variables at the NWAVE 2003.
It might well be that a more thorough investigation into go's real time
patterning would also show a steady presence across the centuries. Hence, if we
accept this scenario, we would interpret the data as a change in behavioural patterns
in which a variant that has been latently around for ages is picked up and highly
favoured by a generation of speakers - a fad. There is indeed reason to believe that
go has been latently present in the system, peaking and declining across time (Joan
Beal, p.c.). Some generations pick up on it and make it a "trend". This change in
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variant preference is brought to completion when a certain saturation level (viz. a
certain frequency, cf. Labov 2001) is reached, whereupon the variant is disfavoured
by subsequent generations of speakers and replaced or superseded by some newer
variants (such as like in our case).
If we sampled across the population during such a trend, we might notice a
pattern across apparent time which shows all the features of age grading or,
alternatively, of a change in progress, depending on the spread of the curve of the
wave and the window we employ (cf. Figure 6.10). The important feature in this
diachronic scenario, though, is that the variant (e.g. go, labialized fricatives) stays
latent in the linguistic repertoire of the community, never fully dies out and can
potentially be picked up as a fashion again.
Two important pieces of evidence speak in favour of such an interpretation:
The first is the fact that the youngest speakers use go again with higher frequencies
after a significant drop in the curve (cf. Figure 6.6). The high frequencies amongst
the youngest age groups could then be interpreted as another peak of the wave-like
development. Indeed, seven years later, Singler's NYC corpus provides evidence that
the curve might already be levelling out again (Figure 6.7). Hence, go's development
starts to look like a change in progress but with a very rapid ebb and flow of variants.
The second piece of evidence is the differential distribution of go across age in
British English and in US English (see 6.5.3), which could be seen as two stages in
the continuous wave-pattern, with BrE representing the darker shaded pattern and the
US representing the lighter shaded pattern.
But obviously, the question of whether go as discovered by Butters (1980)
really first started to appear as a quotative item in US English can only be fully
answered on the basis of diachronic evidence. Only a larger time frame than one
lifespan can show that what we are witnessing in 1988-92 is age grading, a change in
progress or a wave-like development. In order to develop a complete sociolinguistic
history of go, a real time study with a diachronic corpus spanning the time since its
first attestation would have to be conducted. Unfortunately, due to the limited scope
of this thesis, only educated guesses can be made about what might lie behind the
240
pattern we see in the apparent time study on the basis of synchronic data and of the
diachronic evidence cited.
As the following discussion will reveal, we are actually not telling the whole
story if we are only picking up on the patterning of one or two new or age graded
variants. In order to do full justice to a situation of language variation or change, we
need to describe not only the new form, but all variants that make up the variable.
This is especially the case when we are faced with a situation like the quotative pool,
where there is a whole set of variants. The following paragraphs will show first the
interesting interplay between the new variants and the older non-canonical option,
unframed quotes. Finally, I will concentrate on the interdependence between the non-
canonical and canonical variants.
The intimate interplay between like and go raises the question in what way the
non-lexical non-canonical option is affected by the patterning of its lexical variants.
After all, if the frequencies of one variant go up, some other variants' frequencies
must go down. Obviously, only a study going back centuries could give conclusive
evidence of what happened once go was introduced into the quotative system (if, as I
assumed earlier on, go has been around longer than a lifespan in US English).
Bearing this shortcoming in mind, I will now conduct an apparent-time analysis on
the patterning of the unframed variant. The questions to answer in this respect are the
following: what is the interaction between the three non-canonical variants, like, go,
and unframed quotes? Do like and go take over some of the territory previously held
by unframed quotes or do they intrude into the soy-space?
When we look at the unframed quotes' patterning in the US, we find that
younger speakers use this variant significantly more with 23% versus older speakers
with 20% (n.s.).
Above, I have discussed how like and go's patterning across apparent time can
be explained by assuming that the underlying feature [-canonical] has been
transferred back and forth. We saw that because those variants share an underlying
semantic element, go got some impetus from like's high frequency among the
speakers in the youngest age-group. But notice that there is reason to believe that the
quotative option which allowed the feature transfer in the first place is the non-
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lexical variant, unframed. Indeed, I would argue that it was through the reallocation
of [-canonical], first from unframed to go (when go first arose as a variant), and
consequently from go to like (at like's introduction into the pool of quotatives), that
the non-traditional lexical quotatives made their entry into the quotative system in
the first place.
Obviously, the OED does not give any information with respect to zero items.
Also, non-canonical variants do not appear in writing as frequently as standard ones
and often with a significant time lag (Romaine and Lange 1991, Singler and Woods
2002). Consequently, the claim that unframed quotation was diachronically prior at
least to like and go cannot be sustained by data from the OED but is based on 2
arguments: Firstly, we can rely on occurrence in written fiction. Page (1973:26)
shows that in David Copperfield "2 very short sentences are not explicitly attributed
to a speaker". Note that I do not have historical evidence for unframed quotes'
diachronic primacy that goes beyond 1848-1850 but in any case it predates the first
mention of like by far. Evidence of the existence of unframed quotes in the
nineteenth century literature also refutes Macaulay (2001:16), who argued for a
developmental process along the lines say > say like > be like > be > zero.
The second line of argumentation relies on arguments made in the fields of
grammaticalisation and creolistics. Buchstaller (1999), Couper-Kuhlen (1998),
Hopper (1987, 1998), Mann and Thompson (1986) and Thumm (2000, in preparation)
and many others underline the fact that linguistic information is usually highly
contextualized and implicitly given by the textual environment. There is evidence
that phylogenetically, as well as ontogenetically such information is generally not
explicitly expressed using specific lexical means but only slowly emerges out of
regular association between contextualized notions and corresponding surface
expressions. Morphological matter regularly or habitually found in certain contexts
becomes the surface expression of these underlying notions (cf. the notion of
"emergent grammar" Hopper 1987, 1998). Indeed, the genesis of pidgin and Creole
languages (Hopper and Traugott 1993, Thomason and Kaufmann 1988), gives ample
evidence for the process whereby linguistic structure boils out of discourse (cf. also
Buchstaller 1999, Bickerton (ms): 2ff, Sankoff 1980b, Thumm 1999).
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Unframed quotes, i.e. quotes not marked by lexico-syntactic means, are highly
contextualized and rely on other means rather than graphic introducers.
Contextualization cues (Gumperz 1989, 1992), such as "a greater expressive power
of the human voice" (cf. Tannen 1986:323 for the concept of a continuum of
quotative options) indicate to the interlocutor a change in "footing" (Goffman 1981)
and open an "embedded mental space" (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996). For a
discussion of the means speakers have at their disposition in order to signal
embedding into the space "quote from same or other" and how conversely
interlocutors can interpret speech as quoted, see Fonagy (1986), Klewitz and Couper-
Kuhlen (1999) and Kvavik (1986).
While I do not have any literary evidence which would underline a claim that
unframed quotes predated even the oldest, canonical lexical quotative say, such a
scenario would typologically be conceivable and in line with the above
argumentation. For the present purposes, I will assume that unframed quotes, the first
non-canonical quotative option and variant to standard say, predates quotative go,
which is attested as early as 1791 as well as like. If we accept this scenario, we can
suppose that the feature [-canonical], present already in the form of non-lexical,
unframed quotatives, got transferred onto lexical go as it arose as another non-
traditional variant.
Figure 6.11 gives the line graph of the patterning of unframed quotatives across
numerical age.
Figure 6.11: Distribution of unframed quotes across age
Figure 6.1 1 shows, starting from the left, there is a rise in non-canonical unframed
quotes with increasing age up to the ages 26-32. After this, the frequency falls until
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we witness a steep increase until 30% in unframed quotes amongst the oldest
speakers.
This fall in vernacular variants from a certain age onwards and a sudden jump
for the over 55 year-olds has been shown to be typical for age-graded variables
(Downes 1984, Holmes 1992). The obvious tail in the graph can hence be explained
in part by the fact that as older speakers are relieved of the pressures to conform
created by the job market, vernacular forms start to creep in again. Also, in the case
of the competing (say) variants, we know that the oldest speakers do not yet have like
as a non-canonical variant at their disposition. And go seems to have been a low
frequency variant during their formative years (cf. Figure 6.6). Hence, speakers over
42 do not have any noteworthy alternative non-canonical variants in their linguistic
repertoire of quotative devices. When using vernacular quotative options, all their
non-canonical output will be unframed quotes. It is because the unframed strategy
has the competitor variants like and go amongst the younger speakers that that the
patterning of non-canonical strategies shows the highest frequencies in the oldest age
group (cf. Downes 1984: 191).
This situation of competing variants is directly derivable from the graph:
Notice the first dip in the unframed curve amongst ages 33-39. A comparison with
the go-curve (Figure 6.6) reveals that this is exactly the age-range in which go peaks.
Furthermore, from the 25% peak in the group 26-32 onwards, the ratio of unframed
quotes falls until it reaches only 11% with the youngest age group. A direct
comparison with the curves for other non-canonical quotatives, like (Figure 6.4) and
go (Figure 6.6), shows that this downwards trend is concomitant with their rise in
frequency. Consequently, there is reason to believe that the advent of like and go has
lead to the reduced frequencies for the unframed strategy that we witness amongst
those youngest speakers.
We saw earlier on that when like first reaches full force amongst the 20-35
year-olds, it takes over some of the ground of quotative go, which subsequently
drops by 3.5%. Then the like-trend gives a boost to go, which experiences a steep
rise with the youngest age group. In this group, like loses 2% but stays high. These
high frequencies of like and go combined exert pressure on the unframed variant
which sags by 14 percentage points to 11% in the youngest age group. In conclusion,
with the intrusion of 2 new members into the semantic-pragmatic field hitherto held
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by the strategy unframed alone, the old non-lexical variant has lost ground. This, as
we know, is possible due to a reallocation of the feature [-canonical] amongst the
speakers in the youngest age-groups.
The question is still open as to whether this development has implications for
say or whether the distributive reallocation is only occurring amongst the [-canonical]
variants. Overall, as Table 6.13 shows, the proportion of ray-use is significantly
higher amongst the older speakers (36% versus 47%, %2(\): 16.146, p= .000). But
this differential could be merely due to the much-cited fact that younger speakers use
more vernacular variants (like, go and unframed) whereas older speakers generally
use more standard variants. In order to see whether the frequency of say is at all
affected by the trend towards like and go, we will have to monitor ray-ratios across
age. Is there a noticeable dip in ray-frequencies at the point in time when the new
quotative like gains full speed? Or is there one when go starts being used with
incremental frequencies by the youngest age group?
I will now contrast the patterning of non-canonical quotatives as a sum of go,
like and unframed combined with the distribution of say across numerical age. I have
chosen a binary depiction [+/- canonical] because it enables us to see whether
newcomer variants interact mainly within their own semantic field or whether they
have an influence on say.
If ray-frequencies across time prove to be affected, it is an easy step to find out
which of the vernacular variants show fluctuations in patterning in this particular age
bracket. If on the other hand say stays relatively unaffected, we will have to assume
that the reorganisation within the quotative pool has taken place within the
vernacular sub-set.
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Figure 6.12: Contrastive patterning of non-canonical and canonical (say) quotatives
across age
We can see that when we contrast [+/- canonical variants], the resultant pattern is an
x-shaped curve. As expected, vernacular variants (amongst which are the innovative
ones) are increasing with falling age whereas older speakers increasingly prefer
canonical variants. As older speakers tend to have a more conservative habitus (Guy
et al. 1986, Holmes 1992, Labov 1994, Maling 2002, Romaine 1984, Zilles 2003),
the graph shows falling ray-frequencies with decreasing age. Note also the jump in
vernacular quotatives in the oldest age-group due to age-grading (cf. Holmes 1992,
Downes 1984). The incremental frequencies can be put down to higher unframed
rates (consider Figure 6.11). But higher non-canonical rates in the oldest age bracket
do not turn out to be at the expense of say, which is only slightly reduced for the age
group 56-62 (by 4%). Other variants, which have not been considered in this
discussion, must come into the picture here.
We notice an intimate interplay between +/- canonical especially in the younger
age brackets where ray-frequencies are reacting to higher production of non-
canonical variants. Most importantly for our purposes, the say and the non-canonical
lines display a mirror patterning with say dipping at ages 26-30 and peaking during
ages 21-25. Does that have anything to do with the introduction of the new
quotatives like and go? This brings us back to the question of whether there is any
indication that incoming new variants push out canonical say. In order to answer this,
we will have to see whether the point in time at which like became vigorous in the
quotative system (from age 26 onwards, cf. Figure 6.4) or the peak in go-frequency
in the 36-41 year old and the youngest age groups (cf. Figure 6.6) corresponds to a
decline in ray-ratios.
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Let us first discuss ages 26-30. Figure 6.4 shows that like is rising to high
frequencies (while go-frequencies are low in this age bracket). But the peak in the
non-canonical curve (and corresponding dip in say-ratios) also matches up exactly
with high unframed frequencies. Hence, the low in canonical frequencies is not due
to trendy like alone. On the other hand, the high in say-frequencies occurs exactly in
the age bracket when Zz'&e-frequencies soar and go-frequencies are ascending. Pulling
these pieces of information together, we have to contend that the addition of two
variants to the quotative repertoire of the younger age groups does not have any
catastrophic effect on the say-curve. Like and go, while certainly interacting with say,
22have not intruded much into say's territory."
In the field of grammaticalisation. Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994) have
shown that sometimes newly developing forms can restrict the linguistic contexts in
which older forms persist. When we transfer this notion to variationist
sociolinguistics, we find that many accounts of quotatives include some discussion
about certain variants driving out others (Ferrara and Bell 1995) or intruding in some
other variant's space (Cukor-Avila 2002) etc. Indeed, most of the sociolinguistic
literature is concerned with the ensuing consequences for the traditional quotative,
say. Or else, the literature wonders, will like drive out quotative go? (Cukor-Avila
2002, Bakht-Rofheart 2002, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). In Chapter 3 of this
thesis, I have given linguistic evidence that an expulsion scenario is rather unlikely
given the functional equilibrium of all members of the (say) variable. Now we see
that on the social plane as well there is interaction but not expulsion. Earlier in this
chapter, I showed that far from driving out quotative go, like seems to have given it
fuel amongst the youngest generation. Rather, there is evidence that it is the third
non-canonical variant, unframed quotes, which covered some of the ground now held
by like and go. Indeed, looking at Figure 6.11, we noticed a dip in the unframed-
curve during the age range where go peaks and a fall just at the time when the new
vigorous change in progress, like, reached an all-time high of 20%. I have not yet
22 When we compare the deviations of the say-curve with a perfect falling line (the broken line), we
notice that the say-patterning deviates only slightly from it. Hence, even if like and go's peaks alone
were responsible for the dips in the say-curve, their influence is minor and does not exceed 8% (in 26-
30).
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come across any study that considered this possibility of a restructuring amongst the
non-canonical set.
Also, we found that the advent of the new quotatives has not had any major
impact on the traditional quotative say. Fully in tune with the much cited fact that
younger speakers have a less conservative system, like and go have taken away some
of say's ground in the youngest age frame. But it appears that go and like are the
major competitors for unframed quotes. As younger speakers' choice of variants is
wider than the older speakers', there are potentially three strategies that can divide
their [-canonical] quotative category, which was occupied by unframed quotes alone
before the arrival of go and like 23 With the introduction of two new members into
this semantic space, the balance amongst the quotative options which inhabit this
space is in the process of restructuring. We do not expect the variant unframed to be
pushed out of the system, though (as alluded to in Tagliamonte and Hudson 1995).
As the only non-lexical option, it bears stylistic options that cannot be fulfilled by
either go or like, amongst which are the non-allocation to a speaker role, the non-
determinateness with respect to time, and the closer proximity of message and
quotation (Yule and Mathis 1992).
In conclusion, it is only when we look at the quotative system as a whole that
we see the intimate interplay of the competing variants with one another. In the US
system, we have seen that far from ousting the unframed or say-variant, like and go
add options within the vernacular category. The next few sections will show whether
this finding can be extended to British English.
23 Note that this is obviously not the case for any individual speaker.
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6.5 British English
The following paragraphs investigate the (say) variable in British English. The
data for this investigation was collected in 1994 in Derby and in 1994/5 in Newcastle.
It will be shown that the social constraints operating in the quotative system that we
have found in the US are not the same in British English. Hence, it makes sense to
treat the two varieties as separate and coherent systems in their own right.
I will now discuss the possible ways in which the linguistic feature like could
have spread from the USA into the habitus of British English speakers. For UK
residents, US English is ever present, directly through interpersonal contact on
British soil or abroad, facilitated by intercontinental travel, as well as indirectly,
through the written and spoken media (interviews with stars, soap operas, music
channels such as MTV etc.). We know that many US-stars are heavy like-users, as is
exemplified by two stereotypical examples in the excerpts below:
So how long have Britney and Justin been an item? They first met years ago,
when both were cast members of the Mickey Mouse Club, "we were like 12 or
13 and it was like 'Hi do you like me?'" says Spears, smashing the existing
record for the number of likes in a sentence of 15 words or less. (The Guardian,
June 15, 2001)
You know, he actually surprised me when we first started getting to know each
other," she remembered. "He would be singing the hip-hop songs. He loves Ja
Rule, he loves Nelly, he loves Snoop. He would know all the lyrics to these
songs. He'd just start singing, and I would be like, 'What is that?' And he's like,
'That's Snoop from back in the day.' I'd be like, 'What?' (Jennifer Lopez on Ben
Affleck on MTV news, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1458399/20021029/
lopez_jennifer. jhtml?headlines=true, 29. October, 2002)
The following passage from a teen weblog, reporting on a series of "Friends",
shows that characters in the show are also perceived as being high like-users:
rachel was in labour for 47 hours [lol] and rachel and ross kissed, and phoebe
was like "why the hell aren't you two together?" and ross (...) was like "noo, i
explained it already.." and phoebs was like "right right, so who does the baby
look like?" and ross was like "are you kidding? emma is gorgeous, just like
rachel..." (source: http://qtc.blogspot.com/2002_05_12_qtc_archive.html)
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Trudgill (1983), while giving motivations as to why British celebrities should
take on US features, shows that the US variety is indeed influential on Britain's rock
stars (with respect to (t)-flapping, postvocalic (r) and other linguistic features). The
following snippets show that the British media-darlings have picked up on the like-
trend as well. The utterances are chosen from two women who we can safely assume
to be major role models for British youth when it comes to fashion and music, Ms
Dynamite and Victoria Beckham.
He listened to Boo and there are about four bars on there of me singing and he
was like "have you thought about singing?" and I was like "not a whole
song"... He told me to try writing a song, so I did. (Ms Dynamite in Interview
on BBC1, http://www.bbc.co.uk/radiol/urbannelson/ msdynamite \_
20020429.shtml
I think it is great that the fans want to see a little picture of Brooklyn so I
thought, what better way to do it than on my official site where I can control
what goes out. David has just seen the site for the first time and he was like,
"Wow that's amazing". It's very cool. (Victoria Beckham on
http://www.spicenews.com/iviews/ view91 .html)
It would seem reasonable to expect that, along with clothing style (V. Beckham:
"I think that people are really interested in how I do my hair and the clothes I wear
and how my make up artist Karin does my make-up"
(http://www.spicenews.com/iviewsiview91.html)), and aspects of behaviour, certain
features of the stars' linguistic behaviour will be mimicked by the crowd of fans.24
Within the field of linguistics, several studies recently have asked whether and,
if yes, how much effect television has on the linguistic behaviour of its consumers
(Davies 2002, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 2002, Stuart-Smith 2001, Tagliamonte and
Hudson 1999, Walters 2002). Hudson (1996) rejects the specific causal role of TV in
systemic language change, (cf. also Milroy and Milroy 1985, Trudgill 1986, 1988).25
Work by Androutsopoulos (2001), Foulkes and Docherty (2000), Strang (1970) and
Williams and Kerswill (1999) has been attributing a more important role to the media
as a probable source for change in language attitudes or spread of innovations.
24 In an interview for Remix, Ms. Dynamite shows that she takes being a role model seriously "I'm
really aware of the fact that, as a young black woman in Britain, there are not really any other black
women that are given the position that I am, where I can be conscious and speak about whatever's on
my mind", (http://remixmag.com/ar/remix_ms_dynamite/).
25 See Parameswaran's critique of the role of the mass media which, she says, is one of the "key sites"
in which ideologies of globalisation and post-colonial attitudes are "repeatedly manufactured and
distributed" (2002:312). This supports the causal role of the media in transmission of attitudes.
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Stuart-Smith (2001) reports that while studies have shown the influence of TV on
non-linguistic social behaviour (Strasburger 1995: 13, APA (1993) in McQuail (2000:
436) the evidence for the effect of the media on linguistic behaviour is inconclusive
to say the least. Stuart-Smith issues a call for a more differentiated approach to
investigating the influence of TV on systemic language change.
Most authors acknowledge that TV creates knowledge, which can contribute to
a change in attitudes. Furthermore, it can raise awareness about language varieties or
linguistic variants. Why should we assume that these new states of current knowledge
or disposition could not lead to new patterns of behaviour, in linguistics as much as
elsewhere? Indeed, reports such as the one by the British Heart Foundation (2000: 4)
that "watching TV is the most popular sedentary activity for children of all ages, with
nearly three-quarters of 11-16 year-olds watching for 2 hours/day, and over a quarter
watching for more than 4 hours/day" question the claim that face-to-face interaction
is a necessary condition for the transmission of linguistic and other variables. Notice
that Trudgill (1986:40) argues against transmission via the media claiming that if the
media was so strong a factor, then the whole of Britain would be influenced by a
particular innovation simultaneously. But this is exactly the case with like, which is
attested in many varieties in the UK, in London (Andersen 1996), in York
(Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999), in Derby and Newcastle (this thesis) and in the
Shetland Isles (Scobbie, p.c.).
If adolescents spend more time watching TV than any other leisure activity
(Strasburger 1995: 2, cf. also Giddens 1997:368), it seems to be reasonable to
assume that this activity creates virtual communities such as fans of series X and Y-
buffs. This is in vein with Noble's (1975 in McQuail 2000: 406) claim that "these
[TV] characters serve as something akin to a screen community with whom the
viewer regularly talks and interacts ... this serves for many as an extended kin
grouping".
Work by Cutler (1996, 2002) shows that young hip-hop fans display their
affiliation with the hip hop culture through various stylistic choices such as clothing,
hair style, forms of walking, gesturing, etc. By copying such traits from the stars,
solidarity within the community of fans is created. Cutler's work identifies, amongst
other traits, also linguistic features (such as (r)-deletion, (t/0) and (d/5) alternation
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etc.) which are shared by the community of hip-hoppers. If it is the case that the stars
are one of the important linguistic models for rap-fans and that the fans use certain
linguistic variants as a means to affiliate themselves with the world of rap, there is
reason to assume that a variant such as like, which started being used and
consequently became associated with a prestigious social group, the world of pop
and soap stars, could be transmitted from the role models to the group of fans.
Hence, as Figure 6.13 shows, we have a two (or three) way adoption scenario
for the British public. The influence on the British public could be exerted (i) by US
movies, television series (Friends, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Sex in the City), as
well as American showbiz and glam programmes which are readily and regularly
available in the UK and (ii) directly via the UK media, and probably to a varying
extent by both.26
Figure 6.13: A possible scenario for contact-induced ///re-adoption
US public UK media
\
US media UK public
On both sides of the Atlantic, young speakers pick up features from film and music
stars and use them to perform "acts of identity"27 (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985)
signalling their adherence to groups of fans. Like was first picked up as such a
marker of in-group status by early adopters and was subsequently spread to a larger
adolescent public.
Note also the two-sided arrows between public and media. While the above
discussion has mainly been concerned with the influence of the media on the public,
26 Notice that Figure 6.13 contains a weaker coloured link between the US public and the UK public. I
assume direct face-to-face influence to be quantitatively relatively small because the main introducers
of like in the UK, speakers in their late teens and early twenties, do not usually have extensive
intercontinental contact. An investigation into the qualitative strength of such transatlantic
interpersonal ties between US and UK youth and the impact of such contacts is still to be made.
27 Le Page and Tabouret-Keller give two explanations for the adoptions of new linguistic forms: 1) the
attribution of positively evaluated traits with in-group status 2) the association of a linguistic form
with that status. Both attitudes seem to prevail when like is interpreted as Friends- and Sex in the City-
speak and is taken on board by the target group of these programmes, adolescents and young adults.
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it seems more than evident that the general public has an influence on the media in
the sense that they are "in" it. Real people are interviewed or depicted in some way
in television programmes. Also, fictional programmes try to represent "real" people.
Hence, we find a reciprocal influence between media and public. In this vein,
Foulkes and Docherty (1999) note the trend towards vernacular regional features in
the popular media: (i) pop song lyrics (Oasis, Blur, All Saints etc.) are often replete
with regional variants (ii) stars speak regional dialects in interviews and (iii)
television soaps and dramas are frequently set in lower class urban environments
(East Enders, Coronation Street, Teachers). This might have the effect of making
vernacular features more commonplace in the population as a whole, which in turn
again heightens the probability that they will be portrayed in the media and so on.
We know that by 1994 like had found its way in the use of London teenagers
(Andersen 1996). I would claim that contact with a like-variant has had the following
linguistic repercussions on British English speakers' habitus: In a situation of contact
with US English, in which the variant like is already present, the feature [- canonical]
could have been reallocated from already existing variants to a new incoming one.
Hitherto primarily carried by the unframed quotes and to a lesser extent by go, [-
canonical] is now also carried by the newcomer to the quotative frame, like. We
expect this to have happened considerably faster with British pop stars and other
early innovators. The majority of like users followed in due course. Hence, in line
with Britain's (1997, 2002) findings about the reallocation of linguistic variables in a
situation of dialect contact, I suggest that it is not unreasonable to claim that the (say)
variable in Britain could be restructured to accommodate the newcomer. The
reallocation hypothesis can help to explain the synchronic facts of like's global
diffusion: the feature [-canonical], carried hitherto by older variants only, is carried
over to the newly adopted like. As a consequence, in Britain as well, [-canonical]
quotatives now have a competitor variant, like. This section investigates how the
quotative pool reacts to like's intrusion. The following pages will give evidence of




Table 6.15 (below) shows that at the point in time of like''s introduction into the
British English quotative cohort, there is no significant gender bias. In 1994/5 we
find 5% like-use for male and 4% for female speakers.
Table 6.15: Distribution of quotatives per gender
like go say think unframed tell other SUM
% N % N % N % N % N % N % N
m. 5 42 10 86 44 383 9 75 27 238 1 11 4 37 872
f. 4 51 15 177 49 583 8 100 19 224 1 12 4 43 1190
Table 6.15 demonstrates that like in the Derby and Newcastle corpus is a trans-
gender phenomenon. This result is especially interesting given the overwhelming
preponderance with which the literature on quotatives ascribes like either to the
female or the male speaker. With respect to British varieties, Macaulay (2001) and
Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) report that like achieves higher frequencies with
female speakers.
Quotative go, on the other hand, has been around long enough to become
stratified by gender. In my corpus, go is predominantly used by female speakers
(15% versus 10% for men). This result, which is significant at the .01 level
(%2(1): 11.205), is contrary to some much-cited stereotypes. But note that these
stereotypes are reported from the US. I have not found any comment in the literature
on social stereotypes with respect to go in British English. In Buchstaller (2003) I
have shown that results from a social attitudes questionnaire and from a matched
guise test reveal that middle class British informants do not seem to have strong
stereotypes towards go.
My finding converges with Macaulay's Glasgow data (17% male versus 23%
female), as well as with Winter's (2002) results from Australia, where females
favour go, albeit working class females. Hence, quotative go, a variant which had
hitherto been associated with the feature [+male], is produced with higher
frequencies by female speakers in Derby, Newcastle, Australia and Glasgow and has
no gender effect whatsoever in my US corpus (cf. Table 6.9).
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Numerous studies have argued that women use fewer vernacular or non¬
standard variants because "females show greater sensitivity to socially evaluative
linguistic features than males" (Labov 1969/1972: 76, see also Cameron and Coates
1988, Labov 1972a, 1990, 2001, Mougeon et al. 1988, Romaine 1978, 1984, Trudgill
1983, Wolfram and Fasold 1974). Data from 3 British varieties (Derby, Newcastle,
and Glasgow) and from Australia show that such generalizations do not hold with
respect to the non-categorical members of the quotative system. Indeed, with respect
to the (say) variable, women consistently use more non-canonical variants than men
(see also Chambers 1995, Labov 1990, 2001:71). But note that the quotative system
in British English also shows that women favour more standard variants (cf. the
significant results for the use of say (men 44% and women 49%, p= .024). It seems
that the patterning of the variable cannot be explained by simply subsuming the
variants under the two headings 'standard' and 'non-standard'. A system with more
than one standard and non-standard variants calls for a more differentiated
subcategorisation of the variable. When we implement a two-way differentiation of
the system as canonical versus non-canonical and old versus new, we can state that
women use more of the old canonical variant say. But women also pick up incoming
non-canonical variants with higher probabilities. Men prefer the older [-canonical]
variant, unframed.
To give some time-depth to this investigation, Figure 6.14, below, depicts the
comparative histogram of the 2002 York data with my corpus split up by gender. As
the categories unframed and think were a matter of inconsistency, I will only discuss
the variants like, go and say in the two corpora.
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Figure 6.14: Real-time comparison between say, like, go in 1994/5 and 2001




If we compare the Derby and Newcastle corpus from 1994/5 with the York 2001
corpus, it becomes evident that while say is reducing in frequency, it is losing its
gender bias as well. In the 1994/5 data, we notice a bias towards female speakers for
the whole population (with 49% versus 44%, cf. Table 6.15) as well as for adolescent
speakers (with 32% versus 39%, cf. Figure 6.14), both of which are significant at
the .05 level. This bias levels off by 2001, where Johnson reports no statistical
significance.
Gender also plays an important role in the development of both non-canonical
quotatives. While in 1994/5 the difference between young male and female speakers
for like is only 2.2% (p=. 138), by 2001, this has grown to a significant 13%. Like
develops a gender effect. I interpret this result as an indication that like, while only
an incipient change in 1994/5 with no gender differentiation, has picked up
momentum in 2001. This finding is concurrent with Labov's (2001:186) claim that
"incipient changes ... do not have strong enough correlations with age and social
factors to be informative. A clear view of the social location of a change in progress
appears only when its age coefficient becomes significant, reflecting the fact that it is
approaching the middle section of its s-shaped curve" (see also Eckert 1989).
Moreover, Chambers (1995) points out that it is more geographical and social
mobility and access to information which determine our use of innovative features. I
will assume that during like's initial stage of entry into the British quotative system,
potentially transmitted via TV. it is available to speakers of both genders (but cf.
Nordberg and Sundgren 1998). We see from the data that in Great Britain younger
speakers of both genders acquire an incoming variant in equal numbers. It is initially
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picked up at equivalent rates. In subsequent years, this innovative feature can be
further exploited by specific subgroups and can become a stereotype or even a
marker of this group. This seems to have been the case with respect to like-use in
British English: By 2001, like is used more by young female speakers.
Note that the Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) data from 1995-6 in York
already shows a significant gender skew for the distribution of like with a lead for the
females (YARBRUL weights .67 versus .36, they unfortunately do not give any raw
numbers). Whether like has taken on the trait [+female] within the short time
between 1994/5-1995/6 (collection of my data and collection of the Tagliamonte and
Hudson York corpus) or whether these results are a case of regionally conditioned
variability remains a question. It might even be the case that like (for a reason yet to
be determined) was introduced earlier into the York variety and thus had more time
to develop a gender skew. But from my Derby and Newcastle data it seems
reasonable to assume that in its initial stages of entry, the social variant like does not
show any gender effect (which supports Labov 2001 as well as Chambers 1995).
Once like's introduction into the quotative system is vigorous by 1996 in York, it is
carried by the typical innovators, young women,
These findings show that the neutralisation of the gender bias, which Ferrara
and Bell observed for their US data over the 4-year time period of their investigation,
cannot be confirmed in the BrE corpus. On the contrary, my findings fully support
the claim made by Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999:167) that "the more diffused be
like is, the more likely it is to differentiate male and female speech". But note that
BrE like, even in 2001, is still a young phenomenon with a life-span of
approximately only 6 years, as compared to 12 years for the 1994 corpus in which
Ferrara and Bell found a levelling of the gender-bias. Initially, in 1990, 8 years after
tike's official "discovery" by Butters in the US, Ferrara and Bell, too, found a
significant gender skew in their US data. Whether the gender-bias in BrE as attested
in Figure 6.14 will level off to follow the American trajectory or whether it will
remain or even become stronger as predicted by Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) is a
matter for future investigation.
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Go, on the contrary, seems to lose its gender constraint. In 1994/5, it has an
overall gender bias (cf. Table 6.15) and is clearly favoured by the female speakers
(15% versus 21%, p = .006). A comparative examination with newer corpora shows
that the percentage gap of 6% in 1994/5 shrivels to a 2 % difference in Johnson's
data (2001). Already the Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) data from 1996 shows no
significance for gender (.46 versus .53 VARBRUL weights, not significant). Hence,
from Derby / Newcastle to the 2001 York corpus, go loses its gender effect and
increases in frequency.
The fact that go does not have any gender associations in the US data whereas
it is clearly associated with the feature [+female] in British English in 1994/5 but
later loses this gender effect proves again that social meaning is indeed arbitrarily
assigned and can be associated differently in different varieties and at different times.
At this point, it needs to be stressed that the figures given in Table 6.15 are only
the average total numbers from the Derby and Newcastle corpus. If we split the
figures up by variety (cf. Table 6.16), we can see that within Britain, different
localities show different tendencies.





While both varieties participate in the new like-trend, Table 6.16 shows that in
Newcastle, where like is overall more frequent, men as well as women are the
driving forces behind the introduction of this new quotative. Here, women are
slightly at the forefront with 8% versus 6%. Those numbers look as if they could be
an earlier stage of the Johnson (2001) and Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) statistics.
We can imagine a scenario in which the 2% difference in Newcastle in 1994/5 has
grown to 13% by 2001 (Johnson 2001).
But Derby speakers, in spite of being the later corpus and having had more time
to adopt the variant like, produce far fewer tokens of it than their Newcastle
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counterparts (N=22 versus 71).28 Derby men slightly lag behind Newcastle men (4%
versus 6%). But the Derby women, who hardly use like at all, mainly account for the
big regional difference. Indeed, while the Newcastle grid looks indicative of a
prototypical change in progress with women as the innovators and men lagging
behind (Aikio 1992, Feagin 1980, Haeri 1994, L. Milroy 1999), the Derby women do
not participate in this innovative feature. Their 1% like-usage runs clearly counter to
the many statements in the literature which point to female speakers as the principal
carriers of the recent changes in the quotative system (Ferrara and Bell 1995, Igoe,
Lamb, Gilman and Kim 1999, Johnson 2001). Rather, the Derby women in my
corpus do not participate in a supra-local innovation. While it is still a conjecture at
this point, there is a possibility that the avoidance phenomenon that Bakht-Rofheart
(2002) has detected for her Long Island teenagers could provide an explanation for
the behaviour of the young Derby women. In not using the innovation, they would
then distinguish themselves simultaneously from (i) their male counterparts, who
adopt like, (ii) as well as from other women (in their country as well as abroad) who
have been pinpointed as being the principal like-users. This finding is fully coherent
with Eckert's (1989:253) claim that "gender does not have a uniform effect on
linguistic behaviour for the community as a whole".
Now let us see whether Derby women generally do not participate in the use of
the non-canonical quotatives. The next table shows the distribution of quotative go
split up by gender for both varieties, Derby and Newcastle:





28 How much difference, if any, in the diffusion of such rapidly spreading features we would expect
from one year's difference in data collection is a matter of conjecture. However, given the speed with
which like appeared in most major varieties of English and the vigour with which it spread both across
the sociological spectrum and within the linguistic system, we cannot easily dismiss one year as
insignificant.
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In Newcastle, we witness the same effect as in Table 6.16: female speakers favour
the non-canonical quotative (by 17% versus 7%, x2(l):20.618, pc.Ol). Hence, again,
Newcastle speakers display a gender gap with women predominantly using the non-
canonical form. But in Derby, there is a roughly even frequency distribution between
men and women (13% versus 14%, not significant). Derby women are not lagging
behind as with like, but they still do not produce (significantly) more of the
vernacular variant. Thus, while Table 6.17 shows that overall women use go more
frequently than men in British English, we now see again that the distribution by
gender is also conditioned by locality: while Newcastle women are in the lead for
both variants, Derby shows no significant gender-effect because conservative female
ratios and high male production cause their output to meet in the statistical middle.
Let us now reconsider Foulkes and Docherty's (1999) claim that female
speakers use more supra-local forms. Indeed, the above presented data shows that go
is favoured by women of all ages, in Derby (albeit with a slim margin) as well as in
Newcastle. Go is also a supra-local form. It is noted in London English (Andersen
1997), in Glasgow English (Macaulay 2001), in Edinburgh (Miller and Weinert 1995)
and multiple other varieties of English (US English, Tannen 1986, Tagliamonte and
Hudson 1999, Australian English, Winter 2002). Thus, in line with Foulkes and
Docherty, women in my data from 1994/5 favour this global variant, across all
classes (see below) and in both varieties.
But we also find that quotative like, another supra-local form, does not yet have
any gender effect in 1994/5. But an investigation in real time demonstrates that it
rapidly acquires a significant gender-differential with women in the lead. A split up
by variety showed that Newcastle women are in tune with Foulkes and Docherty's
generalisation. The fact that Derby women do not participate in the innovation in
1994/5 might be due to an avoidance behaviour (cf. above).
But note that the category supra-local vernacular forms also includes bald
unframed quotations. Table 6.15 shows the great difference in frequency differential
with which male speakers prefer this option (27% male versus 19% female, p=0.000,
X2(l):20.371). This result certainly runs counter to Foulkes and Docherty's claim.
However, as the hypothesis was borne out with respect to supra-local vernacular
variants which have a surface form, we could restate it as follows: amongst the (say)
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variants, women favour supra-local variants that have a surface form. The null
variant behaves differently.
6.5.2. Socio-economic Class
Most of the literature on the new quotatives discusses data from one social
sphere only, the middle class. In the three large-scale studies on southern British
English so far, Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) only consider middle class speakers.
Johnston (2001) does not mention socio-economic standing at all. Only Macaulay's
(2001) investigation in Glasgow includes class as a social variable. Speakers are
"drawn from two areas of the city, representing broadly urban working-class and
suburban middle-class areas" (2001:7). Macaulay's figures show that in Glasgow
9Q
Scots, like is a middle class feature (with an approximate 13% lead)" , whereas go is
more a working class feature (with a lead of roughly 10%). I will now investigate the
Derby and Newcastle corpus in the light of the social stratification within the
quotative system. Table 6.18 gives an overall break-down of the patterning of all
quotative strategies in the data according to class.
Table 6.18: Distribution of quotative strategies according to class
like go say think unframed tell other SUM





















Table 6.18 shows that like is used by speakers of both social categories to the same
degree (with 4% and 5%, n.s.). This finding is sustained by a break-down according
to locality (Derby working class 2%, middle class 2%; Newcastle working class 7%,
middle class 8%). But notice that it is in contrast to Macaulay's Scottish speakers,
where like is clearly a middle class feature. It also runs counter to the many reports of
US English according to which like is carried by middle class speakers. Note again
that this result is consistent with Labov's (2001) findings on incipient changes. Given
like's budding stage in the British English corpus, we would have expected social
non-distinctiveness, which we indeed see here as well as in Table 6.15. Recall that in
29 No exact numbers were available in Macaulay's article. I therefore had to estimate the frequencies
from the tables he gives.
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my US data, where like had been around for at least 7 years by the time of data
collection, it patterns according to class. Whether like in Southern British English
develops a class effect in parallel with a gender-bias - which more recent corpora
have found it to acquire - and whether it will subsequently match the stratification
found by Macaulay for Glasgow Scots is a matter for future investigation.
Quotative go, contrary to most findings in the literature and notwithstanding
stereotypes on both sides of the Atlantic (cf. Buchstaller 2003) is a middle class
feature in Derby and Newcastle (16 % versus 10 %, %2(1): 17.835, pc.001). This
result is again confirmed by its stability across varieties: In both the Derby and the
Newcastle data we find a clear predilection for go amongst the middle class speakers
(17% and 15% versus 10% and 11% respectively). Note that this result again runs
counter to Macaulay's findings for Glaswegian speakers, where it is unanimously a
working class feature.
The frequency patterning of say looks very much the same in both social strata
(48% and 46%). The results for think seem to confirm the age-old stereotype of
middle class thinkers; it is used less by the working class speakers (7%) and by more
by the middle class speakers (10% of the time). However, the question needs to be
raised of how much we can build on an average 4% difference, even if the difference
does show statistical significance with p= .01 and x2(l): 10.98 (note in this respect
also that, in the US, we do not find any difference in think-frequencies).
Table 6.18 clearly shows that the non-lexical quotative, unframed quotes, is a
strategy of working class speakers, who use it 25% of the time (as opposed to only
19% for middle class speakers, y2{\): 13.876, p< .001). Hence, when wanting to
quote non-canonically, while the middle class reverts to go, the working class
chooses unframed quotes as the vernacular strategy.
The broader effects given in Table 6.18 will now be explored in more detail in
a cross-categorisation of the category class with the orthogonal factor gender.
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 depict a cross-correlation of class and gender for the quotatives
like and go:
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Figure 6.15: Distribution of go across Figure 6.16: Distribution of like across
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Let me first discuss quotative go (Figure 6.15). In the Derby/Newcastle corpus, at the
intersection of class, the gender effect for go remains constant. Following earlier
studies that have shown the patterned relationship between gender and linguistic
variables (Cameron and Coates 1988:13, Chambers 1995:112, Gal 1980, Holmquist
1988), the recent sociolinguistic literature has pointed out that any generalising
claims about the link between gender and use of language features are highly
problematic (Holmes and Meyerhoff 2003, Labov 2001:265 et passim, Romaine
2003). Linguistic behaviour, just as any kind of social behaviour, needs to be situated
in the local contexts and the history of the speech community in which the data is
gathered (Eckert and McConnet-Ginet 2003, Fader forthcoming, Milroy, Milroy and
Hartley 1994).
In the Derby and Newcastle data, we find that gender by no means has a
uniform effect on the output of the new quotatives (cf. also the US data). Figure 6.15
shows that women use higher ratios of go in both classes. And the highest ratios of
non-canonical go are produced by female middle class speakers. Note also that,
contrary to the much-cited trend (L. Milroy 1980, cf. also Chambers 1995: 128 et
passim) whereby less closely-knit networks for the middle classes lead to a
weakening of effects on linguistic variables, in the Derby and Newcastle data the
frequency difference for go is highly significant for the middle class (p< .01) but not
for the working class (p= .763). Overall, the distribution of quotative go has shown
that it does not conform to the general patterning outlined for stable situations by
Labov (2001), whereby stigmatised features are mostly carried by lower class,
younger and male speakers. Rather, in Derby and Newcastle, go is mainly used by
younger speakers of both genders, by mainly middle class speakers and most of all
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by middle class women.30 An investigation into lay perceptions of this variant
(Buchstaller 2003) has also shown that, contrary to many claims in the literature
which were based on US informants, there are no strong attitudes attached to go in
the UK.
But notice that it is like, the innovative variant, which is characteristic of young
working class men's speech. This is in accordance with Chambers (1995) and
Trudgill's (1980:97-8) claim that "changes away from the prestige norm...will have
working class (..) men in the vanguard". Table 6.18 has given evidence that we do
not have a stable class effect. Table 6.15 has revealed that there is no stable gender
effect either. A deconstruction of the overall figures for like by the two orthogonal
factors shows that its distribution is the result of its complementary distribution
across gender and class. In like-use, working class women lag behind the
corresponding males and middle class men lag behind their female counterparts (with
3.06% and 2.57% difference respectively). But while the working class difference
still achieves significance with p= .017 (%2(1): 5.477) (cf. L. Milroy 1980), the
middle class slightly misses the cut-off point with (x2(l): 2.792, p= .084). Note that
this pattern, a change carried by working class men and middle class women, is
exactly opposite to the pattern detected by Labov (2001) for changes that are well
underway. Here, working class men and middle class women fall behind. Note also
that the overall trend summarised by Foulkes and Docherty (1999) cannot account
for like's social reality: In the case of like, a situation of incipient language change,
working class men (6.22%) and middle class women (5.88%) are the primary
innovating forces.
In the case of the (say) variable, the use of the newest variant like and the old,
canonical say are not stratified by class. Like's non-significant patterning can be
accounted for by the fact that it so new (Labov 2001). The social stability of say, as
the most unmarked, neutral run-of-the-mill quote introductory item is not surprising
either. Rather, the situation presents itself such that the quotatives that do show social
stratification, go and unframed quotes, revolve around the stable axis of say. Middle
30 A comparison with Macaulay's (2001) Glasgow data shows that also further north, we cannot speak
of go as a working class phenomenon generally. In Glaswegian English, go is primarily produced by
the middle class boys (43%) followed by the working class girls with still roughly 29%.
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class speakers use more non-canonical go whereas working class speakers use more
unframed quotes. This, again, points to the usefulness of the reallocation principle in
explaining synchronic facts: while working class speakers use primarily unframed
quotes as the [-canonical] quotative, middle class speakers revert to go. The
underlying feature stays the same, the surface output looks different according to
class.
6.5.3. Age
We know that by 1993, like has found its way into the speech of London
teenagers because Andersen (1996) points it out in the COLT. Having looked at the
rest of the British National Corpus (BNC), I can safely state that I find zero tokens of
full quotative like in British English before 1993 (cf. Chapter 4 for the discussion of
ambiguous cases). Hence, we are in the position to claim with relative certainty that
my data represents the very point in time when like was first introduced into the
British quotative system. Looking at the data in apparent time, we expect to find a
frequency distribution that shows this change in progress.
My data from 1994/5 gives time depth to the York studies of 1996 and 2001.
We are thus given the chance to investigate the real time development of the
restructuring of the British quotative system as a whole. In contrast to trend studies
such as Trudgill (1988), which add a more recent time slice to an existing apparent-
time study, this study proceeds in the opposite direction and adds an earlier time slice,
the 1994/5 data, to the 1996 and 2001 corpora. This methodology gives us the chance
to catch a variant in its incipient stage and to monitor its further interaction with
other members of the quotative pool at 11994.1996=1 and 0994.2001=6 years.
Quotative go, far from new, has been around as a variant for centuries. The
section on US English has provided some interesting results with respect to go's
patterning across real and apparent time. I will now compare these findings whith the
British English data.
Consider first Table 6.19 below for an overall distribution of the (say) variable.
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Table 6.19: Distribution of quotatives per age-group
like go say think unframed tell other SUM



















Looking at like's patterning, two things already mentioned come to mind: the older
speakers do not seem to use like at all (1% occurrence versus 7% for the younger
speakers, %2(1): 43.288, p< .001). Notice also that like accounts for only a small
number of the whole cohort (7% and 1%, overall 4.5%). This can be explained by its
short age at the time of recording (cf. 8% in Australian English in 1997-99 as
reported by Winter 2002). This result further confirms my earlier claim that the
Derby and Newcastle corpora (1994/5) reflect the point in time at which like
emerged in the inventory of BrE quotatives. But we know from comparison with
more recent corpora that it has picked up speed within only a few years.
Figure 6.17 plots quotative production in different time slices. We get an
approximate idea of like's real-time spread in frequency from my 1994/5 Derby and
Newcastle corpus to Tagliamonte and Hudson's (1999) and Johnson's (2001) data
from York. In order to achieve general comparability, I have singled out the youngest
31
age groups in the data."
Figure 6.17: Comparison of younger speakers' production of quotatives in
1994/5 (Derby and Newcastle), and 1996 and 2001 (York)
31 The Tagliamonte and Hudson (1999) corpus was taken from young university students only, the
social group that has been pointed out as being the heaviest like-users. Johnson's (2001) corpus
consisted of only 30% older speakers.
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We notice a rapid numerical increase for like. From 7% in 1994/5 its frequency of
occurrence rises to 18% in 1996 and furthermore to 20% in 2001. Quotative go, on
the other hand, stays relatively stable across these 5 years of comparative evidence
with a slight rise in frequencies during the last interval.
A comparison with Table 6.19 reveals that say is still overall the most frequent
quotative in 1994/5. While it occurs 36% of the time with the youngest speakers (for
similar results see Cameron 1998, Ferrara and Bell 1995, Johnson 2001, Tannen
1986), it makes up 67% of the older speakers' quotative repertoire. But Figure 6.17
shows that amongst the youngest speakers, say-frequencies shrink from 36% to 31%
in 1996 and further to only 23% by 2001. By that time, say-frequency levels out with
that of like, go and think. I will discuss this fall in say-use later.
Note also the differential output of unframed quotes in Figure 6.17. Unframed
quotes account for 15% fewer tokens in the 1996 York corpus than in the 1994/5
32
Derby and Newcastle corpus" in spite of the one-year difference - and they show
even lower frequencies in 2001 in York. This could be due to a rapid decline in the
older, non-lexical non-canonical option as //kc-frequencies rise (via reallocation).
But a comparison with other corpora points to another possible conclusion: The
unframed variant was noted independently by Mathis and Yule (1994), Cameron
(1998), Tannen (1986) and Winter (2002) for their US English, Puerto Rican Spanish,
Greek, and Australian English corpora. In all these data sets, freestanding quotes
account for roughly comparable numbers, between 26% and 18%. Tagliamonte and
Hudson (1999) also found 20% unframed quotes in their Canadian English corpus, cf.
also Tagliamonte and D'Arcy to appear. It seems that a frequency-count of roughly
20% unframed quotes is cross-varietally the norm and that the two York corpora, for
whatever reason, behave differently. The differential unframed output could be seen
as an indication that the dialectal difference between York and other varieties is quite
extensive with respect to unframed quotes, a function of different narrative styles
(Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). Alternatively, the numerical differences could be a
function of different coding criteria in the two York studies, viz. what counts as an
32 In order to ensure consistency of coding, I have compared the frequency distribution across varieties.
My results are validated by the fact that there are equal ratios in the two regional varieties of my
corpus, 20.7% in Newcastle and 18.6% in Derby, which puts them into the normal distribution that
has been attested cross-linguistically.
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unframed quote. Chapter 2 lays out in detail how I define unframed quote for this
investigation.
The different proportion of unframed quotes in my data versus the York
corpora skews the investigation and makes comparison harder. But note that another
factor which complicates comparative evaluation is the much higher frequency of
think in the York corpora. As I have outlined in earlier sections (Chapter 2), think-
framed quotes are often ambiguous with respect to their status as quotes. As an
inclusion of large numbers of indirect think-framed quotes would significantly skew
results, I have consequently excluded all tokens of ambiguous think. I can only
speculate that an explanation for the different think-ratios in my corpus and the other
two York corpora might be that the York corpora applied different criteria for the
inclusion of this category in the data.
These numerical inconsistencies might threaten the claim of comparability of
the two data-sets. But a closer look at the table shows that if we combine the
frequencies of think and unframed quotes across the corpora, we arrive at
approximately equivalent values: 31% in 1994/5, 28% in 1996 and 27% in 2001.
Hence, the total remainder of variants is constant across corpora. This numerical
stability ensures comparability with respect to like, go and say frequencies within the
quotative system.
To sum up results for the variants like, go and say. ///^-frequencies
monotonically increase with time, whereas say-frequencies decrease from 36% to
31% and 23%. Go stays remarkably stable through time with 19%, 18% and 22%
respectively. Given the fact that go is an old variant, we would not expect otherwise,
unless it is currently spreading. I will discuss the interaction amongst the non-
canonical variants in more detail below.
The following table investigates further the like-spread across real time: Figure
6.18 plots the 1994/5 Derby and Newcastle data (D/N) against Johnson's 2001 York
data and the data from Ferrara and Bell's (1995) 1990 Texas corpus.
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Figure 6.18: Distribution of like among young and old speakers














Within British English, //^-frequencies amongst younger speakers spread by 13
33
percentage points from Derby/Newcastle to York by 2001. " They now parallel the
distribution found by Ferrara and Bell (1995) in US English, where in 1990 an
average of 22.78% of all quotatives were like (29% of the young females' quotatives
and 15% of the young males'). Hence, like-ratios have achieved a roughly
comparable frequency distribution in Texas, at least 8 years after like intruded into
the US (say) variable, and in York 7 years after like was first noticed in British
English. This result seems to indicate that like is spreading faster in Great Britain.
This might be a function of the fact that British English speakers perceive already
high ratios in the US variety and model their behaviour towards these frequencies.
Note also that in all three corpora older speakers do not participate in this innovative
feature. The fact that the Derby/Newcastle corpus shows a 0.4% frequency of like for
the older speakers and the other corpora do not might stem from the fact that the
borderline of what counts as "old" is quite low in Derby/Newcastle (over 38) in
comparison to Texas (40+) and especially York (over 70). The speakers over 40 in
my corpus produce 3 tokens out of 691 quotatives.
Like's frequency distribution and patterning in real time point to a change in
progress. But splitting up speakers into only two age-groups entails the loss of an
important amount of information. What about the spread of like's distribution across
those age-groups? Where does like peak? Only if we ask these questions can we find
33 Note that this result is paralleled by Macaulay's findings for Glasgow (2001:11). In a 1997 corpus
he found 21.5% like use for younger speakers in contrast to only 0.2% for the older ones. The exact
date when like was introduced into Scottish English is not certain. In any case. Miller and Weinert
(1995) show that there is no attestation of quotative like before 1980.
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out whether the initial split-up that was imposed upon the data actually makes sense
in the investigation of this particular feature. A division of speakers by chronological
age will provide insights into the patterning of this innovative feature across apparent
time. We can now check for a monotonic relationship between age and like-use.
When looking at the scattergram in Figure 6.19, which depicts like-frequency
per numerical age bracket, we have to consider the sampling method used for the
British English data (as described in the data section in Chapter 2). Speaker selection
was done so that the break-down by age results in a bi-polar speaker clustering with
relatively few speakers between ages 28-45.
Figure 6.19: Like-ratio use per chronological age
1 O 20 30 40 50 60 "***-•— 70 SO
Figure 6.19 shows a clear clustering of high like-ratios in younger years (between
age 18 and 28). From then onwards we notice an abrupt fall towards older speakers.
The r ratio of 0.029 means that 3% of like's variance can be explained by numerical
years. However, the slope of the regression line does not fall as steeply as one might
have expected given the many zero tokens from the age of 38 onwards (r= -0.108).
This is because of one surprisingly high like-ratio at age 57 (with 5% frequency).
Otherwise, we notice zero-values from age 26 onwards (not considering a 2.2% at
age 46 and a 0.6% frequency at age 62, which should not be disturbing given their
values close to the regression line). When investigating the source of the 5% like-
ratio at age 57, it becomes apparent that it stems from one speaker who produced
only 20 tokens, one of which was like. Calculated with such a low denominator, this
singleton token of like sticks out. Notice in contrast the consistency of zero tokens in
neighbouring age-groups in spite of high token numbers overall (E(all verbs)ages5o+=
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550). When we exclude the outlier and group like-use in several age-brackets in
which like-ratios average out, Figure 6.20 ensues:
Figure 6.20: Distribution of like per chronological age by brackets.
The line graph with a consistent downwards slope is typical for an apparent-time
pattern representing a change in progress (see also McMahon 1994 and for a variety
of sound changes consider Labov 1994, 2001). As we have seen for the US data, the
innovative feature like peaks in adolescence (cf. Cedergren 1973, Eckert 2000,
Labov 2001). From the highest point of the curve, the 17-19 age-group (with 7%),
we notice a steep fall towards older speakers. Like-frequencies sag to an intermediate
4% among the 20-26 year olds and subsequently to frequencies below 1%. Overall,
the graph shows a consistent demarcation by age. Note in this respect that Blyth et al.
(1990) found that nobody over 39 used like in the US. Singler (2001) found what he
calls the temporal isogloss separating speakers age 27-33 from speakers age 36-42.
Younger speakers, in my data under the age of 27, use the incipient variant whereas
everyone above this age-limit - with the exception of 3 speakers who each produce
one like-token - stays unaffected by the new form. Hence, given the assured
innovativeness of the feature like, we can safely affirm that the pattern across age
gives evidence of a change in progress.
Because of its novelty, we might want to check for tike's distribution across
varieties. If both Derby and Newcastle show the above bias, we have reason to claim
that we are already looking at a general tendency in 1994/5. Consider Table 6.20.
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Indeed, the like-trend in British English is confirmed by both Derby and Newcastle:
like-use is restricted to the younger speakers. While Derby is lagging behind
(consider Table 6.16), it is evident that all of the few tokens produced come from
young speakers. In Newcastle, like is already more advanced. The quotative pool of
younger speakers consists of almost 10% like. The older speakers' quotative system
contains slightly less than one percent of the variant, which can be accounted for by
borrowing from the younger generation. Cross-generational borrowing has been
pointed out for phonological items by Labov (1994), and for music and fashion by
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955). In conclusion, like's distributive evidence in both
varieties points independently to a patterning according to age. It also shows that the
advent of newcomer like in 1994/5 is a supra-local trend in British English.
One possible scenario is that British English speakers first react to the non-
canonical innovation like with a higher production of variants which have the same
underlying [-canonical] feature while still being reluctant to adopt the surface item.
Only in a further step do they adopt the lexical variant and reallocate the feature [-
canonical] within their own system from the old variants to the new variant like. We
would expect such a development to have left its imprints on the distribution of
unframed and go-framed quotes in apparent time. In the following paragraphs, I will
discuss the patterning of unframed, like, go, and canonical say across age. Other
questions that have to be answered are the following: does go stay stagnant while like
is being introduced into the quotative pool? Do we have a balance in total number of
non-canonical quoting devices or does newcomer like intrude in say's traditional
territory?
The following paragraphs discuss the distribution of go. Table 6.19 has
shown that the younger generation uses go (19% of the time), whereas for older
speakers it accounts for only 2% of the quotative system. This is the strongest age-
effect in the distribution of the whole quotative system and unsurprisingly very
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significant (%2( 1): 120.383). The age-gap persists across both varieties (young Derby=
21%, youngNewcastie =17% versus oldoerby = 1% and oldNewcastie = 3%) as well as
across gender (young men = 15%, young women = 21%, old men = 2%, old women=
2%).
A cross-correlation with class reveals that young middle class women lead
the way (with 25%). This is in accordance with Ferrara and Bell's (1995) finding that
"upwardly mobile young females - the very group reported in studies on gender to
have a high level of awareness of socially correct norms of language use college-
aged females are advancing nonstandard forms". Young middle class men also have
high go ratios, albeit to a lesser degree (18%). The third highest frequencies are
produced by the working class men (with 13%). Hence, go in Derby and Newcastle
is carried by younger speakers of both genders, mainly middle class speakers and
most of all by the young middle class women.
Go's early attestation (OED, 1791) rules out the interpretation of its
distribution as a change in progress (contrary claims about go's newcomer status
such as Macaulay 2001). The question arises as to why, if this quotative has been
around for a while, do we see such a huge age effect? The following paragraphs will
discuss the patterning of go in my data with respect to various possible scenarios. Go
could show an age graded pattern - note that an apparent time investigation in the US
did not yield conclusive evidence as frequencies showed no "tail". At the same time,
we might witness the revitalization of an old, stable variant, which is variably spread
across the population. Recall in this vein the US data where I argued that quotative
go started to extend due to the impetus given by the advent of another non-canonical
quotative, like. Alternatively, some researchers have claimed that go could be pushed
out of the quotative system by newcomer like (Bakht-Rofheart 2002, Cukor-Avila
2002, Ferrara and Bell 1995) In this case, we would witness a dip in go-production
from the intrusion of like into the (say) variable onwards. The following paragraphs
discuss the data with respect to those competing hypotheses (age-graded, higher
frequencies for the youngest speakers, like pushing out go) in real and apparent time.
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The York corpora (cf. Figure 6.17) add later time-slices to the investigation.
While overall, go-frequencies stay remarkably stable, we notice a slightly higher go-
ratio both with the younger and with the older speakers in 2001 in York (19% (young)
and 2% (old) in 1994/5 in Derby/Newcastle versus 22% (young) and 6% (old) in
2001 in York).34 While, again, comparisons across regions have to be taken with a
grain of salt, this 3% and 4% differential over 6 years could give grounds for the
assumption that go, profiting from the drive of the new quotative like, is also gaining
in frequency. A fine-differentiation of the category age can reveal go-use across time.
The scatterplot in Figure 6.21 displays go's patterning in apparent time.
Figure 6.21: Distribution of go by chronological age
We notice a general association between go-production and age. Falling frequencies
correlate with increasing age (r2= .073, p< .01, r= -0.296). But the scattergram shows
that this is not the whole picture. Go-ratios cluster as bi-modal with a peak around
age 17 and a later, more diffuse, secondary peak amongst the oldest age-groups. In
order to smooth out the scatterplot, I have reduced scalar numerical age into 7 age-
groups, which brings out the age curve better. Consider Figure 6.22:
34
Judging from Macaulay's (2001) Glasgow data, it seems that Scottish English has a higher go-ratio
overall with 25% for the young speakers versus 11% for the older speakers in 1997.
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Figure 6.22: Distribution of go-frequency by chronological age35
Go's patterning as represented in the above graph is as follows: it peaks in the age-
group 16-17 at 22.55%. We notice a swift fall for younger as well as for older
speakers. The downwards trend with increasing numerical age is continued in the age
group 30-50 with only 1.15%. After this steadily falling curve through the ages, go
finally rises again among speakers aged 51-61, 62-79 and increases to 2.88% in the
oldest age group. Note in contrast go's patterning in the US, where we did not have
any such 'tail' for the higher age groups. I will now discuss the patterning of go in
the UK in light of the discussion in Chapter 6.4.3.
As we know, go has been attested in British English for centuries and,
according to native speakers' judgments, has been above the level of awareness for a
long time. Perception data seems to speak in favour of an age graded status of go:
The typical reaction of middle aged people is illustrated by our computer support
person Michael Bennett's comment (p.c.) "reminds me of my youth". Note also the
following posting on a web discussion group:
"Subject: Re: 'Stereotype' thread - evolved: ... I knew a (then) girl who spoke
the exact same way, "he goes, she goes," back in the late 70s, and who endured
much harassment for it from her elders. She grew up to use language just fine,
and is now a professional writer of excellent quality"
(http://www.raycomm.com/techwhirl/ archives/0011/ techwhirl-0011-
00530.html, January 24th, 2004).
35 Note that the speaker sampling amongst the older speakers is sufficiently spread (consider
Appendix 1). There are zero speakers in the age-brackets 29-38, 40-44, 51-54 as well as for the ages
47, 48, 59, 60 and so on. Those gaps in the sampling put a notable constraint on the grouping
according to age: In order to avoid empty cells, I had to keep speaker numbers in the age groups
roughly constant. Thus, comparability was the major motivating factor for splitting up numerical age
in brackets in Figure 6.23.
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Hence, it looks as if the patterning of quotative go in the UK is due to unstable
behaviour at the individual level and stable behaviour at the community level: it
seems to be relatively stably age graded. But let us first look at the patterning
amongst the younger age groups: The fact that the youngest age-group displays a
swift fall of 6.5% versus the peak at age 16-17 goes counter to the hypothesis that a
reallocation of [-canonical] from like to go could lead to incremental go-frequencies
for the youngest speakers (as it has done in the US data). Note that frequencies of the
newcomer variant like stay high for the youngest speakers but do not rise. Dipping
frequencies for go cannot therefore be due to increasing like. I will discuss the
patterning of the other contenders, unframed and say-quotes, later on.
How can we interpret the lower frequencies for go amongst the youngest
speakers? Research by Eckert (2000, 2003), Bucholtz (1996, 1999) and Thorne
(1993) has shown that the importance of the life-stage "adolescence" for the
construction and maintenance of ones personality. During this age period, which has
been termed "social hothouse" (Eckert 2000), fashion, music, substance use,
activities as well as linguistic variables are increasingly exploited and become
semiotic resources for the creation of distinction (Irvine 2001, Mendoza-Denton
1996). In the same vein, Labov (2001: 515 - 516) points out that adolescents who
enter the adult world are engaged in a struggle for status, friends, work etc. He
argues that conforming and nonconforming to societal norms are a strategy to these
ends via the linguistic channel. He then formulates the "Nonconformity Principle:
Ongoing linguistic changes are emblematic of nonconformity to established social
norms of appropriate behavior, and are generated in the social milieu that most
consistently defies those norms." (Labov 2001: 513). Consequently, we would expect
vernacular linguistic features which are important for the creation and negotiation of
identity and which signal that the speakers are distancing themselves from societal
norms to be most prominent in the mid-teen age groups. Quotative go is potentially
such a variant. Accordingly, we see the line in Figure 6.22 peak in the age group 16-
17.
How then do we explain the 3% go-differential in the younger and even the 4%
differential in the older age group in real time between 1994/5 and 2001? One
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possible explanation is that we simply cannot compare the York and the Derby
/Newcastle data.
The alternative hypothesis is that, through time, all speakers (possibly
excepting the younger ones, who primarily carry the change in progress, like),
increase their go-frequencies and thereby participate in the augmented go-ratios. We
would thereby witness a linguistic situation which is unstable at the community level;
the whole population increases its use of the variant. The underlying assumption for
this scenario is that across the whole population, the introduction of the new, [-
canonical] variant like leads to renewed interest in go. Hence, a new wave of
language change could have triggered renewed prestige for go amongst certain
sociolinguistic groups. Reallocation could then have taken place due to the fact that
go and the new, salient quotative like both carry the underlying feature [-canonical].
Go could subsequently have gained in frequency, especially with the older speakers
who, due to their more stable linguistic habitus (Chambers 1995:185, Labov 2001)
are much less likely to take on a new lexical item. But by using more of another
variant with the same underlying feature [-canonical], they still participate in the
trend without participating in the variant itself.
This hypothesis, which is supported by findings by Britain (1997) and Trudgill
(1985), shows that the concept of reallocation can be useful for situations in which
older speakers are reluctant to take on new variants but still take part in language
change by associating a feature adherent to the new variant with an item already in
their repertoire and vice versa. The high /zke-frequencies for younger speakers may
thus be mapped across time onto correspondingly higher go-frequencies for people
beyond the critical age. The reallocation hypothesis thus provides thus possible
explanation which can account for go's distribution in 1994/5, as shown in the line
graph in Figure 6.22, while still being able to project higher numbers across time, as
seen in Figure 6.17. An explanation of this type would also tie in with the discussion
in Chapter 6.4.3.
To recapitulate, in the US we do not find any evidence of a "tail", whereas
British English displays a very typical pattern for an age-graded distribution. How
we can explain the different results from British and US English with respect to go's
patterning in apparent time? One tentative conclusion to a cross-varietal description
in the spirit of Meyerhoff and Niedzielski (2003) is to consider go as both age-graded
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and changing. The patterning in apparent time depends on the window we employ
and the behaviour of individual and community at this particular moment in time.
Looking at it from within a lifetime, the frequency distribution could look like a
change in progress (US data) but from a cross-generational perspective, we would
have to assume that it is at least to some extent age-graded (cf. the British English
data). While go admittedly does exist with varying frequencies across generations,
space and time, it has nevertheless played a role within the quotative system as a
variant at the very least since the mid eighteenth century. Due to its latent presence in
the linguistic repertoire of the community, go can be picked up either by younger
speakers as a trend or by older speakers by way of reallocation.
Having discussed the two lexical non-canonical quotatives, I will now compare
their patterning with the other vernacular strategy of the (say) variable, unframed
quotes. Table 6.19 has given evidence that younger speakers in Britain highly favour
this quotative option with p=.002 (x2(l):9.657). While this result is contrary to what
we find in the US data, Cameron notes for Puerto Rican Spanish that unframed
strategies "are more closely connected to youth" (1998:70).36 Figure 6.23 gives a
line-graph of this variant's patterning across chronological age.
Figure 6.23: Distribution of unframed as a ratio by chronological age
36 Notice in this respect that both Cameron's strategies Y NP (and NP) and freestanding are subsumed
under my category unframed quotes. In Puerto Rican Spanish both are disfavoured by speakers over
20 whereas teens and preteens favour Y NP (and to a lesser extent the teens also freestanding).
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Unframed-values slowly and steadily fall from the youngest to the oldest speakers
with the only exception of a deep valley for the second youngest age group. This line
suggests that frequencies for unframed quotes ascend smoothly to ages 16-17, where
frequencies abruptly bottom out at 17.58% and then regain ground. The overall rising
trend for unframed quotes is in line with findings that younger speakers use more
vernacular variants generally. But we have to explain the incident that resulted in the
indented line in the second youngest age group.
When we compare Figure 6.23 with the corresponding graphs for like (Figure
6.19) and go (Figure 6.22), we notice that the dip for unframed quotatives is
synchronous with the peak in the other [-canonical] quotatives' frequency. The
second youngest age group reverts to new (like) and highly salient (go) as non-
canonical options. This choice of preference is to the detriment of the third choice
within the vernacular category, unframed. The youngest speakers, who have lower
frequencies for like and go, produce higher proportions of the unframed variant. It is
still to be conclusively investigated whether the high frequencies of the unframed
variant during the early teens is due to developmental reasons, due to the speakers'
early pubescent status, or whether the like-trend has triggered higher unframed
frequencies.
Even if the total differential between the ages 16-17 and the surrounding two
age groups is not fully accounted for by the comparative highs in like and go's
frequencies, it seems clear that the three non-canonical variants are interacting with
one another. In the age ranges where like and go gain ground, they intrude into the
territory of unframed quotes. When unframed quotes rise again amongst the youngest
speakers, go-frequencies fall. Again, reallocation between variants with the same
underlying feature seems a likely explanation for this intimate interplay.
It remains to be discussed how the standard quotative say patterns across age
and whether its frequency distribution shows signs of interaction with any of the non-
canonical options. Given the fact that there is a close correspondence between the
frequency patterns of all three non-canonical variants, we would not expect the
change in progress like to have much influence on the say-output. Rather, it seems
likely that like, go and unframed quotes compete with one another within their
synsemantic field, with little or no effect on say.
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Older speakers' preference for the older, standard quotative has been pointed
out by Johnson (2001), Ferrara and Bell (1999) and numerous other authors. This is
in line with general statements about the more conservative habitus of older speakers
as well as with the fact that older speakers show more resistance to adopting new
linguistic variants, such as like (Blyth et al. 1990, Singler 2001). This tendency is
underlined by my data, where the age-difference with respect to say-use is highly
significant (with ^2(1): 171.71, p< .01).
The following line graph depicts say-frequencies contrastively with the
patterning of non-canonical variants (go, like and unframed quotes combined). This
display enables us to see whether there is a direct inverse relationship between say
and non-canonical frequencies.
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Note: The broken line depicts the hypothetical perfectly monotonous fall for say across
age. The solid line shows the actual patterning with a marked disturbance in the age range
18-22, probably due to high like and go ratios in this particular bracket.
Figure 6.24 depicts - in corroboration of the discussion above - a falling line for say
with decreasing age. This fall in the canonical variant corresponds quite neatly with a
rising line for the non-canonical options. Holmes' prediction that "the use of standard
or prestige forms peaks between the ages of 30 and 55 when people experience
maximum societal pressure to conform" (1992:186) is borne out by this diagram.
Here, it is the speakers from 52-60 who produce the highest say-frequencies (cf. also
Downes 1984:191). The lines seem to exactly mirror one another (centering around
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the axis depicted by the white bar).37 The relationship between canonical/vernacular
options is directly converse.
To get back to the initial question: does the intrusion of like into the pool of
quotatives have any effect on say's patterning in British English at all? The only time
when the slope of the smoothly falling/rising lines of the converse
vernacular/canonical pair (r-coefficients say-noncanonical: -.959, p=.001) is notably
disturbed is in the age group 18-22. This is an age when like as well as go ratios are
high. But note that both curves level out after that. Rather than falling due to the
intrusion of newcomer like, say ratios recuperate and continue falling with their usual
slope for the last two age brackets. This fact underlines again that say, at the initial
stages of the introduction of like into British English, is relatively unaffected by the
• i 38
introduction of a new quotative option into the pool of quotative devices. Say-ratios
react to the corresponding peaks amongst other, noncanonical variants in 18-22 the
age-group. But Figure 6.24 shows that the differential is not even 10% (consider the
difference between the broken and the solid line). Thus, in 1994/5, the newcomer like,
while certainly interacting with canonical say, only impinges on it to a very limited
degree. As a [-canonical] quotative, like rather interacts with other options (such as
go and unframed quotes) within its synsemantic field and only minimally spread into
the ground covered by quotative say.
6.6. Conclusion
In tune with Weinreich, Labov and Herzog's (1968:188) claim that "all change
involves variability and heterogeneity", the (say) variable as a whole has reacted to
newcomers to the pool. We consequently find orderly variation in the quotative
system which can be represented as statistically significant co-variance between
linguistic variables and social predictors. Overall, the factor that plays the most
37 Note in this respect that 3 variants of the (say) variable are not taken into consideration for this
graph: think, tell and other quotatives, up to 14% overall. This leads me to conclude that the remaining
variants do not partake much in the intimate interplay between the option say and noncanonical
variants. The only time the curves do not perfectly mirror one another is in the 52-60 age bracket,
where we can consequently expect some interaction with the remaining quotative options.
38 But note in this respect Figure 17. From the later York data it seems that, over time, like does
actually intrude into the ground covered by say.
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important role is the age of the speaker. With respect to like we witness the same
trend in US and British English in both varieties, the typical line-graph of a change in
progress (Labov 1994, 2001). While go also patterns by age, diachronic information
suggests that we have to assume a more complicated picture.
But overall, the extralinguistic constraints are only moderately exciting. This
applies especially to gender (which accounts for the fact that in the literature we find
that some studies claim that like is typically male and some claim that it is typically
female) but also to class. The finding that social effects are not very robust in the
(say) variable is in tune with the studies that have investigated both intralinguistic
and extralinguistic constraints (Bell 1984, Eckert 2000, Labov 1994, Meyerhoff 1999,
2000, Preston 1991, Rickford and McNair-Knox 1996). In situations of ordered
variability the linguistic constraints are often more important than the social ones.
Accordingly, as I have shown in Chapter 3, variation at the system internal level
(hypotheticality level, priming effects, mimesis) mainly governs like's and go's
distribution. This chapter demonstrates that the effect that social factors have on the
variability of the (say) variable is only very mild.
The discussion of the (say) variable has shown that the quotative systems in US
and British English have reacted in an idiosyncratic manner to intruding like. They
constitute internally coherent, self-sustained systems with their individual constraints
and accommodate a new variant in their own system-specific ways. Consequently,
we notice that, after the introduction of a newcomer variant into a delimited set of
variants, social reallocation takes place within the respective systems, British English
as well as US English. Hence, social constraints on the (say) variable are far from
consistent across varieties. We cannot generalise social facts across the Atlantic. It is
this system-specificity which led me to treat the two varieties separately in the first
place.
Furthermore, quotative like, far from being transferred with all the social
meaning it bears in US English, seems to lead a very independent life in the UK.
Even if it has been borrowed from American English (which is, given the naturalness
of the development, only one possibility), it can only have been taken over as the
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surface item. Likes social meaning, which is by definition high context information
and arbitrarily assigned, has not been transferred from the donor variety into the
borrowing variety. Consequently, after tike's introduction into the pool of quotatives
in British English, new external, social meaning must have been attributed to it (cf.
findings reported in Johnson 2001, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999). This finding
underlines claims that the mass media is an insufficient transmission channel for the
whole variable.
It could be argued that this chapter provides comparative evidence of how the
British English system with incipient like could look in a few years' time. But firstly
such a comparative view merely presents one of a multiplicity of possible
developments the (say) variable could take. Secondly, in the light of the functional
autonomy of British English as demonstrated in Chapter 5 and the independent
patterning on the external plane demonstrated above, it is clear that the development
of the earlier US system might not necessarily be an indication of the future
development of the British English (say) variable.
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The historical precedent for competition among dialogue introducers
indicates that the arrival of a new form warrants scrutiny in order to
determine pragmatic function, processes of grammaticalization, forces of
obsolescence and social distribution. (Ferrara and Bell 1995: 269)
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Outlook
The advent of like as a variant within the (say) variable has provided an
exceptionally interesting research site. This is mainly for two reasons: (i) as Labov
(2001) has pointed out, we know relatively little about syntactic or discourse changes in
progress. The on-going transformation and refunctionalisation within the field of
quotatives offers sociolinguists the opportunity to investigate such a change in progress.
And (ii) because like intrusion imbalances the interaction amongst a range of variants
within the (say) variable. A look at the entire quotative system reveals the intimate
interplay of competing choices amongst the variants in the pool. An investigation of the
(say) variable system presents a unique opportunity to study the restructuring of a whole
system during the insertion of an innovative member.
This thesis is a variationist investigation of the rule-governed variability of
innovative features and their rival variants (say, tell, think, ci~y, ...) in order to show the
constraints which govern the quotative system as a whole. I have used a synthetic
approach in order to investigate the advent of new vernacular options within the (say)
variable under pragmatic, syntactic, discoursal, and social aspects. I have attempted to (i)
explain variation at all levels (linguistic as well as social) within the variable in order to
account for as much of the variability as possible and (ii) investigate the systematic
interrelation between all competing variants within the quotative pool. But a large-scale
quantitative study, which only considers general trends, tends to simplify many
phenomena. This is because it cannot account for the single case, which is especially
important in cases of incipient language change. Qualitative analyses on the other hand
tend to defy generalisation and often do not allow the drawing of general conclusions.
Hence, in line with Wodak and Benke (1997), I have opted for a "combination of
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methods, a multimethod approach in which different aspects of the object under
investigation are grasped by different quantitative and qualitative methods which
complement and do not exclude each other". In this present study, I have conducted a
qualitative, discourse analytic and a quantitative, variationist sociolinguistic
investigation of the pool of quotative devices.
After having defined my data and motivated my variable (Chapter 2), I first
investigated the intralinguistic factors in the quotative frame. Earlier research had
shown that quotative introducers can be used with reported speech and inner monologue.
The problem with these accounts was that the question of what constitutes speech and
what constitutes thought was not very well resolved. While most studies showed that
they were aware of the problem (Butters 1982, Ferrara and Bell 1995, Romaine and
Lange 1991, Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999, Tannen 1986) the question of how to
resolve it was not fully investigated. In this thesis, I have given an indication of how we
can fruitfully parse the epistemic continuum with respect to reported speech. I have
demonstrated that we need to define our categories before we use them and suggested a
clear contextually rooted pragmatic description of my categories. Setting up a
hypotheticality continuum, I have shown in Chapter 3 that all quotatives, including the
newcomers like and go, pattern in their own way with respect to epistemic stances. Due
to the fact that they all have their own functional niche, and by association with this
particular function, all quotative variants fulfil their specific task: say and go introduce
real occurring quotes, think and like introduce hypothetical quotes and like also
introduces situational quotes. I have also provided evidence that like is the most
indeterminate in this respect and that it parallels the non-lexical variant unframed quotes
in this functionally flexible patterning. This functional versatility might be one of the
reasons why like has become so frequent in the lect of many young speakers.
I have also presented an examination of the "delivery aspects" (Clark and Gerrig
1990) of quotative variants, their co-occurrence with inner state markers or "response
cries" (Goffman 1981), and "birds of a feather" priming effects (Scherre and Naro 1991,
1992). Overall, an investigation into the intralinguistic patterning of all quotative
variants has shown that the quotative pool has reacted to the intrusion of two incoming
items. There has been a redistribution and refunctionalisation of all quotatives as the
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new ones have come in. As a consequence, the functional load is neatly distributed
between all members of the quotative cohort.
The fact that the new quotatives pattern quite independently of the rest of the pool
underlines their functional load. Hence, I have argued that like and go are not vacuous
but indeed have their justified place amongst quotative devices. This claim can be
justified by the fact that they have taken on quite novel functions with respect to
mimetic enactments, the marking of epistemicity, speaker role demarcation etc.
Chapter 4 has provided a motivation of like and go's recent functional extension
to quotative introductory items. I have given evidence that the quotative introducers like
(Buchstaller 2001 a,b) and go (Buchstaller, in preparation) are polyfunctional and build
up a whole network of relations in conversational English. I have shown that only when
we take into account all instances of like and go, and only if we allow for the case-wise
ambiguity and multifunctionality any individual cases may display in real occurring
speech, can we attempt to give a coherent account of how the quotative function can be
linked up with other functions. I have proposed a solution to how like's (Chapter 4.3)
and go's (Chapter 4.4) synchronic functions can be conceptualized as motivated and
interrelated. Later functions, such as the quotative use, can be motivated as functional
extensions from a common core and are connected via cognitive links in a radial
structure (Lakoff 1987). These structures highlight the multifunctionality and the
overlap of the various functions associated with like and go that are evidenced in my
data. We can thus explain how transfers in the linguistic system result in newer,
conceptually connected, functions. Language can be shown to be the reflection of
conceptual manipulation.
Like and go's widespread attestation has led researchers to compare their
patterning with respect to social and linguistic factors in different places. A comparative
investigation presupposes the variants' general linguistic comparability across varieties.
However, sociolinguistics has shown in numerous studies that regionally has an impact
on language structure. It seems in order to conduct a cross-variety assessment (Chapter
5) so as to be able to answer the important question of how much we can generalise the
findings reported thus far. Do locally separate systems handle the situation in the same
way? It seems that to assume that superficial resemblance (in this case the same surface
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form) indicates overall equivalent linguistic constraints in various varieties is to run the
risk of comparing apples with oranges. I suggest that it is important to recognise that
while the underlying processes are the same, the surface output differs. Indeed, a
comparison of the relevant pragmatic and syntactic factors in two varieties of English
revealed some interesting differences in go's and like's development i.e. go occurs with
indirect quotations in British English but not in US English (cf. Butters 1980).
This kind of cross-dialectal evaluation provides an important foundation for
further research on the very nature of grammaticalisation. Is it meaningful, for instance,
to consider the grammaticalisation of like and go as quotatives in British English and
US English as constituting "the same" phenomenon? As Therese Lindstrom (p.c.)
pointed out to me, one could talk about the grammaticalisations of go and like within
English (according to variety or other sociolinguistic variables) and show what they
have in common and what differs. This would certainly have the positive effect of
making it possible to work without the simplistic notion of one grammaticalisation
channel per language while trying to search for common ground amongst different
varieties. As I noted in Chapter 5, these findings fuel discussion of the importance of a
social dimension in grammaticalisation.
Moreover, I have demonstrated that the combination of the concepts of
grammaticalisation and variationist sociolinguistics proves to be very fruitful. Not only
does it make sense to turn to grammaticalisation in the search for generally valid
principles of language change but a grammaticalisation approach can also help to define
what a sociolinguistic variant is. Chapter 5 has shown how sociolinguists can take on
board grammaticalisation as a means of assessing whether our variants generally
function within the linguistic system in the same way. Applied this way,
grammaticalisation helps ratify and rationalise our decision about whether or not a
variant is actually "the same". We can thus ascertain general comparability across
varieties, registers and other lects. In our specific case, I argued that only when we are
in a position to state functional equivalence do we have justifiable reason to claim that a
potential variant is behaving fundamentally as the same thing. And only once this
general sameness is asserted can we investigate how this variant patterns with respect to
extralinguistic or intralinguistic factors such as variety.
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Having ratified my variables in this way, I presented a systematic study of the
extralinguistic constraints on the quotative system in Chapter 6. On the basis of my data,
I examined the social constraints in the two varieties and investigated to what extent
they hold generally. In cases such as the rapid language change phenomenon like, it is
important to explore which social groups introduce the newcomer into the quotative
system in the two varieties. I have found orderly variation in the quotative system on the
social plane and have given evidence that the (say) variable has reacted to the new
addition to the pool. But while previous chapters have underlined like and go's
important intralinguistic constraints, Chapter 6 gives evidence that their extralinguistic
constraints are much less remarkable. This finding constitutes an important argument
for a synthetic approach to variationist sociolinguistics which, in explaining the
variability of the variable, takes linguistic and social factors into account. My findings
complement a growing body of research which has productively investigated the import
of linguistic factors in situations of competing grammars and which has often found
functional constraints to be much more important and robust than social factors.
Accordingly, variation at the system internal level (hypotheticality level, priming effects,
mimesis, ... ) mainly governs /ike's and go's distribution. But in order to understand the
constraints that have a bearing on a given variable as fully as possible, we need to
account for all factors, social as well as linguistic.
The question of whether like's attestation in a multiplicity of varieties constitutes
a borrowing from the US (where it was first noted) or an independent linguistic
development cannot be easily resolved. With respect to discourse marker like,
Fleischman and Yaguello write of the francophone comme, that it might "be a loan
translation of like, an independent development, or an independent development
influenced by like". On the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis, I would argue
in favour of a combinatory approach. Given the naturalness of the underlying process
(Chapter 4), the development of like's quotative function in British English and other
varieties might well have been independent. But we have to assume that the process of
like's functional extension in the UK was at least influenced by US English, a variety in
which the grammaticalisation of quotative like was attested at least seven years earlier.
288
The very social group which introduces like into the linguistic system is also the
one we can assume to be most likely to pick up a new lexical variant through soaps,
talkshows, etc. But Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that the introduction of like into
British English, while very probably sparked off or helped by its already further
advanced status in US English, does not mirror the American functional and social
trajectory. The quotative systems in US and British English have reacted in a locally
idiosyncratic manner to the intrusion of newcomer like. They constitute internally
coherent, self-sustained organisms with their individual constraints and accommodate a
new variant in their own system-specific way, on the intralinguistic as well as the
extralinguistic level.
This finding further underlines the claim that a linguistic sign consists of the
surface item, the functional value and the social value. While a surface item can get
diffused quite straightforwardly, the constraints this variant acquires once it is borrowed
are determined by two aspects:1 The first is the functional equilibrium within the
accommodating variable. Obviously, we will expect the distribution in which the system
had previously stabilised, the established allotment of older variants into functional
niches, to have a certain amount of influence on the functional reallocation that occurs
once like is introduced. The second is the social facts that have a bearing on the
accommodating system. Given the fact that the allocation of social meaning is arbitrary
and highly culture specific, we would expect an idiosyncratic local patterning of
sociolinguistic variables with respect to social constraints. The social associations which
newcomer variants acquire are a matter of convention and are attributed by the
borrowing community itself. The data presented in Chapter 6 has indeed revealed that
like's social meaning, which is by definition high context information (von Hippel
1994), has not been transferred straightforwardly from the donor variety into the
borrowing variety.
Note that this finding also further corroborates claims that the mass media is an
insufficient transmission channel for the whole variant (surface item, functional value
and social value). If like was transmitted from the USA to the UK, the social
information adherent to it in the donor variety was not taken over but seems to have
1 A third, orthogonal, factor that plays into the acquisition of functions is the criterion of naturalness,
which hinges on underlying and persistent semantic-pragmatic traits as I discussed in Chapter 4.1 will not
elaborate on this issue here.
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been re-created in the borrowing variety, as has been suggested by Meyerhoff and
Niedzielski (2002) and Buchstaller (2003). What seems to be taken over is the surface
form but not the systematic functional and social load. Far from paralleling the US
development, like on this side of the Atlantic takes on an individual profile, both social
and linguistic. The transfer of a surface form goes hand in hand with reallocation and
reappropriation in the borrowing variety.
In line with Meillet's (1926:17-18) claims that social and linguistic structure
correspond and that general changes in one are translated into changes in the other, the
data presented in this thesis show that after the introduction of a newcomer variant into
the (say) variable, social and functional reallocation takes place within the respective
systems, British English and US English. This finding has an important bearing on
research on globalisation phenomena and so-called linguistic "mega-trends"
(Buchstaller 2003, Kerswill 2003, Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 2003, Tagliamonte and
Hudson 1999, Trudgill 1983, 1994, and many others).
The findings reported in this thesis are hence important for a whole range of
reasons: the question of globalisation of innovative variants, of competition within the
same socio-pragmatic field, of functional restructuring with numerous competing
variants within one variable, the role of grammaticalisation in sociolinguistic research
and the role of extralinguistic and intralinguistic constraints.
One of the questions that remains open is the future of the quotative system, post
like. There has been lengthy speculation in the sociolinguistic literature about the
possible outcomes of this linguistic change. Will the system stabilise in its richer form?
Or, alternatively, will the advent of like drive out one of the older members of the
quotative cohort? As Ferrara and Bell (1995) have pointed out, the introduction of a
new quotative, tellan did indeed once lead to another member of the quotative complex,
cwedan, being pushed out during the Old English period (even though quoth continued
to exist in literary styles and numerous dialects until the Modern English period.). It
remains to be seen whether the introduction of like into the pool of quotatives will result
in a reduction of the set to the original number or whether the neat task-sharing within
the quotative complex will maintain its stability.
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The question remains: will like survive? Some researchers are not convinced.
Dailey-O'Cain (2000) shows that like is stigmatized by society at large. Bailey (in
Cukor-Avila 2002: 22) sees it more as a sociolectal adjustment (Chambers 1995) of
speakers who try to fit in with the latest trends in society. Others, such as Linda
Coleman, director of the Freshman Writing Program at the University of Maryland,
College Park suggest that "'like' is something young people will grow out of. Once
students establish more stable relationships, 'like' (...) will be employed less often",
(http:// www. inform, umd. edu / News / Diamondback / archives / 2002 / 09 / 16 / news
5. html). But most researchers are careful not to declare their position. For good reason
because why, if like-users sound "like an airhead" (Guy in Cukor-Avila 2003: 22) does
like pop up in most varieties around the world and maintain its grip on the quotative
system of speakers as they grow older (Singler 2001)? It has even been introduced into
the written media (Romaine and Lange 1991. Singler and Woods 2002).
There is, to date, no evidence that like will fade away. Even though the first like-
users are only in their 20s and 30s, as the generation who started the change in progress
grows older, the age limit in which like is found is continuously reported to move
upwards as well (Singler 2001). Also, from a structural point of view, the loss of like
seems highly unlikely. As one quotative option amongst many reported dialogue
introducers, like certainly has a big advantage over the traditional variants: it can be
used for internal and external speech, approximate or exact renderings, speech, sounds,
voice effects and gestures. As Ferrara (1992) has pointed out, on-line speech production
requires a multiplicity of fast choices. The flexibility of like makes it a ready-made item,
available in multifold discourse planning situations. Furthermore, Chapter 4 has given
evidence that like's quotative function is cross-linguistically sustained. The
development of an item meaning 'similar to' to an introducer of reported speech and
thought is a very natural and frequently attested process. Well stabilised through its
underlying semantic-pragmatic field, quotative like has the potential to stay.
But only a real time study can reveal whether the generation which uses like now
will continue or whether they will eventually stop using it as they grow older. Singler
(2001) is right when he points out that the trait "young" is perceptually attached to like,
which might, in the long run, lead to a stably age-graded distribution. But the last few
years have seen the rise of the phenomenon "youth culture" (Bucholtz 2000, Pujolar
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2000). Google produced 250,000 hits for the phrase "youth culture" on February 7th,
2004, as opposed to only 108.000 hits on November 17, 2003. Much more than
formerly (Eckert 2003), the formative teenage years are being seen as more than merely
a step towards adulthood but are considered as a way-of-life. Society at large has been
reifiying this age-group, fuelled by the commerical industry which has long ago
discovered its market potential. With like and go being so highly associated with youth
culture and its expression via American soaps, it remains to be seen which influence this
non-canonical [+youth] feature might exert on older speakers. It will have to be
explored whether speakers drop their likes, just as I have shown them to drop their goes,
in British English, once they have matured out of their 'Friends' and 'Sex in the City'
phase. Without real time evidence, it is impossible to tell whether like will only persist
as a fad of the generation that uses it today, whether it will result as an age-graded
feature, or whether its spread will continue. We will need data from later time slices in
order to establish whether or not age-stratified patterns of variation in the data actually
reflect a change in progress in the long term.
It is true that the comparative evidence presented in this thesis gives time-depth to
the investigation. It could be argued that US English provides an indication of how the
British English system with incipient like could look in a few years. In this case we
could treat the two corpora as an embryonic and a developed stage. We would consider
the British data as the patterning of a new quotative item at its very emergence and treat
the US data as if it was an advanced stage of British English. But in the light of the
functional autonomy of British English as demonstrated in Chapter 5 and its
independent patterning on the external plane demonstrated in Chapter 6, it is clear that
the development of the US system might not necessarily be an indication of the future
development of the British English (say) variable. Rather, British English constitutes an
independent development where like, from the very beginning, invents itself. This is
why I have treated the two systems as self-contained and hermetic entities. We would
need real-time data from the respective varieties to see how the individual systems
evolve in their own right.
Furthermore, newer quotative options were reported directly subsequent to like's
earliest attestation. Stein (1990) documents I'm sittin' there as a new quotative. Be all
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was first mentioned by Lamb, Igoe, and Gilman (1999) and has consequently been
pointed out in numerous varieties. While my data only contain very small token
numbers of this quotative (US English 1 token, British English 4 tokens), its persistence
and robustness in California led Labov to issue a general call for the investigation of
this quotative at the NWAVE in 2003. Other newcomers, ephemeral as well as longer
lived ones, are surely in the making. Indeed, it has been claimed in the literature that go
and like will be driven out in a chain-like fashion by yet newer quotatives such as be all
(Bakht-Rofheart 2002, Cukor-Avila 2002, Ferrara and Bell 1995). But only a more
recent corpus, post-^e all, can show the future composition of the quotative system after
this newest robust arrival. An exhaustive investigation of the relationships the
newcomer quotatives develop between one another in the language external and internal
plane remains a project for the future.
Finally, the results of this study bring us a step nearer to answering the
fundamental questions raised by Ferrara and Bell (1995:269): What factors cause
certain forms to prevail while others die out? Are those processes cyclic? And why, if
there is such a variety of quotatives readily available, is there a need for another
quotative?
An integrated approach such as the one presented in this thesis can provide an
answer as to why some forms prevail while others die out. An underlying semantic
pragmatic field which is cross-linguistically sustained provides an indication that
persistence is at least sustained by a highly natural underlying process. Also, if we look
at the quotative system post like, we notice that the introduction of a newcomer variant
has resulted in an important restructuring of the quotative system and that this
reorganisation produced a situation of stable and orderly variability depending on
internal as well as external factors. Such a firmly organised system, where every variant
retains its own functional and social niche, has the potential for diachronic stability.
Cukor-Avila (2003) equates the spread of like to the spread of vall outside the South. As
Tillery, Wikle and Bailey (2000) have shown, yall also fulfils important grammatical
and pragmatic functions, filling the systematic gap in the paradigm of personal
pronouns for the second person plural. But whereas yall's morphological shape mirrors
already existing forms, which gives it an easy entry path into the system, like and go do
not have any predecessors with formal similarities. Yet, Schourup (1982) for go and
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Cukor-Avila (2002) following him with like make the point that they disambiguate
indirect from direct quotes. In Chapter 3 of this thesis I have shown like and go's
functional load in a larger spectrum (with respect to mimesis, epistemic stances, speaker
disambiguation etc.). Hence, we are in a position to assert that a defined and delimited
functional niche for the variants as well as a balanced distribution within the variable
are factors that favour persistence. The absence of these factors will probably not cause
innovative forms to die out but will offer them a less accommodating environment.
As for whether such processes are cyclic, it needs to be pointed out that this study
is not diachronic. But even from a synchronic point of view, we come across a number
of attestations of newcomer variants in the quotative pool. Go as an introducer for
sounds and voice seems to have made its way into the quotative system in 1789 and has
enlarged its potential to the introduction of all quotes at some point before 1980. Dubois
(1989) mentions what she calls the "pseudoquotation" Hey which takes the form 'Hey,
she didn't really say it'. A little later, Butters first mentions like and Igoe, Kim and
Gilman draw our attention to all. Stein (1990:303) further points out I'm sitting here.
Numerous other, more short-lived innovations have surely come and gone in the
meantime without having been picked up in the literature or without having caught my
attention. While none of these introductions have led to the clear-cut ousting scenario
described by Ferrara and Bell (1995) for cwedan in Old English, we can nevertheless
conclude that the quotative frame seems to be a site for repeated innovative language
use. Below, I will argue that this is no surprise given the highly expressive genre,
narratives, in which quotations tend to occur and given the fact that quotation
constitutes highly stylised theatrical rendering of past events.
Why then is there a need for newcomer quotatives? The question can be answered
by pointing to three particularities of quotations: (i) the genre and the place in the
narrative sequence in which they tend to be found (ii) their important pragmatic status
as highly salient introducers of theatrical instances of animating others' voices and (iii)
the social profile of the most frequent users of quotation.
The most prototypical genre of occurrence of quotation, narrative, is very frequent
and largely informal, a factor which favours innovative language use. We can
furthermore assume that quotations occur at crucial points during the narrative sequence
(Labov and Waletzky 1967), where we would expect a "breakthrough into
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performance" (Hymes 1975) and where speakers expectedly talk at their most
vernacular. It is at this site that linguistic creativity is most freely exerted and that
narrators are under the most pressure to perform captivating and attention-catching
output in order to keep the narrative floor. Theatrical mimicking of others' voices bears
an enormous expressive potential. These pragmatic and discoursal factors favour the use
or creation of linguistic innovations.
Furthermore, as Nordberg (1980) has pointed out, quotation is an important
linguistic style marker for adolescents. We know that the social group who use most
quotation, and where //^-frequencies peak, adolescents, tends to exploit vernacular
linguistic features (innovative ones as well as older ones). Distancing themselves from
societal norms (Labov's 'Nonconformity Principle', 2001: 513) and engaged in the
creation and negotiation of personal style via linguistic and other ends, adolescents lead
all other age groups in innovative language use. Consequently, sociolinguistic research
has shown on numerous occasions that creative use of new variants peak in adolescence.
Hence, it should come as no surprise that adolescents have come up with and continue
to fashion ingenious new variants (like, all) for an old variable. This is all the more
expectable as the prototypical context of occurrence of the variable calls for effect and
dramatic heightening. In conclusion, the quotative frame seems to be a perfect site for
newcomer variants.
This thesis has shed some light on the social repercussions and functional
distribution of one innovative variant, like. I will now pass the ball to whichever
researcher answers to the need for an investigation of be all and other newer variants.
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Appendix 1: Sociolinguistic Information
I. Sociolinguistic Distribution in the British English data
Derby
Table 1: Matrix of Derby speakers
MC female MC male WC female WC male
old 4 4 4 4
young 4 4 4 4
Newcastle
Table 2: Matrix of Newcastle speakers
MC female MC male WC female WC male
old 4 4 4 4
young 4 4 4 4
Figure 1: Distribution of British English speakers across chronological age
8
14 20 26 32 38 44 50 56 62 68
II. Sociolinguistic distribution in the US data









Figure 2: Distribution of US speakers by year of birth
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quick, immediate connection of new turns or single units
micro-pause
short, middle pause
lengthening, according to its duration
high rise, appeal intonation
mid rise, continuing intonation
low fall, final intonation
unintelligible passage, according to its duration
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